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Abstract 
 
 This thesis attempts to illustrate the salience of the concept ‘heresy’ for 
sociologically-informed studies of religious violence and opposition by removing it 
from its traditional moorings in historical theology and applying it to two religious 
movements: second-century Christians and nineteenth-century Mormons.  Divided 
into two major sections, the study pursues its objective first by surveying available 
definitions of heresy (theological and sociological) and offering its own understanding 
of heresy as a Weberian ideal type of religious opposition.  Part One of the study 
concludes with a look at the sociology of knowledge in general and the theory of 
identity adumbrated by Hans Mol in particular, appropriating each in order to outline 
the social process whereby religious groups facing opposition come to elaborate 
complex soteriologies capable of resolving the conflict. 
 The second half of the thesis involves a close examination of early Christians 
and early Mormons, providing a detailed description of the types of social opposition 
each group faced and juxtaposing the two communities in an effort to illuminate 
unique historical patterns of social marginalisation.  Following this investigation of 
each group’s religious milieu and corresponding persecution, the study engages the 
soteriologies articulated by Irenaeus and Joseph Smith, paying particular attention to 
the connections between specific forms of opposition and the way in which espousing 
deification helped resolve such ‘heresy’.  The thesis concludes with thoughts on the 
relationship between adaptable belief systems (such as the forms of deification 
expressed by Irenaeus and Joseph Smith) and the future success of new religious 
movements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1840, Mormon believer Lorenzo Snow uttered an unforgettable couplet: 
‘As man now is, God once was; as God now is, man may be.’  Though never 
officially acknowledged as doctrinal, Mormonism’s founder Joseph Smith told Snow 
in 1843 that the idea was from God and was true.1  Many centuries earlier, a Christian 
bishop in Gaul, Irenaeus, stated that Jesus Christ became human ‘in order to make us 
what he is.’2  In this way, and separated by wide expanses of time and geography, 
both the second-century Christians and the nineteenth-century Mormons espoused 
forms of deification.  For both parties, soteriology and theological anthropology 
overlapped; the hope of salvation was not relegated to the intellect nor to the future 
but was increasingly understood as entailing individual progress in the here and now.   
 Indeed, as this thesis will argue, for both groups, an emphasis on progression 
arose out of experiences of acute persecution and social marginalisation.  Much as 
William Blake touched on this reality ‘Without contraries is no progression.’3  For, in 
encountering hostility and external agonistic influences, early Christians and 
Mormons articulated soteriologies focused on deification, soteriologies developed in a 
dialectical relationship with circumstances of opposition.4  As New Testament scholar 
Heikki Räisänen notes concerning early Christianity, one should view the first two 
centuries of doctrinal development as a ‘living, dynamic process’ in which beliefs 
                                               
1
 Gerald N. Lund, ‘Is President Lorenzo Snow’s oft-repeated Statement – “As man now is, God once 
was; as God now is, man may be” – accepted as Official Doctrine by the Church?’ Ensign 38(February 
1982), 1. 
 
2
 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, V.Preface.  English quotes from Against Heresies (hereafter, AH) are 
taken from Robert M. Grant’s Irenaeus of Lyons (London: Routledge, 1997) when available. 
Otherwise, the English translation is that of: Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (eds), Ante-
Nicene Christian Library, Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325, volumes 5 and 
9 (Edinburgh, 1868).  Additional Irenaean passages from On the Apostolic Preaching (hereafter, Dem.) 
(New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997).   
 
3
 William Blake, ‘Marriage of Heaven and Hell,’ Blake: The Complete Poems, ed. W.H. Stevenson 
(London: Longman, 1989), 105. 
 
4
 A particularly helpful term which encapsulates the specifically sociological form of opposition with 
which we are concerned is ‘agonism’.  In the pages to follow, agonism is often used to refer to conflict 
between social groups.  This is appropriate given that the original Greek ἀγών referred to the gathering 
of individuals for the purpose of competition.  Agonism, then, is applied to opposition with a 
competitive element. 
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emerged through interaction with social experiences, ‘often conflict experiences’.5  In 
the following pages we adopt this general view, applying it to early Mormonism as 
well as to Christianity in the second century.6  Maintaining a balance in the relevant 
data for both parties and framing it all with sociologically-informed theory, our study 
attempts to assay the varied circumstances and contexts of each group with an eye for 
the interface of religious opposition and evolving soteriologies.  We will come to see 
the perceived need for salvation in the midst of suffering as a mobilising and potent 
force, motivating some to embrace universalism and driving others to geographical 
and ideological isolation.  Indeed, one should not assume that the marginal social 
status of any one religious group is a matter of choice for its members; they may, and 
the Mormons are key to the thesis on this point, integrate alienation into their beliefs 
in order to benefit from that which was once understood as detrimental.  Just as Homo 
religiosus adapts to survive, so the religious collective adapts.  In the end, complex 
notions of salvation in which a form of deification is espoused may serve as one 
adaptive means of ameliorating social friction and safeguarding identity for the 
opposed group and its members. 
 In the following work, then, we explore the reason(s) behind the existence of 
seemingly similar theological anthropologies and soteriologies among quite dissimilar 
religious groups and propose the presence of an 'elective affinity' between groups 
experiencing certain types of opposition (expressed in terms of heresy) during 
formative years and soteriological schemas which account for this resistance.  As a 
heuristic tool borrowed from Max Weber, who in turn borrowed the idea from 
Goethe,7 ‘elective affinities’ refer to seemingly natural attractions between sets of 
social phenomena given specific contextual circumstances, such as the apparent 
affinity that we will highlight between certain religious groups and certain belief 
                                               
5
 Heikki Räisänen,  The Rise of Christian Beliefs: The Thought World of Early Christians 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 5. 
 
6
 We define ‘early’ Mormonism as the period of Joseph Smith’s leadership, from the founding of the 
movement in 1830 to Smith’s assassination in 1844. 
 
7
 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Die Wahlverwandtschaften [The Elective Affinities] (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1971); Torbern Olof Bergman, A Dissertation on Elective Attractions (London: J. Murray, 
1785).  Goethe, of course, adopted the term from Bergman, a Swedish chemist noted for his exhaustive 
charting of chemical affinities. 
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systems.8  The chief and driving questions of this study arose as a result of a previous 
theological analysis of the distinctive types of deification promulgated by Irenaeus 
and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS).9  Whilst that previous 
comparison emphasised the disparity between these two forms of deification it also 
engendered additional queries that are easily summarised in question form.  So, 
though the two parties are ultimately expressing different beliefs, why do they exhibit 
any similarities at all?  Why would any religious group, particularly any strand or 
derivative of Christianity, come to believe in deification?  Having already explored 
the similarities and differences between the two systems in terms of theological and 
philosophical claims, it became evident that these unanswered questions were 
essentially social-scientific in nature.   
 
Method and Approach 
 Consequently, in order to investigate the apparent affinity between groups 
experiencing opposition in their early stages of development and soteriologies 
involving deification, this study adopts an approach from the sociology of religion, as 
a discipline that attempts to reveal and explain observable social patterns manifested 
in religious phenomena.  Such patterns may appear cross-culturally as well as during 
different historical eras.  For example, the threat of social subversion and similar 
experiences of localised persecution that link second-century Christians with early 
Mormons also surface in the account of seventeenth-century Quakers in 
Massachusetts.  In an insightful application of the sociology of deviance, Kai Erikson, 
for example, highlights the manner by which those Quakers lost identity and 
enthusiasm as a result of England’s successful suppression of Puritan violence against 
Quaker missionaries.10  This is not unlike Terryl Givens’ claim that the general 
                                               
8
 Max Weber, ‘Die Protestantische Ethik und der “Geist” des Kapitalismus,’ Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 20(1905): 54.  In this essay, Weber states his objective as 
determining whether and to what extent ‘elective affinities’ exist between certain religious faiths and 
work ethics.  In a later English translation this would be changed to ‘correlations’ (The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons (London: Routledge, 2004), 49.).  For a 
catalogue of Weber’s uses of the term as well as a thorough synopsis of the debates surrounding its 
definition, see Richard Herbert Howe, ‘Max Weber’s Elective Affinities: Sociology within the Bounds 
of Pure Reason,’ American Journal of Sociology 84.2(1978): 366-85. 
 
9
 Adam J. Powell, Deification, Exaltation, and Progression: The Theological Anthropologies of 
Irenaeus and the Latter-day Saints, M.A. dissertation (Wayland Baptist University, 2010). 
 
10
 Kai Erikson, Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (London: John Wiley and 
Sons, 1966), 125. 
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acceptance of Mormons after their denunciation of polygamy in the late nineteenth 
century resulted in a decrease of commitment as individual adherents were forced to 
question their desire to retain membership.11 
 Thus, the question of whether and to what extent such patterns exist may be 
less significant than the question of how to approach an analysis of those patterns.  It 
is one thing to adopt the general sociological axiom that behind any theology stands a 
particular anthropology,12 but it is something more to choose historical examples and 
delve into both their unique instances of pain and distress as well as their salvific 
hopes.  In the pages that follow, we agree with Javier Garrido’s straightforward 
observation that ‘there is no religion from abstract thought, only from the concrete 
experience of life...’13  However, we will employ abstract theoretical notions 
grounded in empirical data to illumine the concrete experiences of second-century 
Christians and early Mormons.  By doing so, we are able to explore the social 
processes that produce complex soteriologies capable of resolving and absorbing 
opposition, offering group members a fortified identity as a result. 
 Although we stand firm in asserting that the comparative method is basic to 
the study of religion, our analysis of second-century Christians alongside early 
Mormons is much more than an arbitrary one-to-one comparison.  Not only are there 
numerous similarities between the two groups, such as each community’s eagerness to 
connect to ancient Israelites, experiences of localised persecution, and marginal status 
within their respective societies, but our investigation also attempts to utilise each 
group as separate illustrations of a single social process.  By focusing on the thoughts 
of Irenaeus (representing the second century) and Joseph Smith (representing the 
Mormons of the early-mid nineteenth century), we are able to illuminate both the 
similar social circumstances and the soteriological principles of the two parties whilst 
                                               
11
 Terryl Givens, People of Paradox: A History of Mormon Culture (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 18. 
 
12
 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (New York: Calvin Blanchard, 1857), 34; Georg 
Simmel, Essays on Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 111; Emile Durkheim, The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life [1912] (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 469.  Feuerbach notably 
asserted that ‘the object and contents of the Christian religion are altogether human.’  His claim, though 
highly contested, made a lasting impact on the study of religion, and his basic argument is echoed in 
the sociological works of Simmel and Durkheim.  Each of the latter see religion as the product of 
human interaction, thus religious systems reflect social values, needs, objectives, etc. 
 
13
 Javier Garrido, Proceso humano y Gracia de Dios: Apuntes de espiritualidad Cristiana (Santander: 
Sal Terrae, 1996), 27. 
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producing a nuanced juxtaposition rather than a heavy-handed comparison.  The 
Mormon case, perhaps, is a more obvious study in the crystallisation of doctrine 
during the embryonic stages of a new religious movement, given the abundant 
historical record documenting all minutiae of nineteenth-century anti-Mormonism.  
However, second-century Christianity is far from a dubious analogue, for that period, 
too, witnessed a concentrated, intentional effort at self-definition in relation to 
Judaism as well as the related issue of doctrinal development, largely due to societal 
opposition against what was, at the time, still a minority movement in the empire.14  
Additionally, the second century is of special importance for our study as both Justin 
and Irenaeus (influential figures of the time) have been cited as the ‘inventers’ of the 
traditional, theological notion of heresy.15  In support of our contention that 
persecution and opposition serve as catalysts for the articulation of identity and 
beliefs, it is instructive to survey the contexts and experiences of Christians in the 
second century as a group that may serve as a sort of antecedent to the phenomena 
seen among Mormons during the religious fervour of early nineteenth-century 
America. 
 Thus, with these religious movements as illustrative examples, we pursue the 
notion of an elective affinity between opposition and deification.  Expressed 
differently, the following study endeavours to explore the notion that certain 
experiences are involved in a dialectical relationship with certain beliefs.  To achieve 
this end, we make use of the sociology of knowledge in general as well as Hans Mol’s 
sociological theory of identity in particular.  In its essence, the sociology of 
knowledge recognises that groups come to understand the world through socially-
legitimated interpretations of reality.  Yet, societal conflict and persecution affect 
individual believers equally as much as the collective, and the following chapters 
                                               
14
 Philippa Townsend, ‘Who Were the First Christians?’, Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity, eds. 
Eduardo Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 212.  Townsend argues 
that second-century Christians were the first to define themselves as a separate community from 
Judaism. 
 
15
 Alain Le Boullec,  La notion d’hérésie dans la litérature grecque IIe-IIIe siècles (Paris: Études 
Augustiniennes, 1985), 1.110-12.  G.E.M. De Ste. Croix, Christian Persecution, martyrdom, and 
Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 212.  Le Boullec is frequently cited as one of 
the first to attribute this significance to these two writers.  In particular, he proposed that Justin created 
the literary genre of heresiology irreversibly altering the meaning of the term heresy.  Ste Croix cites 
Le Boullec but adds that the significance of Justin and Irenaeus lies in their establishment of heretical 
lineages.  He claims that these ‘genealogies’ ‘established opposition between the apostolic succession 
of the church and the succession of all heresies from Simon Magus’.  This will be important in chapter 
one when heresy is defined not as in inside influence but as an exogenous force. 
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acknowledge this by deploying Mol’s theoretical contributions to the study of 
religious identity.  In fact, we take his assertion that a dialectic between identity and 
adaptability undergirds much of social existence as something of a driving predictor 
of both the ability of soteriologies to confer identity on adherents and of the link 
between adaptability and the future success of those religious groups who face 
opposition.  Suggesting that religious groups and individual believers both conserve 
their identities within stable orders and adapt to changing circumstances, Mol 
adumbrates a theoretical model that is almost uniquely relevant for answering our 
primary research questions.  Early Christians and early Mormons encountered threats 
to solidarity and social stability in the form of acute external opposition, and both 
groups resolved the potential crises by articulating stabilising soteriological systems 
capable of conferring stronger identities, a function made plausible by inbuilt 
flexibility in the belief system.  Though some scholars, such as Stephen Taysom, 
acknowledge the high degree of tension demonstrated by Mormons in relation to their 
American milieu, few (if any) recognise the salience of Mol’s sociological theory for 
understanding how such groups survive by avoiding the inherently deleterious 
potential of that social tension.16   
 Thus, we combine the group focus of the sociology of knowledge with the 
individual, interpretive focus of Mol to analyse the relationship between religious 
opposition and soteriological belief.  Of course, our study is indebted to those in other 
disciplines who present noteworthy scholarship concerning the evolution of identity 
and boundary maintenance within religious groups of history.17  As we proceed with 
our assessment, the reader will encounter the outcome of a number of key 
methodological decisions.  For instance, when discussing primary sources from the 
second century including the works of Irenaeus, Greek and Latin usage is limited to a 
very few cases in which the original text and/or meaning is germane to our argument.  
                                               
16
 Stephen C. Taysom, Shakers, Mormons, and Religious Worlds: Conflicting Visions, Contested 
Boundaries (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 197.  Taysom notes that tension models are 
inadequate in explaining groups that display even higher levels of tension than Mormonism, such as the 
Branch Davidians.  It is possible, however, that Mol’s model is capable of assisting the study of a wider 
range of religious traditions. 
 
17
 For examples, see John Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1998); Judith Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman 
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of 
Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); and Averil Cameron, ‘The 
Violence of Orthodoxy,’ Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity, eds. Eduardo Iricinschi and Holger M. 
Zellentin (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). 
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This choice not only helps the general flow of the content but allows us to dedicate 
more space to social topics by restricting notes related to matters of translation.  Of 
course, identity is one of the most important of those social topics to be studied and, 
given the nature of the material, the discussion of identity in Irenaeus differs slightly 
from the discussion of identity in Joseph Smith, the former case suffering from a 
relative lack of historical documentation when compared with the latter case.  Beyond 
these methodological concerns, the present study is built on a terminological 
foundation which must be grasped before its analytical framework can be elucidated.  
Subsequent chapters offer fresh insight into a number of topics concerning 
persecution and belief, but those incisive outcomes are enabled by our distinctive 
understanding of the following terms. 
 
Heresy 
 For our purposes, heresy is understood as religious agonistic conflict.  By 
removing the term from its theological and historical roots, we are better able to see 
its utility for the study of social opposition in a wide field of contexts and can 
demonstrate such usefulness by applying it to second-century Christians and early 
Mormons.  Applying the term to such cases also pays homage to the word’s original 
Greek usage.  Αἱρεσις simply meant ‘choice’ when it was employed among the Greek 
philosophers, and this came to refer to an individual’s choice to join any number of 
philosophical schools.  Quite naturally, then, an element of competition lay implicit in 
the term.  However, its utilisation by key Christian figures such as Paul in the first 
century and Justin in the second resulted in a pejorative connotation; heresy was still 
in some sense a choice, but it was the wrong choice, a rejection of the truth.   
 In this study we will approach heresy as a threefold ideal type of religious 
opposition, comprised of societal, doctrinal, and personal elements.  Chapter One 
discusses Max Weber’s concept of ‘ideal types’ as helpful analytical constructs before 
explicating this detailed, and sociologically-informed, definition of heresy.  Here, we 
simply highlight the unique understanding of heresy that weaves throughout the study.  
The words of Jacques Berlinerblau are instructive for introducing the notion of a 
sociology of heresy: 
In order to be a legitimate object of sociological scrutiny, the pairings of 
heterodoxy and orthodoxy must be a phenomenon that may be identified 
across different times and places.  In other words, if this nexus were not a 
recurring phenomenon, it would be pointless to develop something like a 
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sociological theory, or better yet an ‘ideal-type,’ to describe its most general 
features.  As an aggregate, historians and theologians who study this topic 
seem to confirm that heresy/orthodoxy is a relation that can be identified in 
manifold historical contexts.18 
Viewing Berlinerblau’s statement as both insightful and persuasive, the following 
pages explore two of those contexts in the hope of shedding light on some of the 
‘general features’ of social heresy.  We also note, however, that heresy demands 
resolution, and the religious groups that face intense opposition in their early stages 
often find the articulation of complex soteriological systems helpful for addressing the 
potentially debilitating consequences of acute opposition and ensuring the 
maintenance of religious identity in the midst of such circumstances. 
 
Soteriological Schema 
 Throughout the present study, those soteriological systems are referred to as 
soteriological schemas.  We have chosen ‘schema’ over alternative terms, such as 
structure or narrative, because when belief systems are expressed as a means of 
resolving heresy they often entail more than narrative theology or detailed doctrine.  
Likewise, due to theoretical ‘schools’ and movements within the social sciences over 
the past century, ‘structure’ has acquired strong connotations that might confuse and 
mislead the reader.  Not wanting to invoke the language of Claude Lévi-Strauss or 
others committed to a structuralist approach but desiring to emphasise the complexity 
and efficacy of soteriologies as overarching interpretive systems, we employ the term 
‘schemas’ and note their relationship to the resolution of heresy.  In some sense, we 
understand the specific soteriological schemas assayed in the present study as 
synonymous with deification, using the two interchangeably in some instances.  Yet, 
there is always a basic assumption that soteriological schemas refer to more 
generalised phenomena beyond our two historical cases, whereas deification is the 
predominant characteristic of those two particular systems.  Nevertheless, the primary 
purpose of soteriological schemas is to offer an ordered meaning system capable of 
integrating heresy and conferring resilient identities on the group and its members, a 
                                               
18
 Jacques Berlinerblau, ‘Toward a Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa,’ History of Religions 
40.4 (2001): 333. 
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notion largely based on Mol’s dialectic between stability (or identity) and change (or 
adaptability).19 
 
Two Structural Pillars 
 Finally, we should include the two principal pillars on which our study is 
erected.  First, we argue that heresy is a salient analytical tool for the study of 
religion, especially when defined as an ideal type of religious opposition.  Second, we 
explore the elective affinity between new religious movements facing heresy (second-
century Christians and early Mormons) and the deifying soteriologies that they come 
to espouse.  These two topics guide our analysis and encapsulate its basic 
organisational structure. 
 
Thesis Outline 
 The following analysis is separated into two sections.  In ‘The Role of Heresy: 
Social and Doctrinal Impact’, we include two chapters addressing the sociology of 
heresy.  Chapter One surveys the available literature on the topic of heresy, paying 
particular attention to past attempts to develop a sociological approach to the issue 
before offering our own definition.  The first half of Chapter Two then provides a 
critical overview of the theoretical assumptions and foundations informing our later 
exploration of Christians and Mormons, followed by an in-depth theoretical 
explication of the social processes whereby persecuted groups expound soteriological 
schemas in the second half of the chapter. 
 The second section, ‘Surviving and Integrating Heresy’, comprises the focused 
study of our two illustrative religious groups.  This begins with Chapter Three and a 
consideration of the historical contexts of both parties.  Juxtaposing the two 
movements and elucidating the threefold heresy that each movement faced goes far 
toward lending fresh insight to topics such as religious persecution and sets the stage 
for Chapter Four in which the Mormon ‘Plan of Salvation’ and the Irenaean 
‘Economy of Salvation’ are analysed as soteriological schemas with particular 
emphasis on the way heresy is integrated into the meaning systems and identity is 
conferred on the believers.  Individual identity within the soteriological schema is 
defined as the soteriological self, a specific understanding of place and purpose based 
                                               
19
 Hans Mol, Identity and the Sacred (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), 70. 
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on notions of deification in which the believer views the present life as a salvific 
opportunity to progress.20   
 Following the fourth chapter, the conclusion summarises the basic content of 
the study before offering additional, related insights.  By highlighting the inherent 
flexibility of the soteriological schemas as well as listing specific historical instances 
of altered doctrines, the concluding chapter argues that heresy (as opposition) benefits 
religious identity by testing its conceptual elasticity.  This illustration of the inbuilt 
virtues of soteriological schemas for religious groups who have survived heresy also 
helps us answer our original question of the nature of the link (elective affinity) 
between persecuted groups and complex soteriological beliefs which allows for 
individual progress of the believer whilst establishing a secure collective identity. 
                                               
20
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PART ONE 
 
THE ROLE OF HERESY:  
SOCIAL AND DOCTRINAL IMPACT 
 
 
 
‘Happiness and misery, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice…All advantages are 
attended with disadvantages.’1 
                                               
1
 David Hume, Dialogues and Natural History of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
183. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
HERESY AS OPPOSITION: DEBATES AND DEFINITIONS 
 
 In order to explore potential elective affinities between persecuted religious 
groups and soteriologies involving varieties of deification, we begin by redefining 
‘heresy’ in sociological terms.  The justification for this approach lies in the fact that 
many of these groups invoke heresiological language when describing their 
opponents.  Not only do the terms ‘heresy’ and ‘heretic’ appear in the writings and 
oral pronouncements of such religious communities, but these terms fittingly 
characterise the tense social relationship between religious insiders and those who 
oppose them.  Thus, heresy serves as an appropriate descriptor of the sociological 
phenomenon observed when physical and ideological agonism results in the 
articulation of complex soteriological schemas by those religious groups facing such 
hostility.  This sort of heresy is best understood as opposition to the solidarity of the 
group, a multifarious attack not only on the beliefs but also against the physical health 
and social position of the group and its members.  Adopting and appropriating this 
theological/historical nomenclature of heresy, heterodoxy, orthodoxy, etc. for the 
study of religious opposition and social marginalisation also casts fresh light on the 
nuances and contours of historical social conflicts. 
 Before exploring existing sociological perspectives on heresy and adumbrating 
our own, it is informative to note the long history of enmity between those who locate 
themselves within the ranks of the ‘orthodox’ and those they label ‘heretics’.  
Although the distinction may seem obvious to some, there is little consensus over the 
developmental sequence of the two categories.  In many cases, for instance, it could 
be argued that the concept of heretical teaching is actually solidified prior to that of 
dogma.1  Perhaps this is easily explained; aberrant ideas threaten to stretch notions of 
                                               
1
 This is may be the case with Irenaeus, one of the very first apologists and systematic theologians.  
Irenaeus articulated his discourse on Christian doctrine as a refutation to the claims of various 
‘Gnostics’.  Though he preferred to view himself as preserving and presenting the rule of faith handed 
down since the earliest times of the Church, the formulation of Christian orthodoxy found in his 
writings is often acknowledged as the first cohesive, systematic theology composed by a church father.  
From a historical perspective, then, his presentation of doctrine follows the expression of heresy. 
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truth beyond established parameters and, therefore, provide impetus for the internal 
crystallisation of belief.2   
 It is not surprising, however, that this formula has been contested by various 
scholars concerned with the history of doctrine.  Until early in the 20th century, for 
example, it was taken for granted by Church historians that orthodoxy was in some 
sense ‘right’ and heresy was ‘wrong’.  For many, this ‘rightness’ was related to the 
notion of correct doctrine, a belief that history has preserved the original teachings of 
the earliest Christians, combating aberrant notions as they arose.  In this sense, 
orthodoxy was not simply the articulation of triumphant beliefs in the early years of 
Christianity but was, instead, the accurate and absolutely true expression of Christian 
beliefs over and above competing conceptions.  Anglican-turned-Catholic John Henry 
Newman notably upheld this view in his Essay on the Development of Christian 
Doctrine and other writings by arguing that, though doctrine was systematised in 
response to the presence of heresy, the truth found in orthodoxy had been preserved 
by the Roman Catholic Church since the time of the earliest church fathers.3  Thus, it 
was possible for Newman to speak of an ‘apostolic legacy, preserved and dispensed 
by the church’ whilst also explaining the struggle which ensues between heresy and 
orthodoxy: 
Such is the general course of religious error; which rises within the sacred 
precincts, but in vain endeavours to take root in a soil uncongenial to it.  The 
domination of heresy, however prolonged, is but one stage in its existence; it 
ever hastens to an end, and that end is the triumph of the Truth.4 
This war between heresy and truth in the thoughts of Newman is what Thomas 
Ferguson calls a ‘dialectic opposition’.5  In his essay on Newman’s understanding of 
heresy, Ferguson repeatedly characterises Newman’s historical hermeneutic as an a 
priori belief in ‘heresy producing orthodoxy’.6  This was only true, however, in that 
                                               
2
 The issue of whether the threat is external or internal to the group in question will be addressed more 
thoroughly later in the chapter. 
 
3
 John Henry Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (Harmondsworth : Penguin 
Books, 1974); The Arians of the Fourth Century (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1891). 
 
4
 Newman, The Arians of the Fourth Century, 54, 393. 
 
5
 Thomas Ferguson, ‘The Enthralling Power: History and Heresy in John Henry Newman,’ Anglican 
Theological Review 85.4 (2003): 653. 
 
6
 Ibid., 645, 51, 53, 59. 
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heresy instigated the conflict which forced the Church to wield the ‘undefeatable 
truth’ in order to overcome the falsehood of the heretical.7  In this way, orthodoxy 
arose from the conflict but was itself the articulation of the preserved truth.  Heresy, 
on the other hand, was not simply a false belief arising from within the Church; 
instead, it was an outside influence ‘under the garb of sound religion’.8 
 Although Newman’s work has seen serious contestation in the years since its 
first publication, its scholarly significance at the time was duly acknowledged.9  Even 
so, sceptical scholars tended to question the process whereby this orthodox majority 
‘won out’ over competing views as well as the validity of supposing that the winning 
perspectives were held by a majority.  In Walter Bauer’s pivotal publication, 
Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity for example, a sceptical outlook was 
evident as the sine qua non.  First published in Germany in 1934, this text 
substantially affected the study of heresy and heretics in the early years of Christianity 
by arguing that the early heresiologists either inadvertently interpreted their situation 
incorrectly or intentionally employed rhetoric when stating that heresy infiltrated from 
the outside.10  In Bauer’s view, those ideas that came to be known as heretical were 
almost always present from the earliest moments of Christianity.  Based on this fact, 
Bauer was one of the first to suggest that ‘heresy’ and ‘orthodoxy’, as labels, were far 
from useful for scholars.  Though the Christian church eventually understood heresy 
as right belief gone wrong, this was not the case in many parts of the empire, and 
Bauer contended that competing doctrines existed, in areas such as Asia Minor, from 
the very beginning of the religion. 
 This argument, now known as ‘The Bauer Thesis’, has received much 
attention since its first presentation in English.  Many scholars have challenged 
Bauer’s interpretation of history, refutations coming from many directions.  Patristic 
                                               
7
 Ibid., 652. 
 
8
 The Arians of the Fourth Century, 103.  Newman’s thoughts are important for the present study 
because  he believes that heresy is essentially the external work of Satan against the Church.  He 
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9
 Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition (London: SCM Press, 2001), 5.  Williams refers to 
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 Walter Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity (New York: Fortress Press, 1971), 90. 
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scholar, and Roman Catholic, Lewis Ayres recently introduced a volume of the 
Journal of Early Christian Studies dealing with the development of orthodoxy.11  In 
this preamble, Ayres intimates the two-fold nature of the various rebuttals to Bauer’s 
notions stating that the thesis is typically denied due to: 1) The fact that Bauer’s 
‘examples have turned out to be unconvincing as scholarship on the second and third 
centuries has progressed’, and 2) The majority of important studies on early Christian 
beliefs reject ‘the idea that we can narrate a monolithic story of heresy becoming 
orthodoxy.’12  Other recent critiques of Bauer have come from scholars such as 
Andreas J. Köstenberger, Michael J. Kruger, and others.13  Our acknowledgement of 
the wide refutations of Bauer is not to suggest, however, that Bauer’s thoughts were 
insignificant for early Christian studies or even that his thesis has been unanimously 
discarded.14 
 It is important to note, however, that Bauer’s work was not made available in 
English until almost forty years after it first appeared in German.  Consequently, 
many English-speaking historians continued to produce work which presupposed the 
utility of the labels applied by early heresiologists, and, in most cases, this material 
was embedded in books and articles concerning early church history in general, much 
less common were those texts meant to address the issue of orthodoxy and heresy in 
particular.15  However, since the 1970s the study of heresy has taken a number of 
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different paths; some have echoed Bauer’s claims whilst others have echoed his tone.  
More importantly, the discoveries of Nag Hammadi provided impetus for re-
evaluations of ‘Gnosticism’ and other belief systems traditionally labelled heretical.16  
Though not all agree on the religious environment of the Graeco-Roman world, there 
is something of a consensus with regards to the existence of opposition in Christian 
history. 
 Indeed, opposition is integral to our analysis of heresy and the development of 
soteriological schemas.  Not only does the idea of religious opposition permeate the 
present theoretical discussion, but it is also key for our later examination of second-
century Christianity and nineteenth-century Mormonism, two religious movements 
that nearly seamlessly incorporated opposition into their narrative theology and, thus, 
into their identities.  We need not search long to find other, rather unexpected, 
references to the role of opposition in the human experience in general or the human 
religious experience in particular.  For example, the philosopher David Hume, whose 
words form the epigram opening Part One of the present study, repeatedly notes the 
presence of opposition in humanity’s religious impulses.  Believing that the earliest 
forms of religion, polytheistic systems, arose out of humans experiencing opposition 
in their everyday lives, Hume asserted that as individuals witnessed the contradictory 
characteristics of nature, such as the unremitting harshness of winter and the new life 
of spring, they began to posit various supernatural beings as opposed forces driving 
the natural world.17   
 Of course, many other philosophers also note the significance of opposition 
and otherness.  Hegel, for instance, believes that God is a ‘conscious’ entity because 
of the divine ability to recognise otherness, encountering otherness is the action 
during which one becomes aware of what he or she is not.  This resembles Emmanuel 
Lévinas’ concept of ‘alterity’ as cognizance of the otherness of the other.18  For 
Lévinas, a lack of alterity leads to hostility, misunderstanding, and violent conflict.  
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Thus, the Holocaust was the ultimate example of a lack of alterity, for if one group 
had recognized the defining, unique characteristics of the other, violence may have 
been avoided.  In a sense, these ideas from Hume and others are strikingly similar to 
those of another formative thinker, psychologist Sigmund Freud who located the 
human desire for religion in the shared experience of opposition from nature and 
civilisation: 
The gods retain their threefold task: they must exorcize the terrors of nature, 
they must reconcile men to the cruelty of Fate, particularly as it is sown in 
death, and they must compensate them for the sufferings and privations which 
a civilized life in common has imposed on them.19 
For Hume, as for Freud, belief in the supernatural was a function of agonistic 
experience. 
 As we continue with the present investigation of heresy and the particular 
topics of our study come into ever sharper focus, it is significant to recognise that the 
notion of opposition as a developmental catalyst for religion extends beyond Western 
thinkers of the modern era.  One might highlight, for instance, the importance of 
Jacob’s ‘wrestling’ with God in Genesis 32:24-28.  In this scene, Jacob is said to have 
‘wrestled’ (24-25) and ‘struggled’ (28) with God and is given a new name, Israel.  
This struggle is from the Hebrew sarîta, meaning ‘persisted’, for the father of the 
twelve tribes became a patriarch through his resilient struggle with opposing forces, 
‘with God and with men’ (28).20  Likewise, the New Testament expresses a sort of 
tension between those claiming orthodoxy and their heretical targets.  For example, 
Jack Sanders points to Colossians 2 and its illustration of one Christian group 
opposing Jewish heresy.21  In this Pauline epistle, the apostle exhorts his audience to 
defend themselves against those who would take them ‘captive through hollow and 
deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of 
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this world rather than on Christ.’22  Here, it is claimed that Jewish customs such as 
circumcision and Sabbath observance are no longer relevant.  Although Christianity 
arose out of Judaism, a point we take up in our later discussions of second-century 
Christian identity, the latter was eventually deemed heretical because of its veneration 
of antiquated rites, superseded by the coming of the Messiah.  These Biblical 
examples, of course, direct our attention to one critical component of any discussion 
of heresy and orthodoxy, the inherent difficulty in establishing a normative definition 
of the terms due to their unavoidably subjective nature. 
 
Available Definitions 
 Once relegated to the curiosities of theologians alone, recent decades have 
seen an influx of studies on heresy by historians of late antiquity as well as by social 
scientists.  As might be expected, then, the present study, insomuch as it is a 
substantive contribution to that ongoing discussion of heresy as a social phenomenon, 
is indebted to the content of such investigations.  Throughout the following pages, we 
take it to be something of an epistemological axiom that knowledge is never sui 
generis, it is always historically and socially contingent.  Such an assertion not only 
results from familiarity with the major findings of the sociology of knowledge, as 
explicated in Chapter Two, but it stems from a basic recognition of academic 
knowledge as a sort of contextually-bound bricolage, a structure of ideas built from 
the thoughts of various scholars who have come before.  In this way, the 
understanding of heresy espoused in the following pages owes much to the thoughts 
of various historians, theologians, and social scientists who benefitted the field of 
religious studies by articulating well-reasoned definitions of heresy.  Though a more 
traditional perspective on heresy may still be found in innumerable publications,23 
Bauer initiated an irreversible shift in studies on the nature of heresy that provided 
both impetus and momentum for social-scientific involvement in the debate.  As we 
                                               
22
 Colossians 2:8, The Holy Bible, New International Version (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing 
House, 1984).  All biblical references are taken from this translation unless otherwise noted. 
 
23
 Geoffrey D. Dunn, ‘Heresy and Schism According to Cyprian of Carthage,’ Journal of Theological 
Studies 55.2 (2004): 551-74; Hume, 166.  In this example, the patristic scholar Geoffrey Dunn explores 
the nature of schism and heresy in early Christianity.  Dunn includes Tertullian’s definition of heresy, 
expressed as ‘novelty of belief introduced later than truth’ (p.554).  Even the philosopher Hume 
defined heresy as the ‘rational choice’ because it was the product of an intellectual grapple with 
inconsistencies and therefore occurred after the formulation of orthodoxy. 
 
19 
 
will now show, recent definitions of heresy, whether composed by historian or 
theologian, possess an overtly sociological character.   
 
Historians and Theologians on the Social Aspects of Heresy 
 The many publications of Karen L. King concerning heresiological writings of 
the early church serve as fitting examples of the growing awareness of the social 
features of such a topic.  When discussing second-century issues such as ‘Gnosticism’ 
or the actions of Pope Victor, for instance, King acknowledges that heresy was a 
constructed label for that which was potentially detrimental to Christian solidarity.24  
In the case of Victor, King argues that the Pope’s decision to excommunicate 
dissenters, though intended to preserve unity, actually served to establish competing 
groups through the process of schism.  Instead of accepting the hackneyed notion that 
heresy is simply wrong belief or a deviation from truth (thus, implying that orthodoxy 
predates heresy), King chooses to highlight the social component of heresy as an 
interpretation of the discontinuous actions of peers and as a subsequent catalyst for 
unifying efforts.  In fact, she defines heresy as ‘an assessment tool that distorts 
religious proximity and sameness into textual difference and social exclusion.’25  
Thus, the considerable similarities between the dissenters and their accusers are 
understated by the charge of heresy, an accusation which rhetorically functions as a 
social-distancing device.  Expressed in this way, King’s understanding of heresy finds 
an appropriate home amidst sociological and anthropological concepts such as 
negotiations with the ‘other’ and ‘boundary maintenance’. 
 The blending of social theory with late antique history is perhaps best 
exemplified by the presidential address of Maureen Tilley to the North American 
Patristics Society in 2006.26  Subsequently printed in the Journal of Early Christian 
Studies, this insightfully contributes to the ongoing discussion which attempts to 
delineate schism and heresy.  As a means of resolving various issues related to the 
problematic bifurcation between these two terms, Tilley utilises the organisational 
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theory of sociologist Walter Firey who proposed a system by which organisations 
come to experience schism.27  In Firey’s model, group objectives are located on a 
unity/identity continuum; thus, as effort is expended toward achieving group unity, 
less is allocated to the various methods for reinforcing group identity.  In essence, 
Firey posits incessant flux between valorising the modes of unity and valorising the 
modes of identity; as groups come close to realising either goal (unity or identity), 
that goal becomes less meaningful because the group is being pulled so strongly 
toward the opposite end.  Here, we should note that this vacillation between unity and 
identity conjures an image of flexibility or elasticity as the group is stretched in its 
endeavour to achieve each goal, being pulled even more aggressively the further it 
strays.  As the present study introduces and appropriates Hans Mol’s sociological 
theory of identity as a dialectic between adaptability and stability in the following 
chapters, the idea of elasticity will become increasingly important, ultimately 
spotlighted in our concluding chapter as a means for discussing both the degree of 
adaptability as well as the future success of nascent religious groups. 
 For now, however, it is important to highlight the way in which Tilley 
fruitfully applies Firey’s thoughts to Cyprian and his third-century Carthaginian 
community.  Noting  that this community valued multiple goals such as church unity, 
individual holiness, and martyrdom, Tilley explains that the value placed on these 
ends by Cyprian himself, as he headed the ‘rigorists’ following the Decian 
persecution, did not always find a parallel in Rome.28    Though Tilley cites several 
scholars who assert that Cyprian saw no distinction between heresy and schism, she 
clarifies the situation further by showing that schism occurred when two churches 
valorised the same ends differently, as, for example, when one church put forth more 
effort to maintain a certain degree of holiness whilst another strove for unity.  Tilley 
suggests that both groups valued holiness and unity; however, the act of valorising 
those same two goals to different degrees resulted in significant tension between the 
two communities.  When this tension occurs, Tilley claims, one observes schism 
rather than heresy.  Viewing schism in this way then allows Tilley to construct her 
definition of heresy as the movement ‘from simply different valorisations of the same 
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ends to valorisations of different ends.’29  Therefore, heresy is almost an extreme 
version of schism and results from a complete change in the end goals themselves.  
What is more, sequentially speaking, heresy follows schism. 
 Though Tilley’s work serves as a helpful methodological segue, bridging the 
conceptual gap between theology and history on the one hand and sociology on the 
other, her contribution is admittedly a single representation of a larger set.  It is 
noteworthy, for example, that the German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher long 
ago defined ‘heterodoxy’ as the ‘inclination to keep the body of doctrine mobile and 
to make room for still other modes of apprehension.’30  Without delving into 
Schleiermacher’s context and rather idiosyncratic theological agenda, we simply 
underline his definition of heterodoxy as one implicitly acknowledging an inherent 
social element in the Christian Church’s incessant efforts to define dogma in addition 
to suggesting a need for ‘mobility’ in that ‘body of doctrine’.  In Schleiermacher’s 
recurring attempts to marry Christian theology to the everyday happenings of the 
human experience, he necessarily advances beyond dichotomising doctrine into true 
or false and, instead, acknowledges the role of heterodox conceptualisations in 
meeting the demands of Christian anxiety. 
 More recently, historian of Judaism Adiel Schremer took cues from the first-
century Jewish community and the destruction of the temple in 70 C.E. in order to 
adumbrate a theory specifically intended to account for the social function of heresy 
in a religious group’s articulation of their self-definition.31  In his work, Schremer 
distinguishes between ‘intellectual heresy’ and ‘emotional heresy’, the former 
referring to a theological disagreement that does not necessarily lead to schism, and 
the latter referring to reflexive actions stimulated by traumatic social events (the 
temple destruction) that cause believers to question both their group and their God.32    
Emotional heresy, then, is not solely rational but is a felt ‘mood’; in response to the 
agonistic influence, some members of the group rush to establish new boundaries and 
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a new identity.  As a result, those presenting Schremer’s ‘emotional heresy’ are no 
longer considered insiders.  In distinguishing between these two forms of heresy and 
centring his theoretical concepts on the social behaviours of those who choose to 
diverge from the existing community when facing acute opposition, Schremer 
effectively aligns his thoughts with social-scientific theories of deviance.33 
 In comparison, Lester Kurtz is an example of a social scientist applying, at 
least to some degree, a more traditional approach to heresy even as he borrows the 
language of deviance in doing so.  Kurtz argues that heretics are ‘deviant insiders’; 
ipso facto, heresy is a form of social deviance.34  Of course, this notion is not 
necessarily incompatible with a sociological perspective; studies of deviance such as 
that by Kai Erikson mentioned in our introduction often include premises and 
approaches analogous to those employed in studies of heresy.  Although we will argue 
below that heresy ultimately originates outside of the group, one need not fully 
abandon or deny the element of deviance in that which is deemed heretical.  
Furthermore, to view heresy as an aberration is also to reject the early Christian, and 
increasingly difficult to defend,  practice of dating orthodoxy earlier than heresy.  On 
this issue, Kurtz says, ‘It is in the heat of escalating conflicts that orthodoxy is 
formulated, often through explicit disagreement with a position held by “heretics,” 
sometimes at the expense, and sometimes for the benefit, of the belief system in 
question.’35  Thus, even though our later attempt to define heresy makes little use of 
Kurtz’s ideas, it would be unfair to suggest that he fully embraces a typical, traditional 
definition of heresy.  Even so, he does view the heretic as one who arises from within 
the group but who differs in doctrine, a perspective that would certainly be supported 
by any of the early heresiologists who warned their audiences against ‘wolves in 
sheep’s clothing’.  Kurtz’s study does, however, lead us into the heart of sociology, a 
field with its own instructive and pertinent analyses of heresy. 
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Sociological Definitions 
 Some of the earliest sociological discussions of heresy, though quite brief and 
inchoate, come from scholars who primarily see the relationship of orthodoxy and 
heresy as a class conflict.  For example, Friedrich Engels discusses the religious 
conflicts in Reformation-era Germany in terms of class oppression and opposition, 
naming Thomas Müntzer as a heretic for leading an uprising against feudalism.36  The 
implication, here, is that Müntzer achieved heretical status not for his anti-Lutheran 
stand or his support of Anabaptist theology but because of his political position.  As 
Hugues Portelli says, ‘For Engels, heresy is the ideological expression of a rupture 
between a subaltern class and a ruling class.’37   
 As for sociologist Georg Simmel, he not only composed a substantial work on 
conflict, but also wrote an essay entitled ‘Contribution to the Sociology of Religion’ 
in which he explicitly mentions heresy as it relates to the social cohesion of a 
religious group.  Essentially, Simmel recognises antecedents or precursors to 
‘religion’ in the social activities which he calls ‘religiosity’.38  Human interaction 
necessitates the types of social experiences that, after having been abstracted and 
institutionalised, become religion, and that same interaction in social life results in the 
collective veneration of unity.  It is along these lines that Simmel states, 
That which arrays great masses of people in hatred and moral condemnation of 
heretics is certainly not the difference in the dogmatic content of teaching; in 
most instances, this content really is not understood at all.  Rather, it is the fact 
of the opposition of the one against the many.  The persecution of heretics and 
dissenters springs from the instinct for the necessity of group unity...So 
religion is the purest form of unity in society, raised high above all concrete 
individualities.  This truth is demonstrated by the energy with which every 
heresy, no matter how irrelevant, is combated.39 
In this way, Simmel defines heresy as a threat to group unity, a potential risk which 
causes aggressive responses from the orthodox. 
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 Writing in the twenty-first century, Jacques Berlinerblau offers not only a 
synthesis of the early sociological definitions of heresy but an insightful and erudite 
contribution to the sociology of heresy.  Cited in our introduction as a sociologist who 
sees potential for the formulation of an ideal type of heresy, Berlinerblau inches closer 
than others to that goal by drawing on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
in order to reconstruct the ‘hard orthodoxy’ of early sociologists such as Engels, 
Gramsci, and Weber before presenting his own ‘pure’ definition of orthodoxy: 
A (religious) orthodoxy (of the purest and hardest type) is a superordinate 
compulsory organization composed of a leading class in cahoots with other 
classes and social groups that (1) controls the means of material, intellectual, 
and symbolic production; (2) articulates ‘correct’ forms of belief and praxis 
through the work of rationalizing and consent-generating intellectuals; (3) 
identifies ‘incorrect’ forms of belief and praxis through these same 
intellectuals; (4) institutionally manages deviant individuals and groups 
through coercive mechanisms (e.g., physical and symbolic violence, excessive 
taxation, ostracism, etc.) or through ‘re-education,’ compromise, 
accommodation, and so on.40   
It seems, then, that for Berlinerblau heretics are those who deviate and are 
subsequently ‘managed’ by the controlling, ‘superordinate’ class.   
 Such a notion accords well with Berlinerblau’s definition of heresy as that 
which arises in relation to an authoritative political apparatus capable of identifying 
heterodoxy and effectively managing it, a description which appears earlier in his 
work.41  In some sense, then, heresy is an ascribed label for the minority or at least the 
politically disadvantaged that, either potentially or actually, represent a threat to the 
ruling party.  This posed threat, however, is containable, and the act of managing it is 
simultaneously the act of identifying it as heretical.  It is important to recognise that 
this definition of heresy implies a sense of conflict between the dominating and the 
dominated strata of any given society.  In much the same manner as Simmel, Engels, 
and Kurtz, Berlinerblau recognises the undercurrents of social competition and 
political struggle present when ‘heresy’ is invoked and concludes his work 
accordingly, ‘A heretic is someone who says things that only our “enemies” say.’42 
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 However, Berlinerblau’s relatively curt offering is deceptive, for in that brief 
expression one not only encounters the in-group/out-group dichotomy at the centre of 
much social conflict but also the dialogical or discursive aspect of heresy.  
Berlinerblau’s primary concern is to connect ‘heretic’ with ‘enemy’, a notion that will 
become increasingly important as we move forward, offering our own definition of 
heresy as a phenomenon identified with a sort of unalloyed opposition.  For 
Berlinerblau, as for the present study, the heretic is a type of enemy or, at least, an 
antagonist who threatens to frustrate and injure.  Yet, Berlinerblau chooses not to 
define a heretic as one who does what enemies do but as one who says what enemies 
say.   
 This subtle acknowledgement of the linguistic over the pragmatic is a 
recurring observation of those engaged in studies of heresy, much as it is present in 
the writings of heresiologists who exhort their audiences not to succumb to the 
teachings of false prophets.  In the first paragraph of Against Heresies, for instance, 
Irenaeus states his purposes for writing such a lengthy volume.43  Among the motives 
listed, the bishop explains his desire to refute the ‘false statements’ and ‘impious 
ideas’ of those who ‘falsify the words of the Lord’ in their ‘bad interpretations’ of 
revelation.  Although Irenaeus eventually offers a number of sinful behaviours 
perpetrated by his opponents, his reason for refutation is simply to decry their 
teachings.  This is especially important for Irenaeus’ dealings with the ‘Gnostics’ for, 
as J.T. Nielsen notes, the ‘Gnostics’ essentially denied any special epistemological 
value to Scripture, averring that truth was transmitted solely by word of mouth.44 
 A familiarity with the prominence of discursive conflict in the writings of the 
early heresiologists led Averil Cameron to her conclusions on the relationship of 
heresy to orthodoxy.  Orthodoxy, Cameron says, ‘was asceticism, the asceticism of 
words and belief whose imperative was the rejection of all else.’45  In this sense, the 
heretic was an orator, providing a voice for the expression of heresy, resulting in a 
war of words in which opponents employed various rhetorical strategies both to harm 
the discourse of the other and to buoy up the confidence of their respective followers.  
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Such a struggle may have culminated in physical aggression, but it began as the 
verbalisation of antithetical views. 
 To illuminate the significance of language and dialogue for the sociology of 
heresy is to recognise two constituent, and often complementary, cogs in the social 
machinery: 1) The conscious, explicit use of language, and 2) The subconscious, 
inadvertent, and implicit realm of axiom.  As separate planes of thought, the two work 
together during the articulation and identification of heresy.  For example, 
heresiological responses to the language employed by opposing views make use of a 
conscious operation, the intentional engagement with the pronouncements and 
teachings of the perceived enemy.  Likewise, the heretic (not self-defined as such) 
uses language to express his or her disagreements with and criticisms of the status 
quo, or, as in the two illustrative cases analysed in subsequent chapters, the heretic 
wields language in the form of polemic in order to stifle the rise of religious 
competitors.  Applying similar ideas to orthodoxy, Cameron defines the latter as ‘the 
asceticism of words’, the conscious struggle to limit and control the expression of 
competing thoughts.   
 
Subconscious/Conscious  
 At times, however, there appears to be a deeper level to the process, a 
subconscious element.  In Berlinerblau’s work, he notes that both Simmel and 
Durkheim contribute important insights to any discussion of heresy for each theorist 
suggests that the players in this volley of words are unwittingly participating in an 
important societal cycle.46  In Simmel’s comments mentioned earlier, for example, he 
carefully notes that the individuals involved in battles between heresy and orthodoxy 
believe that they are arguing over religious doctrine when, in fact, they are actually 
attempting to protect and maintain group solidarity.  Similarly, Durkheim’s work is 
described as positing an underlying reality of religious life wherein adherents mistake 
their worship of the social group as worship of God.  This is related to Durkheim’s 
separate assertion that criminals often only see the immediate penal ramifications of 
their actions but do not comprehend the important, but latent, social function of 
criminal behaviour.  These ideas lead Berlinerblau to suggest that Simmel and 
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Durkheim view the heretic as a ‘potential catalyst for social change’ who almost 
inadvertently propels society forward by stretching the ‘conscience collective’. 
 Simmel and Durkheim, however, are not the only ones to address the 
unwitting and inadvertent outcomes of heresy in such contexts.  Pierre Bourdieu’s 
well known concept of doxa could be defined as the axiomatically and implicitly held 
notion of the status quo.  As soon as doxa is described, explained, or expressed 
verbally in any manner it no longer exists as doxa because it can no longer be taken 
for granted.  Exposure to the collective consciousness raises it to a different 
epistemological plane where it is both explicitly and socially acknowledged.   
 Scholar of religion William Arnal, appreciating the utility of doxa for the 
study of heresy, applies Bourdieu’s concept to analyse the role of heresy in the 
construction of identity.47  In his work, Arnal delineates between heresy and 
heterodoxy.  The latter, he says, shares common ground with orthodoxy, and that 
common ground is understood as doxa.  In existing as an implicitly understood notion 
of truth, doxa provides a shared paradigm in which various factions of the same 
general group are capable of expressing disagreement.  This stability is disrupted, 
however, when dissenters, in their articulation of belief, unintentionally expose doxa.  
By exposing that which was implicitly and tacitly taken for granted, the heterodox 
transforms himself or herself into a heretic and doxa into orthodoxy.  Thus, 
heterodoxy is a departure from orthodoxy just as heresy is a departure from doxa.  
However, the exposure of doxa initiates a paradigm shift and provides the impetus for 
the first explicit formulation of orthodoxy, the latter only officially articulated when it 
is forced to do so.  That which began as a mere quibble amongst adherents with 
shared axioms becomes a social rupture as dissenters shift their gazes from peripheral 
issues to the implicitly taken-for-granted truths of the community.  By framing the 
discussion of heresy in this way, Arnal ventures close to the sophisticated 
anthropological work of Roy Rappaport who intimates a hierarchy of ritual in which 
the two highest levels of ‘ultimate sacred postulates’ and ‘cosmological axioms’ 
essentially refer to implicitly shared understandings of the supernatural, relatively 
vague but important conceptions that often stand outside of formal expression as long 
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as they can remain unchallenged.48  Although Arnal’s model approaches a similar 
topic through Bourdieu’s anthropologically-based theories rather than Rappaport’s, it 
is still intended to explain the manner by which heresy precedes the clarification of 
orthodoxy, threatening abstract subconscious assumptions and forcing the formal 
formulation of belief. 
 However, at the conscious level, heresy may be understood to operate 
somewhat differently.  The more traditional understandings of heresy, in which the 
term is viewed as a deviation from orthodoxy, the choice to follow a competing 
school of thought, or the deceitful cunning of ‘wolves in sheep’s clothing’, all stress 
the volition of the heretic and accept heresy as a deliberate verbalisation of dissent.  
Just as the subconscious or unintentional nature of heresy piqued the interest of early 
sociologists, so the conscious/calculated actions of heretics have also borne the 
burden of sociological analysis.  Peter Berger, for example, appeals to the original 
Greek definition of heresy when he defines it as the ‘picking and choosing’ of an 
individual or group from elements of the prevailing, authoritative tradition.49  The 
realities of religious pluralism, scientific discovery, and globalisation create an 
‘imperative’ whereby individuals and groups are compelled to choose their beliefs 
from a plethora of options, even in the face of abundant and potentially contradictory 
information.  This inescapable imperative obviates the need for an ‘orthodoxy’ for, in 
Berger’s view, those individuals comprising the orthodox of any religion attempt to 
convince themselves that they have surrendered to fate when, in actuality, they are 
quite cognisant of the choices that led them there.50  For Berger, then, intentional 
choice is one hallmark of heresy. 
 
Rhetoric, Equivocation and Confusion 
 Yet, in examining the conscious/subconscious or intentional/unintentional 
duality linked to the concept of heresy, we now find it difficult to ignore the potential 
for rhetoric and confusion inherent in heresiological discourse.  After all, rhetoric is 
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the deliberate management of poignant words in the service of religious agenda to the 
same degree that confusion is the unintended consequence of religious competitors’ 
inability to recognise doctrinal debate as a veil for social conflicts regarding solidarity 
and marginalisation.  For this reason, George Zito authored an insightful sociological 
investigation into the discursive element of heresy, in which he notes, ‘Heresy is first 
of all a language phenomenon: it exists only in discourse, whatever its social 
derivatives.’51  Zito then defines discourse as ‘any collective activity that orders its 
concerns through language’ and applies the thoughts of postmodern theorists, such as 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, to argue that heresy is ‘an attack...upon an 
institutionalised way of speaking about the world.’52  Much like the ongoing issue 
over the difference between schism and heresy, a distinction is made here between 
heresy and apostasy by claiming that heresy threatens to use accepted orthodox 
terminology to say and mean something different; apostasy makes use of another 
discourse/language altogether.  With that distinction in mind, it is important to note 
that the institutionalised manner of speaking is threatened because the heretic’s 
proclamations reveal that the same language can have an entirely different meaning, 
or worse yet, the pre-existing discourse can remain unchanged whilst justifying a new 
set of behaviours, a realisation that often leads to cognitive dissonance among the 
orthodox adherents who are now confounded by the sense of equivocation.53  Zito 
rightly notes that this confusion is at the heart of the violent responses often exhibited 
by those threatened.   
 Such cogent thoughts have already served subsequent sociologists like 
Malcolm Bull who applied the theory to his study of Seventh-Day Adventists.54  Bull 
draws a parallel between Zito’s classifications of heresy and apostasy and the 
categories of sect and cult.  The Seventh-day Adventists are, Bull argues, heretics 
(and, thus, a sect) because they define themselves in opposition to American civil 
religion.  Bull’s observations are important for the present study because he mentions 
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that the opposition expressed by ‘heretical’ sects can be either implicit (Seventh-day 
Adventists) or explicit (early Latter-day Saints).55  Indeed, as the following pages turn 
more directly toward early Mormonism, this explicit social opposition will be of 
central significance. 
 In addition to benefitting the work of other sociologists, Zito’s theory stands 
alone as a helpful synthesis of a number of the aforementioned concepts concerning 
the sociology of heresy.  Much like Engels or Berlinerblau, Zito asserts that heresy 
requires a ‘prevailing orthodoxy’ against which the heretics struggle.  Echoing 
Simmel, Zito mentions the aggressive responses of the orthodox believers who 
perceive the heresy as a group threat and act reflexively.  Furthermore, Zito’s 
emphasis on what he calls ‘the semiotic phenomenon’, which he admits is primarily a 
‘semantic phenomenon’, raises the important point of equivocation and its role in 
causing confusion and mental unrest.  When the institutionalised meanings of words 
are challenged, the orthodox encounter the same terms employed differently, a 
phenomenon which is crucial not only for Zito’s definition of heresy but, it could be 
argued, also for Tilley and Arnal’s.   
 In slight contrast to Tilley and Arnal, however, Zito dedicates no space to 
discussing the relativity or subjectivity of the designation of a discourse as ‘heretical’.  
Though Tilley is bound by a historical record which comes to her through the voices 
of the majority, she does not simply reconstruct a scenario in which a large, 
authoritative body exists prior to the deviation of a smaller group with the former 
deeming the latter ‘heretical’.  Instead, Tilley argues that these competing views 
moved from schism to heresy when they came to seek different ends and group values 
altogether, heresy is almost understood as the impasse itself.  Her concern, of course, 
is not so much with the orthodoxy/heresy dichotomy as with the ‘schism/heresy’ 
dichotomy, but there may be some justification for arguing that Tilley accepts the 
inherent relativity of heresy as a term invoked by those on either side of the chasm of 
values even if she does not explicitly address the issue.  In contrast, Arnal’s thoughts 
on the relative nature of heresy are a bit clearer.  He challenges the traditionally-held 
notion of the sequence wherein orthodoxy precedes heresy, asserting that orthodoxy 
only comes to exist when doxa is exposed.  Thus the heretic is the one responsible for 
unveiling that which was formerly taken for granted whether or not such an individual 
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is aligned with the majority or some minority.  For Arnal, then, ‘heretic’ is used more 
as a sociological classification than as a pejorative label.   
 This differs significantly from Zito who states, ‘To be creditable, a heresy 
always appeals to those same values that enabled the prevailing orthodoxy to maintain 
its monopoly, extending these to itself (emphasis added).’56  As mentioned above, 
Zito explicitly asserts that heresy is defined as such in relation to an already 
established orthodoxy.  Indeed, Zito’s model necessitates an orthodoxy capable of 
identifying the cause of the cognitive dissonance experienced in the group.  Most of 
the definitions offered above share similar shortcomings, relying on an obvious 
political majority or normative discourse to serve as the orthodoxy in opposition to 
which heresy appears.  There is little recognition of the fact that heresy is ultimately, 
necessarily synonymous with ‘the other’ and, therefore, is frequently only imbued 
with meaning when applied to outsiders by insiders.  As Cameron says, ‘To describe 
oneself as a heretic is in essence a logical contradiction.’57  It seems, then, that our 
sociological view of heresy must account for this relativity whereby religious groups 
facing opposition come to describe that opposition in terms of heresy and their own 
identity in terms of orthodoxy, a fully subjective, but perhaps sociologically expected, 
behaviour intended to safeguard identity in the face of danger.  Therefore, at this point 
in our study issues of internal politics combine with the rhetorical energy of the 
language of heresy and orthodoxy to illuminate the inescapable biases driving 
religious truth claims. 
 
Relativity and Heresy 
 In his Letter Concerning Toleration, philosopher John Locke presents an 
argument concerning the relationship of religion to government.  In noting the 
importance of religious toleration for minimising civil unrest, he comments on the 
laborious task of identifying one true religion.  It is in this context that Locke laments 
the unfortunate abuse suffered by some Christians at the hands of their fellow 
believers, stating that the claim of one group to have authority over the other is ‘great 
and specious’.  This opinion, he notes, is supported by the fact that ‘every Church is 
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orthodox to it self[sic]; to others, Erroneous or Heretical.’58  This assertion echoes the 
thoughts of philosopher Blaise Pascal who bemoaned the lack of a universal sense of 
justice in his Pensées, remarking, ‘Truth lies on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the 
other.’59  Likewise, Hume said that monotheism in general necessitated an exclusive 
mindset as every monotheistic movement necessarily maintains the absolute truth of 
their own beliefs, over and against the doctrines of others.60   Each of these quotations 
suggests that philosophers have long recognised the unequivocal bias in the 
distinction of truth versus falsehood. 
 The postmodern era, of course, effectively lifted notions of relativity to the 
fore, making it somewhat imperative that we acknowledge the apparent biases as well 
as the undeniable subjectivity lying beneath scholarly endeavours.  In studying 
heresy, it is crucial that one concede the inherent ambiguity in the object of scrutiny; 
heresy, for the heretic, is orthodoxy.  As a third party, however, the scholar of religion 
is fortunate enough to avoid the quagmire of truth/falsehood disputes located in 
theological discussions of heresy and orthodoxy.  As Berlinerblau notes, orthodoxy is 
not the expression of some immutable truth but is the articulation of perspective in 
relation to heresy.61  In other words, there is a relational contingency between 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy; existing as two opposed forms of knowledge, each needs 
the other in order to sustain meaning.  Though this recognition marks a distinct turn 
from the heresiologies composed by devout religious adherents of the past, it is true to 
the basic premises of sociological inquiry wherein opposed social units each construct 
identity in relation to their opponents.  In the same way, we can claim that orthodoxy 
is essentially the process of ‘constructing an inversion of the heretical other’, subtly 
underlining the role that perspective plays in the enterprise of heresy hunting.62  This 
calls to mind anthropologist Marshall Sahlins’ observation concerning more 
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‘primitive’ cultures: those viewed as ‘marginal to history and modernity’ are 
‘marginal in nobody’s eyes but our own.’63  In the eyes of the ‘marginal’, it is 
modernity that is ‘peripheral’.  Perhaps perspective, then, is the sine qua non of 
accusation, an important point for our later survey of the social antagonism exhibited 
toward second-century Christians as well as toward early Mormons. 
 For now, it is critical to note that the intrinsic relativity of heresy indirectly 
challenges the theories of early sociologists mentioned above.  Individuals such as 
Gramsci, Marx, Engels, and Weber offered few explicit statements on heresy, but the 
relevant content that does exist suggests that heresy, for them, was little more than 
class conflict and, accordingly, the orthodox were understood to be the powerful 
majority.  In cases where it is ceded that political authority is not necessarily 
possessed by a majority, these theorists still prefer to view the heretics as 
underprivileged or of lower socio-economic status.  Upon recognising the relative, 
subjective nature of heresy, however, one discovers historical examples of politically 
powerful majorities promulgating what the subordinate minorities deem heretical.  
For example, the Quakers who arrived in the Massachusetts Bay during the 
seventeenth century were quickly ostracised and persecuted by the ruling Puritans of 
Boston.  The Puritans viewed these Quaker missionaries as heretics and set out to 
eradicate them from the colony.  At the same time, however, the Quakers received a 
great deal of their identity from this conflict and also began to view the Puritans of the 
area (the political majority) as representatives of heresy.64  From an analytical 
perspective, both religious movements felt compelled to label the other, not because 
of doctrinal dissention nor because of political subversion but more basically due to 
actual, physical opposition and the potential injury to group identity.   
 
Heresy and the Negotiation of Identity 
 This, as will now be apparent, provides one of the basic contentions of the 
present study.  Heresy, in its most basic, social sense, consists in opposition from any 
or all directions against the solidarity, identity, and the existing worldview of a 
collective.  While more will be said later, it is worth making clear at this stage that 
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early Mormonism expressly exhibits this dynamic.  The seminal event of early 
Mormonism, Joseph Smith’s First Vision, finds young Joseph asking the Father and 
Son which Christian denomination is correct.  In response, one of the theophanic 
‘personages’ tells Joseph that all sects are ‘wrong’.65  This event, when combined 
with the numerous accounts of apostasy found in both The Book of Mormon and 
Doctrine and Covenants, resulted in the distinctly Mormon belief in a ‘Great 
Apostasy’ of the early Christian church.  Coincidentally, while the early Latter-day 
Saints were constructing their views on the falsehood of Christianity, various 
Protestants within the immediate environment argued that Mormons themselves 
propagated fraudulent fabrications.  One notable example is that of Peter Bauder.  
After interviewing Joseph Smith in 1830, the inaugural year of the Latter-day Saints’ 
Church and of their Book of Mormon, Bauder published the following conclusion: 
… Among these imposters there has one arisen by the name of Joseph Smith, 
Jr. who commenced his system of church government in this state, (New 
York) in the year 1830.  His followers are commonly called Mormonites, 
sometimes New Jerusalemites, or Golden Bible society; they call themselves 
the true followers of Christ.  I conceive it my duty to expose this diabolical 
system for two special reasons—first, because I have had an opportunity with 
Smith, in his first setting out, to discover his plan; secondly, because I learn 
since they were broke up in New York State, they have gone to the western 
States, and are deceiving themselves and the people, and are increasing very 
fast.66 
Later, Bauder referred to Smith’s ‘translated’ Book of Mormon as both a ‘horrid 
blasphemy’ and a ‘diabolical invention’.  For the first 15 years or so of Mormon 
history, analogous examples abound as outsiders sought to define the new religious 
movement.  The opposition exhibited by such non-Mormon observers, even in their 
pejorative use of ‘Mormonites’ for those following Joseph Smith, is the basic subject 
of later chapters; however, these polemical and ideological conflicts highlight the 
difficulty in distinguishing the orthodox from the heterodox among competing forms 
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of religiosity.  From the perspective of both the early Mormons and the various 
Protestants with whom they coexisted, the other represented heresy.   
 It is not surprising that similar social tensions occurred in early Christian 
history.  By the beginning of the second century, for example, Jews, Christians, and 
Pagans began to emerge as distinct social groups.  Although events such as the 
destruction of the Jewish temple during the first century had caused a great deal of 
enmity between Jews and Roman society, as Philippa Townsend highlights, a certain 
faction of those Jews began to view themselves as part of a separate movement known 
as Christianity just as the second century dawned.67  In turn, this new movement was 
seen as heretical by the Jews who were, by now, shifting their focus from Romans to 
Christians.  We recognise the relevance of this example when we highlight the effort 
exerted by Christians like Justin Martyr in refuting Jewish teachings.  Once again, the 
heresy label was tossed to and fro, serving less as an absolute measure of truth and 
more as a mechanism for negotiating with competing social groups.  For both the 
second-century Christians and the early Mormons, social threats were perceived by 
insiders and outsiders, an impasse of perspective that incited those encountering 
religious opposition to call their opponents heretics.  In our third and fourth chapters, 
we explore these social tensions in more depth, elucidating both the particular forms 
of opposition faced by the new religious movements as well as the counter-narratives 
articulated as a means of resolving conflict.  Before we can proceed with such an 
analysis, however, we must first outline our understanding of heresy as an ideal type 
of opposition. 
 
The Ideal Type 
 As a topic of sociological scrutiny, heresy sheds light on the nature of social 
opposition by pointing beyond the conflict itself to the dialectical processes involved.  
As William Arnal notes, ‘heresy requires an orthodoxy.’68  Conversely, in his 
insightful article on the matter, Kurtz says that heresy benefits orthodoxy because, 
‘Beliefs are most clearly and systematically articulated when they are formed via 
negativa.’69  The two exist in a binary relationship that, in most contexts, relates to the 
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polarity of their respective truth-claims, perhaps one of the most basic and unalloyed 
forms of opposition available for analysis.  As we have already demonstrated, in this 
ideological tug-of-war, the categories of heresy and orthodoxy are necessarily 
relative.  For instance, some scholars believe that second-century dissenters such as 
Valentinus were actually seeking Christian reform in order to achieve doctrinal 
standardization.70  From Valentinus’ perspective, opponents such as Irenaeus were 
resisting the process of developing and establishing orthodoxy.  This charge, of 
course, differs little from that made against the Valentinians by Irenaeus himself. 
 Thus, as multiple groups struggle to combat the assertions of the others, 
encounters with heresy inevitably result in a more profound delineation between the 
in-group and the out-group.  As one collective becomes increasingly marginalized, 
those of the less marginalized gain confidence and increase in identity through the 
regulation of their own beliefs.  Self-definition does not, of course, occur 
instantaneously.  The process, however, is initiated by the perceived threat of false 
teachings or, perhaps most importantly, the threat of misrepresentation.  It is in this 
sense that Irenaeus refers to his Gnostic opponents as wolves in sheep’s clothing, 
‘those who are now promulgating heresy’.71  Here, Irenaeus’ fear is not only that 
Christians might be led away from the Western church and its true teaching but also 
that the heretics may be easily mistaken for orthodox believers, a sort of stretching of 
the boundaries to accommodate multiple outlooks.  For Irenaeus, this type of 
accommodation could dilute Christian identity, depleting it of its distinctiveness 
among various sects and superstitions emerging in the empire. 
 The degree of rhetorical command and cogency inscribed in the works of 
Irenaeus and other heresiologists, however, is of little benefit to the modern scholar of 
religion.  This is because a certain utility of heresy comes when, as a religious 
concept, it is removed from its theological moorings and allowed to function as a 
sociological instrument.  Max Weber offered the study of religion a useful analytical 
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concept he called the ideal type, an intellectual construct ‘formed by the one-sided 
accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many 
diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete 
individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized 
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.’72  In essence, ideal types function as 
the measuring sticks for sociological concepts in general and religious phenomena in 
particular, ensuring that discursive study of concrete, observable data is possible by 
postulating an ideal sample against which future observed samples may be compared 
and contrasted.  However, as Bruun correctly highlights, Weber explicitly defined 
ideal types as abstract constructions admittedly tied to the historical setting of the 
scholar as well as the context of the phenomena studied.73  Ideal types are, in this 
way, never to be found in reality for they simply exist as an idealised aggregate of 
observed data. 
 
A Working Definition 
 For the present study, therefore, we define heresy as an ideal type of 
externally-sourced opposition against the beliefs, personal wellness (physical and 
psychological health), and unity of a religious group and its members, often 
demanding both explanation and subsequent theological renovation by those within 
the group.  The collective’s response to such heresy is not so much an articulation of 
belief or truth as it is a negotiation with their cultural context, an effort to establish a 
fortified meaning system.  Heresy, as opposition, threatens to stretch that system unto 
breaking by directly challenging both beliefs and group solidarity.  In doing so, 
however, heresy engenders further group development and creates new social 
dynamics as well as novel theological beliefs.  The threat of heresy may be perceived 
by the majority group to be a matter of doctrinal deviance, but Simmel correctly notes 
that it is more precisely a threat against unity.74  But where does this threat originate? 
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Whence comes the Heresy (Exogenous or Endogenous)? 
 In viewing heresy as an ideal type of opposition, we implicitly reject the 
aforementioned notion that the heretic is simply a ‘deviant insider’.  In fact, even the 
early Christian heresiologists acknowledged that the ultimate source of heresy was 
external.  King notes that these authors often exerted great effort ‘alleging that heresy 
is produced by outside contamination of an originally pure faith.’75  One of the most 
popular scapegoats in this regard was Simon Magus, assumed to be the figure from 
Acts 8.  Within the Christian tradition, Simon Magus increasingly came to be 
recognised as the father of all heresy due, in great part, to the influence of Irenaeus’ 
work, Against Heresies, in which Simon is identified as the forefather of all heretical 
sects.  In fact, Irenaeus attempted to reconstruct a sort of heretical lineage by which 
Simon’s teachings led to ‘all the heresies’.76  This juxtaposition of the heretical 
lineage with the apostolic lineage of the Church rhetorically suggested that the 
‘Gnostics’ not only stood outside of orthodoxy but actually belonged to a certain 
heritage in their own right, in bad company but company nonetheless.  We should 
note that Mormon scriptures repeatedly speak of lineages as well.  Whether it is the 
cursed descendants of Canaan in Moses 7:8, references to Adam’s seed, Abraham’s 
seed, or Lehi’s seed, or discussions of Lamanites versus Nephites, Mormonism 
expresses much of its theology and anthropology in terms of ancestry.77  Indeed, the 
incessant struggle recounted by the Book of Mormon between the Lamanites and the 
Nephites is one key example of how opposition comes to be understood as something 
deeper than competing ideologies.  In fact, Chapter Four illuminates the interplay of 
theological narrative, nineteenth-century social pressures, and religious identity as 
Joseph Smith posited a spiritual dualism in which opposition was understood as the 
consequence of Lucifer’s primordial determination to act against humanity. 
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 The postulation of such lineages implies that heresy possesses a monolithic 
quality capable of being traced back through generations, a suggestion which gives 
rise to the important distinction between heretic and heresy.  The former may in fact 
appear as an insider but, insomuch as he or she is a messenger, that insider may 
simply relay an outside message.  In some sense, then, as we continue to explore the 
social aspects of religious opposition and cultivate a sociologically-informed view of 
heresy, our chief concern is with the external source of antagonism rather than with its 
(potentially) internal representative.  With this in mind, one might single out Max 
Weber as an early figure who recognised the exogenous nature of heresy.  In 
describing the religious landscape of China, for instance, Weber categorised 
Confucianism as orthodox whilst labelling Taoism and Buddhism as heretical due to 
the outsider status of the latter two traditions.78  Berlinerblau rightly notices that, in 
doing so, Weber challenged the common view of heretics as ‘deviant insiders’.79   
 Historian John Henderson similarly points to Irenaeus’ discussion of Marcion 
as an example of the external origins of heresy.80  In Against Heresies I.27, Irenaeus 
says that Marcion was the successor of Simon, spoke ‘with the mouth of the devil’, 
and promulgated ‘the bitter and malignant poison of the serpent, the great author of 
apostasy.’  Henderson mentions this portion of Irenaeus’ writings as an instance in 
which a heresiologist claims both Simon and the Devil as the ultimate sources of 
heresy.81  Again, the heretical teachings find their origins from outside of the religious 
group.  Marcion was a deviant to be sure, he undoubtedly utilised the idiomatic 
language of Christians in his day, challenged certain beliefs, and reformulated others, 
but in the end he represented external opposition.  His was the most fundamental of 
all agonistic voicings, the very words of Satan. 
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 In The Origins of Satan, historian Elaine Pagels traces the history of Satan as 
the quintessence of oppositional power as perceived in the minds of Christians.  In her 
introduction, Pagels observes that Christians have always tended to demonise their 
opponents, drawing on the Gospels for a dramatic framework in which believers are 
identified as disciples and their opponents (Jews, pagans, and heretics) as Satan or his 
minions.82  Perhaps the most pertinent passage in this regard comes from John’s 
Gospel in which Christ speaks to his Jewish audience: 
You belong to your father, the devil, and you want to carry out your father’s 
desire.  He was a murderer from the beginning, not holding to the truth, for 
there is no truth in him.  When he lies, he speaks his native language, for he is 
a liar and the father of lies.83 
Indeed, the Christian tradition has always propagated this sort of satanic legend which 
itself conflates the ‘deviant insider’ with the threatening outsider by speaking of 
Lucifer as a beautiful angel who, as a consequence of pride and envy, is cast out of 
heaven; he is not only the embodiment of evil but of the conspicuous potency of 
exogenous enemies.  It is for this reason that sociologists like Durkheim and Berger 
can separately observe a sociological role for the devil; the former claiming that 
‘Satan is an essential piece of the Christian system’ wherein society’s dualistic 
elements (good and evil) are reflected,84 and the latter noting that the devil is ‘the 
oldest antagonist of the sacred’.85 
 Historian Randall Stephens and his colleague, physicist Karl Giberson, point 
out that conservative evangelical Christians in America still tend to ‘demonise’ their 
opponents, offering examples such as the history book written by Peter Marshall and 
David Manuel, The Light and the Glory, in which America’s history is laid out in 
such a manner as to highlight supposed spiritual battles.  In this timeline, ‘Satan, 
always in opposition, won his fair share of battles, too, but God triumphed overall.’86  
Later in the volume, Stephens and Giberson note that evangelical leaders believe 
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themselves to be incessantly engaged in a supernatural war with Satan.  Opposition to 
conservative evangelical agendas, such as the effort to teach Creationism rather than 
Evolution in schools or the desire to propagate that America was founded by like-
minded Christians, is interpreted as the clever work of the devil.  Stephens and 
Giberson offer a succinct and astute conclusion: ‘Easy, natural invocations of Satan 
are rhetorically powerful.’87 
 As we briefly mentioned above, Satan was understood to be the root of 
agonism for early Mormons as well.  Not only is it his superciliousness that results in 
his expulsion from heaven with a third of the angels, but it is he who tempts the 
‘children of men’ on earth.88  In the early years of the LDS Church, God’s revelations, 
channelled through the prophet Joseph Smith, frequently addressed and redressed 
issues faced by members in the course of their everyday lives.  If objectives were 
frustrated or otherwise inhibited, hope could come in the form of a revelation.  Thus, 
in 1831, Joseph Smith became convinced that the land of Missouri held sacred value.  
Offering his followers numerous revelations on this land of Zion and the community 
which they should build there, Smith often described Satan as the force behind the 
thwarting of these plans.  The Missourians were not keen to hand over the land and, in 
response, Smith presented his group with these words, ‘Wherefore I the Lord willeth, 
that you should purchase the lands, that you may have advantage of the world, that 
you may have claim on the world, that they may not be stirred up unto anger: For 
satan putteth it into their hearts to anger against you...’89  Those who might resist the 
efforts of the Saints, in other words, simply did so under the influence of the devil.  
This sentiment was preserved in the words of a hymn chosen by Joseph Smith’s wife 
Emma Smith for inclusion in a bound collection: 
1. There is a land the Lord will bless, 
Where all the saints shall come; 
There is a day for righteousness,  
When Israel gathers home. 
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2. Before the word goes forth--Destroy! 
And all the wicked burn, 
With songs of everlasting joy, 
The pure-in-heart return. 
 
3. Their fields along Missouri's flood, 
Are in perspective seen, 
As unto Israel "Canaan stood, 
While Jordan flow'd between." 
 
4. Though wicked men and satan strive, 
To keep them from that land, 
And from their homes the saints they drive, 
To try the Lord's command...90 
 
 Whether located in the impassioned poetry of the early Mormons or the 
polemical writings of Irenaeus, there is a recurring sequence which emerges from the 
observations noted above whereby religious believers who are facing opposition 
initially blame an individual and/or the school of thought associated with that 
individual before attempting to trace the historical antecedents of the heresy.  After 
uncovering any such historical lineage, heresiologists like Irenaeus seem to shift the 
blame to an ultimate supernatural source.  This trend calls to mind the thoughts of 
Hume mentioned earlier.  Noting the proliferation of polytheism among the earliest 
human civilisations, Hume proposed that individuals tend to postulate a multitude of 
divines when attempting to explain the various conflicts of nature.  For example, the 
frost that destroyed crops was not simply understood as opposition from the 
malevolent forces of nature against man but, instead, those freezing temperatures 
were viewed as a window into the supernatural realm in which the god of winter 
laboured against the god of the harvest. 
 A similar pattern has also been recognised by various anthropologists.  One 
informative example may be drawn from Godfrey Lienhardt’s study of the religion of 
the Dinka tribe in Africa.  He concluded that the tribe’s various religious rites were 
intended to maintain tension with the divine, an agonistic relationship perceived as 
existing between the human members of the group and God.91  When the Dinka 
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experienced opposition or ambiguities, the term nhialic (‘Divinity’) was evoked, thus 
confounding experiences were effectively integrated into an adaptable belief system 
by always attributing the former to nhialic.92  In this way, though Lienhardt did not 
observe the Dinka engaging in a blaming game like that of Irenaeus, they did trace 
everyday afflictions such as physical illness back to an ultimate spiritual tension 
between God and humanity.  Accordingly, Lienhardt’s colleague Evans-Pritchard 
acknowledged a related phenomenon among the Nuer of the Sudan.  This process 
wherein attention is gradually focused ‘upward’ toward the spiritual was most 
noticeable in Nuer responses to foreign influence.  As the cultural impact of the 
Western world made its way into Africa, the Nuer were faced with the novel 
experience of responding to such an imposition.  They found themselves confronting 
a cultural clash with the inevitable dilemma of whether to assimilate to, or outright 
reject, the encroaching force.  The unfamiliarity of this dilemma resulted in an 
oppressive desire for explanation as the group turned to their existing meaning system 
to answer new questions.  Fortunately, the concept of ‘spirit’ which had developed 
among the group allowed for what Evans-Pritchard referred to as ‘refraction without 
limits.’93  Much in the way that the Dinka used nhialic to explain multitudinous 
existential quandaries, the Nuer were able to maintain a sufficiently broad 
understanding of ‘spirit’ in order to evoke the term whenever exigent, exogenous 
circumstances upset social stability.  Both the Dinka and the Nuer not only serve as 
examples of social groups positing external, and supernatural, origins for opposition 
but they highlight the importance of adaptability for religious systems of meaning, 
providing concepts and categories capable of explaining unfamiliar experiences.  As 
heresy presses in on the group, and as we will revisit in our concluding chapter, a 
degree of flexibility in the belief system goes a long way toward ensuring stable 
identity and future longevity for the community.   
 
The Exogenous Threat: The Power to Penetrate Boundaries 
 In our view, heresy seems an apt descriptor of this phenomenon in which 
religious opposition is experienced and divine sources are proposed as the culpable 
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entities.  It is important to remember, however, that in this discussion there is an 
unavoidable discrepancy between what the religious insider perceives and what the 
religious scholar observes.  For members of many religious groups, it is not only 
natural but quite plausible to shift the focus from deviant to divine because of an a 
priori belief in supernatural dualism, a worldview that proffers a malevolent deity on 
which one may place such blame.  However, the scholar of religion does not benefit 
from such a position and, consequently, is often compelled to view this sort of 
sacralising process as one half of a larger, cyclical formula.  Just as humans turn their 
collective gaze from shared experience to posited, divine conflict, so their constructed 
myths and soteriological narratives act in reverse, justifying and explaining earthly 
opposition in terms of cosmological clashes.  This is precisely the sort of self-
fulfilling prophecy described by Simmel: 
In those social relations the coloring that we call religious, on account of its 
analogy with existing religiosity, comes into being spontaneously, as a purely 
social psychological constellation, one of the possible forms of conduct 
between person and person.  By contrast, religion conceived as an independent 
phenomenon is a derivative thing...When this separation and materialisation of 
religion has been accomplished, religion in turn reflects on the immediate 
psychic relations among people, giving them the now recognized coloring of 
so-called religiosity.  In doing so, however, it merely gives back what it 
received originally.94 
In this discussion of the sociological genesis of religion, Simmel highlights the 
dialectical, or reciprocal, nature of the development; originally born of human 
interaction, religiosity comes to engender beliefs in the divine.  In turn, of course, 
these beliefs are used as an interpretation of reality, effective for deriving meaning out 
of negative experiences.   
 Drawing on Simmel’s ideas, and anticipating Chapter Two in which we 
explicate the helpful contributions of the sociology of knowledge to the present 
analysis of heresy, perhaps it is worthwhile to discuss other projectionists of the early 
twentieth century, keeping in mind that social heresy is often manifested as external 
opposition.  Resembling Simmel’s thoughts in many ways, Durkheim, for example, 
says that ‘society is the soul of religion’ and the sacred is an idealised form of 
reality.95  In Durkheim’s view, group sentiments, arising from social life, come to be 
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expressed as religious concepts and, thus, the various evils and virtues of society find 
representation in the consequent belief systems.  For Durkheim, as for Simmel, ‘The 
collective ideal which religion expresses is far from being due to a vague innate 
power of the individual, but it is rather at the school of collective life that the 
individual has learned to idealize.’96 
 Of course, it would be remiss of us to discuss projectionist notions without 
mentioning the psychologist Sigmund Freud who promulgated a psychoanalytic 
concept of projection whereby individuals turn their internal conflicts, struggles, and 
negative emotions to some person or persons.  In this way, he suggested, the afflicted 
individual creates an enemy, the personification of embodiment of psychological 
troubles.  In The Future of an Illusion, however, Freud applied the concept of 
projection directly to the religious proclivities of humans, suggesting that individuals 
initially construct divinities out of the need to better relate with the oppressive powers 
of nature.97  Just as Durkheim believed that all evil experiences in society find 
representation in religion, so Freud asserted that the ‘gods’ made by humanity ‘must 
compensate [humans] for the sufferings and privations which a civilized life in 
common has imposed on them.’98  Among Freud’s thoughts on religion, we find a 
particularly significant observation – namely, that the projection of social hardships 
onto sacred ideals results in religious beliefs concerned with the righting of wrongs, 
the ‘obliteration’ of death which ‘brings us all the perfection that we may perhaps 
have missed here.’99  In other words, in so much as religion reflects and addresses 
itself to the collective experiences of opposition, it attempts resolution by postulating 
a deeper level of meaning, what Douglas Davies calls ‘super-plausibility’, an idea to 
which we return in Chapter Four.100 Here, it is more important to recognise that the 
deeper sense of meaning provides a path to individual perfection, a crucial point for 
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our later exploration of deification as a type of soteriology capable of conferring 
identity on believers who have experienced intense social heresy.   
 Sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann also instructively expound 
projectionist ideas in their seminal work, The Social Construction of Reality.  This 
work is discussed in much more depth in the following chapter, but it is important to 
note now that Berger and Luckmann contribute very important concepts to our 
discussion, such as an elucidation of ‘paramount reality’.101  First articulated by 
Alfred Schutz in his engagement with the work of Husserl and the latter’s notion of 
‘life-world’ (Lebenswelt), paramount reality essentially designates the reality of 
everyday life, the conscious realm within which all individuals spend most of their 
time.  As a sort of cognitive territory circumscribing, but lending meaning to, every 
individual’s unique perspective on reality, paramount reality is taken-for-granted and 
its explanatory value is only found wanting when some occurrence contradicts this 
reality.  Similar to Arnal’s ideas on the heretic as one exposing the taken-for-granted 
doxa, paramount reality can become threatened in a sense by unfamiliar experiences, 
events that betray the inadequacies of the individual’s perception of ‘the way things 
are’.  Once again, religion is seen as having its roots in society as some human 
interactions and natural events lead to unexplainable infringements on the existing 
barrier erected around the interpretations of reality that have received incessant 
reinforcement from all members of society as they go about their daily lives.  
Confounding phenomena born of social relations are then explained supernaturally, as 
violations of paramount reality. 
 Berger and Luckmann, then, not only add to the body of theoretical knowledge 
concerned with religion as a social product but also illuminate the nearly inevitable 
breach of social, and even cognitive, boundaries resulting from opposition against a 
social group and its members.  Though each of the theorists cited above identify 
opposition differently, insinuating everything from natural disasters to economic 
poverty, there is a general acknowledgement of both the outside status of opposition 
as well as its potential to stimulate supernatural thoughts in the minds of those 
afflicted.  In the introduction to the present study, we highlighted the fact that heresy 
originally denoted a choice, coming to refer to one’s choice between various schools 
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of thought before acquiring the more provocative connotation of a fallacious doctrinal 
alternative.  Thus, Irenaeus’ protégé Hippolytus believed that the source of early 
heresy was Greek philosophy, from these competing schools heretics received their 
corrupt material.102    We should note, however, that the content of the teachings was 
not condemned until it infiltrated Christian boundaries in much the same way that 
unexplainable events penetrate paramount reality, hence the rather ubiquitous 
assumption that heresy threatens unity by originating within.  Indeed, heresy can 
cause a great deal of consternation when it ruptures the perimeters of the group.  
Thus, sociologically speaking, heresy may be an attack from outside the boundaries of 
the group that is perceived as agonistic only when it acts on the group, for that which 
was previously viewed as impotent and irrelevant emerges as hostile and threatening, 
the result of its having penetrated the collective identity through sheer force.  As 
members of the persecuted group come to accept and share an understanding of what 
has happened, plausibility (or social reinforcement) allows the expression of a certain 
interpretation, a combination of recognising the threat as a threat and formulating a 
resolving explanation for its existence.   
 In mentioning the concept of plausibility, we mark the crossroads of 
projectionist theories and the sociology of knowledge, the latter being of particular 
import for our development of heresy as a social process in Chapter Two.  Berger and 
Luckmann explain plausibility as the processes whereby shared experiences achieve 
epistemic significance through social interaction, legitimation, and socialization.103  In 
order for the penetrating experience not only to be reconciled with the previously held 
‘knowledge’ of the world but also to find its way into the taken-for-granted 
interpretation of reality for subsequent generations, the group must reconstruct their 
own social world.  In some sense, those with firsthand experience of the opposition 
undergo a paradigm shift and, so long as the collective exhibits a unified response to 
that which upset the social balance, participate in the process of socialization by 
rendering their interpretation of the events plausible for future generations through the 
reinforcing tools of teachings, stories, myths, traditions, rituals, etc.  Infiltrating the 
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collective’s paramount reality, in this way, heresy threatens to blur the demarcations 
of identity.  As Lewis Coser explains, the heretic, in moments of conflict, effectively 
confounds insiders by embodying the agonism whilst ostensibly upholding shared 
values.104  The import of Zito’s discursive theory of heresy is thus exhibited; the 
group perceives the heretic as one with whom they share values precisely because the 
content of the heresy is articulated in familiar terms.  This confusion is potentially 
deleterious to the boundaries of the group and demands resolution.  In this manner, 
external opposition comes to be heresy by imposing itself on the group and 
subsequently receiving an inside interpretation/meaning.  As we will see in later 
chapters, both the early Christians and the early Mormons demonstrate notable 
prowess in integrating social heresy into overarching meaning systems, blending 
narrative, ritual, traditions, and missions in a successful bid to interpret life and 
protect the longevity of their communities. 
 Before we move on in our discussion, supplying the basic structure of a 
sociology of heresy, it is important to reiterate our understanding of heresy as 
typically an exogenous threat which incites active responses by the in-group as soon 
as the heresy can no longer be ignored.  We emphasise the exogenous nature of heresy 
throughout the study; however, this choice is primarily a result of our disagreement 
with the social definitions of heresy addressed earlier.  In reality, even among the 
Mormons as we will see in Chapter Three, the threat may originate from within, but it 
very often does not.  Thus, our attempt to construct an ideal type necessarily entails 
preference for what appears to be the most common source of opposition.  Though the 
heretic may be a ‘deviant insider’, the deviance is attributable to his or her 
propagation of outside content.  Accordingly, a sociology of heresy must focus on 
both the true source (internal or external) of the opposition as well as collective efforts 
to resolve such crises. 
 
Toward a Sociology of Heresy 
 Having explored available sociological views of heresy, noted the inherent 
subjectivity with regards to uses of the term, and elucidated what we mean by heresy 
as an ideal type of religious opposition, we can now dedicate space to sketching a 
sociology of heresy.  If, as we contend, heresy is ‘externally-sourced opposition 
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against the beliefs, personal wellness, and unity of a religious group and its members, 
demanding both explanation and subsequent theological renovation by those within 
the group’, then tension undoubtedly emerges as a defining trait.  This tension may be 
expressed in terms of agonism, alterity, opposition, or otherness, but it is important to 
note that the conflict may actually benefit the accusers, those who apply the label 
‘heretic’ to some outside collective.  Thus, a sociological understanding of heresy 
must integrate social strain with the process of social bargaining involved in 
responding to external opposition.  In the act of defining and expressing both heresy 
and orthodoxy, religious groups simultaneously, perhaps inadvertently, establish 
collective order and identity.   
 Indeed, this is why Mol’s model of the differentiation/identity dialectic, one of 
our central theoretical bases elucidated more fully in Chapter Two, equates stable 
order with identity.105  In Mol’s view, religions are able to safeguard their collective 
identity by establishing an orderly interpretation of existence, for as Mol states, ‘there 
is no such thing as uninterpreted reality.’106  When exogenous factors impose on the 
individual and/or collective, the established meaning systems must react appropriately 
by integrating or reinterpreting the disruptions.  Acknowledging the inevitability of 
this process, Davies intimates a sociology of knowledge model which synthesises the 
thoughts of Peter Berger and John Bowker: ‘Human systems of religion are thus seen 
as resulting from an interrelation between man’s endeavour to achieve meaning and 
those phenomena which demand explanation or which frustrate the process of 
meaning construction.’107  Humanity’s drive for meaning-making approaches satiation 
when available explanations are perceptibly stable and organised, suggesting a safe 
location in which to ground one’s identity.  Thus, the efficacy of the ordered 
interpretations offered by religious institutions lies not in their explanatory potential 
but in their identity-conserving potential.  However, according to Mol, too much order 
can prove injurious to the religious movement by limiting its degree of social 
flexibility. 
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 This introduces two key, and very much related, components of religious 
success: balance and tension.  Following a well established precedent in sociology set 
by figures such as Herbert Spencer and Talcott Parsons, Mol uses the evolutionary 
term ‘differentiation’ to describe the adaptable half of the balancing act.108  Unlike 
Spencer, and to some extent Parsons, Mol is less concerned with viewing social units 
as analogues for biological organisms and more interested in suggesting that the 
central argument in sociological discussions of differentiation is that social 
institutions adapt to changes in their environments or circumstances much as genes 
mutate and often benefit the species by doing so. It is between this ‘differentiation’, or 
adaptability, and the stable order that a balance must be reached.  As religious groups 
encounter their immediate environment, they must possess the ability to produce 
meaning and identity whilst remaining adaptable to the group’s needs.  The 
equilibrium envisioned in Mol’s theory touches the core of heresy as opposition, for 
the maintenance of internal group balance often means the engendering of sustained 
tension with outsiders.   
 In analyzing the common characteristics of successful religious movements, 
sociologist Rodney Stark concluded that ten components must be present.  The second 
of these, what he calls a ‘medium level of tension with the surrounding environment’, 
is relevant for our discussion because to achieve a ‘medium level of tension’ is to 
achieve balance in Mol’s dialectic.109  Indeed, Stark’s work often emphasises the role 
of distinguishing features within religious movements; tension with the environment 
is said to be achieved via these noteworthy characteristics of the group, and, in 
explicating his cost-benefit model for religious denominations, Stark places the 
tension-making components in the category of ‘costs’.110  By imposing demands such 
as abstaining from premarital sex, Stark believes that religious groups actually 
eliminate the presence of casual, impious members.  This, in turn, serves to raise the 
benefit of social participation within a group of loyal believers.  In Stark’s view, the 
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higher cost abets group cohesion and, in that way, the benefits are considered to be of 
greater value.  These high costs are ‘high’ in that they require a significant degree of 
sacrifice.  It is no surprise, then, that there is a direct link between the self-imposed 
costs of a group and their tension-making characteristics.  The required sacrifices are 
only costly in relation to societal norms and expectations.  Thus, by denying such 
norms, these costs create social tension.   
 Stark’s insights are perhaps too contingent on his own economically-based 
theory of religion and, as will be apparent in the following pages, we prefer Mol’s 
dialectic over Stark’s ‘medium tension’ for analysing the processes involved in 
resolving social heresy.  That being said, his emphasis on commitment, solidarity, and 
future success resembles the findings of sociologist Rosabeth Kanter.  Conducting 
research on the viability of ninety religious communities who had their origin between 
1780 and 1860 in the United States, Kanter discovered that those groups who survived 
beyond twenty-five years all shared certain social characteristics.111  Calling these 
traits, ‘commitment mechanisms’, Kanter explained that the successful communities 
placed rigid demands on their members, such as sexual abstinence, prohibiting 
alcoholic consumption, and banning dances.  These regulations, in turn, served as 
border lines between the group and the greater society.  What is more, by submitting 
to the rules, members exhibited a high level of commitment and an almost obsequious 
orientation to the community.  Thus, the works of both Kanter and Stark highlight the 
importance of maintaining boundaries in religious communities, for the commitment 
costs of the group are the means to that end, functioning as tests of loyalty and what 
Mol calls ‘foci of identity’.112  As characteristics unique to those within the group, 
commitment mechanisms may become almost synonymous with group identity; just 
as some individuals may locate their identity in their socio-economic class (as Marx 
seemed to believe was true for nearly everyone), others may focus on their celibate 
lifestyle or abstemious temperament in an effort to locate themselves within the group 
and within society. 
 With these ideas in mind, heresy appears as a developmental process in which 
a religious group negotiates with external opposition, seeking to establish resilient 
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identity whilst maintaining a certain amount of beneficial social tension.  Manifested 
specifically as religious opposition, then, heresy both creates and integrates this 
tension with the ‘other’, a sort of hallmark for the soteriological schemas articulated 
by groups facing acute persecution.  Heresy may be perceived as an external threat, 
but it is appropriated and utilised internally not only to define the in-group but to 
ensure future adaptability through the elaboration of an exceptionally explanatory 
system of meaning.  This is precisely the assertion made by Arnal when he states that 
‘heresy creates orthodoxy, by forcing the articulation of what had up to that point 
remained unnecessary to say.’113  In this way, we no longer view heresy as a solely 
theological notion just as we liberate it from the strictly ‘discursive’ definition of Zito 
and the organizational emphasis of Tilley. 
 
Heresy as Threefold  
 As we focus our lens and refine our understanding of heresy as an ideal type 
of religious opposition, it is important to highlight the threefold nature of the agonistic 
forces which initiate the formation of soteriological beliefs in relation to the self.  
Throughout the present study, heresy encompasses doctrinal, personal (against 
physical/emotional/psychological wellbeing), and societal opposition.  Experiencing 
an attack on collective beliefs, members’ wellbeing, and the social status of the 
community, new religious movements often respond by expressing their soteriological 
beliefs in a new manner, integrating all three forms of the heresy into the overarching 
system. 
 In many instances, the doctrinal heresy concerns the mode or characteristics of 
salvation; there is an insurmountable disagreement over issues such as individual 
redemption, eschatology, and access to saving knowledge.  Consequently, attempts to 
resolve the conflict appear in the form of clearly stated soteriologies.  This doctrinal 
opposition leads to doctrinal reinvention wherein the group and the individual both 
assume roles in the soteriological schema as both were targets of the opposition.  
Likewise, the somatic nature of persecution (the key variety of personal heresy) leads 
the group to embrace a theological anthropology, providing each individual with 
supernatural efficacy and this-worldly purpose as a recompense for social injustices.  
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Just as individuals suffered physically in the past, so they are rewarded not only 
spiritually in the next life but with a potent freedom of will in the present.    
 Societal heresy, the third and final constitutive form of opposition, is observed 
in the specifically narrative mode of the soteriological beliefs.  Narratives provide 
both an explanation of the opposition experienced by the collective and a temporal 
purpose for that group.  The social marginalisation of the community and the greater 
society’s assessment of the group as subversive or criminal necessitate the 
sociological process of boundary maintenance mentioned earlier.  Clearly distinct in 
significant ways, the group articulates their distinguishing characteristics by 
embedding them in a divine, narrative plan which is viewed by adherents as 
cosmologically engendered.  Accordingly, these soteriological constructs minimise 
cognitive dissonance by establishing a connection to a pre-existing religious tradition 
and intimating a theology of self wherein individuals eternally progress.  It is this 
soteriological schema which offers the individual believer and his or her group 
remuneration for the loss of stability (thus, identity) during the experience of 
opposition, a beneficial outcome made possible because of the teleological content of 
the soteriology; special purposes offer special identities.  Therefore, self-definition 
seems to transform in relation to changing environmental circumstances, and identity 
proves resilient and mobilising when it is able to take root in a divinely-sanctioned 
system at an early stage in the development of a religious movement.  In later 
chapters, we argue that the hyper-individuality of the nineteenth-century religious 
environment in America facilitated just such a well-developed soteriological identity 
among the Latter-day Saints, itself an echo of the saving plan promulgated by 
Irenaeus and others of the second century in which individuals received pride of place 
as God’s creation capable of progressing toward communion with the divine through 
obedience and perseverance.  In both instances, relatively complex soteriologies 
helped resolve the threefold social heresy faced by the burgeoning movements.   
 
Heresy and Soteriology: The Process of Interaction 
 In surveying the available literature related to what might be termed the 
sociology of heresy, we have simultaneously excavated those sources for their 
valuable insights and established a conceptual base for our study of elective affinities 
between opposed religious groups and deifying soteriological systems.  Lifting heresy 
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from the theological arena and defining the phenomenon as an ideal type of religious 
opposition in which the agonistic forces appear in three forms (societal heresy, 
doctrinal heresy, and personal heresy) permits us to analyse historical cases of social 
competition through a unique lens.  Just as the formalisation of doctrine can be 
understood to occur in conjunction with a heightened alertness to the presence of 
conflicting heretical teachings, so soteriological schemas appear to be the product of a 
dialectical relationship between the articulation of stabilising systems of meaning and 
a group’s encounters with social heresy. 
 There should be no misconceptions, however, as this progression from the 
experience of resistance to the formulation and possession of detailed soteriological 
programs is neither some kind of sociological rule, nor is it a component or an 
example of a general social theory of religious determinism.  Yet, there is inherent 
value not only in acknowledging that a process does exist but also in identifying its 
common stages.  Having expressed our definition of heresy and provided brief 
glimpses at a handful of theoretical influences, we now proceed with a more thorough 
explication of the sociological and epistemological concepts guiding the present 
study.  So, in the next chapter, we will spotlight the perspectives and conclusions of 
the sociology of knowledge in addition to the theory of religion adumbrated by Mol in 
preparation for explaining the process by which social heresy interfaces with 
soteriology. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HERETICAL PROCESS: ITS ASSUMPTIONS AND PREDICTIONS 
 
 Working from the assumption argued in Chapter One that heresy is essentially 
a social phenomenon involving opposition against a religious group, with the 
behaviours and beliefs of religious groups reflecting such social pressures in some 
way; it now falls to us in this chapter to explore this process more fully.  This begins 
with an acknowledgement of two separate, yet integral, modes of thought.  First, we 
must inquire into the epistemological progression that leads individuals and 
collectives to know what they know about their world, an investigation aided by the 
sociology of knowledge in general and Mol’s theoretical framework in particular. 
Keeping in mind the sociology of heresy as outlined in the preceding chapter, our 
second constituent mode of thought will scrutinise the social processes with which we 
are most concerned, the events whereby heresy in the form of agonistic experiences 
necessitates the articulation of persuasive and stabilising beliefs.  In a sense, then, the 
following pages progress from a high level of abstraction to a lower, and more 
directly-applied, level, exploring the assumptions and conclusions of the sociology of 
knowledge and Mol’s theory of religious identity before explicating the heretical 
process, the latter serving as the basis for the second half of our study in which 
abstraction continues to give way to further concretisation as two illustrative 
movements are shown to embrace varieties of deification in the face of social heresy.  
 
The Sociology of Knowledge 
 In 1850, American essayist and iconic intellectual Ralph Waldo Emerson 
published a collection of essays entitled, Representative Men.  In the first entry, ‘Uses 
of Great Men’, Emerson states,  
Our colossal theologies of Judaism, Christism, Buddhism, Mahometism, are 
the necessary and structural action of the human mind...Our theism is the 
purification of the human mind.  Man can paint, or make, or think nothing but 
man.1 
Although intended as preliminary thoughts on the important role individual figures 
play in the thought-lives of societies, these words encapsulate the basic premises of 
the phenomenological sociology of knowledge, a philosophically-based approach to 
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studying social phenomena which is especially applicable to the analysis of religious 
data.  Emerson’s proposition that ‘theologies...are the necessary and structural action 
of the human mind’ reiterates the fundamental arguments of the projection theories 
explained in the previous chapter.  That which one discovers or observes in religion 
(rituals, symbols, emotions, relationship structures, relational roles, beliefs, etc.) is the 
necessary reflection of society, of the inevitably social nature of human existence.  It 
follows, ipso facto, that the content of religious belief is essentially the ascription of 
sacred language and posture to human experience.   
  Experience, then, is the foundation for all social institutions, religion being 
just one of many.  If this claim is accepted axiomatically, it is almost unavoidable that 
human experience becomes the object of intellectual scrutiny.  From sociologists like 
Simmel and Durkheim, comes the methodological presupposition that to study 
religion is, first, to study social interactions and processes.  These daily activities 
constitute human experiences in toto.  This is not to say that individuals qua 
individuals do not perceive, interpret, and respond to elements of their environment 
unaided by others.  What is suggested, however, is that the meaning attached to any 
experience is socially-dependent.  In other words, all experiences are rendered 
comprehensible only because they are inseparable from the society in which they 
occurred.   
 This is the contention of theories such as that espoused and intimated by 
Berger and Luckmann who begin their work by explicitly saying as much,2 and it is 
directly related to the comments in the previous chapter concerning the potency of 
external experiences that penetrate the social sphere of a religious group.  It was noted 
that, as an example, persecution is only meaningfully interpreted as opposition and 
only catalyses change when it actually acts on members of the group.  Thus, the social 
significance of persecution is directly related to its experiential proximity; it must 
move ever closer, transforming from abstract thought to potentiality and on to 
recognised reality.  This process, in which alienable contemplations become shared 
realities, is the exact concern of the sociology of knowledge.  Indeed, Berger and 
Luckmann claim that any true ‘sociology of knowledge’ must not only address what 
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constitutes ‘knowledge’ in a given collective but also ‘the process by which any body 
of “knowledge” comes to be socially established as “reality”.’3   
 Before discussing the application of this school of sociological thought to the 
study of religious phenomena, it will prove helpful for us to provide an overview of 
the key figures and ideas behind the approach.  That which follows is not intended, 
then, to be a comprehensive history of the sociology of knowledge; rather, it is a brief 
sketch of the major thinkers and assumptions standing behind the methodological 
perspective taken up by the present study.  Consequently, the amount of emphasis and 
attention dedicated to each writer is admittedly imbalanced.  This is not only due to 
limitations on space but to our limited purpose – namely, the utilisation of sociology 
of knowledge principles for the establishment of a sociology of heresy beneficial and 
applicable to religious studies.  Most importantly, it is to be demonstrated that this 
methodology particularly benefits the study of early Christians and early Mormons. 
 
Karl Mannheim 
  It could be claimed that any discussion of the sociology of knowledge should 
begin with an examination of the philosophical writings of Edmund Husserl.  As an 
exponent (arguably the father) of phenomenology, Husserl undoubtedly influenced 
numerous other thinkers.  His notion of epoché, or the bracketing of judgements about 
the existence of the external world, led him to publish a book on the subject in 1913.4  
It is this idea, that one might observe and analyse phenomena exactly as they are 
perceived by the consciousness, which was adopted by the sociologists of knowledge.  
In fact, Husserl directly influenced notable thinkers such as Max Scheler, Karl 
Mannheim, and Alfred Schutz.  In turn, each of these individuals participated in the 
establishment of a sociology concerned with epistemological questions in society.   
 Karl Mannheim is frequently listed as the father of the sociology of knowledge 
although Max Scheler coined the term Wissenssoziologie in 1924.5  Though 
Mannheim’s writings were contemporaneous with those of Scheler, the latter argued 
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against the validity of a methodology combining phenomenology and sociological 
inquiry.  Mannheim, by contrast, set out to accomplish just that.  In Ideology and 
Utopia, he began a systematic construction of a sociology of knowledge.  This, he 
said, would entail the subjection of ‘all intellectual phenomena without exception, to 
the question: In connection with what social structure did they arise and are they 
valid?’6  Mannheim was especially interested in critiquing Karl Marx and, thus, much 
of Ideology and Utopia presents arguments to that end.  As Bryan Turner notes in the 
introduction to Mannheim’s work, Mannheim gave prominence to social classes as 
the location for the sociological phenomena with which he was concerned (a nod to 
Marx) but also expanded his theories to include other institutions and organisations 
such as generations.7  Ideologies were the product of dominant social classes, and 
utopian ideals were seen as the outcome of subordinate classes struggling for power.  
However, Mannheim realised that much more could be said or derived from this 
understanding of social pressures and their relationship to modes of thought.  He 
insisted that sociologists ought to investigate ‘when and where social structures come 
to express themselves in the structure of assertions, and in what sense the former 
concretely determine the latter.’8  Such inquiries need not simply focus on social 
classes but on the competition arising between other social groups such as ‘status 
groups, sects, occupational groups, schools, etc.’9   
 Drawing on the idea of the life-world promulgated by Husserl, which, as we 
highlighted in Chapter One, referred to the immediate and taken-for-granted realm of 
experience in which the common man is conscious of his environment, Mannheim 
began to view thoughts as context dependent.  In concluding his work, he offers the 
reader this concise definition of the sociology of knowledge approach: ‘Sociology of 
knowledge seeks to obtain systematic comprehension of the relationship between 
social existence and thought.’10  He believed that Marx misunderstood the ‘existential 
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connectedness’ of ideologies and other political thought structures, thus neglecting the 
relative nature of social conflict.  Mannheim spoke of the ‘perspective of a thinker’ as 
‘the subject’s whole mode of conceiving things as determined by his historical and 
social setting.’11  This was a sort of relativity (Situations-gebundenheit) present even 
in social-scientific investigations.  The investigator approaches his or her topic from a 
certain perspective (e.g., positivism, functionalism, Marxism, etc.) and, thus, produces 
a study with links to an underlying social reality. 
 It is for this reason that Mannheim critiques the ‘history of ideas’ approach.  In 
his view, to assume that intellectual history is a timeline of individuals and their 
thoughts is to overlook the fact that those concepts arise out of living experiences in 
social situations.  How any ‘problem’ is handled often depends on ‘forces arising out 
of living experience’.12  In other words, theoretical formulations are always based on 
actual, collective realities encountered by individuals and groups who inhabit a certain 
social position.  Along with sociologists like Simmel,13 Mannheim places special 
emphasis on social conflict as unfailingly formative for group life.  Preferring the 
term ‘competition’, Mannheim offered the following observation on this phenomenon 
as the quintessential example of social relativity: 
We may regard competition as such a representative case in which extra-
theoretical processes affect the emergence and the direction of the 
development of knowledge.  Competition controls not merely the economic 
activity through the mechanism of the market, not merely the course of 
political and social events, but furnishes also the motor impulse behind diverse 
interpretations of the world which, when their social background is uncovered, 
reveal themselves as the intellectual expressions of conflicting groups 
struggling for power.14 
Ultimately, it was this understanding of competition that led to the general topic of his 
book, the two thought-forms (ideology and utopia) resulting from group conflict. 
 Whilst it is true that many of his ideas find more robust expression in the work 
of Alfred Schutz (our next subject), Mannheim’s synthesis of Marxist and Husserlian 
principles successfully furthered the conceptualisation of the sociology of knowledge.  
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Many of the issues addressed are of significant import for sociological studies of 
religious groups.  The fundamental claim, later criticised by numerous scholars, that 
an individual’s ‘whole mode of conceiving’ is ‘determined by his historical and social 
setting’ is of signal importance for the present study and will receive attention later 
alongside similar statements by Peter Berger. In the interim, however, it must be 
noted that Mannheim not only offers a valuable critique of Marxist theories but also 
spotlights the social processes at work under the level of collective consciousness.  
Within the context of a sociology of heresy, one might even envision Mannheim as an 
agent of orthodoxy, bringing awareness to Bourdieu’s doxa and, in the process, 
serving as his own example of the sociology of knowledge; his discussions of the 
taken-for-granted themselves articulated in phenomenological terms which assume 
multiple planes of reality.  By explaining the socially-dependent nature of thoughts, 
he effectively addresses both the inconspicuous forces working in society and their 
absence in the individual’s everyday life-world.   
 More importantly, Mannheim’s discontent with the ‘history of ideas’ is 
instructive in an unexpected way.  He notes that the inter-subjective character of 
human interaction is of epistemic value as individuals come to know what they know 
as a result of existing in community.  This observation, then, leads Mannheim to take 
issue with the method of Marxist interpretations of society.  Marxism lacks a certain 
methodological or analytical distance between the investigator and the phenomena 
investigated.15  Marx’s theories were doomed to a low level of abstraction and a 
correspondingly low level of generalisation because of this.  The analyst only 
recognised the ‘theoretical formulations’ in his or her ‘opponent’.  This, Mannheim 
attributed to a ‘subconscious reluctance to think out the implications of a concretely 
formulated insight’.16  It also meant that Marxist concepts were relegated to fairly 
concrete instances, inseparable from specific historical contexts.  Retrospection 
allowed Mannheim to suggest ways in which his similar sociological concepts could 
avoid this fate.   
 Mannheim explicitly claimed that social classes were the primary focus of 
sociological inquiry, but he was careful to suggest that other types of social categories 
also demonstrated the same phenomena.  This, in his estimation, meant that the power 
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struggles present in society resulted not only in class conflict, with each class sharing 
a certain perspective and interpretation of reality, but also in other social institutions.  
These groups, including those of a religious nature, each possessed a unique mode of 
thought.17  It is in this assertion that one finds a direct, albeit fragile, segue to the 
present study.  One topic which is to be addressed in much more depth in the fourth 
chapter is the ubiquitous tendency of religious sects, in their nascent stages, to assert a 
special connection to a pre-existing religious tradition.  Both the early Christians and 
the early Mormons, for example, claimed connections to various aspects of Judaism.  
For the former, this was perhaps to be expected given the overtly Jewish setting in 
which their new community had arisen.  Whilst it is admittedly speculative, early 
Mormons may have postulated ties to ancient Israel as a result of Joseph Smith’s 
sense of self as a prophetic figure combined with the pressing need to establish 
credibility among the Protestant splinter-groups of early nineteenth-century America.   
 Mannheim’s theories go some way toward elucidating this affair, however.  
Instead of simply occurring as a conscious, legitimising effort, the struggle to 
establish historical connections was made plausible in the first place because its 
formulations and concepts arrived in recognisable, acceptable forms.  This is not to 
say that issues of context are meaningless; rather, it is to claim that the social contexts 
of groups separated by time and geography may actually present common 
characteristics.  Multiple religious groups may offer various answers to a shared 
existential question and, in doing so, reveal the social position which engendered the 
question.  This is important for comprehending the ease with which religious 
movements anchor themselves to other historical traditions.  Very little collective 
energy is expended in establishing the tie because the collective subconscious already 
possesses an affinity for the mode of thought implicit in the structure of the historical 
group’s expressions.  In as much as those expressions indicate certain concrete 
experiences, and when those concrete experiences resemble the new group’s 
circumstances, the older tradition will be adopted and integrated into the beliefs and 
habitus of the emerging movement.   
 This allows for the observation made by Christian Church historian F.C. 
Burkitt who said that when new information is learned about the universe, it is 
possible to hold onto old religion without any consternation, but new religions must 
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take account of the universal truths recently discovered.18  In other words, a social 
setting providing previously unknown ‘knowledge’ might force a new religion to 
reconcile the information with their beliefs or risk extermination, whilst an old 
religion would feel no such pressure.  It is for this very reason, then, that a new 
religious movement such as Mormonism might establish ties with one of the most 
ancient of all traditions.  In the light of Mannheim’s thoughts, and the sociology of 
knowledge more generally, this highlights an interesting phenomenon.  In 
investigating the beginnings of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, for 
instance, one might be tempted to assume that experiences such as the religious 
fervour of the Second Great Awakening and other social interactions would cause 
correspondingly innovative, imaginative reactions from the Mormons.  The truth, 
however, is that social conflict can actually force groups to rely on deeply entrenched 
forms of religiosity, an argument presented by Martin Marty in relation to 
fundamentalist religious groups and their propensity for retrieving ‘doctrines, beliefs, 
and practices from a sacred past’ as a means of fortifying in-group identity by 
presenting such fundamentals ‘alongside unprecedented claims and doctrinal 
innovations.’19  Noting this same level of complexity with regards to the construction 
of social knowledge, Mannheim concluded his book by expressing some concern over 
the deterministic tendency of the sociology of knowledge.  Instead of a strict causal 
relationship between social experience and thought-forms, Mannheim proposed a 
model in which subjective thoughts of individuals also contributed to the overall 
agenda of sociology.20  In gaining an understanding not only of social groups and 
their thought processes but of the subjective, unique interpretations of the ‘actors’ and 
the vantages they hold to be absolute, a broader perspective can be achieved by the 
investigator. 
 Thus, early Mormon modes of thought may have existed as a function of 
specific social pressures, but they also borrowed from and exhibited distinctive 
rationalisations of historical thought-forms.  This place for the individual in sociology 
of knowledge theories was taken up later by others.  Mannheim sought to resolve 
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what he admittedly recognised as shortcomings in his thoughts, but much was left to 
be considered by those who succeeded him.  That being said, his acknowledgement 
that a possible key to the problems of sociology of knowledge lies in the individual 
made way for important theories in religious identity.  Before turning to that topic, as 
intimated by Mol, we must first explore the work of Alfred Schutz in relation to the 
sociology of knowledge and phenomenology. 
 
Alfred Schutz 
 In Alfred Schutz, we encounter a thorough synthesis of Husserlian 
phenomenology with the specific methodological concerns of sociology still present 
in the first half of the twentieth century.  Like Mannheim, Schutz owes much of his 
thought to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl.  In fact, Schutz 
acknowledges this debt in The Phenomenology of the Social World, a gesture that 
elicited a great deal of enthusiasm from Husserl who, shortly after reading the book, 
offered Schutz a position as his assistant.  However, unlike Mannheim who was 
preoccupied with critiquing Marx, Schutz desired to contribute to discussions of 
sociological methodology by clarifying some of the ambiguities in Weberian 
concepts.  In particular, Schutz intended an exposition of the unrealised potential in 
Weber’s ideal types.  Believing that Weber was correct to posit such an analytical 
tool, Schutz argued that the ideal type was based on ‘tacit presuppositions’, needing 
further exploration.21  The ultimate value of Schutz’s work lies in his successful 
amalgamation of Husserl with sociology and, more narrowly, his application of 
phenomenological principles like Epoché and Lebenswelt to the interpretive sociology 
of Weber. 
 Schutz joins Mannheim in claiming that the analyst, in contradistinction to the 
actor, attempts to understand the latter ‘by defining the total perspective and seeing it 
as a function of a certain social position.’22  Yet, Schutz is quick to say that the same 
effort to establish meaning demonstrated by those observed also occurs when a 
sociologist directs his or her actio toward the actum of the layperson.23  These terms 
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represent one example of Schutz’s attempt at minimising ambiguity.  Instead of 
‘action’, he prefers to delineate between actions in progress (actio) and ‘the 
constituted act’ produced by those efforts (actum).  Sociologists of knowledge accept 
that the subjects of their investigations exhibit actions and resulting outcomes, but 
they must also recognise that their own studies replicate this process.  Just as the 
layperson exerts energy as he or she experiences social events and interactions and, 
subsequently, ascribes meaning to those experiences, so the sociologist constructs 
systems of meaning from the data gathered during the course of the study.  For 
Schutz, this act of meaning-making is an inclusive human phenomenon.  It not only 
involves the ‘hardening of...ideologies into ways of life’ but may be further reduced to 
include individuals’ interpretations (of themselves and others).24  In this way, the 
objective observer has something in common with the actor – namely, the process by 
which they both come to understand the information received through inter-subjective 
social relationships.  Using Husserl’s terminology, both the phenomenologist and the 
lay actor suspend judgments about the natural undergirding of social phenomena; the 
former does so purposefully, the latter unwittingly. 
 Schutz discusses Weber’s ideal types from this perspective, suggesting that 
ideal types have utility, and existence, beyond formal analysis.  As all individuals are 
engaged in social relationships, all use ideal types in order to understand others better.  
Schutz refers to the immediate, directly-experienced world of the individual as the 
Umwelt.25  In this social reality, other people may directly influence the individual 
because the latter shares space and time with these other players.  Consequently, 
intentions and motives interact, just as biographies overlap.  This reality, or social 
constitution, results in what Schutz refers to as a ‘we-relationship’.26  The Umwelt 
engenders various thought-forms and is a significant factor in the behaviours and 
beliefs that will come to represent ‘knowledge’ for the individual. 
 There are, however, other social realities for Schutz.  These include the 
various social realms in which others are only indirectly connected to the actor.  There 
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is the world of contemporaries (Mitwelt), the world of predecessors (Vorwelt), and 
that of successors (Folgewelt).27  The latter two may impact one’s life-world through 
their role in conscious decisions and behaviours.  Even so, it is the reality of social 
contemporaries that seems most important to Schutz, for it is in this idea of a Mitwelt 
that Schutz can finally refine Weber’s ideal type.  One’s contemporaries are those 
with whom time, but not necessarily space, is shared.  As a result, they are not known 
in the way that a consociate (those in the Umwelt) is known, immediately and 
meaningfully; individuals make sense of their contemporaries by comparing them to 
‘general types’.28  Without direct access to the contemporary, the mutuality of 
meaning construction is inhibited and all experience is ‘predicative’.  The necessary 
response, then, is to derive generalities from social experience and to use these as 
referential guides to which one can then compare and contrast his or her 
contemporaries.  In essence, this was the relocation of the ideal type from the realm of 
analysis to the social reality of the everyday.  In this way, Schutz believes he has 
redeemed Weber’s concept by outlining the social circumstances in which it is less an 
ostensibly dubious abstraction and more a naturally-occurring, objective tool.   
 In delineating multiple social ‘worlds’, Schutz unequivocally finds himself in 
the midst of epistemological concerns.  Although his attention often lies on the inter-
subjective nature of social interactions and their dialectical effects on 
consciousnesses, such an emphasis inevitably leads to discussions of individual and 
corporate knowledge.  Here, Schutz offers a launch pad for the topic in his idea of 
paramount reality as ‘spatial and temporal immediacy’, a social realm greatly 
affecting one’s subjective knowledge.29  The relationships experienced within the 
Umwelt not only construct knowledge of one’s consociates but, in demanding 
cognisance of the immediate, also remind one of the indirect reality of 
contemporaries.   
 The phenomenological system promulgated by Schutz is integral to 
understanding the applicability of sociology of knowledge for religious studies.  This 
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is a result of his tireless effort to synthesise Weberian sociology with Husserlian 
philosophy in order to arrive at a less ambiguous, more systematised sociological 
perspective.  Ultimately, Schutz surpasses Mannheim by offering sociological inquiry 
a broader lens through which to observe the entire social world.  Where Mannheim 
focused more on the general claim that thought-forms are existentially anchored 
(primarily in response to Marx), Schutz agrees but carries the logic further by 
focusing on individuals, subjective knowledge, and the various planes of social 
experience.  Both thinkers concur on the fundamental principles of the sociology of 
knowledge, but Schutz introduces a comprehensive structuring and repackaging of 
Husserl’s phenomenology for social-scientific purposes.  Additionally, Schutz’s 
salient position in the later works of Peter Burger results in an almost obligatory 
mention of the phenomenologist.  After Schutz, few influential works arose on the 
sociology of knowledge until the topic was again taken up in the 1960s.30  In that 
decade, Peter Berger is incontrovertibly noted as the preeminent figure for the 
revitalisation of sociology of knowledge approaches and, more importantly for the 
present work, the application of such methods to the study of religion. 
 
Peter Berger 
 Our step into the 1960s and 70s is not only one of chronological necessity but, 
in important ways, is one of conceptual inertia.  In so much as Peter Berger catalysed 
the renewed interest in all things concerning the sociology of knowledge as well as 
synthesised the views of Schutz, Durkheim, Mannheim, et alii and applied that 
amalgamated view specifically to the social institution of religion, an analysis of his 
work is irrefutably warranted.  Berger not only left an indelible mark on the scientific 
study of religion through his works during these decades, he also contributed 
significant insights which are germane to our present study.  Although his theories 
have been thoroughly contested, and will not be simply embraced without scrutiny 
here, he will hold an undisputed seat at the table for any work purporting to be 
influenced by sociology of knowledge in the future and serves our purposes more 
precisely by acting as a conceptual bridge between the slightly handicapping level of 
                                               
30
 One arguable exception could be found in: Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Construction 
(New York: Free Press, 1949).  Merton arrived at similar conclusions, however, not only through 
Mannheim but also through Durkheim and Simmel.  He attempted to combine the structuralist-
functionalist aspects of the latter two theorists with the phenomenological outlook of the former.  Thus, 
Merton’s thought should not be considered to reside in the direct vein of Husserl and Schutz. 
  
67 
 
abstractness in Mannheim or Schutz and the theories of religious identity espoused by 
Mol. 
 In the previous chapter, the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (The 
Social Construction of Reality) was considered in the light of projectionist theories of 
society.  Certainly, the sort of dialectical projection of humanity onto society and vice 
versa constitutes a large portion of their argument; however, the other side of the 
conceptual coin is their strong integration and reformulation of sociology of 
knowledge principles.  This is apparent from the outset in the subtitle to their 
influential work: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge.  The book was intended 
to ‘deal not only with the empirical variety of “knowledge” in human societies, but 
also with the processes by which any body of “knowledge” comes to be socially 
established as “reality” (original emphasis).’31  Offering something of a correction on 
the scope and direction of the sociology of knowledge, and acknowledging that it had 
received little development in the years following World War II, Berger and 
Luckmann introduced their joint contribution in this way: 
It is our contention, then, that the sociology of knowledge must concern itself 
with whatever passes for ‘knowledge’ in a society, regardless of the ultimate 
validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such ‘knowledge’.  And in so far 
as all human ‘knowledge’ is developed, transmitted and maintained in social 
situations, the sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes 
by which this is done in such a way that a taken-for-granted ‘reality’ congeals 
for the man in the street.  In other words, we contend that the sociology of 
knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality 
(original emphasis).32 
 In this succinct primer, we easily recognise the influence of Schutz, and 
Husserl through him.  Concerning themselves with the ‘taken-for-granted “reality”’ as 
it is crystallised for the common man, Berger and Luckmann betray their indebtedness 
to Husserl’s Lebenswelt as well as Schutz’s notions of Umwelt and ‘consociates’.  
There is also an important nod to a methodological stance for which Berger would 
later become something of a poster-child.  Three years earlier, in 1963, Berger had 
authored Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective.33  In this introduction to 
the sociological task, Berger is careful to inform his reader that sociology is not for 
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those ‘who prefer to believe that society is just what they were taught in Sunday 
School.’34  This underscores what would become much more fully expressed in the 
years to come - namely, that Berger believes a sociologist must proceed from a place 
of ‘methodological atheism’.35  Unquestionably stemming from the epoché, or 
bracketing, attributed to the phenomenological enterprise, Berger’s ‘methodological 
atheism’ is integral to his sociology of knowledge.  In order to analyse the processes 
by which social experiences generate and solidify religious ‘knowledge’ for the actors 
of society it is imperative that the observer abrogate any assumption that the 
numinous exists as a concrete, distinct, reality.  In other words, the social construction 
of reality is not held in abeyance for the religious.  Religious institutions, as elements 
of social organisation, are necessarily seen as socially-constructed projections of 
human interaction within a society. 
 In singling out religious institutions, we provide a convenient, and important, 
change in direction for our assessment of Berger’s thoughts.  His joint work with 
Thomas Luckmann was not specifically interested in religion, and for this reason, the 
following pages focus almost exclusively on Berger’s solo work.  In fact, the reader’s 
attention will, from this point forward, be primarily directed toward The Social 
Reality of Religion, a tangential work whose genesis and foundational presuppositions 
are to be located in The Social Construction of Reality.36  In the former, Berger 
applies the theories espoused in the latter to the social institution of religion.  Taken 
together, these two books commenced, and fuelled, a lasting discussion focused on 
the validity of sociology in general, and the sociology of knowledge in particular, for 
the academic study of religion.  This is testified to in the amount of attention 
dedicated to the sociology of knowledge during the 60s, 70s, and 80s.37 
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The Social Reality of Religion 
 As the follow-up to Berger’s work with Luckmann, The Social Reality of 
Religion attempts to extricate the same sociology of knowledge concepts from the 
high level of abstract theorising which plagued Mannheim, Schutz, and Berger’s own 
previous work.  Here, Berger’s goal is to present a case for the social dependency of 
religion by utilising the same language and basic theories found in The Social 
Construction of Reality.  For instance, and integral to understanding Berger’s 
thoughts, he continues to discuss the threefold epistemological process whereby social 
experience comes to assert itself as ‘reality’ for the layman.  In the opening pages, 
Berger explains the steps of this ‘dialectic process of society’: 
These are externalisation, objectivation, and internalisation...Externalisation is 
the ongoing outpouring of human being into the world, both in the physical 
and the mental activity of men.  Objectivation is the attainment by the 
products of this activity (again both physical and mental) of a reality that 
confronts its original producers as a facticity external to and other than 
themselves.  Internalisation is the reappropriation by men of this same reality, 
transforming it once again from structures of the objective world into 
structures of the subjective consciousness.38 
If this seems a bit stilted or dense, he offers a more succinct summation: 
It is through externalisation that society is a human product.  It is through 
objectivation that society becomes a reality sui generis.  It is through 
internalisation that man is a product of society.39 
The latter passage exposes a key component of both Berger’s thought and our own 
study, viz., the dialectical nature of society formation.40  Humans construct society 
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just as society constructs humans, and, accordingly, Berger’s theory demands the 
inclusion of a sort of giving and receiving on the part of humanity.   
 Externalisation, the giving element, is perhaps one of the most contentious 
portions of sociological theories, particularly as they relate to religion.  The tension, 
of course, results from the basic claim that religion, as one of any number of social 
institutions, is a product of humanity.  On the surface, and especially for those less 
versed in the social sciences, this is a direct assault on theological concepts such as 
revelation, the immutability of the divine, etc.41  Yet, Berger anticipates this reaction 
from his theological colleagues and, as a consequence, includes an appendix entitled, 
‘Sociological and Theological Perspectives’ in which he addresses the theological 
concerns which he suspects will arise.42 
 In the face of such criticism, Berger is always careful to underline the cyclical 
or dialectical nature of his theory.  Although his book begins with a discussion of 
externalisation and ‘world construction’, moving on to objectivation and then 
internalisation, he understands these three as somewhat simultaneous events, together 
constituting the phenomenon of socialisation.  In his collaboration with Luckmann, 
Berger describes the early development of human babies as one involving ‘socio-
cultural’ influences more so than any ‘biologically fixed substratum’.43  This, they 
claim, is a function of the foetal developments that must take place for human infants 
up to one year after birth, a unique characteristic when compared to the ‘organismic 
developments, which in the animal are completed in the mother’s body’.44  The 
human, then, continues its foundational physiological development alongside its 
initial social and psychological development.  As a result, Berger and Luckmann 
believe that there is only ‘human nature in the sense of anthropological constants (for 
                                               
41
 Paul R. Johnson, ‘Society, Knowledge, and Religion: The perspective of Peter Berger,’ Perspectives 
in Religious Studies 3.3 (1976): 300.  Johnson takes what is, ostensibly, a minority view in his 
statement that Berger’s three-fold process does not preclude revelation.  ‘Revelation, once it enters the 
realm of human knowledge, becomes subject to the three-fold process Berger describes…’ 
 
42
 Note that Berger follows this publication with two books addressing his own personal, Christian faith 
and the more general grievances raised in response to his sociological theories: A Rumour of Angels: 
Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural (New York: Doubleday, 1969); and The 
Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation (New York: Doubleday, 
1979). 
 
43
 Berger and Luckmann, 67. 
 
44
 Ibid., 66. 
 
  
71 
 
example, world-openness and plasticity of instinctual structure)’.45  In our future 
discussion of Mol’s theories on religious identity, a different take on biological 
plasticity will be encountered.  For now, however, it is important to note that these 
assertions lie behind Berger’s emphasis of the socialisation process.  The ‘reality’ and 
‘knowledge’ possessed or perceived by any member of society is, by necessity, 
constructed by the inescapably social nature of human development.  In Berger’s 
view, if we begin our very existence engaged in a relationship with our social 
environment, then that environment not only shapes us but is, itself, shaped by us. 
 Indeed, without some comprehension of the dialectic at work, Berger’s 
thoughts are unequivocally inscrutable.  For instance, he can say, ‘...all culture 
originates and is rooted in the subjective consciousness of human beings’ but then 
describe internalisation, just six pages later, as ‘the reabsorption into consciousness of 
the objectivated world in such a way that the structures of this world come to 
determine the subjective structures of consciousness itself’ (emphasis added).46  This 
is only comprehended when one grasps the incessant nature of the cycle and the 
participatory role of each person in society.  Berger is quick to note that individuals 
are not passive mediums moulded by society into whatever image the latter desires.  
Instead, individuals are ‘co-producers’ of society whose involvement is required to 
maintain the objective and subjective realities society has come to accept. 
 Turning to the concept of objectivation, Berger suggests that the products of 
externalisation are eventually, and so sufficiently, alienated from humanity that they 
then acquire a nature all their own.  Culture is, at least as far as the man in the street is 
concerned, perceived as sui generis.  This is true in at least two ways: 1) Culture is 
‘objective in that it confronts man as an assemblage of objects...existing outside his 
own consciousness’, and 2) It is able to be experienced collectively, inclusive of all.47  
The second aspect is particularly important for it relates back to the externalisation 
component.  Just as all members of society take part in the process of constructing 
that social world, so all take part in its legitimation through shared awareness and the 
collective postulation of society’s objectivity.  By perceiving culture as an entity 
apart, humanity renders that very idea plausible.  Many of Berger’s most helpful 
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concepts enter the argument at precisely this point.  His indebtedness to the 
aforementioned phenomenologists becomes conspicuous here as he discusses 
objectivation as a perception of the ‘actor’ in society.  Berger sees an unambiguous 
distinction between the man in the street and the analyst or student of religion.  
Society is legitimated and maintained by the everyday individual who typically 
participates in this process without cognisance of the fact.  Like Husserl on the 
Lebenswelt or Schutz on the Umwelt, Berger offers insightful glosses on the 
paramount reality of the members of society.  The various conditions and 
constitutions of culture exist within the actor’s immediate reality as irrefutably 
objective.   
 The collective, or communal, variety of objectivation which is at work, 
exemplifies what Berger calls ‘legitimation’.  This, he defines as ‘socially 
objectivated “knowledge” that serves to explain and justify the social order.’48  As 
members of society engage in inter-subjective relationships, attend social gatherings, 
reinforce social norms, etcetera; they continually reiterate and substantiate the order 
of things.  Profoundly expressed by Berger, legitimations are the answers offered to 
the question ‘why’.49  Perhaps more importantly, legitimations are the readily 
available, traditional, taken-for-granted answers to such questions.  When alternative 
answers are offered, however, one might encounter what Berger describes elsewhere 
as ‘ruptures of paramount reality’.50  In these moments, the objective ‘knowledge’ is 
challenged, and the plausibility structures are threatened.  By plausibility structures, 
Berger essentially means the social foundation or grounding of the accepted 
knowledge, both its objectivated and internalised forms.  In most cases, the 
plausibility structure is the particular society and culture of the nation or continent 
itself.  Social norms, notions of the taboo, scientific consensus, and even ethical 
values combine to form a concretised base on which legitimations may flourish.   
 When such plausibility structures are in place, a sort of doxa exists.  Recall, 
however, the particulars of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept and its application by William 
Arnal to heresy studies mentioned in the preceding chapter.  Essentially, doxa qua 
doxa only subsists in the absence of any threat against it or, more basically, any 
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uncovering of it.  The same is true for plausibility.  Existing as ‘knowledge’ of the 
mundane, plausibility structures remain stable and functional so long as no threat 
dislodges them from their subterranean position, elevating them to the level of 
collective consciousness and revealing their shortcomings.  In these moments, Berger 
states, complex legitimations are needed to counter the potentially deleterious impact 
of the threat.51  As an example, he suggests that the mutual antagonism between Islam 
and Christianity during the Middle Ages demanded that each tradition produce 
explanations for their aggression against the other.  Prior to such conflict, the active 
plausibility structures sufficed.  After the fateful encounter and cultural clash, 
however, new theoretical knowledge was needed to justify both the resistance against, 
and the very existence of, the other religion.  Later, as our attention turns toward the 
process of heresy and the articulation of soteriological schemas, this phenomenon will 
be clearly recognisable in the early histories of both Christianity and Mormonism.  As 
we will see, when religious groups composed of members who share a life-world and 
a specific interpretation of reality experience the ‘rupture’ or penetration of that 
reality by some exogenous, oppositional force they often erect complex legitimating 
belief systems in order to ensure balance and render all threats innocuous. 
 Here, before summarising internalisation as the third component of Berger’s 
theory, it is worth mentioning that objectivation ultimately refers to a perceived 
ontological fissure between the projected thought-forms (the consequent products of 
externalisation) and the human society from which they emerged.  As a result, the 
socially-constructed world is understood to be simply ‘how it is’ without much 
reflection on how it came to be.  A similar observation, arrived at by very different 
means and in a very different context, has been noted by sociologist Steve Bruce.  
Bruce comments on the ecclesiastical structures of ‘liberal religions’: ‘For any entity 
to endure it must have some identity and that requires some consensus and that in turn 
requires coercion and that in turn requires a belief system that permits the individual 
to be overruled.’52  Bruce is admittedly involved in an entirely different argument; 
however, his statement concerning the indispensible authority of belief systems seems 
pertinent to our present discussion, suggesting that issues of objective power and 
authority relate to issues of social identity and consensus.  For Berger, the 
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objectivated nomos, the ordered understanding of reality, effectively reigns over the 
individual members of the religious group.  This is precisely because the individual 
tacitly accepts this world and inhabits it freely.  In this way, the Lebenswelt has what 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz would call ‘an aura of factuality’; it seems objectively, 
undeniably true in its own right.53  
 The most ubiquitous example of the inseparable processes of externalisation 
and objectivation is that of human language, a symbol system that has been explored 
from a wide variety of perspectives and for a wide variety of reasons.54  For their part, 
Berger and Luckmann dedicate the first substantive section of their work to the topic, 
making good use of the obvious parallels between language and the construction of 
societies as well as providing us with a smooth and cogent transition from general 
social theory to specific concerns within religious studies.  For instance, Berger and 
Luckmann note that language comes in many varieties from many cultures and is 
established gradually and inconspicuously, developing within certain societies from 
the communicative demands of social interaction.  This, of course, is notably 
correlative with Berger’s idea of externalisation, for language comes to possess 
patterns, norms, and conventions, gradually receiving its own standards and rules.  As 
a result, children are not encouraged to create their own language through social 
living but are taught the socially-accepted standards of the existing language.  Once 
again, legitimation and plausibility are at play.  This may be seen, for example, in the 
way that linguistic norms, taken for granted in one English-speaking nation, may not 
be so in another; one may read the daily news ‘whilst’ eating his or her breakfast in 
England, only to read ‘while’ eating breakfast when visiting New York.55  Such 
conventions are rarely challenged and, more importantly for the sociology of 
knowledge, they nearly always reside below the conscious level.   
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 Of course, just as language manifests in various forms and requires cultural 
and societal legitimations to flourish, so religion can be viewed as an example of the 
same social construction processes.  In this way, and for this reason, Berger justifies 
his follow-up to The Social Construction of Reality, shifting the focus from society in 
general to religion in particular.  For Berger, the latter is a sort of special microcosm, 
and he proposes unique terminology in order to capture the religious form of 
objectivation that occurs as the social settings and experiences of religious groups and 
individuals are externalised: cosmisation.  Cosmisation is the locating of objectivated 
‘nomoi’ beyond the world, literally in the cosmos.56  From an epistemological point of 
view, it is the identification of socially contingent knowledge with the entire universe, 
a sort of ultimate and hallowed reality.  Berger believes that in this removal of 
socially constructed meaning from the immediate, social realm into the cosmos, one 
discovers the essence of religion itself.  It is ‘the audacious attempt to conceive of the 
entire universe as being humanly significant.’57  This relates to, but is not entirely 
homogenous with, Davies’ ‘super-plausibility’ mentioned previously and invoked 
during Chapter Four’s discussion of group purpose as purveyors of secret knowledge.  
Here, we simply note that Davies is using the language of plausibility theory and is 
recognisably influenced by Berger’s thoughts.  The concept of ‘super-plausibility’ is 
intended, however, to benefit the sociology of knowledge by illuminating the 
cosmisation or objectivation process more precisely as it relates to the religious 
adherents themselves.  Accordingly, Davies offers an elucidation of his term: 
‘Religions specialise in the double process of pinpointing the flaws in the human 
condition and positing modes of redress.  And it is these affirmations that constitute 
schemes of super-plausibility’.58  This is particularly pertinent for understanding and 
analysing religious conversion, but also supplements Berger’s thinking by explicitly 
commenting on the common occurrence wherein the sacred form of reality posited by 
religion supplants previously held knowledge.  This superseding information may 
result from better explanations for alienating and marginalising experiences or may 
simply be a function of the holy descriptions attributed to the scheme, or both.  Either 
way, the newly acquired worldview introduces what has been signally lacking thus far 
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in our discussion, the meaning derived by the individual from the objectivated 
‘nomoi’. 
 The final component of Berger’s theory, however, is internalisation, and in 
this stage epistemology comes to the fore: ‘The individual not only learns the 
objectivated meanings but identifies with and is shaped by them...He becomes not 
only one who possesses these meanings, but one who represents and expresses them’ 
(emphasis added).59  This is observable, Berger adds, in social roles.  For example, a 
father or mother learns the objectivated social conventions and norms attached to 
these labels and, thus, not only comes to speak or think on what a father or mother 
does but also inhabits those characteristics and thinks of her or himself as a parent due 
to the capacity for reflecting such norms.  Internalisation, then, with much admitted 
overlap in its relation to objectivation, is the conceptual gateway for issues of identity, 
individuality, and the phenomenological notions of ‘actors’ with subjective realities.  
That being the case, it is no deviation when Berger redirects his discussion to the role 
of the individual in the maintenance and preservation of legitimacy.  The paramount 
reality of the collective and its constituents survives only in the presence of the 
dialectic between society and humanity; the ‘moments’ of which are externalisation, 
objectivation, and internalisation. 
 Thus, Berger reiterates the significance of internalisation, as that event in 
which society affects humanity, before fully immersing himself in the discussion of 
religion in particular: 
The process of internalisation must always be understood as but one moment 
of the larger dialectic process that also includes the moments of externalisation 
and objectivation.  If this is not done there emerges a picture of mechanistic 
determinism, in which the individual is produced by society as cause produces 
effect in nature.  Such a picture distorts the societal phenomenon...The 
individual is not moulded as a passive, inert thing.  Rather, he is formed in the 
course of a protracted conversation in which he is a participant (original 
emphasis).60 
A few lines later, Berger explains that the individual must incessantly engage in this 
bilateral process in order for the objective and subjective ‘knowledge’ to continue its 
function of sustaining the individual and his or her group.  In religion, the necessary 
plausibility structures needed for this sustenance are quite strong and unquestionably 
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effective.  It is for this reason that Berger can seamlessly manoeuvre from 
internalisation to discussions of order and the explanatory value of religious 
cosmisation.  In his estimation, the subjective reality acquired through internalisation 
becomes intertwined with and integral to the individual’s own ordering of existence.  
In other words, experiences must adhere to and find relevance within the subjective 
‘knowledge’ of the actor.  If this does not occur, the personal sense of order or nomos 
must be altered or eschewed, a detail that is reiterated in Chapter Four as we 
illuminate the sense of order and purpose bestowed on religious adherents by the 
compelling idea of deification. 
 It is at this point in our treatment of the sociology of knowledge, then, that we 
must ask and look to answer an important question: What happens when personal 
experience and social reality come into conflict?  Or, more precisely, what options are 
available when the socially-constructed world proves incapable of meeting the 
demands of social experience?  Owing a great deal to Durkheim, Berger addresses 
this concern through the language of ‘marginality’ and ‘anomie’.61  The latter term 
was popularised by Durkheim in his sociological analysis of suicide, and perhaps 
Berger is tacitly indicating his affinity with this concept by choosing to use ‘nomos’ 
and ‘nomoi’ throughout his work.62  The term anomie is a simple word of Greek 
origin; coming from ἀνοµία, it is formed by adding the prefix ‘a’ to ‘nomos’ (law) 
resulting in a term for the absence of law or order.  In sociology, anomie typically 
refers to the loss of order or identity in the face of significant existential dilemmas or 
life changes.63  Sharing this same perspective, Berger’s basic assertion, and one that is 
arguably fundamental within the broader discipline of the sociology of religion, is that 
religious adherents minimise anomie by rooting reality in an ultimate, cosmological 
paradigm.   
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 Such a notion is vastly significant for comprehending the theoretical 
intersection of Berger’s sociology of knowledge and religious studies.  For Berger, 
religions are subject to this threat from instability and disorder, but they are somewhat 
unique in that the looming threat also provides religious communities with their 
raison d’être.  The universality of meaning offered by religion is socially constructed 
and legitimated because of its capacity to (and in order to) mollify the abrasive 
moments in human experience.  No social institution is immune to penetrations of 
paramount reality, including religion; but religion, perhaps the purest form of the 
sociological phenomenon wherein social experience comes to be objectively and 
subjectively legitimated, is a ubiquitous and dexterous product of the dialectic 
espoused by Berger.  What is more, religion provides an unparalleled glimpse into the 
constitutive processes of anomie and the integration of agonistic events into an 
interpretation of reality. 
 
Peter Berger and the Sociology of Knowledge: Summative Thoughts 
 Berger’s theories explore the phenomenological corollaries between individual 
and group experiences and the views of reality they come to possess.  For this reason, 
he deserves mention not only in a summary of key thinkers in the sociology of 
knowledge but in a study specifically analysing the relationship between heresy as 
opposition and the belief systems of those religious groups opposed.  That being said, 
Berger certainly did not escape the publication of his sociological theories unscathed.  
For instance, we can observe one common criticism in Nathan Grossman’s statement 
that Berger placed ‘the cart before the horse’ in asserting that religious institutions 
essentially channel religious/ecstatic behaviour into socially acceptable patterns of 
conduct.64  In contrast, Grossman believes that ‘religious ecstasy...gives legitimacy to 
the pattern and objectives of personal conduct.’  Of course, other more general 
criticisms were also offered by Berger’s colleagues.  Ninian Smart, writing 
contemporaneously with Berger and vehemently advocating religious studies as its 
own separate discipline, claimed of Berger’s thoughts that ‘there is hardly anything in 
his general theory which would make sense of the great variety of religious 
experience, institutions, and doctrines’ in the world.65  Of course, Berger had 
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ostensibly anticipated such an argument when he said, ‘In any case, one cannot 
properly assume a priori that to understand the social roots of a particular religious 
idea is ipso facto to understand its later meaning or to be able to predict its later social 
consequences.’66  Indeed, it may be a slight misunderstanding of the sociology of 
knowledge in general to infer that religious variety is left unexplained or worse, is 
explained as directly caused by some unilateral process of socialisation.  As Berger 
himself often repeats, the dialectic must never be abandoned or ignored.   
 This is not to say, however, that Berger’s theories present only cogent and 
unassailable truths.  In stating what were essentially indirect attacks on the 
‘externalisation’ thesis of Berger’s theory, Smart and others pinpointed a noticeable 
weakness.  Berger offers very little detail on the actual process by which social living 
comes to project or exude principles that can, subsequently, be objectivated.  
Additionally (and it is doubtful whether and to what extent Berger intended this), the 
articulation of externalisation seems to preclude other potential sources of religious 
belief such as individual imagination or newly-acquired, theoretical knowledge.  For 
example, Joseph Smith could learn of the Hebrew word Elohim and its Biblical usage 
as a plural noun, and subsequently, develop a belief in a multitude of gods.67  Smith 
also attempted to set up a sort of utopian experiment, The Law of Consecration, in 
which all members of the community relinquished their possessions to the church and 
then were allocated material goods based on need.  Though there were contextual 
motivators and cultural influences affecting Smith’s choices and teachings, it is 
noteworthy that both of these forms of religiosity, at least in their unique early-
Mormon variety, seem primarily to have arisen in the mind of a single charismatic 
individual, Joseph Smith.  Whilst the latter utopianism failed rather quickly, the 
former theological belief has enjoyed striking longevity.  More to the point, such 
ideas and experiments remain unaccounted for by Berger’s notion of externalisation. 
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 From another angle, however, the failure of utopian ideals and the success of 
non-Trinitarian beliefs underscore one of Berger’s most important contributions, the 
notion of plausibility structures.  Joseph Smith’s assertion that there was a ‘plurality 
of gods’ received social legitimation whilst his attempts to consolidate and distribute 
the community’s property did not; the former quickly appeared not only possible but 
actual, whereas his effort to convince members that they ought to contribute all 
possessions to the betterment of the collective did not enjoy a great deal of social 
undergirding.  Although it is likely that the reason for abandoning the latter was 
multifarious, an amalgam of social circumstances such as monetarily poor converts, 
outside persecutions, and internal conflicts, such a confluence undoubtedly amounted 
to a lack of social plausibility which proved ruinous.68   
 Berger’s understanding of plausibility structures is, therefore, quite useful.  
Certainly, a social base is required for certain elements of information to transform 
into common ‘knowledge’ of reality.  In order for certain religious systems and 
worldviews to subsist over time social legitimations are needed, and Berger does well 
to explain this in detail.  Yet, the initial sources of information are as varied as the 
forms of religious expression noted by Smart.  Perhaps, the diversity of the input, in 
some direct manner, affects the diversity of the output.  This is a possible upshot to 
Davies’ observation that cognitive research has called some sociological assertions 
into question by suggesting that the human brain has an innate propensity for 
organising information in categorical manners.69  In this way, the variety of 
religiosities may result from individuals organising their interpretations of the world 
according to ‘their grasp of what constitutes a human’.  Further, it should be noted 
that geography, biology, diet, climate, to say nothing of ethnic diversity and 
pluralism, combine to form a sort of religious gestalt in each and every society.70  
Whilst the members of each community share many of these influences, it is 
unavoidably the case that conflicts will occur between individuals as well as between 
individual and group.   
 One weakness of Berger’s theories is, then, the lack of detail concerning the 
role of the individual.  In his early publications, as we have shown, the reader 
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encounters considerable material on the processes of socialisation and internalisation, 
both admittedly focused on individuals, but little is said about religious adherents as 
they participate in the epistemological processes of the social group and the subjective 
significance appended to the meaning systems by each believer.  As Davies says, 
Identity also contributes a dynamic and emotional element to the sense of 
meaning and is an inevitable dimension to soteriological discourse.  The 
sociology of knowledge itself tends to overemphasise rational components of 
meaning so benefits from an inclusion of the concept of identity which roots 
meaning in the individual.71 
Concurring with Davies in closing this discussion of the sociology of knowledge, we 
now engage the words of another sociologist of religion, Hans Mol.  In Mol, one notes 
an indebtedness to phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge lying beneath an 
overt venture into the very concepts overlooked by Mannheim, Schutz, and Berger. 
 
Hans Mol’s Adaptation/Identity Dialectic 
 Throughout the present study, effort is exerted to ‘get behind’ the phenomena 
observed, to unearth not only possible initiators of deifying forms of soteriology but 
the epistemological and sociological processes comprising the earliest stages of 
religious movements.  The goal is not to ‘explain away’ but to take an additional, 
conceptual step backwards in the chain of events which leads from experience to 
belief, from societal position to religious confession.  One important step towards this 
end involves an exploration of Mol’s sociological theory of religious identity. 
 Mol would agree with the statement from Davies listed above and, in some 
ways, diverges from the sociology of knowledge because the latter tends to ignore the 
role of the individual, at least as an emotive and imaginative being.72  For Mol, 
identity is the ultimate concern of religion and of any general sociological theory 
applied to its analysis.  Even so, he does seem to grant the sociology of knowledge a 
number of key insights.73  For instance, Mol was cited earlier as avowing that ‘there is 
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no such thing as uninterpreted reality.’74 In this rather laconic proclamation, there is 
an implicit espousal of the same epistemological positions held by the sociologists 
mentioned above.  Knowledge is socially-dependent; it has always, already received 
collective explanation and integration.  Merely a few sentences later, Mol quotes 
Geertz who defines ‘religious patterns’ as ‘symbolic screens through which 
experience is interpreted’.75  Likewise, in Meaning and Place, Mol adopts the 
language of ‘systems of meaning’ which he says are only good if they ‘never get 
caught’, for such systems ‘must be broad and relevant, so that experiences and events 
fit the traditional interpretations.’76  This, he claims, is necessary for rendering 
disorder and anomie innocuous.  Echoing Durkheim, Berger, and others, Mol states 
his presumption simply: ‘If the human muddle and mess can be related to order, then 
the muddle and mess are “relativised”’.77  This language is recognisably entrenched in 
the idioms of both the sociology of religion and the sociology of knowledge. 
 Yet, this introduction of meaning systems is precisely the point of demarcation 
between Mol and those already discussed in this chapter.  Drawing from a very wide 
range of source material, Mol proposes a view of religious identity that understands 
humanity as incessantly engaged in the development of symbol systems.  These 
systems of meaning, however, are not simply the externalisations of social interaction; 
instead, meaning systems are in some sense an evolutionary advantage possessed by 
humans which allows for adaptation to changing circumstances.78  Most significantly 
for Mol, symbol systems protect and anchor individual identity. 
 In addition to his fellow sociologists, Mol references ethologists, 
psychologists, and anthropologists in order to substantiate his assertions.79  By 
utilising such a broad field, Mol is able to begin his presentation with a brief overview 
of both biological influences on identity and evolution as a conceptual frame for the 
study of religion.  As regards the former, Mol is interested in the immune system as a 
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parallel for religion as well as discussing animal aggression in relation to religious 
identity.  Early in his work, he compares the process of ‘sacralisation’ to antibodies in 
the body.80  His reference to the ethologist Konrad Lorenz is far from trifling, and 
supports the general argument rather effortlessly.  Lorenz published an influential 
book on animal aggression in which he (inadvertently?) champions many of the 
sociology of knowledge precepts.81  In Lorenz, Mol recognised an exponent of similar 
ideas concerning human nature.  Indeed, the former discusses not only the biological 
tendency to defend social territory, but the functional benefit of aggression in 
maintaining social tension internally and externally.82  Aggression, according to 
Lorenz, also tends to be transformed into ritualised forms.  These ritualised 
behaviours channel the aggressive propensities into socially acceptable and 
facilitating modes.  Concluding his chapter on the ritual of aggression, Lorenz says, 
I have even stressed the other fact that everything which man by tradition 
venerates and reveres, does not represent an absolute ethical value, but is 
sacred only within the frame of reference of one particular culture...If social 
norms and customs did not develop their peculiar autonomous life and power, 
if they were not raised to sacred ends in themselves, there would be no 
trustworthy communication, no faith and no law.83 
This, unequivocally, supports sociological assertions about the contextual dependence 
of knowledge and, as Mol realised, the persistent sacralisation of the socially-
beneficial elements of culture.  The latter observation connected to Lorenz’s 
recognition of the ritualisation of aggression in animals such as fish, birds, and 
primates, notes that these animals engaged in aggressive behaviours in order to 
maintain the ‘pecking order’, ensure a fair distribution of the same species over a 
limited resource field, and to defend the youngest members of the group.84 
 It was by theoretically linking both the immuno-biological with the ethological 
in this way that Mol arrived at his sociological theory of religion.  Just as a fish may 
defend territory with physical aggression, so the white blood cells attack foreign 
intruders.  In much the same way, humans seem to respond passionately and 
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arduously to experiences perceived as threats to the social order or collective 
cohesion.  Individual identity, then, is ‘the stable niche that man occupies in a 
potentially chaotic environment which he is therefore prepared vigorously to 
defend.’85  Just as Durkheim discusses anomie and its relation to suicide and Berger 
discusses the ‘rupture’ of paramount reality by unexplained phenomena, Mol 
contributes to the topic by discussing the place of individual identity not only in the 
responsive behaviours of those individuals but in relation to the drive for meaning 
within human societies.  Meaning systems are an evolutionary advantage: ‘Man’s 
creation of symbol systems facilitated man’s adaptation of changing circumstances 
quicker than is possible in species that rely on genetic and organic changes.’86 
 Mol, however, is not content with the sociological theories offered by his 
fellow observers of religion.  Much like Berger and others, Mol prefers to discuss the 
sociology of religion in terms of a working dialectic, a model that he believes has not 
received due attention.87  Indeed, Mol criticises Durkheim, Evans-Pritchard, and 
Richard Fenn for working with a ‘strategically dysfunctional definition of religion’ 
(Fenn) and minimising the ‘integrative complement’ of the two components of the 
dialectic: differentiation and order (Durkheim and Evans-Pritchard).88  Mol accepts 
the dualistic view of Durkheim, the delineation between sacred and profane, but is 
more concerned with the process of sacralisation (the making of the sacred) than with 
the sacred itself.  Thus, Mol opens the first paragraph of his key work with his 
definition of religion as ‘the sacralisation of identity’, a description that entails both 
the dialectic between order (identity) and differentiation as well as a focus on 
sociological processes rather than categories.89  In Mol’s view, this working definition 
is superior to Marxist perspectives in that the former includes natural elements such as 
individual commitment as emotional anchorage which do not receive emphasis in 
Marxism.  Accordingly, the sacralisation of identity avoids the pitfall of denying 
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ritual, myth, and objectification, a mistake Mol believes was made by Rudolph Otto in 
his disproportionate emphasis on commitment.90   
 What is more, by connecting identity with both order and stability, Mol is able 
to define sacralisation as, 
the process by means of which on the level of symbol-systems certain patterns 
acquire the same taken-for-granted, stable, eternal, quality which on the level 
of instinctive behaviour was acquired by the consolidation and stabilisation of 
new genetic materials.91 
We might note here that this concept leaves open the possibility for sacralisation to 
occur in arenas not traditionally associated with religious institutions.  This is no 
inadvertent outcome, for Mol subtly addresses the issue of secularisation by 
promulgating his definition of religion, one which is decidedly broad and does not by 
necessity exclude the potential for individuals to locate their identities in non-
religious facets of society.  Even so, Mol holds that ‘religious practices give special 
underpinning to particular conceptions of order within a culture, thus making the 
security of the individual less precarious.’92  This conclusion is reached, at least in 
part, through Mol’s familiarity with aboriginal religion in the antipodes.93  He adopts 
a sort of evolutionary perspective in his assertion that primitive belief systems (e.g., 
that of the Maori of New Zealand) tend to conflate order, spirituality, nature, and 
experience whereas more modern, western religions tend to be differentiated so as to 
adapt more effectively to changing circumstances.94  For this reason, Mol would agree 
with Davies’ comment: ‘The processes that...produce self-identity underlie all aspects 
of life, though they often become most explicit in what we call religion.’95  Davies 
offers this statement with regards to emotions, moods, and life values; yet, it is 
relevant here because, in some sense, the observation justifies Mol’s focus on 
traditional religions despite his intentionally broad definition.  Furthermore, Davies 
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highlights the essential link between identity-producing processes and religion, 
another integral element of Mol’s theory which defines religion in terms of the 
process of sacralisation acting on identity. 
 
The Sacralisation of Identity 
 The definition of sacralisation presented above, though it stands securely 
within the sociological trends stemming both from Durkheim and the 
phenomenologists, is merely an abstract sketch.  Mol, recognising the fact, dedicates 
much of Identity and the Sacred to expounding and expanding this concept.  First, 
however, he further articulates his understanding of dialectic.  ‘Security’, he says, ‘is 
bound up with order.’96  Defining identity as ‘a stable niche’, Mol equates identity 
with the human drive for order and security.  Accepting the sociological 
presupposition that humans and their societies exhibit undeniable yearnings for 
meaning, Mol, also influenced by biological studies, prefers to speak of meaning as a 
longing for wholeness, completion, and fixed points of reference.  His dialectic, then, 
is a differentiation/identity dialectic, a dualistic relationship between humanity’s 
innate drive for stability and the ever-changing experiences inhibiting that effort. 
 Mol chooses the dialectic model because he wishes to construct a widely 
useful theory of religion.  Choosing the subtitle, A sketch for a new social-scientific 
theory of religion, Mol explains, 
For a sociological theory bent on developing generalisations in which both 
past and present, primitive and modern are adequately accounted for, it is 
necessary to have a conceptual apparatus geared to both stability and change, 
to similarities and differences.97 
The reasons for such a model having been established, Mol then describes the deep 
complementarity between identity and differentiation; the one both stimulating and 
countering the other.  Too much order (if humans give themselves fully to their 
natural inclinations) can result in a religion incapable of effectively integrating forced 
changes.  An excess of differentiation can, likewise, cause the destruction of order; 
Mol poignantly (and humorously) compares this possibility to ‘too many prima 
donnas under one roof.’98   
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 There is a necessary balance between these two potentialities.99  Mol uses the 
aborigines of Tasmania as an example of too much order, or religious rigidity.  As 
Europeans began to arrive in Tasmania, the Lebenswelt of the natives was threatened.  
Their religion, a comprehensive interpretation of reality, was wrecked.  Just as steel 
increases both in rigidity and fragility as it is reheated, so there is a positive 
correlation between religious rigidity and what Mol calls ‘the fragile frame of 
identity’.100  Thus, the native population of Tasmania was not prepared for the threat 
of a new, imposing race, and their rigid system ultimately proved ineffective for 
handling such a strain.  Although this particular sort of fragility is less likely in more 
differentiated forms of religion (e.g., western iterations of Christianity), it is 
noteworthy that even the members of such groups tend to frame their experiences 
with agonistic outsiders in terms of ethnicity.  At times, the threat to group solidarity 
and stability is identified as a racial threat even in the face of compelling evidence to 
the contrary.101  Again, this is a result of inadequate, pre-existent means for dealing 
with change.  Consequently, the maintenance and protection of identity necessitates a 
surrendering to the adaptive potential of the reified religious institution in which that 
identity has been grounded.  Sacralisation is the means by which this balance is 
reached and identity is secured.   
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Objectification 
 In outlining his basic theory, Mol distinguishes four ‘mechanisms’ of the 
sacralisation process: objectification, commitment, ritual, and myth.102  The first of 
these significantly resembles the objectivation of Berger’s theory.  In fact, Mol 
describes this apparatus as ‘the projection of meaning and order into a transcendent 
point of reference where essences and archetypes of the mundane can be made to 
appear more orderly, consistent, and timeless.’103  This description actually blends 
Berger’s objectivation with his understanding of cosmisation, and it owes its 
foundational assumptions to the general projectionist ideas included in the closing 
sections of the previous chapter.  Mol asserts that objectification occurs when humans 
construct and apply symbol-systems within and to their environment.  The postulation 
that these orderly schemes possess a certain transcendent value is inevitable.  In this 
way, then, Mol seems to equate objectification with spiritualisation or (if he had not 
already defined it otherwise) sacralisation, the seemingly inadvertent extrapolation of 
meaningful social values into exogenous powers or notions of reality. 
 
Commitment 
 Again, Mol’s logical sequence strays only slightly from Berger’s.  
Recognising that the objectification of systems of meaning tends to participate in or 
act upon the lives of those individuals within the social collective Mol offers the next 
mechanism: Commitment.  Unlike Berger’s ‘internalisation’, Mol’s notion of 
commitment entails both the potent influence of the objectified order as well as the 
individual emotions and behaviours of the ‘actors’.  A number of important ideas 
coalesce in this understanding of religious commitment.  Without question, Mol 
differs from other sociologists of religion in his application of commitment to the 
analysis of religious adherents.  A brief example of this apparent difference is the 
manner in which Rodney Stark and his colleagues have typically defined religious 
commitment.  In American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment, Stark and 
Charles Glock essentially connect commitment with ‘religiousness’ and envision it as 
including five ‘dimensions’: belief, practice, knowledge, experience, and 
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consequences.104  Two decades later, Stark outlined his general theory of religion with 
William Bainbridge and kept to the same understanding of commitment intimated 
above.  For all intents and purposes, religious commitment was equated with religious 
participation.105  For Mol, writing contemporaneously with all three of these social 
scientists, this was insufficient. 
 Commitment, for him, is irrevocably intertwined with identity.  In Mol’s view, 
identity is fragile, as mentioned above, and needs both protection and conservation.  
Mol says that individuals tend to wrap their identities in ‘“don’t touch” sentiments’.106  
Those belief systems, as objectified symbol-systems, which are able to provide for the 
preservation of meaningful stability, are guarded similarly.  Davies also highlights 
this human proclivity: ‘Yet, even theologically speaking, people do have a capacity, 
perhaps even a tendency, to place above all contradiction those persons, places, and 
beliefs that have given them some special sense of purpose and existence.’107  Thus, 
Mol believes that this emotional attachment to the objectified scheme is commitment; 
it is ‘an anchoring of the emotions in a salient system of meaning, social, group, or 
personal, whether abstract or concrete.’108  Commitment is not restricted to religious 
praxis, as Stark and Glock seem to argue.  Furthermore, Mol’s understanding of 
commitment encompasses more than individual emotions; it is tied to group and 
individual identity as well as the notion of ‘foci of identity’.  Mol believes that, as 
social beings, humans tend to focus their identities by various means and in multiple 
locations.  This argument seems to rely on the observation that humanity endures the 
incessant mercuriality of existence and attempts to match the differentiation of culture 
and social reality with a sort of identity complex, seeking a broad footing against the 
shifting antagonisms of mundane life. 
 It is important to comprehend the degree to which Mol emphasises both the 
individual and the collective, the abstract and the concrete.  With this scope in mind, 
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he expresses the relationship of identity and commitment to charisma and conversion.  
Charisma refers to the process, at the collective level, whereby change is integrated 
and incorporated into a new identity.109  The charismatic leader is able to reconstruct 
group identity after change led to marginality.  This mimics the process of personal 
conversion which consists of the shedding of an old identity and an ‘attachment to the 
new focus of identity’.110  Of course, this new focus of identity may be the tangible 
geniality, thus confidence-bolstering influence, of a group’s leader or it may be the 
abstract soteriology that ostensibly stabilises and interprets existence.  In either case, 
the conserved or newly focused identity is in need of forced adaptation, but only to a 
limited extent.   
 
Ritual 
 Mol deviates from the sociology of knowledge again when he asserts that what 
matters most is not the presence or absence of conscious awareness but the issue of 
defending the ‘boundaries’ of a group or individual’s identity.  This goal is at least 
partially achieved through the third component of the sacralisation process - namely, 
the presence of ritual.  If the inclusion of commitment allowed Mol to address the 
emotional aspect of religion, the personal conviction and defensive loyalty of group 
members to the stable identity on offer; the notion of ritual permits Mol to engage 
concepts of embodiment, habitus, and the instruments available for the execution of 
commitment compulsions.  By ritual, Mol intends the ‘repetitive enactment of human 
systems of meaning.’111  He agrees with the remark by sociologist Talcott Parsons that 
ritual is ‘one of the fundamental defence mechanisms of society against the tendency 
to anomie.’112  Rituals reinforce and refocus identities.   Significant overlap exists 
between ritual and the other integral sacralising devices.  For instance, the possibility 
of participation in rites offers the adherent an outlet for commitment.  Likewise, the 
desire to maintain stability impels the group and its members to constantly ‘act out’ 
the sacred identity, resulting in rituals that effectively extend the collective memory of 
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the group and, in so doing, legitimate the objectified version of reality often 
articulated in terms of theology or mythology.  In close relation to this, is the interplay 
between commitment and ritual with regards to identity.  In establishing identity, 
whether through conversion or charisma, ritual can involve recurrent detachment and 
attachment of emotions; this process only proving successful if the attached emotions 
are accompanied by a renewed commitment.  Mol observes, however, that although 
commitment is always a constituent of ritual, the reverse is not the case.  
Consequently, Mol delineates between ritual and commitment according to whether 
or not these are ‘rational actions’.  The latter may be so, but ritual is overtly an act of 
emotion; it is involved in ‘arousing the sentiments’.113 
  
Myth 
 Influenced by historian of religion Mircea Eliade, Mol considers myths to 
have a signal role in both the interpretation of reality and the sacralisation of 
experiences for a group.114  Mol eloquently and succinctly states that myths ‘provide 
the fitting contour for existence.’  Later in this chapter, and corroborated by concrete 
examples in the fourth chapter, this assertion concerning the social function of myths 
will be championed in connection with soteriologies.  The present study holds that, 
among second-century Christians and early Mormons, Mol’s dialectical theory is 
exemplified in the existence of soteriological schemas, interpretive constructs which 
integrate individual/collective experience (heresy in the form of opposition) within an 
unreceptive society into a cohesive, motivating plan for the religious community.  
Though it is not all that is intended, these schemas certainly include myth and 
narrative.  Mol promulgates a view of myth that obviates discussion of its 
characteristic form (i.e., narrative, iterative, philosophical, or otherwise).  What seems 
most important is the symbolic quality of myths; their interpretations of reality are 
relayed as symbol-systems: ‘A myth, then, is the synthesis, or crystallisation, as Lévi-
Strauss calls it, of diverse cultural elements around a suitable symbolic core.’115 
 The differentiation/identity dialectic is never a distant thought for Mol.  In his 
exposure of myth as a sacralising tool, Mol presents a lengthy, albeit compelling, 
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gloss on the good company he shares in positing the idea that symbol-systems tend to 
reflect a complementary duality between order and disorder.  Space does not permit a 
due engagement with this portion of his work, but it is instructive simply to list the 
sources used by Mol for support of his juxtaposition between differentiation and 
stability: the Bible, Confucius, Durkheim, Goethe, Hegel, Husserl, William James, 
Lévi-Strauss, Plato, and Weber.116   
 One example of such a dichotomy is that between sin and salvation.  This 
illustration not only allows Mol to narrow his focus to Western, Christian forms of 
religion but also permits an examination of the ways in which the differentiation of 
culture parallels the increasing complexity of religious myths.  Endeavouring to 
compose a general theory of religion, equally valid for primitive and modern religious 
systems, Mol must address the observable trajectory of the relationship between the 
human and his environment.  In primitive societies, the counterpart to the social 
stability sought in culture was the unpredictability of nature.  However, as scientific 
and technological progress produced an individual more adroit at subduing and 
manipulating his environs, the conflict of order and adaptation relocated to the stage 
of culture alone.117  Here, in the modern forms of religion, one encounters an 
oscillation between various constitutive facets of social life.  This dissonance 
engenders such theological ideas as sin and salvation, the regenerate and the 
unregenerate. 
 The belief systems attached to myths, therefore, must neutralise the deleterious 
potential of the inherent instability of society.  They must possess ‘durability’.118  
Those myths capable of achieving and maintaining an effective degree of this 
durability may actually benefit from the challenge.  This is Davies’ point when he 
states that the explanatory power of soteriology is based on the diversity of the 
                                               
116
 Ibid., 247-49.  The reader may immediately recognise the connection with a number of these 
thinkers.  For instance, Lévi-Strauss is known in the social science community for initiating the 
Structuralist school of thought which held a priori that the true meaning of myths lies below the 
surface in the form of multiple binary oppositions.  Similarly, Hegelian philosophy is often 
recognisable due to its postulation of both an original thesis and the subsequent presence of its 
antithesis.  Of course Confucius propagated the antithetical powers of Yin and Yang, underlying all of 
existence. 
 
117
 Ibid., 255. 
 
118
 Mol, Identity and the Sacred, 252. 
 
  
93 
 
cultures out of which it arises.119  Integration of discordant experience is the raison 
d’être of myth.  As a result, it is perpetually changing in composition as it comes into 
contact with novel experiences, cultures, locations, etc.  Over time, the value of the 
myth is its aptitude at resolving the irresolvable through emotionally anchoring 
identity in an explication of the binary oppositions of the human experience.  In other 
words, myths acknowledge the opposed forces of existence and achieve meaning by 
rendering this opposition simultaneously harmless and meaningful.  Just as ritual 
steadies the emotions through repetitious re-involvement in consolidating order, so 
‘myth sacralises by recurrent narration.’120  This is, to a great extent, the overlap of 
these two mechanisms of sacralisation; both reiterate the sacred identity, one through 
conceptualisation, the other through somatic involvement.121 
 
Critique and Application 
 Our chapter began with a binary focus, suggesting that the process which leads 
from the experience of heresy to the profession of belief could only be understood 
after exploring the epistemological process whereby groups come to share a 
perception of reality, both processes deserving equal analysis.  This was, and is, 
expressed somewhat axiomatically, for religious adherents could not have their 
realities shaken by oppositional experiences if they did not have a reality from the 
start.  Believing that humans are naturally social animals, we also believe that those 
perceptions of reality are inescapably dependent on shared understandings and 
interpretations of experience made plausible through incessant social reinforcement.   
 Thus, it has been necessary to elucidate the fundamental assumptions and 
conclusions informing this study before proceeding with the specific examples of the 
heretical process at work in the nascent stages of Christianity and Mormonism.  It is 
for this purpose that the above review of Mol’s theory is included.  Although 
considerable space was dedicated to the endeavour, it is because the portions of the 
study that follow rely heavily on a number of specific insights offered by Mol that we 
have grappled with his overall approach in its entirety, coming to terms with its 
intricacies, strengths, and weaknesses.  That being accomplished, we can now more 
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precisely address the utility of his thought for the study at hand with a special eye for 
the arguable superiority of his theories over those of Berger. 
 
Identity 
 One of the most significant elements of Mol’s definition of religion is its 
incorporation of the concept of identity, not simply its inclusion but its proposed 
definition of identity.  Mol is not, for example, content with the type of identity 
envisaged by sociologist Orrin Klapp:  
...a functioning system of three variables: 1) what a person thinks about 
himself introspectively, 2) what he projects or sees imaged or accepted in the 
eyes of others (his social identity); and 3) his feelings validated when ‘real to 
me’ and when shared with others.122 
This sort of three-fold definition is still popular among scholars of religion,123 yet Mol 
believes that it ignores the context within which such self-definition can occur.  
Instead, Mol takes identity to mean ‘units of social organisation’.124  This, though a 
bit abstruse, obtains a degree of cogency once placed within Mol’s dialectic.  Not only 
is Mol interested in accounting for both individual and group identities, conspicuously 
espousing the Durkheimian view of humans as Homo duplex, but he also always 
interprets identity through the lens of a complementary dualism between 
differentiation (adaptation) and order.   
 If religion is socially constructed as Berger and others suggest, it necessarily 
involves individuals who contribute to its plausibility structure by grounding their 
identities therein.  Religion is the ‘sacralisation of identity’ because it is the process of 
resolving discordance between social units (identities).  Mol does not supplant Berger 
but, instead, supplements Berger by arguing that these identities may exist in conflict 
with one another, meaning that religion is not solely the attempt to resolve anomie by 
positing a transcendent, objective explanation but entails the erection of a stable 
haven in which anomie and other identity conflicts can find stability.  This is a social 
process to be sure, but Mol is careful to highlight that it rests on more than the 
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externalisation of the outcomes of social living, also entailing an emotional grounding 
aimed at resisting the perpetual oscillation between adaptation and stability.  In 
bringing emotion, adaptability, and identity into the discussion, Mol moves beyond 
relatively restrictive deterministic tendencies seen in theorists such as Berger and 
allows room for the analysis of religious innovation and creativity, an important 
advantage of Mol’s thoughts for our own study of deification in relation to existential 
crises faced by remarkably resourceful religious leaders.  Using Mol’s theory, for 
example, it is possible to predict some degree of theological creativity as communities 
are motivated to maintain identity through adaptability, the latter abetted by a strong 
sense of emotional commitment. 
 
Emotion and Ritual 
 In some ways Mol was ahead of his time in that he included emotions in his 
general theory of religion.  As has been shown, this was partly a function of his 
reading of Lorenz, a zoologist who claimed that animal aggression served 
multifarious purposes for groups of species, both internally and externally.  Mol 
recognised that any discussion of identity in general and religious identity in 
particular, required an acknowledgement of human affect.  Asserting that emotions 
contribute to stability by conducting focus, commitment, and impulse; Mol 
underscored the importance of individual action and the intensity that attaches itself to 
humanity’s valued alcoves of meaning. 
 Although one of Mol’s objectives is to correct what he sees as shortcomings in 
the work of his contemporaries, he avoids discarding ‘the baby with the bathwater’.  
His elucidation of the place of ritual within the system not only relates that concept to 
emotions but is also in harmony with ideas presented by Berger just a few years later.  
In order to comprehend the value of Mol’s model, it may be beneficial to explain 
Berger’s views on ritual and tradition.  Berger, over the course of many pages, 
establishes an essential link between tradition, ritual, and collective memory.125  
Traditions, and their accompanying rituals, allow religious groups to continually 
reiterate and relive supernatural occurrences.  Expressed alternatively, past moments 
of ecstasy or divine intervention are preserved in tradition; these experiences are then 
made available to all members, regardless of place or position.  More importantly, 
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these traditions and rituals create a meaningful longevity and continuity within the 
religious institution, resulting in a collective cluster of legitimated memories and 
transcendent signifiers without the need for recurring signs and wonders. 
 As we persist in our objective both to analyse heresy as a sociological process 
and investigate its workings within two disparate religious traditions, it is 
advantageous to reflect on this conceptualisation of ritual, its attendant emotions, and 
collective memory.  It may initially appear facile to stress the direct connection 
between ritual and emotion, given that the former often pursues specific forms of the 
latter; however, there is more to this phenomenon; rituals benefit the community 
through numerous means.  For instance, they allow for participation, facilitating and 
producing solidarity and socialisation.  Additionally, rituals indicate what Davies calls 
a religious community’s ‘preferred emotions’ and serve as something of a litmus test 
for the social compatibility of member to group.126  To this idea of a collectivity’s 
preferred emotions, we might justifiably add the notion of ‘preserved emotions’.  Just 
as groups tend to repeat and retain their preferred emotions, so their rites ensure 
lasting influence over the emotions inherited by succeeding generations.   
 This is something of the message intended by Berger in addressing the social 
function of religious traditions; however, as rites preserve the preferred, they ipso 
facto supply degrees of temporal continuity, or collective memory.  Religions are not 
only involved in the sacralisation of present identities or more precisely, the present 
sacralisation of identities; they benefit from sacralising identities into the firm 
foundation of historical security, the meaningful memory of the sacred.  Similar 
observations have come from a variety of disciplines.  New Testament scholar Judith 
Lieu offers one of the most incisive remarks on the topic when she expounds the 
reflections of historian John Gillis: 
The relationship between who we are and the past we tell is a reciprocal one 
and is rarely static: as John Gillis remarks, ‘The core meaning of any 
individual or group identity, namely a sense of sameness over time and space, 
is sustained by remembering, and what is remembered is defined by the 
assumed identity.’  Thus, ‘remembering’ creates a history that provides a 
coherent continuity out of the discontinuities of all human experience; it not 
only explains the present but justifies it.127 
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Likewise, historian Elizabeth Castelli directs congruent remarks at the concept of 
Christian martyrdom as it is imagined by those within the ranks.  Her conclusion is 
that feelings of marginality find purpose in the ongoing construction of a ‘collectively 
livable[sic] story’ brought about by the interminable narration of past persecutions.128  
This phenomenon, again, relies on an awareness of embodiment in the perpetuation of 
group identity through ritual and corresponding emotions; this coalesces into a sort of 
animate memory.   
 These observations are integral for the present intention of discovering the 
effects of heresy on the perceptions and beliefs of a religious group.  The life of a 
religious movement may, at times, depend on the efficacy of such efforts.  For 
example, a Christian continuity of belief can be seen in such statements as Hebrews 
13:8, ‘Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever.’  Such confessions 
effectively demonstrate the overlap and intersection of Mol’s concepts: 
objectification, commitment, ritual, and myth.  In addition, it betrays a degree of 
conscious-awareness among the adherents, at least at the collective level; the religious 
community propagates a shared interpretation of reality, including its past, present, 
and future. 
 Some sociologists, such as Eileen Barker, have observed the changes that 
occur over time within religious movements, noting that new religious movements 
tend to deviate away from a Weberian ideal type (charismatic leader-led group) as 
they encounter changes internally and externally.129  The change, it is claimed, always 
progresses toward further assimilation with, and accommodation of, the surrounding 
culture.130  Though it is agreed that ‘factors associated with the passage of time...do 
dictate that a movement will change’ (original emphasis),131 this may not always 
manifest as greater assimilation.  In fact, religious studies scholar Stephen Taysom 
argues that, in the case of Mormonism, a particular pattern remerges time and again in 
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which external pressure does force a form of accommodation.  This accommodation, 
however, is not unalloyed; it entails the reconstitution of those ‘boundaries that are 
dissolved’.132  Taysom is responding to the conventional vision of Mormon history 
that sees the church’s 1890 manifesto banning polygamy as a pivotal moment 
signifying a new accommodating response to outside influence. 
 Taysom offers a much needed correction to the scholarly engagement with 
Mormon history, but Barker’s observations are not altogether invalid for our 
purposes.  In the same article mentioned above, she highlights the process whereby a 
new religious movement instigates and sanctions its own internal changes in order to 
expand geographically and socially.  The results of such changes may include new 
‘interpretations’ and ‘influences’ as converts are welcomed from a variety of 
cultures.133  This, Barker asserts, is necessary for the achievement of balance in the 
demographic distribution of the group, a balance needed to achieve longevity and 
viability.  In an indirect, and admittedly inadvertent, manner, Barker supports one of 
Mol’s most valuable contributions: the adaptability/stability dialectic. 
 
Restoring the Balance 
 As indicated in the previous chapter, Rodney Stark includes ‘a medium level 
of tension with the surrounding environment’ as one necessary trait for successful 
religious movements.  Another sociologist, Lorne Dawson, similarly states, 
If strictness contributes to the competitive edge of a group, then 
accommodation may harm it.  But accommodation to the dominant society 
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seems advantageous in other ways.  Success hinges on sustaining a delicate 
balance of these elements in the face of known and unknown contingencies.134 
Stark and Dawson arrive at this conclusion through a different set of premises than 
Mol; nevertheless, there is obvious agreement.  Religious groups function optimally 
when they are not acutely rigid or exceedingly flexible.  This is the reason for Mol’s 
dialectic.  Mol prefers the differentiation/identity dialectic; yet, heuristic value 
increases if it is termed the adaptability/stability dialectic.  This emphasises the 
contrariety and complementarity between culture’s imposition of adaptation and the 
human drive for sure footing.  Berger and others within the sociology of knowledge 
framework do address the social function of religion once the life-world has been 
negatively affected; however, they rarely illuminate the process comprising this 
resolution of anomie.  Mol is successful in this endeavour.  His vision of constant play 
between forces of differentiation and demands for order poignantly points to the 
consequent role of religion in society.  Religion does more than provide meaning; it 
integrates the extremes of life.  Whereas Berger positions chaos in opposition to the 
sacred,135 Mol places chaos in opposition to order and proposes ‘the sacred’ as that 
which balances the two. 
 Mol’s notion of sacralisation resembles Berger’s concept of ‘cosmisation’.  
That being said, Mol disagrees with Berger’s definition of religion as ‘the audacious 
attempt to conceive of the entire universe as being humanly significant.’136  Religion 
is, instead, the ‘sacralisation of identity’.  It certainly encompasses the process of 
‘cosmisation’ but also acknowledges the importance of various foci, perhaps we 
might even say loci of identity.  The individual locates his or her identity in the 
posited nomos of religion through commitment, ritual, objectification, and myth.  
Religion is not the attempt to understand the cosmos as significantly ordered, it is the 
process by which individuals and groups comes to believe and participate in that 
ordered scheme in such a way that their identity shares the sacred status of the 
cosmological conception itself. 
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 However, Mol arguably muddies the waters with his use of biological 
metaphors.  For instance, the human immune system consists of white bloods cells 
that respond to intrusion by destroying the invader whilst religions do not always act 
in a solely responsive manner that categorises experiences as ‘harmful’ or 
‘familiar’.137   Mol does address this in his conclusion.  There, he compares the 
sacralisation process to the behaviour of an oyster; it ‘adjusts itself to the intruding 
grain of sand by coating it with nacre’.138  This is a little more suitable even if religion 
is still seen as reactionary, always compelled to adapt to changing circumstances.  
Braj Sinha offered a similar observation concerning Mol’s model in the essay, ‘Ways 
of Yoga and the Mechanisms of Sacralisation’.139  Applying the identity theory to the 
various forms of Yoga within the Hindu tradition, Sinha resolves what he perceives as 
Mol’s short-sightedness by postulating a fifth mechanism of sacralisation, viz., 
appropriation.140  Appropriation is the means by which the sacralised thought-forms 
and social units continue to interact with everyday life, ensuring the future success of 
the sacralising process and the religious group itself.  Although we suggest a different 
vantage and a correspondingly different terminology, Sinha’s basic critique is both 
incisive and instructive.  Even though an identity has become sacred, it must 
continually remain permeable from both the transcendent side and the mundane side. 
 In the following pages, this tension between adaptability on the one hand and 
stability on the other is to be understood as a form of elasticity or malleability.  
Embracing Sinha’s critique, we utilise Mol’s dialectic to inform our analysis of heresy 
and its relationship to developing theological notions not only by directing our 
attention to the instability and corresponding fragility of identity caused by opposition 
to a religious community but also by suggesting a form of ‘survival of the fittest’.  
Religious institutions must ensure a degree of flexibility early in their development as 
a movement in order to maximise their future potential and adapt successfully by 
appropriating that which was sacralised.  From a theoretical perspective the heretical 
process, or the method by which agonism stimulates fresh articulation of belief, 
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results in a more perfectly balanced belief system capable of incorporating and 
explaining changes whilst protecting group cohesion.  If new religious movements 
hope to survive in the face of opposition, they must recognise the threats to their 
identity and allow such threats to shape their doctrines, a social process to which we 
now turn our attention. 
 
When Position becomes Confession 
 The following sketch of social heresy and its potentially constructive 
consequences for religious groups facing opposition is presented with some 
reservation; for, though it is not the author’s intention, it may be read as various 
stages in a sequential process instead of the constituent, overlapping parts of a social 
phenomenon.  For this reason, the heretical process may alternatively be described as 
the heretical event.  Some historical examples may exhibit consecutive, distinct stages 
but the two illustrative groups analysed in the next two chapters present what may be 
a more typical case in which heresy appears as an almost simultaneous confluence of 
component occurrences.  Indeed, the mechanisms of the process delineated below are 
separated somewhat artificially so that we may analyse them more effectively in our 
conceptual sketch of the process at the root of the apparent affinity between religious 
groups facing overt social opposition and soteriological schemas entailing deification.   
 Based on the preceding assumptions and conclusions of the sociologists of 
knowledge as well as Mol’s dialectic, it is taken as something of a basic principle that 
social circumstances greatly influence religious beliefs, even if this argument is rather 
easily overstated.  Much of the criticism Peter Berger has received, for instance, goes 
back to this (mis)interpretation of his work.  He is understood as claiming that 
religions and their belief systems are entirely constructed by humans, and that the 
process is both inevitable and inadvertent, a flirtation with utterly deterministic views.  
This is, of course, not far from Durkheim’s understanding of the way in which 
religion simply reflects society, the former existing as an elementary ‘given’ of social 
living. 
 Furthermore, as we mentioned above, these ideas lack an account of the 
imaginative and creative capacity of individuals.  Even so, the basic sociological 
contention that context gives rise to religious particularity remains valuable for 
religious studies and is embraced in our study for its utility in understanding the 
professions uttered by persecuted religions.  The heretical process, then, involves a 
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constellation of events that leads from a religious group’s social position to their 
theological confession.  There has been some debate about the relative value of social 
conflict.141  Some, like Bruce, believe that social conflict can be rather easily 
dismissed if the challenged group can compose an explanatory theory for why they 
are superior.  He does, however, admit that this solution requires social plausibility; if 
it lacks common acceptance, it may fully dissolve and leave the threat intact.142  Many 
methodological options are available for acknowledging the potentially detrimental 
effect of conflict; however, it is Mol’s dialectic between adaptability and stability that 
will be put to such uses in our study.  In his view, too much adaptability or too much 
rigidity can result in the breakdown of the religious group; therefore, the heretical 
process as we envision it is the set of actions on the part of the persecuted group 
aimed at identifying and disarming heresy in order to maintain a harmonious balance 
between stability and change.   
 In the following pages, then, conflict is understood as unquestionably 
containing the purest potential for positive reconstitutions of belief and identity when 
it occurs within religious contexts.  This is because conflict, opposition, anomie, and 
any other social force associated with the volatile fault lines of social life have 
historically left indelible imprints on the religious sentiments and expressions of those 
involved.  If religion functions as the great framer of the inexplicable, then 
confounding moments unlock the power of religion.  This does not imply, however, 
that social conflict (as a category of such moments) unfailingly produces positive 
outcomes for each and every religious group.  What is argued is that such events are 
densely pregnant with constructive potential, almost begging the religious community 
to engage in healthy stretches of their boundaries and beliefs.  Philip Mellor asserts of 
Durkheim that he ‘does not suggest that the capacity to believe is socially constituted, 
only that the nature of beliefs is shaped by social relationships...’ (original 
emphasis).143  Durkheim’s position, then, is closely related to our own. 
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 Indeed, we understand the process of heresy as the convergence of three 
distinct social phenomena: reception, recognition, and resolution.  This threefold 
model is not without justification, for it not only owes something to the socialisation 
theory of Berger (externalisation-objectivation-internalisation) but also stands in the 
good company of more recent scholars like Taysom and Jōrg Stolz.144  Stolz defines a 
‘sociological explanation’ of a phenomenon as an explanation that shows ‘how an 
initial situation (macro) leads individuals to react to this situation (micro) and how, 
through aggregation, these individual reactions combine to form a new social outcome 
(macro).’145  This basic sociological pattern is observable in the heretical event in 
which agonism is experienced (reception), the in-group reacts with varying degrees of 
progress from confusion to ardour (recognition), and then the opposition is integrated 
into their beliefs as one method for mollification (resolution).  Regarding Mormonism 
specifically, this is strikingly akin to Taysom’s claim that the nineteenth-century 
history of the Latter-day Saints presents a pattern of responses to opposition which 
consists of three phases: ‘the assertion of an ideal, external pressure met with internal 
resistance, and finally, external pressure met with internal accommodation.’146  
Taysom’s final two phases are relatively indistinguishable from those of ‘recognition’ 
and ‘resolution’. However, the first phase (asserting an ideal) is taken for granted in 
the heretical model; the ideal represents the social position and religious professions 
opposed by outsiders.  Again, it is also important to remember that, in 
contradistinction with Taysom’s notion, the process of heresy is not so much 
composed of ‘phases’ as it is with overlapping events or episodes.  It may be helpful 
to conceptualise the relationship between the three episodes as somewhat analogous 
to, although far from perfectly parallel with, that between emotions and moods.  If 
emotions are the immediate, initial, and ephemeral responses and moods are the 
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consequent, lasting orientations;147 ‘reception’ corresponds to the former, ‘resolution’ 
to the latter, with ‘recognition’ bridging the two through an increase of conscious 
awareness. 
  
Reception 
 In 2004, philosopher John Gray published a book entitled, Heresies: Against 
Progress and Other Illusions.148  This collection of independent reflections on the 
state of politics and society takes its name from Gray’s assertion that he has chosen to 
adopt dissenting, non-conformist positions on key issues.  His underlying view is that 
heresy involves the conscious exercise of one’s volition; to be heretical is to choose 
an unpopular position in relation to some orthodoxy.  Though Gray’s publication 
stands outside of the scope and subject of the present study, his choice of title directs 
our attention to an important issue regarding heresy and religious conflict: Is it all a 
matter of conscious choice?   
 If one episode in the heretical process involves the reception of opposition, 
and reception often connotes a degree of passivity, it is with considerable justification 
that we ask the above question.  Just as we noted the relativity behind designations of 
‘heresy’ and ‘orthodoxy’ in the previous chapter, so here the perception of a group or 
individual is important.  What one group believes to be the innocent, passive 
toleration of opposition, another group understands to be the assertive and wily 
implementation of rhetoric and strategy.  Once again, heresy is ultimately a matter of 
perspective, and our decision to discuss experiences of opposition in terms of 
receiving heresy is an intentional decision to highlight the presence of what we will 
frequently call a martyrdom mentality, a state of mind characterised by an insistence 
on in-group innocence (thus, moral superiority) and out-group culpability combined 
with intense concern for the future perpetuation of a narrative in which this innocence 
is a central focus. 
 Such competing perspectives are encountered in Mormon Studies, for 
example, in the somewhat contradictory claims of R. Laurence Moore and Terryl 
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Givens.  The former describes the difficulties in arriving at the ‘objective’ truth of the 
historical record concerning Mormonism and offers a possible conclusion: 
Mormons were different because they said they were different and because 
their claims, frequently advanced in the most obnoxious way possible, 
prompted others to agree and to treat them as such.  The notion of Mormon 
difference, that is, was a deliberate invention elaborated over time.  It was both 
cause and result of a conflict in which all parties discovered reasons to stress 
not what Mormons had in common with other Americans, which was a great 
deal, but what they did not have in common.149 
Yet, Terryl Givens believes that Mormons did not exaggerate in their accounts of the 
tempestuous record with Americans and the American government; instead, Givens 
interprets the recurring theme of persecution in Mormon history as ‘emphasising’ 
what was already an accurate telling of real events.150  He does acknowledge that this 
emphasis strengthened solidarity among the Mormons and concedes that the Mormon 
record includes ‘a vocabulary of exclusion’ that would prove incendiary in their 
relations with outsiders.151   
 As this example illustrates, the vantage point is integral to the heretical 
process.  Indeed, reception is the slave of perception in that the heuristic and 
analytical efficacy of the former cannot be measured without full acceptance of the 
inherent constraints of the latter.  In both illustrative examples to be more fully 
explored in the following two chapters, history exhibits actual events of acute, 
personal attacks on the members of the religious group in question.  Even if the 
reliability of the historical record is questioned, however, the minimum requirement 
for an analysis of social heresy is simply the in-group perception of opposition.  As 
Moore states later in his book, ‘[Joseph Smith’s] mission had no chance of going 
anywhere without opposition, both real and imagined’ (emphasis added).152  Be it 
rhetorical device propelled by cunning agendas or careless historical scholarship, the 
absence of significant external forces of heresy does not necessarily preclude the 
presence of a reception mentality.  Although the notion of a religious group 
possessing such a state of mind is a rather simple one, two elements should be 
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highlighted.  The first is the social status/social power of the group; the other is the 
confusion surrounding the event of reception.   
 
Power & Status 
  When discussing the reception of heresy, one must give pride of place to the 
topics of societal marginality and social power.  Not only are the two necessarily 
connected, but the experience of heresy as an opposition against beliefs, social status, 
and physical wellbeing inevitably underscores the degree to which a group has 
enjoyed acceptance by its society.  Each of the three forms of opposition, likewise, 
affects status and power in a unique way.  For example, doctrinal opposition can only 
come after the initial expression of beliefs by the opposed group, for there must be 
something to oppose.  Accordingly, the group may experience an increase in the 
intensity of their social marginality which effectively means an increase in the other 
two types (societal and physical).  In contrast, the amount of power or status accorded 
a community that has not yet articulated aberrant doctrines and/or has not sought any 
social acceptance may or may not fluctuate at all.  What is most important for the 
present purposes is that the reception event entails, at the least, society’s collective 
statement on the social status of the opposed group.  At times, it is both a statement 
and a calculated response from society meant to diminish the power and ensure lower 
status in the future by accusing the nascent movements of subversive practices, an 
incredibly effective method of marginalisation employed against both the early 
Christians and the early Mormons. 
 For those in the in-group, this event is initially perceived as injurious and 
undesirable, but it is not yet recognised as social heresy.  In this moment, the heresy is 
only (but meaningfully) an original, agonistic experience such as physical persecution 
or political oppression.  This occurs as acute, destabilising heresy within the 
Lebenswelten of the individuals and the collective. In the case of physical heresy, both 
the immediate victims and those who are more indirectly touched by the incidents 
may experience almost instantaneous anomie for, as Berger says,  
The marginal situation par excellence, however, is death.  Witnessing the 
death of others (notably, of course, of significant others) and anticipating his 
own death, the individual is strongly propelled to question the ad hoc 
cognitive and normative procedures of his ‘normal’ life in society.153 
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Later, Berger says that these same experiences are ‘the most important marginal 
situations,’ to face death is to face a total disruption in social order.154  Indeed, it is a 
challenge to maintain the belief that one’s group is centrally significant in a society 
which is currently threatening that group’s very existence.  This is all the more 
strongly felt when the group is of a religious nature - in most cases, such a group will 
hold certain beliefs concerning salvation, transcendence, and the supernatural, and 
these beliefs and their explanatory power may receive direct impact from the blows of 
death and persecution.  This is not to claim, however, that the reception of heresy is 
actually or ultimately detrimental to the cohesion of the group or its soteriological 
systems.  In fact, this study contends otherwise and, hopefully, goes some way toward 
arguing that these experiences (when ‘recognition’ occurs) result in more complex 
and adaptable systems of belief.  In fact, even simple rituals may alleviate the pain 
and social disillusionment accompanying the reception of heresy.  One example of 
this is to be found among the various aboriginal peoples of Australia whose intricate 
death rites serve to ease the evolution, not from a pre-death to a uniquely post-death 
state but from rupture to normality.155   
 The topic of death, of course, is quite significant for sociologically-informed 
studies of religion.  As Daniel Bell notes, the ‘human predicament’ is characterised by 
a ‘nagging sense of mortality’.156  Much like the existential emphasis of Berger’s 
statements above, Bell’s belief is that any attempt to understand human culture will 
involve addressing the crisis of impending death.  Psychologists also seem to concur 
on this point; human behaviour is often motivated by thoughts on or reactions to, 
death.  As a member of the psychological field, Nathan Adler borrowed from 
theological language and constructed a definition for what he called ‘the antinomian 
personality’.157  ‘Antinomian’ (from αντι + νόµος, ‘against law’) was first used by 
Martin Luther to describe various Christian groups of his day who had entirely 
discarded the Decalogue or any other moral code as a result of their firm (and 
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extremely literal) understanding of sola fide.158  In this sense, antinomian came to 
refer to such groups and the general outlook they represented; a theological 
understanding of grace in which an irreversible type of justification occurs wholly 
separate from behaviour or adherence to moral law and which results in the belief that 
sin is impossible.  Adler, however, takes the term more literally and appropriates it for 
his own purposes - he is in good company, of course, as the earlier comments on 
Durkheim’s use of anomie and Berger’s application of nomos show159  – explaining 
his use of the expression in his study of various counter-cultural movements of the 
1960s: 
The personality type which I call ‘antinomian’ is manifested by one whose 
frame of reference is threatened or has been disrupted.  He suffers from a 
breakdown in the balance of his control and release mechanisms and from the 
permeability of his body boundaries. (emphasis added)160 
In Adler’s view, those who exhibit the antinomian personality also can be said to 
express a ‘gnostic orientation’ in opposition to ‘the lawful or legitimate institutions of 
the particular society’ in which they reside.161  Although the present concern is not 
with subversive, psychological modes, Adler’s understanding of the antinomian 
personality as ‘one whose frame of reference is threatened’ and who experiences ‘the 
permeability of his body boundaries’ is helpful for underscoring the perceived loss of 
social power or capital and the disconcerting effects of having confronted death as 
well as physical, societal, and doctrinal opposition. 
 Viewed in this negative sense, with heresy presented as the absence or 
decrease of social influence or power, one can begin to recognise the nature of the 
reception episode.  Again, this event is ultimately undesirable whether or not the 
group incited or encouraged such distressing opposition.  Some groups may come to 
value the functional potential of the following two episodes in the process and, thus, 
embrace agonism in their relations with society.  For others, the occasion of facing 
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death, injury, and marginality is alienating and deleterious precisely because it is 
novel and collective foresight is absent.  Even so, existence on the periphery of 
society may lead to certain affinities between group members and soteriologies that 
empower.  Davies connects salvation beliefs with an innate human need for 
empowerment, suggesting that religious adherents will predictably disavow one 
system of meaning in favour of another if the latter appears ‘more compelling or all-
embracing’.162  A similar assumption is manifested here, and illustrated later, as those 
religious groups who are opposed by their societies, physically persecuted, and 
theologically or ideologically challenged are shown to interpret the struggle in terms 
of a loss of power, order, and stability.  Although this initially creates existential angst 
and confusion, it can often lead to the espousal of deifying soteriologies.  Such 
resolving beliefs, however, cannot occur until after the recognition of heresy.  
Likewise, recognition may not elevate the agonistic quality of the shared experiences 
to the level of collective consciousness without said experiences having first 
confounded the actors. 
 
Dissonance, Equivocation, and Cognition 
 Spearheaded by Harvey Whitehouse and research institutes such as the 
Cognition and Culture Research Unit of Aarhus University, the cognitive science of 
religion has become one of the predominant approaches to religious studies in the 
twenty-first century.163  Taking as its foundational assumption the belief that human 
cognition not only helps explain specific religious phenomena but actually illuminates 
the biological propensities for religious belief inherent in human evolution, this 
relatively recent perspective justifiably directs attention to the role of cognition and 
mental processing in humanity’s interaction with religion (at both the institutional and 
individual levels).  Well before these types of studies were in vogue, however, 
psychologist Leon Festinger et alii engaged in a groundbreaking field study on the 
psychological effects of prophetic disconfirmation.164  In the published summary of 
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the study, Festinger coined a term which was subsequently incorporated into everyday 
parlance: ‘cognitive dissonance’.165  By this term, Festinger and his colleagues 
intended to elucidate the mental unrest exhibited by members of the small apocalyptic 
group they studied.  The party in question, a small collective of like-minded 
individuals who shared a passion for extraterrestrial topics such as Martians and 
UFOs and who also centred themselves on the other-worldly ‘communications’ 
received by one of their fold, had publicly announced a number of specific prophecies 
concerning the end of the world and accompanying catastrophic events.  Festinger and 
others managed to infiltrate the group and observe members’ reactions when the 
aforementioned prophecies were disconfirmed. 
 As a form of cognition, dissonance referred to the adherence to and possession 
of two or more inconsistent beliefs, opinions, or attitudes.  As an example, Festinger 
mentions a cigarette smoker who believes that smoking is detrimental to physical 
health.166  In that case, the smoker actively participates in the very activity he or she 
believes to be undesirable.  In such instances, the individual is forced to reconcile the 
contradictory information, a process that may be rapid with the dissonance mollified 
relatively effortlessly or that may cause significant disorientation and psychological 
grief.  Either way, the very nature of cognitive dissonance is an immediate need to 
regain consonance between existing expectations and present experiences. In his 
landmark study, Festinger concludes that when the cause of the dissonance is the 
irrefutable and irreconcilable disconfirmation of a specific religious belief, the 
affected individual is likely to intensify their proselytising efforts and entrench 
themselves more firmly in their doctrines. 
 Although cognitive dissonance was very briefly alluded to in our previous 
chapter, here the significance of these findings is unmistakeable.  When Prophecy 
Fails brought cognition within the scope of religious studies.  Accordingly, the 
publication of these concepts supplemented, from a social-psychological angle, the 
longstanding assumptions of the sociology of religion by demonstrating the role of 
individual cognitive activities for the behaviour of a religious group.  In particular, the 
study corroborated the assertion of the sociology of knowledge that the taken-for-
granted ‘reality’ of a group necessarily requires social support and incessant 
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reiteration.  Festinger found that the group members who were isolated during the 
period in which their eschatological prophecy was disconfirmed were not able to 
maintain belief in the prophecies and veracity of the group’s identity.167  However, for 
those who had remained together in the same house during and after the hours in 
which the world was supposed to experience cataclysmic events, faith remained and 
rationalisations intended to explain the failed prophecy were found to be adequate.   
 Despite the fact that this result, that faith went unchallenged only for those 
who had remained in the same house during the failed prophecy, received little 
attention both in the book and subsequently, it is perhaps the most germane of 
Festinger’s observations for the sociological study of heresy because it suggests a 
direct interplay between individual cognition and social life, between agonistic 
experiences (disconfirmed prophecy) and socially-legitimated mechanisms of 
resolution (postulated reasons for the failure being shared among adherents in the 
same house).  In this way, that which appears to the sociologist to be predictable 
social patterns is approached here from an alternate vantage and described in terms of 
the success or failure of attempts to manage dissonance.  With that in mind, it is no 
stretch to imagine ‘cognitive dissonance’ as closely related to anomie, angst, 
antinomianism, etc., all ultimately representing the existential crises facing religious 
believers when forces outside of their control threaten existing meaning systems and 
demand explanation.   
 We should note that the relevance of cognitive dissonance to the study of 
heresy was also recognised by Zito.  In the previous chapter, Zito’s work on the 
sociology of heresy was described as an attempt to apply the discursive analysis of 
Foucault and Derrida to the concept of heresy itself.  Under such a light, Zito was said 
to offer a unique definition of heresy: ‘an attack, veiled or quite open, upon an 
institutionalised way of speaking about the world.’  This, he claims, makes heresy 
directly connected to social deviance.  Although the ‘institutionalised’ element of 
Zito’s definition may yet rely too heavily on traditional understandings wherein a 
conspicuously ‘orthodox’ position predominates, his ensuing observations are highly 
incisive.  After noting that, among believers, beliefs are understood as engendering 
desirable behaviours, Zito associates cognition with heresy:  
And yet the true believer finds, in the case of heresy, that the beliefs he has 
devoutly held may lead to quite other consequences than his faith has led him 
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to expect.  A heresy accordingly places the true believer in a state of cognitive 
dissonance, imbalance or incongruity.  Heresy plays with the cognitive base 
upon which beliefs and meanings are erected...168 
In other words, if beliefs influence actions, one must possess a high level of certainty 
as to the meanings of the language used to articulate those beliefs in order to avoid 
confusion when such doctrines appear to stimulate alternative practices.  In this sense, 
Zito’s discursive view of heresy is one in which those same words are taken to have 
unorthodox meanings, leading to the potential institutional sanctioning of unorthodox 
behaviours.   
 The cognitive dissonance described by Zito, then, is essentially the result of 
equivocation; the same terms are used but with different meanings, an occurrence that 
quite naturally causes confusion for the longstanding members of the group.  If one 
expands Zito’s basic model to include not only literal linguistic perplexity but also the 
cognitive dissonance consequent upon societal and physical opposition, the 
phenomenon of reception comes into focus.  The religious group is ostracised, 
persecuted, refuted vigorously in the public square, attacked in printed diatribes (a 
particularly vicious approach used against Mormons), and generally rejected; this loss 
of influence and power, doctrinal contention, and victimisation causes disquiet and 
puzzlement.  The adherents face formidable challenge but do not yet recognise it as 
such, for the cognitive dissonance between their nascent but burgeoning religious 
identity and the overt denunciation from society operates subconsciously.  Much like 
Festinger’s subjects, the individual and the collective are perceptibly upset by the 
forced realisation of the disconfirmation (or perhaps, rejection) of their identities, a 
specific concern that receives notable emphasis during the resolution of heresy.   
 To emphasise the pre-conscious character of this event is to relate it directly to 
Bourdieu’s doxa and Arnal’s delineation between heresy and heterodoxy, both 
explained in the preceding chapter.  When heresy occurs, the tacitly taken-for-granted 
doxa is exposed.  That exposure of what had previously been unnecessary to articulate 
causes the consternation that we have described in this section.  Just as the secret 
mantras assigned to individuals in the Transcendental Meditation movement of the 
1960s and 1970s in America were believed to lose their sacred power if disclosed,169 
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so the sacred significance of religious identity is threatened when in the presence of 
the alarming potency of heresy.  Yet, as Berger says, ‘The power of religion 
depends...upon the credibility of the banners it puts in the hands of men as they stand 
before death...’170  Accordingly, the heretical process is not encapsulated by the 
deconstructing and externally-sourced event of reception but proceeds into the 
collective awareness of the group as they recognise the threat and begin to adaptively 
act to resolve the disruption. 
 
Recognition 
 Festinger’s hypothesis concerning the disconfirmation of religious prophecies 
included the idea that adherents would respond to failed predictions by actually 
increasing their proselytising efforts, exposing themselves to public scrutiny for the 
sake of reaching potential converts, a hypothesis which was supported by the group’s 
behaviour after their primary, eschatological prophecy never came to fruition.  The 
once-secretive group suddenly became proactive in contacting journalists and 
releasing confidential audio recordings.171  In this way, cognitive dissonance was met 
with urgency and fervour; it seemed that their angst, instead of being addressed 
directly, was ameliorated by being channelled into further activity.   
 This passion and ardour is important for our analysis of the heretical process 
because the reception of opposition positions the religious group in a state of waning 
social status.  The experience of agonism does not necessarily equal conscious 
awareness of impending peril, but it does force an encounter with the inescapability of 
mortality.  To apply phenomenological terms, then, the Lebenswelt of the adherents is 
breached.  Separated from their ‘reality’, staring at the doxa eviscerated from the 
axioms of existence, the religious members enter into a state similar to ritual 
liminality.172  Just as anthropologists Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner 
understood the liminal stage of religious rituals to include a sort of productive limbo, 
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a tabula rasa, so the recognition of heresy involves the conscious awareness of one’s 
predicament and the first notion that resolution is not only needed but is possible.173  
If, as it is for Berger, ritual is understood to be the preservation of sacred experiences 
for those who were not present for the events, and such a notion is combined with 
Turner’s belief that rituals are not epiphenomena but are agents of social change,174 
then it is appropriate to view the three events of the heretical process and the three 
stages of the ritual process as eiusdem generis.  Recognition is the transition between 
the opposition-induced bifurcation (between in/out group, acceptance/rejection, 
power/subjection) of reception and the integrative goal of resolution. 
 In other words, we can view the social process initiated by heresy as both the 
transcendence of the life-world re-enacted and preserved through ritual and the actual 
medium of social change itself.  The heretical process is repeated incessantly, its 
episodes overlapping and interacting; ipso facto, it resembles the ritual process 
adumbrated by anthropologists such as Van Gennep and Turner - specifically, the 
recognition of heresy is notably similar to the liminality that characterises the brief 
transition from the social stripping of identity involved in the early stages of ritual and 
the reconstitution which follows.  With regards to the reconstitution of a new identity 
after the liminal stage, we should note that anthropologist Maurice Bloch developed 
Turner’s ideas further by emphasising the psychological/existential change that takes 
place in the individual through the ritual.  In insisting that the identity change goes 
deeper than a mere transformation of social status, Bloch’s thoughts anticipate our 
own interpretation of the senses of purpose and individual progress central to early 
Christian and early Mormon notions of deification.175   
 However, for now we remain fixed on ritual liminality, a transitional stage 
illustrated by Van Gennep’s example from the Basoko people of the Congo.  He noted 
that when twins are born to members of this group, the children are confined to their 
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home until they are six years old.  This ‘transitional period’ fills the symbolic and 
temporal gap between the rituals of birth and the rituals of acceptance into the 
community.176  It must be noted that this transformation, marked also by painted posts 
outside the parents’ house, ensured corporate ratification of the twins’ identity both as 
new members and as aberrations; before the twins and their parents could fully 
assume their new social roles, this intermediate stage was needed to bring the group 
into a state of uniformity and consensus.  
 In much the same fashion, recognition creates homogeneity within the group 
as all come to share an epistemic sentience of their plight which, unavoidably, 
dissolves social distinctions and begins to enable solidarity centred on the potential 
for a new, more resilient identity.  Thus, as we might infer from Arnal’s discussion of 
the unveiling of doxa or Zito’s mention of cognitive dissonance, with awareness 
comes a ‘rallying cry’ to defend the threatened identity or hastily construct a new one.  
Whether choosing the one path or the other, the opposed party will almost certainly 
demonstrate great zeal in their principal response, the animosity directed toward the 
afflicted party finding quick and corresponding acrimony, an inevitably emotional 
counterbalance the genesis of which is the (now shared) awareness of the group’s 
poor social standing. 
 
Hostility to Heresy 
 In 1798, thirty years before the publication of the Book of Mormon and the 
official founding of the Mormon movement, Charles Backus addressed a church in 
Leicester, Massachusetts.  In the homily, Backus held forth on the history of 
opposition to Christianity.  With pith and precision, he informed his audience, 
It must be allowed, that, when the public mind has long run in one track, it 
admits of the overthrow of any thing [sic], held in high repute, with great 
reluctance.  There are strong prejudices to encounter, in such instances, where 
any thing [sic] is known to be endangered that goes under the name of 
religion; nor can it be expected that such attachments will be broken without 
violent struggles.177 
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These violent struggles are an indispensable component of the recognition event.  The 
consciousness of the group’s predicament leads to vehemence as their collective 
identity is threatened.  Mol’s observation on the barriers humans erect around their 
identities comes to the fore in this portion of the heretical process.  Identity is holy, 
although correspondingly frail.  Insomuch as one accepts Mol’s claim that religion is 
that which sacralises identity, Backus’ statement should come as no surprise.  
Anything overtly connected to religion will be defended with violence as the group 
members mobilise not in protection of doctrine but in defence of stability.  
Psychologist Erik Erikson observed a similar phenomenon among children who 
guarded their identity ‘with the astonishing strength encountered in animals who are 
suddenly forced to defend their lives.’178  In religious communities, this behaviour 
may be justified through an appeal to the group’s belief in absolute truth, rationalising 
the aggression by interpreting the challenge to identity as a challenge against natural 
order or law. 
 This misguided reasoning was noted by Simmel at the beginning of the 
twentieth century: ‘This truth [that religion is the purest form of group unity] is 
demonstrated by the energy with which every heresy...is combated.’179  Opposition is 
not only (when it is at all) a challenge against dogma but is the imposition or 
presentation of instability into the sacred space harboured by emotional commitment.  
Again, Hume’s thoughts prove insightful and unexpectedly complementary, for in his 
explication of the relative demerits of monotheism, he says that such a theological 
paradigm naturally demands a ‘unity of faith’ and, consequently, leads to competing 
sects, the stage then being set for conflict: 
For as each sect is positive that its own faith and worship are entirely 
acceptable to the deity, and as no one can conceive, that the same being should 
be pleased with different and opposite rites and principles; the several sects 
fall naturally into animosity, and mutually discharge on each other that sacred 
zeal and rancor, the most furious and implacable of all human passions.180 
Later in his essay, he anticipates Festinger in showing that the ‘devotion and spiritual 
faith’ of religious individuals ‘rise with their fears’.181  Thus, if we can take Hume as 
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something of an informative antecedent to later social-scientific findings, it seems that 
the attending emotions involved in the recognition of heresy are not limited to 
violence and unrestrained aggression but to a broad and ubiquitous passion and 
volatility, perhaps even a fragile vulnerability as the heresy effectively spotlights the 
weaknesses of the existing meaning system.  Incapable of denying the opposition any 
longer, the collective responds reflexively.  
 Zito addresses this directly by equating the ‘heretical’ aspect of a statement 
with ‘its ability to produce in the faithful a cry of outraged hostility’.182  According to 
Zito, the impassioned reaction is how one knows for certain that heresy has occurred, 
how one recognises heresy.  However, we must note that the reflexive and typically 
hostile response is not only an indicator of heresy but is specifically a sign of 
conscious awareness among the members.  Much like the emotional and physiological 
‘fight or flight’ phenomenon in which the human sympathetic nervous system is 
activated,183 identifying the threat of heresy causes a heightening of collective 
emotions, a sort of social adrenaline surge.  This recognition, however, entails both 
potentially harmful effects of unchecked animosity as well as potentially beneficial 
influences on the commitment levels and solidarity of the religion and its constituents.  
It is with this in mind that Givens argues that heretics present a unique threat to 
‘spiritual solidarity’ which, in turn, ‘reflects a...need to exaggerate disparity so that 
boundaries can be imposed and enforced.’  This amounts to what he calls ‘a tolerable 
distance’.184   
 This incontrovertible delineation between the in-group and the out-group, 
engendered by the recognition of heresy, is absolutely integral to comprehending the 
variety of responses observable in the historical record.  Although some new religious 
movements receive the opposition, their inability to recognise it or to allow that 
identification to establish a ‘tolerable distance’ precludes the degree of adaptability 
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attainable in the resolution episode.  In addition, the ‘distance’ is more an embrace or 
appropriation of the marginalisation received than it is a volitional construction of 
new parameters.  This is the reason behind Givens’ diction; the pre-existent 
‘disparity’ is ‘exaggerated’.  When a religious community fails to put the heresy to 
work for their own benefit, they may also fail to incorporate it into their belief system.  
As long as those within the community share an interpretation of the agonistic 
experiences, however, the constructive outcomes will emerge with resolution as their 
goal. 
 
So Many Wolves, So Few Sheep 
 To borrow another quote from Givens, ‘To speak in these terms [of heresy 
serving to fabricate distinction and reinforce boundaries] is to recognise the 
constructed, artificial, and highly malleable nature of categories like heresy and 
orthodoxy.’185  As mentioned in the previous chapter, a significant degree of relativity 
and subjectivity is indeed inherent in the process of identifying heretics and their 
heresies.  Predictably, then, this relativity surfaces during the social process of heresy; 
after all, to recognise is to categorise - when reception is not accompanied by 
recognition, heresy defies description.  Perhaps a number of examples will benefit us 
here before we direct our attention to the resolution event of the heretical process. 
 In 1949, the Boston Globe reported on the recent events attached to Boston 
College, a Catholic institution of higher education.  In the preceding months, an 
independent Catholic organisation, the St. Benedict Centre, had become increasingly 
hostile toward Boston College for what the former saw as the instruction of heresy.  
The vitriol of the St. Benedict Centre and its members was easily seen in the use of 
the term heresy for the teachings of their opponents.186  Initially, members of the St. 
Benedict Centre described ‘Protestantism’ as both ‘the greatest enemy of the Catholic 
Church today’ and ‘heresy’;187 however, Boston College came to be seen as an enemy 
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for supposedly associating with Protestants and the secular world and, thus, implicitly 
undermining the superiority of the Papacy.  In this way, the defenders of Catholicism 
transformed themselves into dissenters from Catholicism as their actions led to formal 
rejection from church authorities.  Later, we will explore the significance of this sort 
of devastating rigidity among religious groups in addition to looking at dissension as a 
form of heresy faced by early Mormons, but our concern here is the observation that 
those judging Boston College to be teaching ‘heresy’ would eventually receive the 
same descriptor by the Archbishop of Boston as they were cut off from the Catholic 
Church.   
 It is noteworthy, however, that the early history of Mormonism is ripe with 
similar demonstrations of the importance of perspective in identifying the heretical.  
In 1831, the Cambellite periodical, The Evangelist, printed an article by Josiah Jones 
entitled, ‘History of the Mormonites’.  In this brief essay, Jones recounts the events 
whereby a number of Cambellites followed Sidney Rigdon out of their circle and into 
the Mormon Church as the result of Mormon missionary efforts.  The editor of the 
paper, Walter Scott, penned an addendum which followed Jones’ contribution.  In a 
distressed tone, Scott describes the Mormons as ‘impostors’ (twice) and ‘a vile sect’.  
His opinion of Rigdon is quite unfavourable as well: ‘Rigdon, like a true wolf in 
sheep's clothing...surrendered himself and flock to these impostors.’188 
 It seems that the recording of Matthew 7:15,189 provided every generation 
since with a convenient idiom with which they could achieve the rhetorically 
desirable: the simultaneous condemnation of opponents and regulation of adherents 
through fear and the suppression of choice.  The ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ is 
ubiquitous in the Christian-based cultures of the West, and the application of such an 
expression parallels the phenomenon mentioned previously wherein heretical 
teachings are eventually traced back to an external source which is often believed to 
be Satan or some other evil force.190  The early Mormons, it would appear, borrowed 
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this language of Matthew’s Gospel and exhibited the very phenomenon about which 
we speak.  Just two years after the publication of the article mentioned above, and just 
prior to the ransacking of its printing house by an anti-Mormon mob, The Evening 
and the Morning Star (an LDS publication) printed, ‘Beware of False Prophets’.191  In 
this brief article, William W. Phelps reminded his fellow Latter-day Saints of the 
various Biblical passages that portend the infiltration of Christian ranks by ‘false 
prophets’, endeavouring to ruin ecclesial unity by pilfering the credulous and 
unwitting.192  In the space of 2300 words, Phelps wrote the words ‘false prophets’ 
fourteen times and included them within the larger phrase ‘beware of false prophets’ 
nine times.  The general sentiment is best expressed by Phelps himself: 
...Amid all the confusion, and trouble now existing, in consequence of so 
many different denominations, all declaring they are right, and that they take 
their doctrines from the holy scriptures, we feel it a duty that we owe to God 
and to all that seek the riches of eternity, to say as Jesus said: Beware of false 
prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing.193 
 This sort of demonization of one’s opponents, or one’s competition on the 
religious scene, is precisely the reason for our understanding of heresy as opposition.  
The agonism may originate from within or without, from an oppressed substratum or 
from a powerful majority, all that matters for the social aspect of religious opposition 
is that it occurs, is recognised, and is (to some extent) resolved.  In Phelps’ article, our 
true concern is with his passing utterance of an obligation to warn those that seek the 
riches of eternity.  These weighty words echo his opening sentence in which he 
divulges the motivation behind his composition of the essay: a desire to ‘caution’ 
those earthly ‘inhabitants...[who] wish to enter in at the door and be saved’.  This 
emphasis on salvation and eternity is often the core of the resolution event in which 
religious groups come to incorporate or, by some other means, cope with the heresy 
they have experienced.  Those involved in Boston’s St. Benedict Centre as well as the 
early Mormons and their opponents all framed religious conflict with soteriology.  As 
the present study progresses from recognition to resolution, our focus mimics that 
shift in sophistication also undertaken by opposed groups as they turn from reflexive 
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attitudes toward heresy to the more differentiated, integrating systems meant to 
achieve some degree of adaptability in the face of challenge.   
 Turner’s anthropological studies revealed a ‘social tendency either to make 
what falls outside the norm a matter of concern for the widest recognised group or to 
destroy the exceptional phenomenon’ (original emphasis).  He compared the latter 
option to a boy who upon seeing a Giraffe for the first time simply says ‘I don’t 
believe it’.194  The recognition and resolution of heresy may overlap considerably 
(remember that they are not conceived of as entirely distinct, consecutive stages or 
phases); however, when a religious community or adherent initiates measures to 
render heresy innocuous, the scholar of religion witnesses something akin to the 
ousting of Turner’s latter option in favour of his former; unrestrained vehemence and 
cognitive opacity give way to a concern for both the present and the future wellbeing 
of the group. 
 
Resolution 
 In some ways, we see the theories of both Mol and Berger subsumed under the 
category of resolution.  Here, groups establish and emphasise belief systems based on 
the externalisation of their experiences.  These beliefs then act back upon the 
collective and its members, reinforcing religious identity in the face of heretical 
agonism.  As a result, the social position of the religious group becomes, or 
engenders, the theological confession of that community.  Perhaps this process of 
heresy resolution can, to some degree, help elucidate the externalisation elements of 
Berger’s theory.  Arguably the weakest component of his thinking, externalisation is 
supposed to be the occurrence whereby humans produce society.  In this study, one of 
admittedly narrower scope, externalisation is at least paralleled by the event of 
resolution.  The cognitive awareness of recognition naturally leads to a corporate 
desire or impulse for integration/adaptation, producing a belief and/or value system 
that originated within the collective consciousness but that also often becomes an 
objectified soteriological schema.   
 This process also reiterates our preference for Mol’s theory over Berger’s as 
the objectification of the theological beliefs seems to be nearly impossible to 
distinguish from their emphasis, creation, inheritance, internalisation, sacralisation, 
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etc.  Again, Mol highlighted the sacralisation process in which identity is anchored or 
stabilised by objectification, commitment, ritual, and myth.  The stability, however, 
was his primary concern, and it is no different for us.  In resolving heresy, a group and 
its members consolidate their remaining social capital and steady their capricious 
existence by embracing a new, more flexible, theology.  The significance of the 
amended or imaginative new belief system is not that it is somehow considered 
absolute or immutable but that it offers explanatory power for past, present, and 
future, a key feature of the soteriological schemas that we investigate in Chapter Four.  
Having arisen from the ashes left by persecution, for example, these new systems 
possess potential that would have been impossible previously.  As the next two 
chapters will show, at least in our two historical cases, this potential was realised and 
the opposition experienced by the collective gave rise to a soteriology capable of 
reinforcing identity and explaining negative experiences. 
 In his recent book on the physical boundaries of nineteenth century Mormons 
and Shakers, for example, Taysom mentions that the death of Joseph Smith left the 
Latter-day Saints in a state of liminality.  He notes, however, that Brigham Young and 
others actually record an increased sense of unity and serenity among the Saints in the 
aftermath of Smith’s death, the liminal stage creating solidarity and peace.195  Indeed, 
it has already been shown that liminality as both Van Gennep and Turner imagine it 
can result in heightened solidarity as social distinctions are lost and the collective is 
mobilised.  Certainly, one should acknowledge such potential during the recognition 
of heresy, for the principal difference between recognition and resolution is that the 
latter seeks to ensure longevity, future viability through adaptability. 
 In 1842, the New York Herald printed insightful (and relevant to our 
discussion) words directed at Joseph Smith who had recently been accused of 
conspiring to murder the ex-Governor of Missouri: 
We advise Joe Smith to be quiet – his enemies and slanderers will make him a 
better prophet than he could hope to be made by any other process.  
Opposition was the making of Moses – of Mahomet – of Napoleon - of every 
great master spirit that has appeared in this dirty world below.196 
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Similarly, by 1882, George Q. Cannon could say of the opposition presented by the 
US government against the Mormon practice of polygamy, ‘Let persecution come if it 
will have a good effect.’197  Of course, this view, that opposition can strengthen unity 
and bolster one’s social position, has been noted by sociologists and historians for 
many years.198  Simmel, for instance, claimed that persecuted groups needed the 
agonism, victory over those forces would mean dissolution of the community.199  
Likewise, Kai Erikson noted that the Quakers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony lost 
their passion as soon as England stepped in to cease their persecution at the hands of 
the local Puritans.  Subsequently, the Quaker movement in the region struggled to 
survive.200  The tension for each of these examples was not only beneficial for 
solidarity and identity, it was integral.  However, though the resolution of heresy 
certainly involves the incorporation of conflict into structures of religious belief, 
conflict is not always the primary scaffolding of that edifice, and we should carefully 
consider Bruce’s proviso: ‘...Far from being initially desired for its group-reinforcing 
functions, separation from the wider society was often reluctantly adopted by the sect 
only after it had failed to persuade the rest of the world to accept it standards.’201  In 
many cases, however, religious parties successfully absorb heretical experiences in 
the process of resolution, benefitting from the opportunity to anchor their identities in 
a resultant fortitude. 
 
Integrating Heresy 
 Discussing his findings with regards to ‘antinomian’ religious groups, Adler 
notes that all share ‘identical modes of adaptation as a response to similar kinds of 
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social stress.’202  This adaptive response most often takes the form of an ‘apocalyptic 
drama’ as groups posit new, millenarian, chiliastic myths that function to make sense 
of the stress occurring in their society.  In many cases, the myth is received with 
fervour; speaking in tongues and charismatic leaders both accompanying the 
newfound zeal and identity.203  Adler supports his argument with examples taken 
from disparate times and locations in history: Jews, early Christians, Anabaptists, 
cargo cults, ‘Gnosticism’, and even the Hippie culture of the 1960s and 70s.  Due to 
the complexity of variables involved in the common espousal of any one religious 
narrative by a collective, we ultimately reject Adler’s assertion that these 
theological/philosophical responses are ‘sentimental improvisations’.  However, his 
observations are still instructive in that he explicates the core of the resolution event – 
namely, the formulation/illumination of a religious myth or narrative that serves to 
‘reach for a new man and the redemption of time’.204   
 The Spanish Biblical Scholar and Theologian, Agustίn Del Agua believes that 
the Christian message is one inherently inclined toward narrative formulations.  For 
him, Christian faith is the telling of an event, the ‘interventions of God in 
[individuals’] own lives that allow believers to narrate themselves in the key of 
salvation.’205  For Del Agua, it is the ‘process of faith tied to history’ which is at work 
among the Israelites, seeing themselves as God’s chosen people more and more as 
they understood their own shared experiences as a ‘whole history from beginning to 
end in a unity of meaning’.206  Del Agua also sees the same occurring with early 
Christians because, as he astutely notes, ‘It is natural for religious identity to be 
expressed in narrative form.’207  Whilst we certainly agree with Del Agua’s 
observation of Christianity and Judaism, he does not seem to recognise just how 
‘natural’ and prevalent this phenomenon is.  In an ostensibly inadvertent manner, he 
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corroborates the sociological views described earlier which would reinterpret his 
‘interventions of God’ as ‘penetrations of paramount reality’.  These destabilising 
experiences, supernatural or not, are often preserved through ritual and myth precisely 
so that members might ‘narrate themselves’ and achieve existential harmony.  In this 
same way, the resolution of opposition entails a narration of group life, a temporal and 
sequential rooting of the collective consciousness. 
 In asserting that the resolution of heresy involves anchoring believers in a 
history, we not only echo Berger’s understanding of the function of ritual but Adler’s 
statement that historical events do not ‘exist’ but are ‘construed’.208  Similarly, 
Castelli’s study of Martyrdom and Memory led her to affirm that early Christian 
historians did not simply preserve the story of persecution, they ‘created’ it.209  This 
assertion may become unconvincing if taken too literally, but Castelli’s argument has 
much in common with Adler’s and should be duly noted.  The expressive actions of 
religious groups with regards to their origins, traditions, pasts, and beliefs has less to 
do with contrived and erroneous histories and more to do with the narration of 
meaning necessitated by the incessant, dialectical processes of heresy resolution and 
identity reconstitution.  In the following chapters, then, it will be shown that both the 
early Christians and the early Mormons were embroiled in these activities and that 
their experiences of religious conflict ultimately, and directly, affected the theologies 
they promulgated.210  More specifically, these myths emerged from the turmoil as 
complex soteriologies, the individual and the collective both finding crucial roles in 
the schema.   
 
Articulating Salvation 
 It may be important to reiterate, here, that, in their efforts to resolve conflict, 
religious groups come to avow certain soteriologies, complex schemas that are the 
product of the interminable negotiations between identity and agonism.  As the 
primary conceptual and pragmatic response to heresy, soteriology should be seen as 
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the nexus of religious conviction.  Such beliefs are not necessarily the outcome of 
experiencing heresy tout court; the resources used in constructing the system are 
typically available beforehand.  In fact, whereas the beliefs of one group may be 
entirely syncretistic, another may achieve resolution by stressing advantageous 
portions of a single tradition they have adopted or inherited.  Accordingly, the process 
can also entail some combination of these alternatives.  Here we simply want to stress 
that, whatever the case may be, the soteriology of the opposed community is likely to 
include a developed anthropological component so that it simultaneously offers 
eschatological hope as well as saving imperatives in the here and now. 
 Much could be (and has been, elsewhere) said concerning the development, 
role, and variations of religions and their soteriologies.  For the sake of brevity and 
argument, however, our focus is limited to the complex structures engendered by the 
encounter with heresy.  Soteriological schemas, as they are to be labelled throughout 
the remainder of the study, reveal a predominant and intense focus on purpose.  This 
claim is clearly undergirded by the general axioms of social science, such as the 
assumption that human experience is itself propelled by a drive for meaning, but 
speaking in terms of ‘purpose’ rather than ‘meaning’, as we often do in our fourth 
chapter, is intentional for the narrower discussion of soteriology as an interpretive 
schema capable of conferring stable identity on both the group and its members.  In 
Bull’s article listed in the preceding chapter, he defines ‘civil religion’ as ‘the 
religious symbol system which relates the citizen’s role and American society’s place 
in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate existence and meaning.’211  
Were one to substitute ‘citizen’ with ‘adherent’ and ‘American society’ with 
‘religious community’, the resulting statement would succinctly, effectively express 
what we mean by soteriological schema.  Note that the definition relates the more 
restricted variables of ‘role’ and ‘place’ to the broader frame of ‘meaning’.   
 We should note, then, that soteriological schemas can be relatively complex as 
they attempt to explain existence in terms of individual and group purposes.  This 
relates to Berger’s finding that legitimations become quite intricate when plausibility 
structures have repeatedly broken down.212  As a means of resolution, these systems 
are necessarily involved in the counterintuitive activity of dissolving distinction 
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between the sacred and the profane.  This is not to say that such schemas dissolve 
religious boundary markers; indeed, they tend to provide such markers, but they 
perhaps more importantly provide an in-group framework for comprehending God, 
divine intervention in the world, the role of individual adherents, the immediate 
environment, the need for salvation, the process of salvation, group history, etc.  They 
are constructions that function by imposing welcomed parameters around sacred 
thoughts.  Sacred and profane lose some of their distinction because the soteriology, 
after integrating opposition, is capable of interpreting nearly everything as an element 
of a networked purpose and, a fortiori, binary opposites are nullified.  In some sense, 
the same goes for Mol’s adaptability/stability dialectic, as we will see in our 
exploration of early Mormon dissenters; soteriological schemas incorporate the 
constancy and differentiation of the religious group into a unified identity.  Indeed, 
this is at least implicit in Mol’s argument and is undoubtedly the reason for his choice 
of a dialectical (as opposed to dualistic) model. 
 From the broadest level of purpose, soteriological schemas can be further 
deconstructed into group and self narratives.  As mentioned above, the integration of 
heresy results in resolution through narration.  At the group level, this narrative 
history (or narrative theology) includes cosmology and the preservation of 
supernatural interventions throughout time, the collective receives purpose and 
mission.  Although reality is often much less tidy than the ideal types we are 
explicating, it is beneficial to conceptualise the group-level narratives as the 
resolution of both the societal and doctrinal heresies.  At the individual, or self, level, 
however, the narrative infuses the believer with identity and a pragmatic course of 
action, often manifested as moral prerogative in relation to ultimate potential.  The 
direct, physical attacks encountered during persecutions are rectified in the personal 
(even, somatic) redemption offered by the salvation scheme.  As the opposed 
believers seek the certitudo salutis, one witnesses Weber’s elective affinities at play.  
Looking for purpose amidst heretical events and the embitterment that ensues, group 
members connect with soteriologies capable of situating the agonism within a 
theological/anthropological system of meaning; thus discovering a balanced identity.   
 This notion is implicitly attested by Davies when he discusses the early 
Christian impartation of Jesus with Messianic sentiments.  As being Christian came 
more and more to mean something separate from being Jewish, that which 
distinguished the two parties (a veneration of Jesus as Christ) also came to be 
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increasingly venerated.  For Davies, this might explain the transformation from 
viewing Jesus as Jewish prophet to Jesus as ‘Gentile God’.213  More importantly, it 
points to the proposition that certain groups, through a multifarious network of 
experiences and contexts, may come to have an affinity with specific theologies.  The 
idea is more fully developed by New Testament scholar Stephen Patterson as he, like 
Davies, suggests that Jesus was accorded a high degree of significance as Jews and 
then Christians came to find identity in what the Christ-figure could potentially 
represent.  Referencing passages from Isaiah, Daniel, 1 Corinthians, and many 
Second-Temple Jewish texts; Patterson contends that Jewish identity had come to be 
grounded in martyrdom, and Jesus’ life was interpreted as that of a resurrected martyr 
by Paul and others who had an affinity with the sense of purpose that such a belief 
could provide.214  It would be impossible to irrefutably prove that this process took 
place in this way, but Patterson and Davies both indicate that underprivileged 
religious groups may, by virtue of being so, possess an affinity for certain 
soteriological beliefs.  These beliefs, in turn, entail an explicit focus on the individual 
believer and his or her physical life.215  Similarly, as we will see in the remainder of 
our study, those groups who attempt to resolve heresy often accept a soteriology 
entailing deification or some other comprehensible route guiding the behaviour of the 
individual and ameliorating the fragility of his or her identity.  
 
From Opposition to Salvation 
 Mol once remarked, ‘The relevance of a moral system lies in its capacity to be 
concrete rather than eternal.  The relevance of a meaning system lies in its capacity to 
be eternal rather than concrete.’216  For those religious groups who encounter and 
recognise the potentially harmful effects of heresy, their ability to achieve resolution 
is indivisible from their aptitude at confessing a soteriological schema constituted by 
both concreteness and an eternal focus, moral pragmatism and transcendence.  In 
Berger’s terms, the heresy must be incorporated into the process of cosmisation, the 
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social experiences must be objectivated into a comprehensive nomos.  In the light of 
Mol’s theory, it is clear that resolution necessarily accompanies reception and 
recognition as the religious community naturally strives to maintain a balance 
between differentiation and identity as the latter is threatened by instability. 
 We take the sociology of knowledge and the theories of Mol as instructive in 
our investigation into groups confronted by heresy and the soteriologies they hold to 
be meaningful.  Mol’s thoughts are particularly significant as our focus turns toward 
second-century Christians and early Mormons, two specific historical examples of the 
heretical process at work.  Instead of highlighting the process whereby identity comes 
to be sacred, however, Part Two emphasises what is taken to be an innate drive for 
meaning and purpose pursuant upon the strength of balance found in the 
adaptability/stability dialectic.  In terms of the process outlined above, our major 
interest in the following chapters is the resolution episode.  However, in exploring the 
contexts of second-century Christians and early Mormons in the next chapter, we first 
identify the heresy (reception/recognition), then, in the final chapter, that opposition is 
analysed with an eye for how it relates to the forms of deification found in the 
soteriological schemas of the two parties (resolution).   
 Although it was hardly a central focus for Mol, his dialectical model offers 
valuable insight into the future viability of religious groups who are able to remain 
adaptable whilst maintaining resolute identities.  In the cases of early Christianity and 
early Mormonism, the lessons learned through opposition proved advantageous not 
only in articulating adaptable soteriologies but in the future employment of those 
systems during trying times.  We believe that the success of both parties was largely a 
result of carefully resolving heresy during their nascent stages, an idea we revisit in 
the concluding chapter.  That being said, the following chapters only explore these 
theories within limited bounds and though two historical instances separated both by 
time and geography hardly demonstrate a universal pattern, they nevertheless display 
the social behaviours and processes intimated above.  Other groups, of course, have 
encountered similar heresies and responded differently.  Immediately one may think 
of such movements as the nineteenth-century Shakers or the Hutterites, the latter even 
moving into an isolated western territory of North America shortly before the 
Mormons did the same.  Not all religious groups will resolve heresy with deifying 
soteriological schemas.  Indeed, not all such collectives will resolve the opposition at 
all, but all will try.   
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 In fact, this chapter has clearly shown that such an epistemological and 
existential drive is ubiquitous and permeating.  Whether noted by Husserl’s 
phenomenology, Berger’s theory of social construction, or Mol’s insights into the 
social struggle to safeguard identity, humanity exhibits a profound eagerness to 
explain and interpret the world.  Thus, in bringing Part One of our study to a close, we 
are reminded that confounding experiences stimulate humanity’s innate drive for 
meaning, an event manifested in the way religious groups articulate their beliefs in 
relation to social heresies.  By erecting our sociologically-informed theoretical 
scaffolding first, we can now proceed unhindered with our analysis of these 
communities and their beliefs, sharing Simmel’s awe of the ever-present and cyclical 
nature of the relevant social processes: 
...one must bear in mind that religion, as a spiritual experience, is not a 
finished product but a vital process that each soul must create for itself, no 
matter how stable the traditional content may be.  It is precisely here that the 
power and depth of religion are found – namely, in its persistent ability to 
draw a given item of religious data into the flow of the emotions, whose 
movements must renew it constantly, like the perpetually changing drops of 
water that beget the stable image of the rainbow.217 
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PART TWO 
 
SURVIVING AND INTEGRATING HERESY 
 
 
 
‘Mythical thought always progresses from the awareness of oppositions toward their 
resolution.’1 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LOCATING HERESY: THE THREEFOLD ATTACK 
 
 In our effort to discover the social processes behind the apparent elective 
affinity between new religious groups facing agonistic forces and the sort of 
soteriology that incorporates deification and individual development, we have shown 
that heresy can be understood sociologically, as an ideal type of religious opposition, 
and that, as such, it involves a process of social reconstitution for the religious group 
opposed.  Weber argued for the analytical utility of ideal types even whilst insisting 
that the concepts described could not be observed in such an unalloyed form.  Ideal 
types assist in analysing religious phenomena by creating formal constructs in relation 
to which the actual observable patterns and recorded data may be compared.  Section 
two of our study proceeds with a description of concrete historical examples and with 
subsequent comments on the socio-heretical processes at play in each of them. The 
trajectory of this discussion originates in the firm understanding of ideal types as 
abstract intellectual constructs.  With this in mind, an exploration of heresy among the 
early Christians and the early Mormons can clarify and tighten the loose threads 
woven in the preceding section.   
 Both groups were opposed by their respective societies, and each community 
struggled to resolve the conflict after identifying it as such.  As previously suggested, 
the social nature of both the heresy and its resolution may take other forms than those 
investigated here.  Early Christians and early Mormons are not the only examples of 
persecuted religious groups available from the historical record, and many of the 
others (e.g., seventeenth-century Quakers) did not produce complex soteriological 
schemas involving deification as a means of stabilising the social scaffolding of their 
community.  The age-old fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc, endangers many 
theoretical studies as scholars attempt to discern patterns in the multiform data of the 
human experience.  Even so, it does appear that a specifically social form of heresy 
does unveil taken-for-granted doxa for the opposed group, and this unsettling 
experience often calls for existential stabilisation through adaptive belief systems.  
This claim was theoretically substantiated in the two preceding chapters and is 
afforded considerable cogency in the pages to follow as two separate, but similar, 
collectives are probed for the light they shed on the heretical process and its 
significance for inducing religious adaptability. 
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 The current chapter is, in some ways, an expounding of the reception and 
recognition events introduced in the previous chapter.  Thus, it is entitled, ‘Locating 
Heresy’.  More importantly, this chapter describes two historical instances of the 
heretical process at work.  Such an endeavour is pursued whilst embracing John 
Henderson’s critique of modern scholarship as being too quick to suspect opacity 
when attempting to reconstruct the doctrines of past heretics.  Henderson decries such 
research because of its insistence that orthodox groups only offered skewed and 
impenetrable interpretations of their ‘heretical’ opponents: 
In doing so, [such researchers] sometimes forget that the obstacles themselves, 
the heresiographical distortions, reveal significant patterns.  In fact, these 
patterns of the ways by which orthodoxy constructs heresy may be of even 
broader and greater significance than the actual historical character of the 
heresies.  For they may illustrate universal tendencies or templates in human 
culture and even psychology for representing a hostile or threatening 
other...While such a general heresiographical template might be difficult to 
identify or verify by focusing on one particular heresiographical tradition, 
such as that of early Christianity, it is more readily discernible in a 
comparative study that incorporates several such traditions.  In this case, Niels 
Bohr’s observation that clarity is achieved through breadth seems to hold 
true.1 
In the following pages, the reader is confronted by details of both Christianity during 
the second century and Mormonism during its first fourteen years.  The apparent 
discrepancies between these two groups, however, dissolve as similar experiences and 
social processes are described.  Appealing to these two illustrative examples is far 
from arbitrary and is intended to demonstrate the potential universality of both the 
existential dilemmas of agonistic experiences and the integrative, harmonising 
potency of soteriological schemas for groups on the receiving end of heresy.  The 
latter concern is the focus of Chapter Four, but before one can assay the adaptability 
of early Christian and early Mormon soteriologies one must persevere in studying the 
cases of persecution and marginalisation experienced by both parties.   
 The first half of the present chapter, then, introduces and adumbrates the social 
heresy faced by Christians in the second century.  This period was crucial for the 
development of Christian theology in the face of localised persecutions, competing 
religious ideologies, and overt marginalisation.  Though persecution seems to have 
occurred during the first century of Christianity (e.g. Nero), the heretical process 
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appears most clearly during the second.  The latter century presents us with an 
important Christian figure who was witness to persecutions, familiar with the eastern 
and western reaches of the empire, and exerted great effort in refuting the claims of 
competing religious communities: Irenaeus.  This second-century bishop serves as the 
window into early Christianity as well as a fitting representative of our 
aforementioned process whereby opposition interrelates with soteriological beliefs.  
 Accordingly, the following chapters rely disproportionately on the writings of 
Irenaeus and other texts associated with him when compared to alternative early 
Christian writings.2  Never fully breaking its gaze away from the experiences and 
responses of this early Christian believer, the study is able to illuminate the manner by 
which social processes interact with theological articulation.  In discussing the pre-
Nicene era, painting in broad strokes would necessarily bear little fruit; developing 
doctrines were not yet expressed ex cathedra.  As a religious leader, however, 
Irenaeus directly experienced the three-fold antagonism with which we are now 
familiar and also developed a complex theological anthropology in which salvation is 
categorically tied to history and the undulations of every individual’s biographical 
timeline.    That being said, the ensuing portrait of early Christian struggles is 
supplemented by references to various contemporaneous texts penned by other 
Christians as well as non-Christian Romans.  The objective is to present a concise but 
thorough summary of the heresies faced by Irenaeus and his Christian peers.   
 This same goal, for Joseph Smith and his Mormon peers, is sought in the 
subsequent portion of the chapter.  Early Mormonism exhibited many of the same 
responses to many of the same tensions and conflicts as the second-century 
Christians; persecution was localised and acute, the greater society tended to reject 
them on political and social grounds, and competition arose between the in-group and 
various out-groups.  Smith and his early followers, although unquestionably 
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analogous in many ways, are not intended as a parallel case to that of the early 
Christians – rather, the early Latter-day Saints and their charismatic leader are a 
separate illustrative example of the complex interplay between heresy and belief.  
Strict comparison between these two parties is circumscribed both by the method of 
our investigation as well as the dissimilarity in the historical record available for each.  
Whilst considerable information is available for the reconstruction of the second 
century context, the corpus is dwarfed by the robust documentation of Mormon 
history.  This material difference points to another disparity which demands mention, 
viz. that as a religious product of Graeco-Roman and Palestinian cultures and 
traditions, nascent Christianity was strikingly distinct from that later product of 
nineteenth-century America.  To contend that experiences, through social processes, 
come to influence beliefs, one must acknowledge the indispensable centrality of 
cultural/historical contexts in the evolution of religious groups.  The study now turns 
its attention to those contexts; the worlds in which fledgling religious communities 
were affronted by agonistic forces. 
 
Pagans, Jews, Gnostics, and Rome: The Irenaean Antecedent 
 In his recent address at the Patristics conference, A Celebration of Living 
Theology: Engaging the Work of Andrew Louth, Kallistos Ware paraphrased the 
influential Orthodox theologian Georges Florovsky: ‘To follow the Fathers, we must 
adopt their existential approach...their mind.’3  The concern, both for Ware and 
Florovsky, was that the theologies and texts of the early Christians receive appropriate 
citation and application, never being entirely alienated from the context within which 
they were produced.  If, as Emerson says, ‘Other men are lenses through which we 
read our own minds’, then it is a worthy endeavour to visit the Sitz im Leben of those 
individuals.4  Thus, in investigating the writings of Irenaeus it is also beneficial to 
explore his context, the religious and social milieu of the second century.  A definite 
tension is to be maintained, however, as Irenaeus serves as an historical example of 
the heretical process and an antecedent to those similar phenomena observed among 
the early Mormons.  He is both the gateway into the Graeco-Roman environment as 
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well as a sort of exemplar, itself a category fruitful in social analysis of a comparative 
kind. 
 Social anthropologist Rodney Needham, introducing his book on Exemplars, 
says, 
In Exemplars, a...contention is that there are further advantages to be had from 
suspending the traditional concentration on social facts, and from considering 
instead the examples presented by individuals.  However far-separated in time, 
or contrasted in other respects, they too demonstrate that certain steady 
constituents of human response can be discerned by the criteria of 
comparativism, and that this can be done by the study of individual 
representations as well as by the analysis of social facts.  Considered 
methodologically, the exemplars...furnish a new and distinct validation of the 
efficacy of comparative analysis.5 
In other words, the utilisation of comparison, often lambasted as a form of scholarly 
inquiry yet radically important to fields such as social anthropology, finds 
legitimation in the study of representatives.  Irenaeus steps into view as a fitting 
exemplar of a certain type of religious identity constructed in the wake of opposition, 
finding expression alongside its avowal of complex soteriological concepts.  Without 
question, the hallmark of Irenaeus’ soteriology is deification.  Historian J.A. 
McGuckin articulates Irenaeus’ significance as an early exponent of this particular 
belief:   
Irenaeus was the theologian who developed the notion [of deification] 
imaginatively, and with freshness of insight...Irenaeus sketched out many of 
the chief lineaments that would comprise the nexus of theosis theory: its 
dynamic as a soteriological term, its rootedness in the concept of creation’s 
purposes, its close relation to the ideas of corruption and immortality... 
(emphasis added)6 
As an exemplar, however, Irenaeus must not only function as the forebear of an idea 
but as a conceptual/historical compass allowing his own insights and experiences to 
illumine the path toward broader trends and patterns present in his context and (it is 
argued) beyond. 
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The Second Century 
 As a Christian bishop in the second century, Irenaeus represents a crucial 
period in the history of Christian development.  Indeed, the Christians of his day had 
begun fully to separate themselves from Judaism but had not yet received the 
acceptance from the empire that they would in the fourth century.  Although they 
were persecuted, the opposition itself was far less generalised and state-sanctioned 
than it would be at various points in the third century.  The persecution experienced in 
the second century was sporadic and localised, rarely receiving official endorsement 
from Rome.7  In addition, the second century preceded any Christian creedal 
proclamations and witnessed a loose concept of doctrine and authority; the original 
apostles had died and the new generation of Christians found themselves heirs to a 
burgeoning movement consisting of local communities separated by considerable 
distances.   
 
Religious Milieu  
 More importantly, however, the Christians of this time existed throughout the 
Graeco-Roman world.  Thus, they were influenced by and were an influence on a 
great diversity of peoples and beliefs.  No longer a branch of Judaism, no longer tied 
to Jerusalem, Christianity was a new religious movement in a large world of deep 
history and vast traditions.  The Roman religious milieu of this century unequivocally 
fostered supernaturalism in any number of forms.  As the Romans conquered new 
lands, they often absorbed the religious tendencies and perspectives of those they now 
governed as long as the latter were willing to participate in the civil religion of the 
empire.8  At times, this might mean only a brief acceptance whilst Rome determined 
the worthiness of the newly acquired peoples’ religion.9  In the case of the Jews, the 
Romans allowed them to maintain their exclusivist practices and doctrines, excusing 
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them from fully assimilating to the pluralistic atmosphere of Graeco-Roman culture 
on the basis that the Jews had a long, powerful history.   
 That which is most conspicuous concerning the religious environment of the 
empire is its enthusiasm for the mystical and supernatural amid such pluralistic 
circumstances.10  Historian Arnaldo Momigliano, for instance, notes that there was a 
ubiquitous concern with dreams, demons, miracles, supernatural healing, and 
divinization of individuals in the Roman Empire.11  The idea of a mystical ascension 
to heaven, for instance, was shared by ‘Paul, Jewish rabbis, Gnostics such as the 
author of the Gospel of Truth, and Plotinus.’12  As an example of belief in 
supernatural healing, Momigliano points to the notion that Asclepius could heal the 
sick.  This Greek god surged in popularity in the second century and was believed by 
the Christian apologist Justin to have been the result of demons mimicking the true 
characteristics of the Christian God in their fabrication of deities.13  Certainly, 
Momigliano’s assertion finds ready corroboration in Graham Anderson, the latter 
believing that the second century exhibits, ‘...a particularly rich haul of dreams and 
dreamers.  We have Aelius Aristides’ self-portrait through his dreams in the later 
second century; and an almost exactly contemporary view from the perspective of a 
professional peddler of dream interpretations, Artemidorus of Daldis.’14  Aelius 
Aristides, Anderson describes as a ‘tendentious sophist...living in a fantasy world of 
self-advertisement, in which dream, miracle or theurgy alike explain a very profitable 
partnership with’ the gods.15  This ‘partnership’ illustrates the religious dynamism and 
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fertility of the second century, a period for which dreams and visions denote the 
diffusion of the supernatural into the immediate realm of experience. 
 As one might expect, the permeation of many Romans’ Lebenswelten, 
exemplified in the proliferation of manifestations and revelations (i.e. dreams, visions, 
theurgy), naturally pointed to the forces beyond or behind such demonstrations.  With 
many cults and ethnic groups came many gods.  Perhaps this reality is reflected most 
poignantly in the writings of the second-century satirist, Lucian of Samosata.  In The 
Parliament of the Gods, Lucian constructs a fictional assemblage of various 
traditional gods who gather to discuss the unprecedented increase of their ranks.  
Momus, the personification of satire, is in dialogue with Zeus when the former claims, 
‘...at present, oracles are delivered by every stone and every altar that is drenched with 
oil and has garlands and can provide itself with a charlatan – of whom there are 
plenty.’16  This predicament of excessive and dubious rites is only a function of the 
related problem: excessive and dubious deities.  Thus, Momus proposes that, in the 
case of these ‘aliens’ and ‘barbarians’ who have fraudulently come ‘to be accounted 
gods’ and have caused ‘a noisy rabble of polyglot flotsam’, their ‘images be pulled 
down and those of Zeus or Hera or Apollo or one of the others be substituted.’17  
Lucian, then, not only demonstrates the pluralism of the period but also the dichotomy 
between traditional and novel/foreign gods.   
 Although such a distinction was inevitable in an environment that venerated 
longevity and historical continuity, it did not necessarily lead to outright rejection of 
the less familiar deities.  Anderson supports this observation with a passage from 
Maximus of Tyre: 
The Celts worship Zeus, but their image of him is a tall oak-tree.  The 
Paeonians worship the Sun, but the Paeonian image of it is a tiny disk on top 
of a long pole.  The Arabs worship a god, but which one I do not know; I have 
seen their image, a square stone.  The Paphians worship Aphrodite; but their 
image of her you would compare most accurately to a white pyramid of an 
unknown substance.  To the Lycians their mount Olympus sends forth fire, not 
like the fire of Etna, but unthreatening and under control; and this fire serves 
both as their temple and image.  The Phrygians around Celaenae honour two 
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rivers, the Marsyas and the Meander...What a profusion, what a variety of 
images!18 
Here, another writer of the second century highlights the pluralism and proliferation 
of gods represented throughout the Roman Empire.  In response to this quotation, 
Anderson notes that Maximus seems to ‘accept the integration or equivalence of 
Greek and foreign deities.’  Accordingly, it is a difficult task to uncover the 
motivations behind the persecution of a single religious group within this pluralistic 
context.  Though there is little doubt that the Graeco-Roman world was one of 
multifarious religious beliefs, cults, and posited supernatural beings; it is also 
apparent that this familiarity with diversity did little to quell religious violence or 
selective intolerance. 
 One eminent scholar of early Christian history notes that Rome sometimes 
chose to suppress new religious movements by claiming criminal activity.19  This was 
certainly one way in which Romans framed the gripe they had with Christianity.  
Later, the various accusations raised against the Christians will be discussed in some 
depth as a combined form of societal and doctrinal heresy.  The Roman Empire, as the 
antecedent of modern western democracies, was guided both by religious currents and 
political fortitude.  It was unique, however, in that the two created synergy by 
coexisting as an intertwined singularity.  We learn from Tacitus that Christians 
received ruthless persecution at the hands of Nero in the mid-first century; however, it 
was the second century that witnessed multiple cases of Christian persecution as the 
direct result of a perceived threat that Christianity might destabilise this religio-
political equilibrium.20  Thus, a conspicuous element of the second-century setting is 
the manner by which the Romans dealt with small religious movements, particularly 
Christianity, whilst maintaining the advantageous balance between the pax romana 
and the pax deorum. 
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 As local Christian communities grew in size and influence, local authorities 
found themselves without clear recourse.  On the one hand, Christianity promulgated 
familiar values such as passive suffering and justice; the veneration of Christ’s 
crucifixion appearing compatible with the moral outlook of Greek literature in which 
heroes chose virtue (thus, suffering) over vice (acquiescence).21  For example, 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon describes the gain one receives in death as a ‘learning 
through suffering’, πάθει µάθος.22  This is not only congruent with early notions of 
Christ’s atoning sacrifice but is directly related to our later exploration of the 
soteriological self, the individual identity located within the soteriological schema 
whose experience of heresy finds significance and redemption in personal 
progression.   
 After full consideration, however, the second-century Roman proconsuls also 
recognised that the Christians possessed a number of confounding concepts such as 
the notion that the supreme deity was the only deity and had, in fact, created the 
universe ex nihilo.  Such an idea explicitly challenged convention and tradition.23  The 
novelty of the movement was diluted by their obvious ties to Judaism.  Although that 
connection had been severed, the Christians embraced their independence whilst also 
claiming historical continuity with the faith of the Hebrews.  In the environment of 
the second century, tradition was the test of true religion; innovation amounted to 
denial of history.24  For Romans who knew little more than this, the Christians were 
puzzling.  In the early years of the second century, as Tacitus was recounting the 
ignoble use of Christians as a scapegoat by Nero, a governor in Bithynia expressed 
this confusion to the emperor Trajan and, in doing so, provided subsequent 
generations with a glimpse into the nature of the animosity felt toward early 
Christians.  
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Christian Persecution/Martyrdom  
 Serving as a provincial governor, Pliny wrote to Trajan describing his 
immersion in the active prosecution of Christians but is undeniably uncertain about 
the legal protocol for such matters.  In fact, Pliny admits his own confoundedness 
over the legality of the name Christianus and whether it is that name, quod faterentur 
(their admissions), or their inflexibilem obstinationem (unflinching obstinacy) that is 
to be punished.25  Pliny’s remarks are instructive for our future discussion of the 
Roman attempts to categorise Christianity, but they also offer an insightful entry to 
the topic of Christian persecution/martyrdom in the second century.  Who were these 
superstitious rabble-rousers?  Why did they exhibit such inflexibility with regards to 
established tradition?  Though Pliny’s procedure of affording accused Christians 
multiple opportunities to renounce their membership in the cult before sentencing 
them to death received Trajan’s approval, there was no empire-wide method for trying 
Christians during the early years of the century.  Indeed, Trajan’s successor Hadrian 
appears to have attempted such a measure by composing a rescript demanding that 
Christians be given a court trial and receive punishment according to the crimes 
proven to have been committed.26  In spite of this effort, however, little uniformity 
was achieved concerning the persecution of Christians.  Persecution was not officially 
sanctioned by Rome until the reign of Decius in the third century, and thus ambiguity 
surrounded the preferred means by which Roman authorities were to deal with the 
growing population of Christians. 
 This Christian conundrum fell somewhere outside of the bounds of legal 
precedence, not only because of the movement’s origins from within the Jewish areas 
of the empire rather than without, but also because the Christians presented a 
somewhat unparalleled case.  For instance, the Christians did not yield to or retreat 
from Roman power like other cults (e.g., the Druids), they rarely rebelled against the 
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empire, they demonstrated an overt interest in classical culture, and it was difficult to 
determine whether their ecclesiastical organisation offered a ‘rival or a subsidiary 
structure’ to the state.27  At times, the various provincial authorities decided that the 
Christians posed a threat to the established order, and persecution ensued.  Given the 
explication of what we have called the heretical process in the previous chapter, it 
might be expected that these moments of persecution (or reception, in our terms) led 
to corresponding instances of recognition.  Said differently, the reception of intense 
social heresy, if we are correct, should engender an episode during which the taken-
for-granted is brought to the surface and reinterpreted in the light of new knowledge.  
For Christians of the second century, this transition from reception to recognition is 
encapsulated by their eventual understanding of persecution as martyrdom.28  By the 
historical period with which the present study is concerned, Christians had begun to 
display an irrational zeal for martyrdom.29  Thus, Irenaeus and others can draw from 
the Christ of the Gospels and profess the necessity of tribulation for believers; the 
persecution leads to their being ‘fitted for the royal banquet.’30 
 In the following pages, martyrdom as an interpretive apparatus in the face of 
personal heresy is explored further, particularly in reference to the manner by which 
complex soteriologies incorporate the suffering into a meaning-system.  Here, 
however, it is sufficient to note that martyrdom was a Christian means of facing death 
and resisting Roman power that came into its own during the latter half of the first 
century and the first half of the second.31  The term µάρτυς/µάρτυρος 
(martus/marturos) originally meant ‘witness’.  Its transformation into the laudable 
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descriptor for an individual who has died for the sake of Christianity was abetted by 
mingling the values of the classical world and the inevitable association made 
between the message shared by those persecuted and their resultant deaths.  Carole 
Straw incisively articulates the consequent potency of this formula: 
Consonant with the classical honour code and its ideal of the good death, a 
martyr’s confrontation with death distilled the essence of his or her actions and 
worth.  A martyr’s feelings of control over death and torture – the voluntary, 
even eager acceptance of condemnation – transformed the sordid ordeals one 
suffered into a most honourable vindication...Precisely, and paradoxically, 
because suffering was so contemptible when imposed against one’s will, it 
became all the more glorious and stunning when embraced actively with the 
will.32 
This, Straw avers, ultimately leads to this sort of equation: ‘volition = honour = death 
= proof of authenticity.’33  In this way, the martyr is a witness in that he or she bears 
testimony to an authentic message.  Straw is careful to concede that this same 
equation applies to classical heroes who ‘make a devotio’ but argues that the Christian 
martyrs altered the telos of the honourable death by shifting attention away from 
themselves and on to ‘the sanctity of suffering itself.’34 
 
Jewish Opposition 
 Such suffering was not solely at the hands of pagans, however.  A complete 
assessment of Christianity in the second century must address the increasingly 
strained relations between Christians and Jews.  Jack Sanders notes that the Bar 
Kokhba revolt, in which Jews challenged Roman authority around 132 C.E., resulted 
in the ultimate detachment of ‘Jewish Christians’ from ‘non-Christian Jews’.35  This 
divergence, though arguably inevitable, was far from entirely amicable; Jews and 
Christians continued negotiating the boundary between their two communities even as 
the latter began to draw additional lines between themselves and pagans.  Elsewhere 
Sanders notes that the ‘heretics’ mentioned in the Deutero-Pauline letter to the 
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Colossians are Jewish Christians, and a certain degree of animosity existed between 
the Gentile Christians and their Jewish peers due to the different opinions regarding 
Jewish practices such as circumcision and the avoidance of unclean food.36  
Therefore, the first century witnessed an embryonic divide that reached fruition by the 
early second century.   
 The line separating insider from outsider solidified as pressure mounted and 
time passed.  The ‘deviant insider’ changed rather rapidly into the external other.  
Justin’s words cited below, however, indicate that the nature of the opposition 
remained unaltered.  The same cannot be said for the location of the heresy.  This is 
important to note as our survey eventually turns to early Mormonism, a group whose 
most keen enemies consisted of disaffiliated members.   
 As for relations between Christians and Jews in the second century, sources 
from the period indicate not only the existence of an appreciable rift but overt 
hostility.  Justin, for instance, writes that the Jews of his day consider Christians to be 
enemies; he accuses the Jews of attempting to murder Christians whenever possible.  
Bar Kokhba, the leader of the Jewish uprising mentioned above, Justin recalls, also 
turned his aggression toward Christians during the coup, pressuring the latter to 
renounce their belief in Jesus as the Messiah.37  Such doctrinal heresy incited the 
personal heresy; Justin reveals that the disagreement over the status of Jesus as well as 
incongruity in the understanding of circumcision’s relevance caused the Jews to curse 
Christians during the ritual activities within the synagogues, and the apologist charges 
the Jews with causing greater injury to Christianity than any other group.38  Writing 
very early in the third century, Hippolytus similarly claims that Jews are as culpable 
as pagans in overtly opposing and attempting to harm Christianity.39  He accuses the 
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Jews of ‘wishing to bear false testimonies against’ the Christians and identifies his 
opponents as those mentioned in Galatians 2:4.40   
 From an outside perspective, the two parties seemed to be legitimately at odds.  
Celsus, a pagan philosopher and contemporary of Justin and Irenaeus, repeatedly 
highlights the tension caused by Christianity’s attempt to balance an appeal to Jewish 
roots alongside an innovative system of scriptures and beliefs.41  Celsus’ work serves 
as an instructive and illuminating example of the pagan perception of Christians 
during this time.  As the investigation progresses into the realm of social and doctrinal 
opposition, Celsus provides insight into the particularities of the threat Christianity 
posed to the empire.  This sect, fully severed from Judaism, represented 
approximately 0.08% of the empire’s population by the mid-second century.42  Even 
so, the group embodied one of Rome’s greatest fears: social subversion in the form of 
a destabilisation of the precarious balance struck in the empire between religion and 
polity.  Thus, the majority strove to alienate the threatening minority, struggling to 
define and confine the nascent movement by any number of means.   
 
Societal and Doctrinal Heresy 
 It is admittedly problematic to delineate between societal, doctrinal, and 
personal forms of religious opposition.  Although doing so can provide useful insight 
into the social processes at play on the early development of a religious community, 
the challenge becomes impossible when endeavouring to separate societal from 
doctrinal in the Graeco-Roman context.  The two realms, social and religious, existed 
as an indivisible marriage.43  This is apparent in the concept of the pax deorum.  The 
gods were to be appeased; were to be pacified by the diligent ritual practices of Rome 
and its citizens.  To fail in this duty was to risk upsetting the harmony of society, the 
agreement between divinity and humanity. 
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 Divine wrath, of course, was the feared repercussion of impiety.  It is difficult 
to declare with certainty the degree to which Roman citizens truly believed the 
supernatural claims associated with their religious rites.  Members of the educated 
classes probably displayed a range of belief, some representing a sort of henotheism 
and some simply adhering to tradition because of the social cohesion enabled by 
doing so.44  What is clear, however, is that events such as natural disasters were often 
attributed to immorality or ritual noncompliance.  Tertullian claims that his fellow 
Christians are blamed for ‘every harmful setback of the people’, including famine or 
plague.45  Once again, the relativity of such claims becomes apparent.  The pagans 
about whom Tertullian writes certainly understood Christians to be irreligious and 
recalcitrant, following their own novel ideas rather than the established orthopraxy.  
Yet, two Christian emperors of the fifth century, Theodosius II and Valentinian III, 
felt that it was their duty to pursue ‘true religion’ and echoed the early pagans when 
attributing poor weather and diminished crops to the Christian god’s wrath in 
response to pagan practices.46  Time and circumstance inverted the conflict, but the 
notion that divine anger should be expected to result from the misdeeds of the 
religiously heretical remained unaffected.   
 Young and ostensibly unfettered movements forced a reaction from the greater 
society, a responsive attempt to categorise the new group, understand their beliefs, 
and measure the significance of their socio-political threat.  It is useful to note that, 
whereas historian Glen Bowersock tends to emphasise the pax deorum and its 
stabilising role in Graeco-Roman society, Arnaldo Momigliano locates social 
cohesion primarily within the attendant rituals and practices of the imperial cult.47  
Christianity, however, was a threat to both, as the two elements of that particular 
culture were intertwined.  To decry the efficacy of ritual piety, directed toward the 
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gods or the emperor, was to undermine crucial social scaffolding.  In the eyes of 
pagans, groups that exhibited such subversive propensities were not necessarily 
religious.  They could be political, or they might be superstitious.  Within a setting 
that reserved the term ‘religion’ only for those communities in possession of an 
evident tradition, groups were more likely to earn the appellation ‘cult’ or ‘magic’ 
than almost anything else.  For second-century Christians, this was unequivocally the 
case.  As their numbers grew, so did outsiders’ efforts to define this new religious 
movement. 
 
Appellations and Categories: The Struggle to Define Christianity 
 As previously mentioned, the Romans saw a clear distinction between the 
ritual devotion and historical depth of religion on the one hand, and the groundless 
innovations of superstition on the other.  The former involved pietas (piety), but the 
latter was taken to be baseless and void of such active dedication.48  The idioms and 
categories available to those in the Roman Empire not only included religion and 
superstition but also society, cult, philosophical school, and others.  During the second 
century, Christianity confounded many pagan writers.  As a result, various terms were 
applied to the group, each one meant to underscore a certain element of the perceived 
threat posed by such a young and inventive community. 
 Tacitus, recounting the grave actions of Nero, describes the Christians as 
belonging to a ‘destructive superstition’.49  Tacitus’ contemporary during the early 
years of the century, the aforementioned governor Pliny, utilises multiple terms in his 
efforts to place Christianity.  He calls them a cult or superstition but also implies that 
they fit the description of a political society.50  These societies were associations of 
likeminded individuals, often gathering with common political agendas.  In Robert 
Wilken’s words, such societies were ‘social, recreational, and religious.’51  He asserts 
that the closest parallel for the Christianity of this period is found in the Bacchic 
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Society of the late second century.52  This hetaeria (society) met together regularly to 
hear speeches, pay dues, perform rites involving wine, assist with one another’s 
expenses (particularly with burial costs when a member died), and sing hymns.  
Wilken adds, ‘Like the followers of Heracles who were called Heraclists, the devotees 
of Asclepius called Asclepiasts, or the followers of Isis called Isiacs, the Christians 
were called Christiani.’53  From the outsider’s vantage, then, the Christians appeared 
to fit a certain mould. 
 This simple categorisation, however, collapsed under the load of Christian 
success and sophisticated reasoning.  Although Celsus, composing his philosophical 
assault around 170 C.E., describes the Christians as a ‘secret society’ which promotes 
‘magic’ based on the example set by the ‘sorcerer’ Jesus;54 other writers found it a bit 
more challenging to situate the Christians by the last few decades of this century.  It is 
interesting to read Tertullian’s early third-century compromise that takes Christians to 
be a ‘society (corpus) with shared religious understanding.’55  Yet it is perhaps more 
valuable to observe the shift that had already occurred before Tertullian.   
 Galen, a doctor and philosopher whose career eventually deposited him in 
Rome, was born around 130 C.E. in Asia Minor.  Therefore, his context closely 
resembles that of Irenaeus who was also born around the same year and in the same 
region of the empire.  Galen’s treatment of Christianity during this period presents an 
alternative to the polemical and confused voices already discussed.  For Galen, 
Christianity and Judaism represent schools that, though deluded, come close to the 
moral stature of true philosophers.56  Although Galen is ultimately critical of the 
irrationality of Christians and Jews, his ascription of the term ‘school’ to these 
communities betrays a certain degree of acceptance that is absent from Tacitus, Pliny, 
and Celsus.  The latter does, however, chastise Jews for leaving their established 
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tradition for ‘another life’ (Christianity).57  It could be argued, then, that Celsus also 
views Christianity as an optional way of life.  Either way, the delineation between a 
philosophically-inclined school and superstition is an important one.  Scholar of late 
antiquity, Arthur Nock, astutely notes that ‘turning from luxury and self-indulgence 
and superstition to a life of discipline and sometimes to a life of contemplation’ is the 
hallmark of converting to philosophy.58  Even more illuminating is Nock’s response 
to the question of Greek philosophy’s importance in later centuries of Graeco-Roman 
culture: 
Why did these schools hold so dominant a place in the spiritual history of the 
succeeding centuries?  Firstly, they offered intelligible explanations of 
phenomena...Secondly – and this is a point of cardinal importance – the 
schools offered a life with a scheme.59 
Consequently, if Christianity was a school of thought, then it ventured beyond the 
inane and into the meaningful ordering of existence for its members.  Galen may 
signal a turning point of sorts wherein Christians experienced a greater degree of 
social acceptance.  Even if the Christian ‘school’ meant that pagans no longer viewed 
the new movement as an alien disturbance, it did not prevent further opposition. 
 If one recalls the original definition of heresy as the choice to join a competing 
school of thought, Galen’s comments serve both to lend credence to Christianity 
whilst implicitly labelling the movement heretical.  Indeed, pagan efforts to define 
Christians were thinly veiled struggles to stifle what was perceived to be an agonistic 
force.  Relying on established social types, non-Christians engaged in name-calling en 
masse.  The nicknames and appellations were offensive in and of themselves, 
highlighting the lack of historical grounding and the conspicuous excess of delusion.  
If Christianity signified anything, it was the propensity for credulous individuals to 
find solidarity in their common predicaments and fatuous myths.  For those on the 
inside, though, their camaraderie was abetted by the belief that Christianity was, in 
fact, a philosophical way of life.  Seeds of truth were to be discovered in Greek 
thought, certainly, but the ultimate truth was voiced by the community of believers.  
For many outsiders, Christianity remained less a competing way of life and more a 
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shallow superstition that appeared to add nothing of value to the conventional (thus, 
proven) civil religion of the empire. 
 Though the topic is addressed more thoroughly in the succeeding chapter, one 
should take note of the fact that Christians responded to these attacks.  Not only did 
apologists such as Justin or Origen (in countering Celsus) explicitly refute the 
accusations and misinformed haranguing of Christianity’s opponents, but figures such 
as Irenaeus sought to resolve many of the problems born from the opposition faced 
during this period.  Those who denied Christianity the status of religion on the 
grounds that it lacked adequate history inadvertently contributed to the establishment 
of a soteriological schema in which narrative receives pride of place and believers are 
resolutely linked to the community’s historical telos.  Likewise, specific arguments 
such as Celsus’ assertion that the god of the Jews is incompatible with the god of the 
Christians find ready rebuttals in the writings of those who, like Irenaeus, expend 
great energy to express both the unequivocal compatibility (indeed, unity) of the two 
gods as well as the manner by which that single deity created a complex plan for the 
world.60  As will be explored later, the Christians came to articulate such plans as 
schemas or narratives of salvation.  If philosophical schools offered ‘life with a 
scheme’, Christianity certainly assumed its rightful place alongside such ‘ways of life’ 
as it came to incorporate the agonistic influences encountered in the empire into its 
belief system and meta-narrative. 
 From a different perspective, however, it was precisely this alternative way of 
life that concerned many Romans.  Plutarch argued that superstition ultimately led to 
atheism, for the former posited erroneous notions about the gods which, by pulling the 
mind further from the noble truth of philosophy, ultimately left the individual 
stranded and without any true concept or need of deities.61  Naturally, atheism worried 
the pagans.  In the complex religious system of the empire, maintaining an allegiance 
to one’s own private deities was common and acceptable; however, religious devotion 
had to be divided between those objects of private loyalty and the obligatory rites of 
Roman tradition.  When the former overshadowed or fully precluded the latter, 
problems arose.  Thus, accusations regarding the piety and ritual practices of 
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Christians existed alongside discursive attacks on the religious legitimacy of this up 
and coming group. 
 
Social Subversion: Accusations against Christians 
 Social subversion may be understood as the upending of society’s 
established/stabilising norms, and, in the particular case of second-century 
Christianity, the subversive behaviours for which they received resistance encompass 
both social and doctrinal heresy.  In other words, Christian practices and choices 
appeared rebellious because they undermined social and religious harmony.  As stated 
above, the two elements of society were closely intertwined, and Christian 
transgressions in one area could prove detrimental in the other.  Ostensibly, 
Christianity encouraged people to ‘abandon ancestral customs and break the sacred 
bonds of family, society, and nation.’62  In Pliny’s address to Trajan, a related 
problem is mentioned.63  Christians, due to their waxing influence, are blamed for a 
decrease in the sales of shrines and sacrificial meats intended for use in the temples.64  
Accusations extended beyond such economic complications.  During the second 
century alone, Christians were charged with criminal activity, religious impiety, and 
outright atheism.   Historian A.N. Sherwin-White sees a gradual shift during the 
period in the angle of attack; opponents changed from focusing on the flagitia 
(crimes) of the Christians to highlighting the group’s ‘godlessness’.65  Keeping in 
mind the unassailable ties between the flagitia and the more overtly religious 
offences, we turn our attention to the former, separating the multitude of accusations 
into smaller categories only to aid our analysis. 
 Claims of criminal activity levied against religious assemblages were common 
in the empire.  As mentioned previously, this was one method employed by Rome for 
suppressing unwanted superstitions.66  In the case of Christianity, the charges 
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included repugnant activities such as anthropophagy (cannibalism) and incest.  These 
Thyestean feasts and covert instances of Oedipodean intercourse, respectively, were 
denied by Justin in the middle of the century.  In his apologetical writings, Justin goes 
beyond simply denying the criminal charges and appeals to Hadrian’s rescript for fair 
legal treatment of those accused.67  Arguing for diversity among those who are called 
‘Christians’, Justin claims that the various ‘heretics’ may commit such crimes, but the 
‘true’ Christians do not.68  Throughout much of his writings, these specific 
accusations are refuted and deflected.  A sense of injustice pervades his pleas as 
Christians are not only falsely accused but unfairly convicted.   
 By Tertullian’s time a few decades later, pagan claims remained unchanged.  
In his Apology, Tertullian echoes Justin, albeit with a more indignant tone.  He lists 
the same charges brought against Christians, denies them, pleads for justice, and 
asserts the dubiousness of the allegations.69  For the Christians, though, these criminal 
acts comprised only a portion of pagan resistance.  In fact, the purported criminality 
of Christianity was supplemented by more explicitly religious challenges.  To engage 
in secret rites was one thing, but to eschew the obligatory public rites was too much 
for Rome.  In this way, then, the full spectrum of Christian behaviour became the 
target of societal and doctrinal heresy.   
 Impiety and atheism were believed to be closely related, barely distinct from 
one another on the spectrum of social misbehaviour.  Thus, in a text such as The 
Martyrdom of Polycarp, one encounters numerous invocations of ‘atheism’ by those 
opposing the Christian Polycarp as well as their assertion that Polycarp ‘teaches many 
not to sacrifice or worship.’70  That agonistic audience understood the refusal of ritual 
participation in terms of atheism; to save one’s allegiance solely for the one God was 
to slight the entire pantheon.  The martyrdom account describes those in attendance as 
both Jewish and pagan, and their anger toward Polycarp and the community he 
represented was provoked by the Christian leader’s refusal to ‘swear by the genius of 
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Caesar’.71  Such stubborn atheism, then, not only betrayed a disregard for social 
convention but contained the potential to incite the gods.   
 As previously indicated, divine wrath was assumed to be the potent 
repercussion of botched religious responsibility.  Failing to pay tribute to the gods 
amounted to disrespecting them.  Punishment could be expected as the just 
recompense for such dishonour.  A late second-century tablet from Lydia illustrates 
this type of causal relationship in the collective religious consciousness of the empire: 
Because Ioukoundos fell into a condition of insanity and it was noised abroad 
by all that he had been put under a spell by his mother-in-law Tatia, she set up 
a sceptre and placed curses in the temple in order to defend herself against 
what was being said about her, having suffered such a state of conscience.  
The gods sent punishment on her which she did not escape.  Likewise also her 
son Socrates was passing the entrance that leads down to the sacred grove and 
carrying a vine-dressing sickle and it dropped on his foot and thus destruction 
came upon him in a single day’s punishment.  Therefore great are the gods of 
Axiottenos.72 
Here, one observes the logical formula whereby one unwelcomed religious act 
produces a penal response from the local deities.  To behave fecklessly with regards 
to the religious was seen as despicable; yet, we should recognise the relativity 
inherent in this sort of religious conflict.  Heresy, or social opposition, has no sole 
owner.  For the pagans of this period, the Christians represented heresy, and vice 
versa.  The issue of piety was central to the matter.  This is observed in Eunapius’ 
retelling of a prophecy supposedly given by Antonius in the second century predicting 
the destruction of the Serapeum at Alexandria in 391 C.E.  In this account, the 
Christians are said to be as ‘men in their outward appearance but like swine in their 
lifestyle’ who ‘consider this as an act of piety, to despise what was divine.’73 
 ‘Despising the divine’ was more than rhetoric or unfounded polemic.  Given 
the nature of Graeco-Roman culture, it was almost inevitable that charges of flagitia 
combined with questions of pietas and led to a collective form of trepidation over the 
seeming want of any religiosity at all among the Christians.  Perhaps Plutarch was 
correct; Christian impiety engendered atheism.  This, at least, was the view of many 
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non-Christians.  Celsus, for example, decries the Christian apathy toward religious 
rites and claims that these individuals blaspheme the gods.74  What is more, argues 
Celsus, is that the Christians refuse to ‘swear by the genius of the Emperor.’75  
Polycarp was certainly presented with the opportunity to save himself by producing 
such an oblation, and he chose death.76  Justin acknowledges the charge of atheism 
but unashamedly defends the Christians’ abstention from the state religion and 
emperor-cult.77  Likewise, Tertullian admits that Christians do not swear by the genios 
of Caesar but ita per salute eorum (‘by his health’); a prayer that Tertullian believes 
to be strong evidence of Christian devotion to the empire.78 
 Those opposing Christianity, however, were not always convinced by such 
reasoning.  In the veneration of Jesus, antagonists like Celsus saw an incontrovertible 
attempt to undermine the unity of God.  This doctrinal issue quickly transformed into 
a social argument as Celsus proceeded; worshipping Jesus, he maintained, might lead 
to the overthrow of the emperor.79  Thus, the specific nature of Christian belief 
intersected with the social subversion this new movement was thought to embody.  If 
they did not pledge an oath to Caesar’s genius, then to what did they profess loyalty?  
Could Christian belief blend with Graeco-Roman religious understanding? 
 
Apo-theosis and the One God 
 In an environment so utterly immersed in philosophical tradition and civil 
religion, the notion of understanding, or rationality, was paramount.  If Christianity 
purported to be more than a superstition, it needed to substantiate such a claim.  Those 
defending the Christians, like Tertullian, often affirmed belief in the unity of God.  In 
fact, Tertullian’s justification for supporting the emperors stems from his faith in the 
ultimate sovereignty of the one, true God.80  Even so, various elements of Christian 
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doctrine baffled outsiders.  At various points in his text, Celsus questions the logic of 
believing in Jesus’ incarnation, the possibility of resurrection, and the sincerity of 
Christians who profess monotheism.81  Christians, he asserts, suffer from sedition in 
their lack of reason.82  Not only is it unthinkable that God could change in order to 
become incarnate, thus contravening the accepted Platonic view of divine 
immutability, but Christians offer no cogent response to logical challenges.  Their 
only retort, according to Celsus, is that everything is possible with God.83 
 Once again, Celsus provides an instructive example of the doctrinal and 
societal heresies facing second-century Christians.  His onslaught, although 
potentially seen as harsh, is not unfounded.  Positing doctrines such as the ability of 
God to become human or the supernatural resurrection of Jesus explicitly contradicted 
many of the common views of metaphysics and deity.  Even creatio ex nihilo, a 
developing belief during this time, offended the Greek tradition of pre-existent souls 
and, accordingly, appeared irrational.84  It is very important to acknowledge that the 
doctrinal tension experienced by the Christians also came from competing, but 
equally marginal, sects.  Often, these other sects (sometimes called ‘Christian’) 
attempted to ameliorate the incongruity between traditional, philosophical 
understandings and novel perspectives.   
 The present analysis of this period centres on the figure of Irenaeus; therefore, 
one would be remiss not to mention ‘Gnosticism’ as one front in the heretical battle.  
Irenaeus wrote his entire five-volume Against Heresies in response to the teachings of 
various ‘Gnostic’ groups, and his articulation of a soteriological schema owes much 
of its inspiration to his drive to resolve the apparently counterfeit confessions of these 
opponents.85  Primarily, Irenaeus sought to decry the tenets of Valentinianism, a 
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‘Gnostic’ sect which gained popularity in the western regions of the empire during 
this time.86  Valentinus, and his pupil Ptolemy, constructed a somewhat convoluted 
cosmology in which Greek philosophy was blended with Christian discourse.  The 
result was a system of divine emanations, all traceable back to the one Bythos 
(Forefather).  The lowest of these was the Demiurge who created matter, but there 
was also a role for Logos, Ekklesia, Sophia, and even Christ, Truth, and the Holy 
Spirit.  In this manner, then, these ‘Gnostics’ developed a more syncretistic system 
that, at least in part, borrowed from the popular structure of henotheism.   
 Perhaps one could argue then that the most threatening belief espoused by 
those Christians who would emerge over the next couple of centuries as ‘orthodoxy’ 
was one of its most unassuming: monotheism.  The notion of a supreme deity was 
actually quite familiar to a milieu steeped in henotheistic ideas.  Yet, Christianity 
seemed to want to disabuse Romans of their certainty that the lesser gods existed at 
all.  When a Christian professed faith in the ‘one, true God’, he or she literally 
intended not to express loyalty to any other entity.  This antipathy toward other 
supposedly divine beings also extended to the emperor, as we have already shown.  In 
Graeco-Roman culture, heroes deserved honour.  It was not uncommon for these 
noble individuals to be immortalised in the minds of others.  This bestowal of god-
like esteem extended both to exceptional, but relatively unknown, figures as well as to 
emperors.  A story from the second century, for instance, tells of a ‘rustic child of 
nature in the Athenian hinterland who comes to be regarded as a Heracles or 
Marathon-style hero to whom offerings may be made (and who detects impure ones 
by means of his supernatural powers).’87  Here, one encounters an account of a mortal 
receiving a degree of divinity from those in the local area.  This form of deification is 
precisely the type afforded emperors and highlights the sacralising tendency in the 
earliest societies of the Common Era. 
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 When this sort of apotheosis occurred within the social institution of the ruler-
cult, it functioned to direct attention to the present power and innate vitality of the 
emperor by positing an ultimate consummation as the due outcome of so worthy a 
life.  The term itself communicated as much.  Beginning with the prefix ἀπο (apo) 
meaning ‘from’ or ‘away from’, Ἀποθέωσις (apotheosis) acquired the connotation of a 
liberation of the ruler’s divine element from his mortal life on earth.88  If, as 
Momigliano states, ‘people were finding it easy to call exceptionally powerful men 
gods because they were losing faith...in the effectiveness of their traditional gods’;89 
then it may not be surprising that Christians, seeing these same powerful men 
humbled by the zeal of Christian martyrs, came to adapt apotheosis in order for it to 
describe adequately the members of their own ranks.  Perhaps by removing the prefix 
from the term, the very element that had come to suggest an escape from the shackles 
of mortality, the process of θέωσις (theosis) was firmly situated within the present 
instead of the future.  Appropriated in this way, the notion of theosis implicitly 
subverted social conventions, including the specific virtues of the imperial cult as well 
as the more deeply ingrained tradition of heroic death in general.  For insiders, 
however, the desire to comprehend death at the hands of one’s opponents was 
palpable.  Alongside the societal and doctrinal tensions existed the physical dimension 
of the conflict: death, or Berger’s ‘marginal situation par excellence’.90 
 
Personal Heresy 
 The topics of identity and social cohesion are always intimately connected.  In 
the second century, as we have shown, Roman identity and social unity was 
dependant on religious complicity from those within the boundaries of the empire.  
When residents such as Christians displayed recalcitrance and an ostensible disregard 
for rituals and traditions, the natural response from pagans was aggressive and primal.  
Here we recall Lorenz’s work on animal aggression and its function for establishing 
‘pecking orders’ and the manner by which Mol appropriated that observation for the 
study of religious identity.  For the Romans, civil religion and its immutable link to 
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the imperial cult fostered an identity and cultivated a stability encapsulated in the 
notions of pax romana and pax deorum.  What is more, Sherwin-White argues 
convincingly that the second century witnessed an increase in Roman unity:  
As the governing class came to be recruited increasingly from outside of Italy 
the distinction between Roman citizens, subjects and foreigners became 
blurred politically...The peoples of the empire came to be regarded as ‘our 
people’, cives or hominess nostri.  This attitude led finally to the 
amalgamation of all subjects as Roman citizens under the constitution 
Antoniniana.91 
It was precisely this waxing sense of solidarity that the Christians threatened; just as 
any social unit would, the Romans sought to conserve the identity they held to be 
sacred even as it became more inclusive.   
 However, our overarching concern is with the sacralising and resolving 
actions of the second-century Christians; a subject we partially breach by peering into 
the physical form of antagonism they experienced.  For these religious adherents (that 
is, Christians), too, identity was constructed in the face of opposition and preserved 
with vehemence.  As they came to face persecution, Christian identity and group 
cohesion became embroiled in a paradigm indebted to the harsh experiences 
themselves.  As Judith Perkins asserts, Christians used the discourse of tortured 
bodies as a means for articulating their social identity.92  The marginalisation they felt 
physically was also internalised and felt inwardly, manifesting itself as a meaningful 
identity.  Just as communitas develops for those in a liminal state, so the Christians 
began to enjoy increased solidarity as (in our terms) the reception of persecution 
became the recognition of martyrdom. 
 As one might expect, there is considerable overlap between the 
societal/doctrinal heresies already discussed and the personal heresies to follow.  
Justin, for example, concurrently laments both the curses of the Jews towards the 
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Christians and the former’s violence against the same group.93  Tertullian responds to 
the exchange between Pliny and Trajan with incensed incredulity, underlining the 
curious decision to persecute the accused even when their beliefs are as innocuous as 
their crimes are elusive.94  In the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons 
(hereafter, Letter), a martyrdom account to which we turn our attention below, those 
persecuting the Christians in Gaul decide to burn their victims and discard the ashes 
into the Rhône so that there is no hope of resurrection.  This belief in resurrection is 
then cited as the motivating force behind the ‘new foreign cult’ in which torture is 
accepted willingly, thus rendering the latter ineffective.95  The physical persecution, 
then, took a particular form in conversation with the doctrines and social conventions 
of each party. 
 As for martyrologies like the Letter, one primary objective was the 
reinforcement of group solidarity;96 therefore, it is not surprising to encounter within 
their pages an abundance of rhetorical turns.  Nevertheless, most of these texts are 
considered historically reliable in their articulation of the nature of Christian 
suffering.97  With this in mind, the present exploration of the second century proceeds 
with an analysis of two martyrdom accounts, both linked to Irenaeus, albeit in two 
different ways.  First, the Martyrdom of Polycarp is discussed as a record of 
martyrdom in the second century.98  Then, we return to the Letter, a composition 
supposedly generated in Gaul during the latter half of this period. 
                                               
93
 Justin, Dialogue with Trypho, 16. 
 
94
 Tertullian, 2. 
 
95
 Eusebius, V.1.63.  The letter is preserved only in chapter five of Eusebius’ History of the Church.  
For a recent English translation, we use the same version of Eusebius cited previously.  Due to its ease 
of use, however, discussions of this martyrology also benefit from reference to: E.C.E. Owen, Some 
Authentic Acts of the Early Martyrs (London: S.P.C.K., 1933), 53-70. 
 
96
 Perkins, 134. 
 
97
 Moss, 100-06.  Moss provides an overview of the scepticism surrounding the reliability of the letter.  
She is not quite willing to deny it its place among the other martyrologies, but speaks with a cautious 
tone about how much of the letter is Eusebius and how much is his source, knowledge that she 
rightfully suggests cannot be obtained with any certainty.  For the position that the letter is completely 
unreliable, see James Westfall Thompson, ‘The Alleged Persecution of the Christians at Lyons in 177,’ 
The American Journal of Theology 16.3(1912): 359-84. 
 
98
 Candida R. Moss, ‘On the Dating of Polycarp: Rethinking the Place of the Martyrdom of Polycarp in 
the History of Christianity,’ Early Christianity 1(2010): 572, 574.  Moss’ article is the most recent and 
exhaustive discussion of the problems with dating the Martyrdom of Polycarp.  She notes that the 
extant version of the text most likely dates from the first half of the third century instead of the middle 
of the second century as was previously thought.  Even so, she believes that it is ‘probable’ that the 
  
161 
 
 
Martyrdom of Polycarp 
 Michael Holmes recognises the Martyrdom of Polycarp as ‘the oldest written 
account of a Christian martyrdom outside the New Testament.’99  Along with the 
aforementioned epistle from Christians in Lyons and Vienne, it may also serve as 
proof of a sort of martyrological genre in which the persecutions are detailed in the 
form of a general letter from a church or churches to another church or churches.  The 
retelling of Polycarp’s martyrdom is attributed to the church at Smyrna, where 
Polycarp was bishop, and is addressed to the church at Philomelium.   
 It would be difficult to gainsay the account’s significance.  As Holmes and 
W.H.C. Frend both attest, the Martyrdom of Polycarp testifies to the growing unrest 
and intensifying maltreatment of Christians in Asia during the middle of the second 
century.100  Some scholars believe that the letter was written sometime between 155 
C.E. and 160 C.E., thus documenting a martyrdom that occurred before the reign of 
Marcus Aurelius (whose reign lasted 161 – 180).101  In that case, the persecution 
would not correspond with other accounts and might exist as a random, anomalous 
outburst in which a Christian bishop was tried and killed in Smyrna along with eleven 
others during the same period thought to be so peaceful that it caused bishop Melito 
of Sardis to forget that persecution had ever happened.102  If, however, the letter dates 
from around 167 C.E., the date Eusebius provides for Polycarp’s death; then it stands 
alongside other evidence for increased hostilities during the reign of Aurelius, a 
period during which Irenaeus was ascending the ranks of ecclesial leadership.  Frend 
accepts this later dating, and it is made all the more plausible if chapters twenty-one 
and twenty-two are later extensions, a very likely possibility given the conclusion of 
chapter twenty and the manner in which the those two questionable chapters explicitly 
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and unashamedly build on one another as if successive editors were keen to show that 
they were adding further elaboration.103   
 It seems possible that Eusebius’ date is close to the original material used to 
compose the letter.104  As Frend notes, other outbreaks of persecution occurred during 
this same period in Asia.105  There are other reasons that the Martyrdom of Polycarp 
is very significant for the present summation of the personal heresy faced by Irenaeus 
and his Christian peers.  Not only is its narration of the martyrdom thought to relay 
relatively accurate minutiae concerning the types of death experienced by the 
persecuted, but its original version may have been written based on the eyewitness 
account of Irenaeus.106  If this is true, and if it is defensible to hold that Irenaeus also 
composed part or all of that first version of the Letter from Lyons, then one begins to 
see both the reason for our selection of Irenaeus as well as the possible motive behind 
his construction of a soteriology meant to resolve existential conflict.  Having come 
from Asia Minor to Gaul, Irenaeus may have personally witnessed multiple instances 
of heinous persecutions and composed his theological works shortly thereafter 
(between 180 C.E. and 190 C.E.). 
 The Martyrdom of Polycarp presents the reader with a poignant narrative of 
the socially incendiary nature of a stalwart’s conviction and the method by which that 
bishop and others were killed.  It opens with a description of the persecutions already 
endured.  Christians, the text claims, have been lashed with whips to the point of 
exposing veins and arteries; they have faced wild animals and sundry forms of torture 
including lying on beds of broken shells.107  As for Polycarp, he is repeatedly asked to 
swear allegiance to Caesar.  Unfailingly, the bishop refuses to renounce his Christian 
faith.  The proconsul first threatens Polycarp with death at the paws of beasts, but this 
does little to sway the Christian leader.108  In the end, Polycarp is burned and stabbed.  
His death is said to be one of twelve that took place. 
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 From such an account, it is learned that the modus operandi of the persecutors 
was very often death by wild animals in the arena.  Apparently, when fire was 
preferred, the victim was typically nailed to a fixed structure so that he or she could 
not escape the fatal flames.  It is also apparent that the authors of the martyrology 
believed Jews to be equally as culpable as pagans and that; ultimately, it was the devil 
who instigated it all.109  This is yet another example of the exogenous nature of heresy 
and an ostensible case of physical harm at the hands of both Jews and pagans: 
Evarestus was writing under the stress of crisis.  He had no time for 
theological niceties.  He wanted to tell the Christians of Philomelium and the 
world how the great Polycarp had been arrested, tried and gone serenely to his 
end.  His was the model martyrdom, victim like his Lord had been, of the 
unholy alliance of pagans and Jews.110 
 This was no isolated incident, either.  Although persecution remained sporadic 
and localised until the third century, the Martyrdom of Polycarp simply relates one of 
at least two notable eruptions during Irenaeus’ time.  The other, transpiring around 
176 C.E. to 178 C.E., included the deaths of three believers in Eumeneia one of whom 
was their bishop Thraseas.111  More importantly, a gruesome outbreak took place in 
Lyons, the Gallic city in which Irenaeus would become bishop.  The letter 
documenting that event reveals a great deal about the form of opposition faced and 
indicates the embryonic stages of the resolution process for those insiders touched by 
the affair. 
 
Martyrs at Vienne and Lyons 
 There is some opacity in the scholarly understanding of how Christianity 
found its way to Gaul during the second century, not to mention a sizable and 
justifiable degree of scepticism concerning the plausibility of a joint martyrological 
epistle originating from both Lyons and their rival city, Vienne.112  It is likely that the 
various towns of Gaul were partially settled by immigrants from Asia Minor who had 
followed the Rhône Valley as a trade route, immigrants who brought their Christian 
beliefs and practices with them to their new homes.  The seeds of persecution may 
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have been planted by tensions created between the locals and the influx of these 
foreign ideas, and the hostility was nourished ‘by the occurrence of natural disasters, 
such as the vicious onset of disease or famine: thus the persecutions along the Rhône 
may have been precipitated by the waves of contagious disease which spread 
throughout the Empire from 165 onwards.’113  Such catastrophes, as has been 
discussed, were often blamed on the pernicious qualities of superstitions.  Perhaps 
more notable is the ubiquity of religious conflict ensuing because of a perceived 
infiltration of established norms by external forces.  This is also a phenomenon 
observed among the early Mormons as they were repeatedly expelled from various 
towns and states, and it is another way of articulating our understanding of heresy in 
general. 
 In any case, the tension in Lyons and Vienne seems to have erupted into 
outright brutality and bloodshed.  Although the letter is the only record of the events it 
relays from this time period, it is still possible to excavate cautiously the details of its 
narrative in order to learn a bit about the violence experienced.  As Boudewijn 
Dehandschutter highlights, the Letter can be read on three levels: story, epistle, part of 
Eusebius.114  The analysis by Candida Moss, already cited, is explicitly a literary look 
at the narrative and certainly exemplifies the viability of such an exposition of the 
text.  The Letter differs from other martyr acts, such as that of the Scillitan martyrs of 
Africa which is contemporaneous with the Gallic letter, in that the former appears not 
to be based on actual legal proceedings.  In spite of the rhetorical embellishments and 
hyper-spiritual tone of the work, a number of useful specifics shine through with 
regards to the personal heresies carried out against the Christians. 
 As Eusebius himself states in his introduction to the letter, its contents provide 
both the historical record and the lessons to be learned from it.  One of the most 
notable messages of the letter concerns the demographics of the Christian community; 
the specific characters in the narrative include men, women, slaves, youths, the aged, 
and a doctor.  A number of the martyrs were Roman citizens as well, including one 
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Attalus.115  These Roman Christians were beheaded instead of facing the beasts of the 
amphitheatre.  The latter punishment was repeatedly used against those who refused 
to denounce their membership in the young movement by making offerings to other 
gods.  The wild animals were only a small portion of the cruelty, however.  The 
martyrs were beaten, stoned, dragged across the ground, whipped, forced to endure 
the pain of hot metal plates placed on sensitive areas of their bodies, imprisoned, and 
put to death by the white-hot torment of the ‘iron chair’.  If the Letter is reliable, the 
number of those martyred continually increased due to incessant arrests being made in 
the two cities.116  Finally, the various martyrs succumbed to the torture, and their 
bodies were left in the sun for six days before being burned; the ashes were dumped 
into the Rhône so that the Christian remnant could not pay due homage to their fallen 
friends nor claim any resurrection of the dead.117 
 To these historical events are added editorial flourishes.  For instance, there is 
a constant theme of ‘painless suffering’ in the text, a theological claim that one’s 
witness engenders analgesic power.  In turn, this power neutralises the persecution.  
Supernatural claims in the text do hint at the Christian community’s eagerness to 
make meaning out of their experiences.  The letter ends with a statement commending 
Irenaeus as a worthy presbyter in the church, presumably meant to bolster his 
authority in the eyes of the Asian recipients of the letter.  Whether or not Irenaeus 
composed this record himself, Eusebius unequivocally connects the church leader 
with the churches in Gaul, and Irenaeus does become the bishop of Lyons shortly 
after these alleged persecutions.  Moss argues for a Gallic form of Christianity 
responsible for the similarities between Irenaeus’ Against Heresies and the theological 
content of the Letter.118  In either case, the Christians of this region and this time 
demonstrate the recurrent phenomenon of interpreting opposition in terms of an ideal, 
external enemy before postulating means of redress. 
 Throughout the Letter, the travails of the in-group are formulated as stemming 
from the ultimate exogenous force – at various times: the Devil, the adversary, the 
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crooked serpent, the beast, and Satan.119  Perhaps more illuminating, the text of the 
Letter contains a focus on Stephen (from Acts 7) as a proto-martyr, an effort to 
interpret the present in the light of the past also employed by Irenaeus but absent from 
many other texts of the second century.120  Both the emphasis on Satan and the 
mention of Stephen point to a very significant element in these second-century works: 
‘martyrdom was the peak of moral excellence.’121  To follow Stephen was to follow 
Christ was to participate in the disarming victory over the enemy.  Personal heresy 
was personified in the form of Satan, and the willingness to suffer was the volitional 
act par excellence. 
 Dehandschutter rightly avers that the Letter is not an example of voluntary 
martyrdom but is focused on the ‘worthiness’ of those martyred.122  The figures 
whose stories are told in the Letter do not seek out their own deaths.  They were 
accepting, however; and the issues of acceptance and worthiness appear inseparable.  
The merit of the characters is manifest in their passive courage. Individuals such as 
Vettius Epagathus were compelled by their righteousness to affirm their standing as a 
Christian, an affirmation that they knew would secure a position in ‘the ranks of the 
martyrs’.123  The text, unquestionably, does portray the persecutions in Gaul as a sort 
of athletic contest between the in-group and the out-group; thus, it differs from the 
eager desire to die present in other records because those in Gaul exhibited great 
mettle and strength, convincing their peers who had denied Christ to return even if it 
meant sure death.124 
 Even so, the author of the Letter (Irenaeus or not) joins with Irenaeus in 
proposing a tripartite arrangement interlinking the past righteousness, the present 
suffering, and the future salvation of the individual.  Indeed, one martyr who was tied 
to a stake is likened to Christ on the cross, seeing their fellow believer suffer in this 
way reminded the others present that ‘any man who has suffered for the glory of 
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Christ has fellowship for ever with the living God.’125  Such fellowship was salvation 
and relates to the participatio and communio frequently mentioned by Irenaeus.  For 
the latter, communion or fellowship with God was the unique hope of humanity.  The 
mingling of humanity with divinity was prefigured, thus restored as a possibility, in 
Jesus Christ.126  More importantly, the intensely physical persecutions essentially 
inspired this notion of theosis as a sort of embodied glory wherein the corporeality of 
the believer’s body was integral to the system of advancement.  Appropriating, as we 
have shown, the notion of apotheosis and interpreting their predicament in the light of 
Jesus who was understood to have been crucified unjustly, the second-century 
Christians connected somatic actions with salvation.  The martyr was one who had 
lived worthily; death at the hands of heretics (in our social sense) only immortalised 
the victim, figuratively and literally.  The Romans contributed this interpretive system 
themselves: ‘For the Romans, as for the early Christians, the victim was 
conspicuously central and active: the more actively voluntary, the more effective the 
sacrifice.  Sacrifice exalted the victim and rendered him or her divine.’127  This ‘active 
voluntarism’ flowed from the degree of righteousness and affected the Christian 
understanding of martyrdom itself as a ‘fulfilment’.  Writing before the composition 
of the Letter, Justin already described conversion to Christianity as becoming perfect 
(τέλειος).  By the late second century, the Letter used a form of the word τέλειος 
(‘perfect(ed)’) when describing those who finally succumbed to the persecutions.128  
In Against Heresies, Irenaeus employed the same term when promulgating his 
theological anthropology in which disciples of Christ who follow the Scriptures as 
explicated by the Church are made ‘perfect’.129 
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Christianos Esse Non Licet 
 The Christians of the second century were ultimately condemned because they 
possessed an identity: Christian.130  It was this name that incited fear and reflexive 
aggression due to its supposed crimes but, perhaps more to the point, due to its 
potential to expose what Bourdieu and Arnal refer to as the doxa of society.  Yet, as 
the Christians endured various attacks to their physical wellbeing and social status, 
they came to recognise the oppressive heresy.  That they immediately sought to 
incorporate the opposition into a meaning system can be seen from their budding 
concepts of salvation that presaged more complex soteriological schemas in which 
deification took centre stage.  By the end of the second century, Christian leaders 
embraced the present as the vital epoch in salvation history: 
...theologians adapted themselves surprisingly easily to the ‘time of the 
church,’ which provided the present – the existence under Christ’s invisible 
rule – with meaning and let the future grow pale.  Toward the end of the 
second century, Christians could already pray for the delay of the final 
fulfilment. (original emphasis)131 
Origen concurs, seeing the parousia as ‘the coming of Christ in perfected men and 
women.’132   
 In accordance with this reverence for the present, the persecuted Christians 
slowly altered their thoughts on the origin of the opposition itself.  Justin blamed 
human free will and the nefarious workings of demons for the misfortunes of 
believers.133  Only a few decades later, however, these agonistic forces were taken to 
be divinely-sanctioned opportunities to progress.  Thus, the empire was a mechanism 
of providence.134  Much as early Mormons viewed the United States and its 
Constitution as integral to God’s plans for the world, so the Christians of Irenaeus’ 
day came to welcome opposition as a supernatural wedge dividing the righteous from 
the unrighteous.  We explore this interpretive framework more fully in the following 
chapter but here we acknowledge the changing perspectives as reception and 
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recognition overflow into a desire for resolution; a process that permitted Tertullian to 
avow, ‘the blood of Christians is seed’ as he wrote with boldness against a society that 
had repeatedly tried to outlaw his community.135   
 The very same sentiment was echoed many years later and many miles away 
when a leading Mormon intellectual reflected on the place of conflict in his tradition’s 
past: 
Opposition to the Church, the pitiless maltreatment to which its people have 
been subjected, particularly in the earlier decades of its history, comprising 
mobbings, drivings, spoliation, scourgings, and assassination, have operated to 
strengthen the Church, body and soul. True, the heat of persecution has 
scorched and withered a few of the sickly plants, such as had little depth of 
sincerity; but the general effect has been to promote a fuller growth, and to 
make richer and more fertile the Garden of the Lord.136 
With this outlook in mind our exposition now sets its sights on those early Mormons 
of nineteenth-century America and their struggle with various forms of heresy.  
Remaining sensitive to the contextual details separating early Christians and early 
Mormons, we nevertheless find it heuristically valuable to spotlight the latter as 
another historical moment in which social tension enveloped a nascent religious 
movement.  In the pages below, therefore, the characteristics of anti-Mormonism in 
the early nineteenth century are traced with the same care and critical awareness with 
which we explored Christian persecution in the days of Irenaeus.  Again, we employ 
the three-fold model of social heresy.  This methodological consistency serves the 
topic well by delicately handling the inevitably comparative nature of our study, 
simultaneously drawing to the surface the similar oppositional forces faced by the two 
parties as well as flagging key areas of interest for sustained analysis in the next 
chapter. 
 
Ministers, Mobs, Apostates, and ‘Gentile’ (Protestant) America: The Early 
Mormon Example 
 In attempting to scour the early Mormon example for its unique insights, one 
immediately observes numerous tensions and paradoxes.  At every level (LDS, North 
Eastern America, America), conflict and reform appear to be the defining marks.  The 
                                               
135
 Tertullian, 50.13 
 
136
 James Talmage, The Vitality of Mormonism: Brief Essays on Distinctive Doctrines of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Boston: The Gorham Press, 1919), 15. 
 
  
170 
 
‘pitiless maltreatment’ mentioned by James Talmage above provides a suitable 
example of one hurdle, viz. that of perspective.  As was mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, persecution almost necessitates interpretation by those on the receiving 
(often, minority) side of the clash.  Incongruity is quite likely to exist between the 
imagined persecution cited by insiders and the events presented by the historical 
record.  That being so, the student of religion must recognise the uncertainty involved 
in reconstructions of social struggles.  Moore, in his study of ‘the Mormon 
controversy’, offers a similarly cautious aside: 
In struggling for position, the opposing parties relied on a variety of strategies.  
One was violence.  Another was legislation and its subversion.  Yet another 
was rhetoric that made contradictory and competing claims.  Once historians 
recognise that they are trying to unravel not merely what was true in some 
easily defined objective sense, but what people thought was true, or what they 
wanted others to accept as true, they have to come to grips with the fact that a 
lot of seemingly contrary things were simultaneously true.  Perception admits, 
even insists on, that sort of ambiguity.137 
Moore’s words are incisive.  He not only points to one of the unavoidable dilemmas 
involved in the study of Mormon conflict, but also helpfully highlights the various 
‘strategies’ employed by the opposed communities.  The latter observation is 
important because it reasserts our own focus on the societal, doctrinal, and personal 
forms of heresy.   
 Before turning to those topics, however, it is important to continue to divulge 
the tensions present in early Mormon history.  Throughout the following pages, it is 
assumed that the insider’s account of LDS persecution will differ by some degree 
from that of the outsider or of later historians.  Scholars themselves are far from 
agreement on the issue of Mormon persecution, as was demonstrated earlier in our 
discussion of the contradictory conclusions of Moore and Givens.  The waters remain 
just as murky when historians consider specific events.  Stephen LeSueur, for 
example, states definitively that the critical 1838 Mormon ‘war’ in Missouri was 
initiated by non-Mormons.138  He is compelled to argue that ‘Joseph Smith 
exaggerated little when he complained that the law “is always administered against us 
and never in our favour.”’  Aware of the debate, LeSueur continues: ‘In Missouri, 
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regardless of who was at fault or who broke the law, it was Mormon leaders who were 
jailed, and Mormons who were forced to abandon their homes.’139  These same 
Mormons encountered intense opposition in their next home state, Illinois.  Historians 
John Hallwas and Roger Launius present the Illinois conflict in a starkly different 
fashion from LeSueur’s description of the Missouri War: ‘the only documented case 
of out-and-out religious persecution enacted in Hancock County [IL.]... [was] against 
the dissenters who dared to point out Mormon shortcomings in their newspaper and 
demand reform.’140  In other words, Mormons inflicted persecution on those within 
their own ranks who showed mettle by publicly questioning the direction and 
behaviour of the group’s leadership.  For Hallwas and Launius, the Mormons of 
Illinois had become a ‘theocratic, expansive, separatist community that would have 
provoked opposition anywhere in America...’141   
 Was that opposition – real or imagined, from within or without – truly 
religious in nature?  This seemingly innocuous question captures the spirit of another 
rift in the field, viz., that some, but not all, early Mormons believed they were 
persecuted for their beliefs.  Some, but not all, of their opponents agreed.  Later, in 
our introduction of the doctrinal heresy faced by the early LDS community, we 
excavate this tension between those who choose to see Mormonism as a religious 
threat worthy of religious rebuke and others convinced that religion was, at best, a 
facade hiding the political and economic flavour of America’s resistance to Joseph 
Smith and his followers. 
 The paradoxes and bifurcations continue as one’s field of vision broadens.  
The America of the nineteenth century was still reckoning with the effects of 
independence and revolution just one generation earlier.  An old guard of Calvinistic, 
puritan elites was losing influence in the face of rising democratic sentiments among 
the ‘common man’ of the rapidly growing western borders and the waxing sway of 
Enlightenment rationality.  The country was not teetering on the edge of survival but 
wrestling with its unprecedented success and growth.  Its sails were swollen without 
anyone at the helm.  As the nation entered what is often called the era of Jacksonian 
                                               
139
 Ibid., 253. 
 
140
 John E. Hallwas and Roger D. Launius, eds., Cultures in Conflict (Logan: Utah State University 
Press, 1995), 6. 
 
141
 Ibid., 8. 
 
  
172 
 
America, republicanism and democracy seeped into the most unexpected of minds as 
the truest of values and the most potent of processes.142  The upshot was a largely 
Protestant country whose inherited esteem for the individual was fertilised by a 
political and cultural environment that placed all power in the hands of the people, 
even when those citizens disagreed. 
 Opposition and conflict were inescapable.  In a sense, they were the 
unfortunate by-products of the very characteristics that propelled the new republic.  In 
the following examination of Mormon conflict, there is an intentional effort to avoid 
sides on many of these potentially polarising historical issues.  Just as LeSueur 
observes, it is clear that the early followers of Joseph Smith endured true injustice and 
violent resistance at times.  This may only account for a portion of the persecution 
many of these early Mormons recorded, the remainder constructed by their own 
emotional reflexes and rhetorical agendas.143  Even so, the context was ripe for social 
discord, and the Mormons and their unbelieving neighbours often indulged in what 
was nearly a national pastime.   
 From the outset, Joseph Smith seems to have placed an emphasis on what we 
might now describe as binary opposites in the human experience and the propitious 
effects (both spiritual and material) of one force being countered by another.  In the 
first edition of the Book of Mormon published in 1830, Smith recorded: ‘Wherefore, 
the ends of the law which the Holy One hath given, unto the inflicting of the 
punishment which is affixed, which punishment that is affixed is in opposition to that 
of the happiness which is affixed, to answer the ends of the atonement; for it must 
needs be, that there is an opposition in all things.’144  Placing the law of God in 
opposition to happiness in the light of Christ’s atonement, this passage seems to 
portend the more developed theology Smith would introduce years later.  The passage 
also ascribed an authoritative tone to the notion that adversity is advantageous.   
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 It is striking that Smith’s reflections exhibit an increasing preoccupation with 
persecution and opposition.  The theophanic event that would come to be known by 
Mormons as the First Vision, a moment of reported intensity and inspiration for Smith 
which we first mentioned in Chapter One, is a telling example.  Smith described the 
details of this supernatural vision multiple times in the first decade of Latter-day Saint 
history.  The version of the event that was canonised and reproduced in the sacred 
texts of Mormonism and that, as Douglas Davies notes, came to be a ‘paradigmatic 
scene’ for Latter-day Saints; was not recorded until 1839.145  Yet, Smith provided 
details of the 1820 experience at least three times before.146  Whereas the earlier 
accounts from around 1831/32 and 1835 speak of seeing a single being and ‘two 
personages’ with angels, respectively; the 1839 account specifically names the Father 
and Son appearing to young Joseph and recalls the way in which their arrival rescued 
Smith from an oppressive darkness that nearly destroyed him.147  More importantly, 
the canonised version of this pivotal experience includes Smith’s depiction of the 
personal persecution that followed the event.  Our concern is not whether Smith’s 
altered narrative was the result of fraudulent motives or fuller disclosure.  Indeed, 
debating the historical validity of the later report does little to advance the present 
study.  It is much more significant that, even if the persecutions and oppressive 
supernatural powers were simply omitted in the earliest depictions, they eventually 
received emphasis at a time when the Mormons were still recovering from violent 
conflict with Missourians and subsequent expulsion from the state.  Much like the 
basic elements of deification that gradually rose to the surface during Smith’s tenure 
as leader, focus on persecution and endurance sharpened over time.  The words from 
2 Nephi lodged a seed in the early LDS psyche, and this sprouted fresh green leaves 
after being germinated by political and religious unrest in nineteenth-century 
America. 
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Nineteenth-Century America 
 The nineteenth century was a unique period for America, in which tradition, 
authority, and establishment of any kind were challenged in the names of democracy, 
revolution, republicanism, and God.  Politics and religion were melded together 
indissolubly.  One of the central figures of this time, Alexander Campbell, began a 
new Christian sect called the Disciples of Christ and remarked that 4 July 1776 should 
be remembered much the same way as the Jewish Passover, as a signpost of 
freedom.148  Political and social liberty was synonymous with religious liberty.  Such 
a notion was only partially inherited from the Revolution with its disdain for popery 
and monarchy.  The new sentiments of the nineteenth century stemmed from an open 
embrace of democratic principles and an application of such values to other facets of 
life.  Much like the growing chasm separating the older ideas of Jeffersonian politics 
and the fresh conceptions of Jacksonians, the hegemony of white Protestants grew 
increasingly divided between the traditional, educated denominations and the rapidly 
expanding constituency of semi-literate, sons of democracy.  In effect, America was 
facing an epistemological crisis.  In the midst of securing national independence, the 
primacy of erudite clergy and formal theology within the Christian churches was 
challenged but ultimately buttressed by Enlightenment inroads; now, these mainstays 
of religion were threatened by the very laity they were meant to serve.   
 Believing that everyone should be capable of discerning truth just as everyone 
is trusted to elect national leaders, America’s citizens unwittingly embarked on the 
process of constructing a form of civil religion.  As founts of knowledge, clergy were 
supplanted by less-formal, grassroots media such as newspapers and pamphlets.149  
Once again, the printing press took centre stage in a religious revolution.  The Second 
Great Awakening, as this seminal episode of religious reform is called, almost begs 
for comparison to the Protestant Reformation: ‘Christendom has probably not 
witnessed a comparable period of religious upheaval since the Reformation – and 
never such an explosion of entrepreneurial energy.’150  Placing the power of insight 
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and influence in the hands of the common citizen resulted in more than new, 
fragmented sects.  It caused an eruption of religio-political activity that, in turn, 
engendered a sort of national religion.  It was no contradiction to speak of Christian 
nationalism.  In fact, Heman Humphry, the president of Amherst College, said in 
1831 that America had finally achieved ‘that sort of union which makes every patriot 
a Christian and every Christian a patriot.’151  The future was thought to be undeniably 
bright for the young nation, and its key purpose was conceptualised in religious terms: 
it was to be the city on a hill.  The democratic, capitalist cornerstones of America 
were now the building blocks of Christian faith, extended outward for the entire world 
to see and emulate.  
 Focusing on a small, fledgling group such as the Mormons, however, 
highlights one of the most conspicuous ironies of the day.  The same respect for 
individualism and contempt for intellectualism that helped crystallise the constitutive 
elements of America’s emerging civil religion also gave birth to a myriad of 
competing sects, some of which venerated socially subversive ideals that defied the 
dominant system.  Thus, religious movements such as the Latter-day Saints owed 
much of their existence to the republicanism gripping New England but came to 
represent an alternative to those predominant standards.  Adopting and echoing 
Marvin Hill’s basic but profound argument that Joseph Smith and the early Mormons 
intended the establishment of a unifying religious antithesis to the rampant pluralism 
of the period, Klaus Hansen contends that the millennial focus of nineteenth-century 
American Protestantism which led most Americans toward an overt optimism 
concerning their nation’s role in God’s will was framed differently by Smith and his 
community: 
To Joseph, Mormonism was American to its very core, making it potentially 
subversive to those who saw such language as rhetoric that only masked a 
deep cultural divide.  Mormonism presented itself not merely as another 
variant of American Protestant pluralism, but as an articulate and sophisticated 
counterideology [sic] that attempted to establish a ‘new heaven and a new 
earth’ intended as an alternative to the Protestant evangelical millennium.152 
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In simple terms, the Mormons threatened the ascendant Protestant culture in America 
even whilst owing their existence to its relatively unprecedented level of pluralism. 
 Hill sees the early Mormons as displaying a degree of animosity not only 
toward religious pluralism but also towards the general social splintering of 
nineteenth-century America represented by the increasing popularity of volunteer 
groups, benevolent societies, and a plethora of other social institutions.153  The sheer 
diversity and quantity of these organisations, however, almost guaranteed violent 
outbreaks between competing groups of all sorts, not just between Mormons and 
everyone else.  Riots, mobs, and a relatively illusory faith in the merits of vigilantism 
were unfortunate features of American society at this time.  As Michael Feldberg, 
author of an impressive volume on violence in Jacksonian America, says, ‘...the 
1830s, 1840s, and 1850s were probably marked by a higher frequency and variety of 
urban collective violence and disorder among private groups than was any equivalent 
period of time in the nation’s past.’154  The 1830s and 1840s witnessed what perhaps 
was the apex of this ubiquitous aggression due to the establishment of the abolition 
movement and rapid immigrant growth (especially of Catholics).  By 1837, it was all 
enough to compel Abraham Lincoln to state, in characteristically poignant phrasing, 
...there is even now something of an ill omen amongst us.  I mean the 
increasing disregard for law which pervades the country – the growing 
disposition to substitute the wild and furious passions in lieu of the sober 
judgment of the courts, and the worse than savage mobs for the executive 
ministers of justice.  This disposition is awfully fearful in any community; and 
that it now exists in ours, though grating to our feelings to admit it, would be a 
violation of truth and insult to our intelligence to deny.  Accounts of outrages 
committed by mobs form the every-day news of the times.  They have 
pervaded the country from New England to Louisiana; they are neither 
peculiar to the eternal snows of the former nor the burning suns of the latter; 
they are not the creatures of climate, neither are they confined to the 
slaveholding or the non-slaveholding states.  Alike they spring up among the 
pleasure-hunting master of Southern slaves, and the order-loving citizens of 
the land of steady habits.  Whatever their causes be, it is common to the whole 
country.155 
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 Lincoln’s speech failed to address one crucial detail, an aspect of Jacksonian 
America that the future president, Illinois legislator, and practising lawyer probably 
hoped was not true – namely, that at times those ‘ministers of justice’ were as 
embroiled in the national propensity for violence as anyone else.  Writing from a jail 
in Illinois’ neighbouring state of Missouri just over a year after Lincoln shared his 
thoughts on America’s love affair with mob violence, one of Mormonism’s key 
figures recounted how Judge John F. Ryland of Lexington, Missouri advised the 
Latter-day Saints to fight and kill the mob of angry Missourians who had run the 
Mormons out of the city of Independence.156  If Parley Pratt’s account is accurate, a 
local Judge recommended a tit-for-tat strategy.  Mob violence was to be countered by 
more mob violence.  It is tempting to conclude that a sort of corruption had overcome 
American society, or at least the justice system.  Yet, it important to recognise that 
power was decentralised and wielded by the people, this was one of the objectives of 
American democracy.  Again, the same foundation on which was built a thriving new 
nation proved hospitable to socially destabilising forces as well.  Law enforcement 
and peace-keeping fell on the shoulders of under-resourced sheriffs and state militias.  
These bodies were hardly sufficient for checking the whims of what psychologists call 
groupthink,157 and the lack of ‘paramilitary, preventive police departments’ meant that 
extralegal means were often used to realise the goals of the majority.158  For the 
average citizen, however, this may have seemed entirely sufficient.  LeSueur, for 
instance, notes that a publicist from the time considered ‘Lynch law’ to be a 
‘supplement’ to the ‘established laws of the country’.159  Even so, the Missouri 
Republican printed an article in 1838 condemning vigilante activities against the 
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Mormons.160  Much like Hadrian’s rescript concerning the proper legal handling of 
Christians, this was an effort to promote adherence to due process and diminish 
unjustified persecution.  Just like the second-century emperor’s charge, it 
accomplished neither.  This outcome resulted from and reflected the unsettled state of 
the culture, one which revered the individual and the majority but was not yet 
uniformly striking a balance between the two.  In the religious realm, this instability 
was often interpreted as unencumbered potential.  Pluralism did not only extend to 
groups but to individuals; those of the latter category who possessed a creative mind 
and a charismatic bent were effectively unfettered by the new direction of American 
society, free to pursue their gifts and to gather a network of like-minded believers.161  
As historian Matthew Bowman rightly asserts, the ‘peculiar democratic tide’ washing 
over America, 
...offered Americans the opportunity to master their own lives rather than 
subordinate themselves to the collective.  It trained them in individualism, in 
self-reliance, in risk-taking, and in the pursuit of opportunity...The prophets 
were children of this age.  Their grand religious experiments were possible 
only in the chaotic freedom of the time.162 
Religious Milieu: Awakenings and Liberties 
 Charismatic prophets and sectarian movements, however, required fertile soil 
in which to take root.  The religious milieu of nineteenth-century America was the 
ideal environment for such endeavours.  Not unlike that of the second century, this 
religious context included a strong sense of the supernatural.  Particularly among the 
less educated and those residing outside of the larger urban centres of the northeast, 
dreams and visions were often understood to possess spiritual meaning and provide 
revelatory guidance.  As Alan Taylor notes, this was one component of ‘Christian 
primitivism’, a popular religious orientation identifiable by the individual’s effort to 
‘directly know his God’ through the use of spiritual media such as speaking in 
tongues, interpreting dreams, and witnessing miracles.163  Christian primitivists were 
‘seekers’ who displayed the eagerness for material and supernatural blending that 
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Ernst Troeltsch attributed to mysticism.164  Christian churches, these seekers claimed, 
were denying the spiritual power that was present in the earliest days of Christianity.  
Accordingly, they called for a return to a perceived original minimalism.  Kicking 
open the doors to unmediated experiences with the divine, this growing body of 
religionists freshly reconstructed an almost medieval affinity for magic and 
supernaturalism. 
 Joseph Smith and his family serve as ideal examples.  Bowman, drawing on 
the recollections of Joseph’s own mother, elucidates the relationship between 
Joseph’s father (Joseph Smith, Sr.) and religion in terms of the former’s 
dissatisfaction with the available Christian denominations but vibrant intimacy with 
the spiritualism of dreams.  Joseph Smith Sr. had many dreams, and these vivid 
experiences often contained religious allusions.165  Likewise, his son participated in 
the folk magic of his day by using materials such as dowsing rods to locate hidden 
treasures underground.  Much has been made of young Joseph’s forays into the world 
of magic; some seeing the behaviour as indisputable evidence of Smith’s nefarious 
ways and others downplaying its significance as a simple product of the times.  The 
present acknowledgement of the Smith family’s involvement in such practices 
functions only to illuminate the nineteenth-century interplay between democratic 
individualism, religious factionalism, and supernatural fervour. 
 Much as the pagans of the Graeco-Roman world tended to interpret natural 
disasters as divine displeasure, many American Christians in the early 1800s found 
divine intervention and spiritual communication in natural anomalies.  Both Joseph 
Smith and Parley Pratt, for instance, witnessed the Leonid meteor storm of November 
1833.  Owing to another key characteristic of their religious context, millenarianism, 
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each of these LDS figures interpreted the wondrous display in the night sky as a ‘sign’ 
of the impending return of Christ, the eschaton.166  However, one paradox of this 
religious environment was its intensifying struggle between the worldview of the old 
Calvinists who imported their Scottish theological heritage whilst holding positions of 
leadership in churches as well as institutions of higher education and the new 
perspective of the rationalists who inherited a high regard for Enlightenment 
values.167  The belief in divine sovereignty proffered by the Calvinists intersected 
with the generally optimistic anthropology of the rationalists, producing concepts 
such as America’s ‘manifest destiny’ within God’s plan for the world.  At times, this 
intermingling of ostensibly incompatible philosophies also engendered confusion for 
the people.  A popular jingle from nineteenth-century America demonstrates this 
reality: 
You can and you can’t, 
You shall and you shan’t; 
You will and you won’t. 
You’re damned if you do, 
And damned if you don’t.168 
 
This short verse expressed the obvious tension between Calvinism’s promulgation of 
a God whose will is arbitrary and unknowable and the Deist philosophy that claimed a 
rational God who rewards those who exhibit dedication and diligence.  At best, the 
Protestant ethic was now amalgamated with the rapid growth and temporal success of 
the young republic.  At worst, the newly empowered, and religiously inclined, 
individual citizens of the nation were disorientated and adrift in the rising waters of 
pluralism.  For those convinced of the spiritual power available to the faithful, the 
challenge was to reconcile such notions with the now deeply planted demands of 
rationalism.169  As for the early Mormons in particular, it is important to note that they 
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resolved this conflict, just as they attempted to resolve many others, by offering a 
relatively innovative system in which God was sovereign, spiritual gifts were 
practicable, and personal progress was both cosmologically ordained and understood 
in terms of expanding knowledge.170 
 This latter idea, that individuals can progress spiritually and intellectually, 
developed over the course of Smith’s leadership.  Indeed, the theological 
anthropology he came to espouse is the focus of our next chapter because there 
appears to be an affinity between new religious groups facing social heresy and the 
sort of soteriology that incorporates deification and individual development.  Yet, one 
must recognise the indebtedness of Smith and others like him to the store of ideas 
made available in their respective cultures.  Our primary argument is that persecution 
and other forms of religious opposition interact with the formation of salvation 
doctrines; nevertheless, it is undeniable that additional influences take part in the 
process, shaping the specific contours of the resulting doctrines.  During the first half 
of the nineteenth century, a period often referred to as the Second Great Awakening, 
numerous strands of perfectionism could be found woven into the American religious 
fabric.  The Transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, the teachings of the 
Unitarian William Channing, the social experimentation of the Oneida community, 
and the revivals of Charles Finney all joined together in unexpected harmony to 
advocate similarly positive conceptions of human achievement in relation to spiritual 
enlightenment.171  These disparate voices found inspiration and corroboration in 
Wesleyan theology and the perfectibility propagated by the newly formed Disciples of 
Christ.   
 Perfectionism was anticipated by the previously mentioned optimism 
concerning the nation.  Each of the religious schools cited above shared this common 
source.  However, the Mormons gradually diverged from the rest.  Jordan Watkins 
says that ‘lurking behind a fairly commonplace idea of perfectionism, anti-Mormons 
discovered one of Mormonism’s most blasphemous teachings: the doctrine of equality 
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with Christ.’172  In a similarly earnest tone, literary scholar Richard Brodhead speaks 
of the differences between Emerson and Smith as American prophets, peddling their 
versions of human and divine potential: 
Smith put forth his prophetic authority as a real-world fact and demanded that 
real others accept it on those terms.  Emerson, so to speak, mentalized the 
prophetic, taking it out of the realm of persons, places, and things and making 
it available as a fiction of self-empowerment...Smith insisted that he in his 
actual person was the bearer of the new dispensation, that his writings were 
divine revelations, that salvation was available through the exact forms, rites, 
and offices that he designated – and thousands of people accepted those 
claims...173 
Just as the early Christians made special use of the pre-existing concept of apotheosis, 
so the early Mormons constructed their unique vision of deification by appropriating 
existing religious norms. 
 Brodhead’s statement also underscores the success of Smith’s prophetic 
efforts.  This is due, in great part, to the religious context of both western New York 
and the American nation as a whole, a fitting setting for the birth of visionaries and 
new religious movements.  Historian Whitney Cross first coined the term ‘The 
Burned-over District’ as a way to reference the geographical/historical region of 
religious revivalism in western New York between 1800 and 1850.174  In his landmark 
study, Cross reveals that the heavy concentration of missionary activity, influx of 
migrant workers from the east, and establishment of ‘benevolent groups’ (i.e., 
missionary societies and tract societies) caused ‘a phenomenally intensive religious 
and moral awareness’ in the area of New York west of the Catskill and Adirondack 
mountains.175  As evidence, Milton Backman intimates that ‘between 1816 and 1821, 
revivals were reported in more towns and a greater number of settlers joined churches 
than in any previous period of New York history...[yet] the grand climax in the “series 
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of crests in religious zeal” occurred between 1825 and 1837.’176  As large numbers of 
itinerant farmers and labourers made the journey from locations such as eastern New 
York, Vermont, and Connecticut; the denominational hubs in cities like Boston and 
Philadelphia grew concerned over the spiritual and moral provisions available to these 
peripatetic populations.  Some, such as the Congregationalists and Presbyterians, 
joined forces in sending missionaries to the western towns.  By collaborating, these 
groups amassed a considerable religious force; however, it was the Baptists who 
overtook the Presbyterians in the Burned-over District by 1825 (with an estimated 
forty thousand members in that region alone).177 
 According to Cross, sects such as Freewill Baptists and Unitarian Baptists 
consisted of an abundance of believers who were ‘ready to respond to any spiritual 
stimulus but lack[ed] the initiative to originate or direct novelties.’178  The latter 
activities were left to the devices of exceptionally prodigious religious leaders like 
Anne Lee (the Shakers), Alexander Campbell (Disciples of Christ), William Miller 
(Millerites/Adventists), and John Humphrey Noyes (Oneida Community).  These 
individuals flourished in the rich revivalist soils of New England, finding the 
environment both conducive to religious experimentation and teeming with believers 
who preferred enthusiasm to intellect and needed to make sense of their economic 
struggles.179  In this religious mélange, the Mormons ‘came to be seen as the most 
serious threat to the hegemony of the evangelicals.’180  It is apparent that this 
animosity partially resulted from the speedy growth of Mormonism.  When the 
movement first began in Palmyra, New York (within the boundaries of the Burned-
over District) in 1830, there were approximately seventy to seventy-five members.181  
By Smith’s death in 1844, the Latter-day Saints numbered about fifteen thousand.182  
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The mounting size of the Mormons was a direct threat to surrounding communities 
because the new religious group represented for many the regrettable apex of hyper-
individualism, a cancerous despotism and ‘delusion’ enlivened by unbridled 
evangelicalism.  Indeed, it took little time for early Mormonism to diverge 
appreciably even from its dynamic birthplace: 
...the evangelistic-mindedness from which it developed in the beginning, and 
which constantly fed it with members, had little tolerance for such an 
unorthodox offspring, and drove the Saints by its persecution along their 
westering course.  But neither the organisation of the church, nor its personnel, 
nor its doctrines were frontier products.  All belonged rather to that Yankee, 
rural, emotionalised, and rapidly maturing culture which characterised western 
New York so markedly in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.183 
Thus, as Smith and his followers left both their cultural heritage and their orthodox 
roots behind, they faced the expanding western frontier as outsiders.  A product of 
democratic principles and the new American form of Protestantism, the Mormons 
encountered hostility and opposition from a society whose fog was lifting only to 
reveal what seemed a threateningly industrious and enigmatic faction within its 
borders.  
 
Societal Heresy 
 Just one year after Joseph Smith started his church, one of his most esteemed 
followers reported that ‘the whole country...with all the devils from the infernal pit are 
united, and foaming out their own shame against us.’184  Whilst it is doubtful that such 
a small minority roused the entire nation, these words from Oliver Cowdery set the 
tone for the following analysis of the societal opposition faced and imagined by the 
earliest Mormons.  At times, the American nation indeed seemed outraged by the 
presence of the Mormons.  At other times, politicians at both the state and federal 
levels appeared indifferent.  It is difficult to deny, however, that the Mormons 
experienced a great deal of resistance and outright hostility from their fellow citizens.  
J.H. Beadle’s 1877 observation that America’s one native religion ‘is the sole 
apparent exception to the American rule of universal toleration’ would be just as 
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profound if aimed at the period of Joseph Smith’s leadership.  Beadle speculated as to 
the reason for this unique rejection of Mormonism: ‘...Something peculiar to 
Mormonism takes it out of the sphere of religion and necessarily brings it into conflict 
with a republican people and their institutions.’185  The remarks supported an editorial 
written by Beadle attacking the theocratic character of Mormonism in Utah, but his 
words are perhaps less rhetorically potent and more astute than even he realised.   
 Some scholars essentially view anti-Mormonism as a process of religious 
intolerance hiding behind a mask of political or ethnic prejudice.186  From another 
perspective, however, social roles and markers are necessarily, and inimitably, linked 
with tension as individuals and groups struggle to reconcile their self-definitions with 
the identities accorded them by society.  The outcome for the early Mormons, just as 
for the early Christians, was a confusion of religious, political, and economic conflict; 
it would be virtually impossible to isolate one of these areas as the root or core of the 
fracas.  Critique of Mormonism came from many directions and, perhaps more often 
than not, arrived in an alloyed form.  Thus, in 1842 the Presbyterian minister Jonathan 
Turner could refer to the LDS as ‘in truth, the most dangerous and virulent enemies to 
our political and religious purity, and our social and civil peace, that now exists in the 
Union.’187  Religious integrity and ‘civil peace’ were hardly distinct issues.  As we 
have shown, the Romans almost envisioned a cause-and-effect relationship between 
the pax deorum and the pax Romana.  Similarly, nineteenth-century religious leaders 
spoke of social harmony and politics whilst their political colleagues spoke of the 
injurious potential of superstition.  There is perhaps no better example of the latter 
than the speech by General John Clark to the surrendered Mormons of Far West, 
Missouri in 1838 just moments after explaining that the latter must leave the state or 
face death: 
I am sorry, gentlemen, to see so great a number of apparently intelligent men 
found in the situation that you are; and, oh! that I could invoke the spirit of the 
unknown God to rest upon you, and deliver you from that awful chain of 
superstition, and liberate you from those fetters of fanaticism with which you 
are bound. I would advise you to scatter abroad and never again organise with 
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Bishops, Presidents, &c., lest you excite the jealousies of the people, and 
subject yourselves to the same calamities that have now come upon you.188 
Ostensibly linking belief to behaviour, Clark spoke with authority and lamented the 
‘fanaticism’ that drove the Mormons to act in a manner not consonant with their 
surroundings.  However, the criminal activities and socially subversive actions that 
came to be associated with the early Latter-day Saints were more frequently cited as 
the reasons for anti-Mormon efforts than any overtly religious or doctrinal criticisms.  
The latter are discussed in the following section of the study, but it is important to 
first acknowledge that attacks on Mormonism followed a similar trajectory to those 
levelled against the second-century Christians.  The earliest societal conflicts, such as 
those with vigilante mobs intent on harming and forcing the relocation of their 
Mormon neighbours, tended to focus on alleged crimes and political threats instead of 
doctrinal idiosyncrasies.189  In addition to emphasising the supposed flagitia of the 
early Christians, opponents such as Celsus relied on rhetorical poignancy to sway 
their audiences.  In the case of opposition to early Mormonism, the two were often 
combined to great effect.  The aforementioned ubiquity of printing presses only 
exacerbated the situation, and the followers of Joseph Smith found themselves in the 
midst of a society as eager to categorise the new religion as it was indiscriminate 
about its sources.  As the age of democracy flourished, individuals brandished more 
power than ever before.  Yet, relegating everyone to the same social plane meant 
cacophonous competition; upstarts and novelties were countered by polemics and 
diatribes. 
 
Appellations and Categories: Raging Rhetoric 
 In chapter two, it was noted that Walter Scott, editor of the Campbellite 
periodical The Evangelist, called the Latter-day Saints ‘impostors’ and a ‘vile sect’.  
These pejorative descriptors were repeatedly ascribed to the Mormons during their 
early years.  J.Spencer Fluhman notes both the variety of name-calling that took place 
and the manner by which these appellations mark the stages of Mormonism’s fight to 
be recognised as a religion.  Displaying remarkably thorough scholarship, Fluhman 
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cites numerous examples of anti-Mormon polemical rhetoric; the Latter-day Saints 
and their new faith were called ‘impostors’, ‘dupes’, ‘delusional’, a ‘superstition’, 
‘magic’, and ‘folk magic’.190  Echoing the pagans early in the Common Era, those 
who opposed the Mormons tended to withhold credibility by deeming the new group 
not a religious community but a ‘superstition’ or an assemblage of ‘dupes’ who share 
a fondness for ‘folk magic’.  Richard Livesey, an American Methodist minister, wrote 
an 1838 pamphlet summarising Mormonism.191  Within the first paragraph, Livesey 
refers to the community as a ‘delusion’ and an ‘imposture’.  Later, Livesey quotes 
from W. Parrish, a past secretary of Joseph Smith, who likewise describes the Latter-
day Saints as ‘infidels’, ‘bigots’, and a ‘superstition’.  Even those who appeared to be 
free of an agenda against the upstart religious sect found it difficult to see past the 
apparent credulity of Smith’s followers.  Historian Robert Baird perpetuated this trend 
by including the Mormons in his Religion in America and describing them as ‘dupes’ 
who possess an ‘ignorant character’.192 
 Recognition, however, often bridges the divide between the experience of 
heresy and the resolution implicit in the group’s developing soteriology.  When early 
Christians continued to be accused of heinous crimes, Justin came to their defence.  
An insider, Justin’s basic argument hinged on his concession that there could be 
individuals somewhere who call themselves Christians and commit such atrocities, 
but the Christianity with which he was familiar did not.  It is no surprise that various 
Mormons shouldered the same challenge after enduring years of continuous verbal 
affronts.  The extreme rhetoric of many non-Mormons could provoke much of the 
same from those within the fold.  After withstanding insults like those uttered by 
Samuel Owens who identified Mormons as a ‘tribe of locusts’ and a ‘mass of human 
corruption’, Parley Pratt responded with parallel language.193  In Mormonism 
Unveiled (the title of which was also intended to reflect the wording of an anti-
Mormon publication, Mormonism Unvailed[sic] by E.D. Howe), Pratt attacked the 
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readers of an agonistic publication, Zion’s Watchman, by stating that they were 
‘deluded’ by the ‘impositions’ found therein.194  His vitriol climaxed with an ad 
hominem blow to the moral probity of the publication’s editor who Pratt asserted 
ranked among ‘dogs, sorcerers, whoremongers, murderers, and idolaters.’195  As 
previously stated, the relative ease with which a private printing press was secured 
allowed the diatribes of this period to be carried to and fro in the form of pamphlets 
and newspapers.  Pratt’s choice to rebut the accusations of his opponents by 
composing a published essay is a striking example of the preferred modus operandi.  
It is not overstating the point to claim that the entire issue of societal heresy and 
conflict is manifestly captured in the rivalries between periodicals in early Mormon 
history.  The pro-Mormon newspapers Times & Seasons and The Wasp were 
consistently combated by the anti-Mormon sentiments and critical commentaries 
printed by The Warsaw Signal and the Nauvoo Expositor.196   
 At other times, however, members of the opposed group attempted to offer 
more equable refutations.  Of some note is Francis Bishop’s 1839 text concerning 
LDS ‘sufferings in the state of Missouri’.197  A few years after its publication Bishop 
was excommunicated and organised a schismatic group, but in 1839 he was a leading 
member of the Mormon community that had just been expelled from Missouri.  
Bishop offers a denial of the accusations of the Missourians: 
We say, we challenge the world to prove that we, as a church or people, have 
ever cherished or inculcated the least unwholesome principle, or that we have 
injured a person either in reputation, or have molested them in the peaceable 
enjoyment of their civil rights.198 
Beyond this, though, Bishop notably refers to his own religious collective as both a 
‘church’ and a ‘society’.199  These countering categories are important for they not 
only suggest legitimacy but borrow directly from the vernacular of the dominant 
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Protestant culture in which churches and societies were the primary, acceptable 
purveyors of moral instruction and social norms.  The nation was growing 
increasingly familiar with novel religious expressions, but it was particularly uneasy 
about those that appeared to embrace an authoritarian structure that ‘deluded’ its 
members into possessing seditious notions. 
 
Social Subversion: Race Relations and Democracy  
 The abundance of documentation available for an analysis of Mormon 
beginnings serves to complicate the endeavour because all of the cloudiness remains 
in the picture.  For our brief look at the second century, it was possible to establish 
certain constants and proceed with a description of the ways by which Christians 
challenged those norms.  Thus, cultural mainstays such as paganism or the imperial 
cult were seen as the institutions subverted by Christianity.  The context of early 
Mormonism, or any religious context for that matter, was not necessarily any 
different.  Social norms existed, and the new group was seen as a threat.  Our 
challenge, however, is to select representative tensions from the myriad options.  
Many voices entered the fray, and just as many reasons were given for the existence 
of such conflict.  The succeeding paragraphs address the issue of social subversion 
and its relation to the societal heresy directed at the Mormons.  For the sake of a 
focused argument, we highlight both the manner in which early Mormonism was a 
competing, exclusivist society and the charges brought against Smith and his 
followers concerning contentious racial allegiances. 
 Though he may overstate the case, Leo Pfeffer offers insight into religious 
marginalisation in America: ‘In the United States theology plays no role either in 
marginality or legitimation...marginality is essentially a function not of theological 
unorthodoxy but of tension with particular secular interests.’200  For the opponents of 
early Mormonism, those secular interests were many.  Typically articulated in terms 
of economic and political danger, the primary threat that Mormons posed was 
persuasive power.  To aver that Mormons were dupes was not solely to question their 
intelligence or gullibility but to lament their loyalty to a competing societal force.  As 
David Brion Davis propounds, the conflict surrounding early Mormons and their 
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neighbours stemmed from ‘a contest for economic and political power between 
western settlers and a group that voluntarily withdrew from society.’201  Davis asserts 
that anti-Mormonism assumed a nativist mode; the nascent religious movement being 
perceived in much the same way as Irish Catholics, for instance.  It is certainly true 
that those opposing the Mormons often directed resentment toward the latter for being 
an ostensibly separate people.  Regardless of whether the societal heresy resembled 
ethnic tensions or not, it is indubitable that early Mormonism came to represent a 
social threat simply because its insularity recognisably removed members from the 
established social systems of justice and popular decision.202  In this way, it seemed 
‘to embody those traits that were precise antitheses of American ideals.’203  Ironically, 
one of the religious sects that owed its very existence to the democratisation of 
religion quickly came to represent the opposite: a dubious, authoritarian, parallel 
society. 
 By the 1840s, Joseph Smith and his disciples understood themselves as a 
complete society.204  At this stage in our discussion, space does not permit a fuller 
explication of early Mormon concepts such as mission and restoration.  It is 
imperative, however, that one consider these motivating ideas in relation to the 
formation of an exclusive subculture within a pluralistic nation.  The Mormons and 
their antagonists demonstrated the reciprocal, or dialectical, nature of social conflict 
by allowing insider and outsider perspectives to develop in conjunction with one 
another.  In other words, it was true that ‘the exclusiveness of Mormon society was a 
predominant feature of the public’s perception of the sect’, just as it was true that 
Mormons invoked the Jewish term ‘gentile’ in order to delineate between the 
faithfulness of the ‘Saints’ and the errant ways of non-Mormons.205  Givens is correct 
in his observation concerning the Mormons use of such language: ‘The Mormon 
practice of referring to all outsiders as ‘gentiles’ is therefore not to be seen as 
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historically naive posturing, but as the transformation of a literal indicator of 
chosenness into a metaphor for a special difference that must be constructed.’206  Even 
so, the early followers of Smith and their adversaries saw the construction of this 
difference for precisely what it was: a competition for influence/loyalty. 
 When non-Mormons in Missouri witnessed the organisation of an elite, 
militant group of Latter-day Saints called the Danites and the political meddling of 
Joseph Smith and other Mormons in local elections, hostility rapidly escalated.  The 
Danites explicitly rejected the authority of local laws whilst Mormon involvement in 
politics amounted to little more than overt power plays by Smith who could guarantee 
the en bloc voting of his followers.207   Citizens of surrounding communities grew 
increasingly agitated over the presence of such a religious faction: ‘...for no body 
politic could be asked to tolerate a power that was designed to destroy it.’208  
Therefore, some politicians like William Peniston turned to denigration, calling the 
Mormons ‘thieves, liars, counterfeiters, and dupes...’209  By 1842, one outspoken ex-
Mormon fumed over the subversive prowess of Smith and his devotees.  John Bennett 
published a lengthy tirade against the Mormons in which he accuses them of 
‘infidelity, deism, atheism, lying, deception, blasphemy, debauchery, lasciviousness, 
bestiality, madness, fraud, plunder, larceny, burglary, robbery, perjury, fornication, 
adultery, rape, incest, arson, treason, and murder.’210  Naturally, the influential 
Mormon figure Sidney Rigdon wrote that such claims were unfounded and 
‘monstrous’, concluding that anyone who believed ‘such outlandish representations’ 
must possess ‘a large stock of moral courage’.211 It is significant that these rather 
sensational charges point to the height of incivility and disorder.  By the 1840s, little 
had changed since Roman governors listened to allegations of Christian incest and 
atheism.   
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 The social subversion of which the Mormons were accused also took patently 
nineteenth-century American forms.  Race relations were gaining ground as a key 
political issue in Jacksonian America.  Rapport between white settlers and Native 
Americans remained strained and inconsistent, and abolitionism was a burgeoning, if 
alternative, position in the young nation.  Once again, the Mormons seemed to touch 
all of the most contentious topics of the day.  The Book of Mormon introduced the 
notion that Native Americans (‘Lamanites’) were distantly related to ancient 
Israelites; within six months of Joseph Smith establishing his church, he sent 
missionaries to Native American tribes in the western borderlands of America.212  A 
few years later, the English traveller Edward Abdy affirmed that the persecution of 
Mormons in the state of Missouri was a direct result of the religious group’s amiable 
relationship with Native Americans.213  Similarly, the early Latter-day Saints were 
accused of harbouring blacks and being proponents of abolition.  The majority of the 
earliest Mormons were originally from New England, and their outsider status in 
areas like Missouri and Illinois only exacerbated the tension arising from accusations 
of Mormonism supporting anti-slavery efforts.  Indeed, some believers were of 
African descent, a fact not ignored by their enemies.  This was interpreted as Mormon 
attempts to pit slave against slave driver, and newspaper articles to this effect 
succeeded in convincing many that Smith was capable of this type of sedition.214  
Perhaps one federal soldier spoke for many when he penned these ominous words for 
the New York Herald in 1842: ‘The time will come when this gathering host of 
religious fanatics will make this country shake to its centre.’215 
 For the early Latter-day Saints, however, this sort of societal heresy only 
fuelled the deifying bent of the opposed group’s soteriology which, in turn, further 
reinforced the exclusivist mentality.  The steady but gradual lean toward deification 
that took place in early Mormon belief was itself indicative of a form of Berger’s 
cosmisation; the group’s exclusivity was imbued with authoritative sacrality.  Their 
uniqueness in society came to be articulated more and more in terms of their 
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uniqueness within God’s plan.  Standing outside of the social order went hand in hand 
with aberrant theology.   
 
Doctrinal Heresy 
 Givens says that the earliest opposition to Mormonism ‘was to its beliefs, not 
its practices.’216  Earlier, we included the argument between those who agree with 
Givens’ assessment and those who argue that the opposition, almost unfailingly, was 
about politics or economics.217  This, as we mentioned, is one of the primary 
difficulties in reconstructing Mormonism’s past.  Above, it is noted that early 
Mormons desired and projected their own separate society, and the ensuing conflict 
with non-Mormons seemed almost inevitable because of that.  Even so, non-Mormons 
exhibited intense anxiety about Smith’s teachings, prophetic claims, and LDS 
religiosity in general.218  It must also be accepted that ministers from other Christian 
denominations often led the opposition.219  Perhaps the only worthwhile conclusion is 
that it is not the historian’s lens that is fogged, but the specimen under scrutiny. 
 America, then as now, found it immensely difficult to delineate between 
religion and politics.  The land of religious liberty maintained some key stipulations.  
Baird wrote that religious freedom was only extended to groups ‘whose religious 
principles were not thought subversive of the great moral principles of 
Christianity.’220  The German scholar Philip Schaff echoed Baird a few years after 
Smith’s death when he reported back to his countrymen concerning American religion 
and culture: ‘American toleration, as we have before remarked, has its limitations; the 
separation of church and state by no means involves a separation of the nation from 
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Christianity...’221  Regarding Mormons specifically, he continued: ‘This much is 
certain, that the Mormons and the Americans...do not fit together, but have a deadly 
hatred of each other.’222  These observations invoke religion generally, and 
Christianity particularly, as central to the tussles between America and its people.   
 For early Mormonism, the seamless blend of religion and politics was equally 
present among insiders and outsiders.  From the outsider’s perspective, Joseph Smith 
and his colleagues were both religious and insidious, the former a cloak for the latter.  
As one outsider opined, ‘They lie by revelation, swindle by revelation, cheat and 
defraud by revelation, run away by revelation and if they do not mend their ways, I 
fear they will at last be damned by revelation.’223  Another opponent believed that the 
Latter-day Saints were succeeding because they retained many of the beliefs shared 
by the Christian denominations whilst appealing ‘strongly to the love of the 
marvellous, to that thirst and anxiety, so rife with a certain class of mind, to know 
more than God would have us know...’224  This latter quote comes from E.G. Lee who 
composed Knavery Exposed, an anti-Mormon text from 1841.  Lee’s words, as one 
can see, were less harsh than those mentioned in Chapter One by Peter Bauder who 
saw Mormon growth as deception of the people by a ‘diabolical system’.  These 
exposés were the preferred means of refutation during the early nineteenth century.  
Before probing more of the insiders’ perspectives in subsequent sections, we now list 
and discuss the many anti-Mormon texts of the time, emphasising the cases in which 
Protestant leaders led the attacks on this nascent movement. 
 
The Saints Exposed! 
 Whether motivated by fear of Mormon political dominance or a genuine 
concern for the propagation of theological truth, much of the overt antagonism 
directed at early Mormons came from clerics of other Christian traditions.  Although 
it betrays a grave misunderstanding of Joseph Smith’s original scripture and the 
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latter’s role within the LDS community, the name Mormonites was first ascribed to 
the Latter-day Saints by outsiders, particularly Protestant ministers, who sought to 
mock Smith and his followers whilst unequivocally differentiating between followers 
of the Bible and followers of the Book of Mormon.225  Their name, however, was not 
all that the early Mormons received from competing religious leaders.  Some of the 
harshest criticism, not unexpectedly, came from those who disagreed with some or all 
of Smith’s teachings 
 One possible reason for the confusion over the actual motivations of these 
early religious critics may be that it was Smith’s claims to revelation and authority, 
for both the Book of Mormon as well as his own proclamations, that roused the 
greatest indignation.  That being so, it is easy to suggest that the preachers and 
advocates of other denominations saw the Mormons as wily cheaters, poaching 
unsuspecting religious seekers from those sects that all agreed to play by orthodox 
rules.  Offering new scriptures and ongoing communications with God hardly seemed 
fair.  This certainly appears to be important to some of those early opponents.  
Campbell, mentioned earlier, composed an exposé entitled Delusions, An Analysis of 
the Book of Mormon.  As Thomas Alexander notes, Campbell rejected authority 
claims much more so than theological particulars.226  Likewise, Livesey focused on 
the credibility of the Book of Mormon, arguing that the text was fraudulent.227   For 
Benjamin Morris, a missionary of the American Home Missionary Society, the 
Mormons were led by a ‘despot’ who possessed ‘unlimited influence’ over his 
followers.228  This was more than one missionary’s despair over the waxing clout of 
Joseph Smith; Morris seized the opportunity to point out in his 1841 report from the 
Illinois missionary field that the Latter-day Saints primarily consisted of converts 
from ‘those churches where the great cardinal doctrines of the Bible are kept rather in 
the back ground. (original emphasis)’229  By implication, this was a Christian battle 
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against an undesired social power that might be won by proper, directed adherence to 
sound teaching. 
 Thus, others challenged the specific theological assertions of the Mormons.  In 
such cases, it would be difficult to speculate about the possibility of additional, veiled 
motives.  Oliver Barr, a member of the Christian Connection – an inter-
denominational movement in the early nineteenth century which overlapped with the 
Millerites and Campbellites – who held a binitarian view of God, exchanged a series 
of letters with a Mormon elder Stephen Post in 1837 and 1838.  A theological debate 
of sorts, the correspondence led Barr to question the apparent modalism of the 
Mormons as well as their avowal of divine corporeality.230  For German Reformed 
minister Diedrich Willers, Joseph Smith and his Book of Mormon represented the 
‘greatest fraud’ of the period, but Willers demonstrates the inseparability of anxiety 
over religious competition and disquiet concerning ‘new doctrines’.231  The Book of 
Mormon was a devious threat, yes; but Willers felt compelled to refute Mormon 
doctrines and warn his congregation about their falsity. 
 Representing what seems to be the most sincere pole on the spectrum of anti-
Mormon exposés, Presbyterian minister Truman Coe’s article in The Ohio Observer 
set out to educate readers on the foundations of LDS origins and beliefs.  Coe denied 
the authenticity of Mormonism’s claims, but he extended ‘Christian charity’ by 
submitting that the followers of Joseph Smith were ‘industrious, good neighbours, 
very sincerely deceived, and possibly very sincere Christians.’232  Coe was eager for 
his readers, assumed to be Protestants themselves, to avoid the pitfalls of bias and 
mockery: ‘The prevalence of religious delusion is not to be attributed so much to mere 
ignorance, as to the structure and prejudices and pernicious habits of the mind, a 
predisposition to be captivated with anything that is new or wonderful.’233  In this 
way, Coe functioned as doctrinal heresy of an irenic variety, decrying doctrine 
without resorting to excessive rhetoric or hurtful polemic.  Regardless of their 
approach, individuals like Campbell, Willers, and Coe concurred: the Mormons were 
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misguided.  As a monolithic front, this outside opposition was often combated with 
derivative tactics; as we saw, Parley Pratt penned Mormonism Unveiled in part as a 
mimicking answer to Mormonism Unvailed[sic].234  Internal conflict – reflecting a 
more traditional understanding of heresy in which threatening competition emerges 
from within – proved more pestilent, lifting politics to the fore and provoking 
devastating violence. 
 
Dissention and Division: Heresy Within 
 In Chapter One, we cited the definition of heresy offered by Kurtz: the heretic 
is a ‘deviant insider’.  Kurtz edges closer than many other social scientists to the 
traditional understanding of heresy but stops short, insisting that orthodoxy develops 
during the ‘heat of escalating conflict’ with heresy.  For the case of the early 
Mormons, Kurtz’s view provides meaningful insight.  The LDS soteriology explored 
in the following chapter did not emerge in its most distinct form until around 1844, 
the year of Joseph Smith’s death and in the midst of certain, concentrated discord with 
Mormon dissenters.  When studying the various forms of heresy encountered by the 
Mormons, it is imperative than one address the topic of dissenters as one significant 
source of consternation and theological stimulation. 
 Within one year of Mormonism’s founding, converts began leaving the 
church.  Of those in attendance at a church conference in September 1831, for 
example, approximately twenty-four exited the community shortly thereafter.235  
Foreshadowing various elements of his innovative soteriology, one of Smith’s 
revelations from 1834 chastised those who stirred up conflict from within: 
Behold, I say unto you, were it not for the transgressions of my people, 
speaking concerning the church and not individuals, they might have been 
redeemed even now.  But behold, they have not learned to be obedient to the 
things which I required at their hands, but are full of all manner of evil...And 
are not united according to the union required by the law of the celestial 
kingdom...And my people must needs be chastened until they learn obedience, 
if it must needs be, by the things which they suffer.236 
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In addition to mentioning the celestial kingdom and the role of suffering in the 
process of learning obedience (two crucial aspects of early Mormon soteriology), the 
revelation directly addressed the pressing concern of division within the group.  
Concern was not unfounded; within a few short years, Joseph Smith and his closest 
assistant Sidney Rigdon were forced to leave Ohio due to the unremitting tension with 
disaffected believers who questioned the LDS leaders’ financial aims.  The church 
had attempted to establish a bank and experimented with a communitarian structure in 
which members signed over their possessions to the church for equal distribution.  As 
member John Corrill recalled in his history of the group, these decisions created 
distrust and jealousy ‘to a great height, so that, instead of pulling together as brethren; 
they tried every way in their power...to destroy each other.’237 
 The conflict continued to intensify.  By the time the Mormons were driven out 
of Missouri and arrived in Hancock County, Illinois the stage was set for a fateful 
clash between dissidents and devotees.  William Law and his brother, Wilson Law 
became two of the most prominent and infamous dissenters in Illinois.  It is thought 
that Wilson authored a set of poems that appeared in a local newspaper during the 
spring of 1844 in which Mormon leaders were called out for their practice of 
polygamy and Joseph Smith was portrayed as a ‘tyrant’ and a ‘lustful beast’.238  
Though the poetry was published anonymously, the attack by Wilson’s brother was 
more audacious.  Excommunicated in April 1844, William Law quickly set up a 
printing press and decided to publish a periodical exposing the polygamous 
behaviours and other indiscretions of Smith and his colleagues.  As he and his co-
editors expressed it, ‘We are earnestly seeking to explode the vicious principles of 
Joseph Smith, and those who practice the same abominations and whoredoms...’239  In 
the first and only issue of the Nauvoo Expositor, Law included a revealing passage 
about the Mormon founder from a nearby paper called the Quincy Whig: ‘It is not so 
much the particular doctrines...however abominable they may be in themselves, that 
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our citizens care about – as it is the anti-republican nature of the organisation, over 
which he has almost supreme control...’240   
 Thus, the internal heresy pointed to the same fear exhibited by many of the 
outside opponents; Mormonism was despotic and socially subversive.  In response to 
William Law’s publication, Joseph Smith called a city council meeting to discuss the 
possible courses of action available to the LDS leaders.  Following Smith’s guidance, 
the council decided to raze the press and, in doing so, physically crush that symbol of 
resistance and unrest.  Destroying the Nauvoo Expositor set in motion a series of 
events that culminated in Joseph Smith’s assassination at the hands of an outraged 
mob inside the small city jail of Carthage, Illinois.  Yet, the Mormons’ choice to 
demolish their opponents’ property bore a strong resemblance to earlier suffering that 
was directed at the young religious movement.  Within months of the church’s 
establishment, for instance, local ministers in New York demolished a dam built by 
the Mormons for the baptism of new converts.241  Such violence seemed to follow the 
early Mormons.  Indeed, a chain of physical opposition spanned the distance between 
those local religious leaders tearing down the Mormon dam and Mormon leaders 
levelling the printing press of dissidents. 
 
Personal Heresy 
 Years before Joseph Smith was held in Carthage Jail, he spent time 
incarcerated in Missouri.  From the latter, he wrote a letter to his followers that was 
subsequently canonised as section 123 of Doctrine and Covenants.  Directing the 
Mormons to record the details of the persecutions they had suffered, Smith claimed 
that the effort to document such affliction was ‘an imperative duty’ owed to ‘wives 
and children...widows and fatherless, whose husbands and fathers have been 
murdered..’242  Mormonism’s enemies were characterised as a single, malevolent 
force, an ‘iron hand’ whose ‘dark and blackening deeds are enough to make hell itself 
shudder, and to stand aghast and pale, and the hands of the very devil to tremble and 
palsy.’243  The letter was perpetuating a persecuted identity that would not only gain 
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greater propulsion from Smith’s death at the hands of his opponents but would come 
to shape much of Mormonism’s self-understanding for over a century.244 
 In many ways, this martyrdom mentality was present among the Mormons 
from their earliest days.  We have already shown that the Book of Mormon itself 
proposed a divine purpose for opposition.  The prevalence and centrality of this 
mindset is seen in Joseph Smith’s repeated self-identification with the Joseph of the 
Old Testament who was persecuted at the hands of his brothers and with Enoch who 
is spared death because of his faithfulness and righteousness.245  A persecution motif 
also runs throughout Smith’s collected revelations.  Although the passages were 
removed from the Doctrine and Covenants in the early twentieth century, the 1835 
edition included ‘Lectures of Faith’ in which the Mormon leader encouraged his 
followers to persevere in their suffering because the ‘pure and unadulterated religion 
of heaven’ will always be persecuted ‘to the uttermost’.  Anticipating the deifying 
element of his later soteriology, Smith emphasised that suffering was necessary to 
become ‘joint heirs with Christ Jesus’.246  This sort of response, continuing 
throughout the fourteen years of Smith’s leadership, certainly established a foundation 
for the soteriological schema that would go far to resolve the heresy encountered 
during Mormonism’s early years; but were such discourses purely rhetorical?  
Perhaps not. 
 One year before the ‘Lectures of Faith’ were presented before a class of 
Mormon elders, a meeting of their opponents gathered in Missouri to discuss the 
undesired influx of Latter-day Saints.  In the meeting, Reverend Finis Ewing shared 
his belief that ‘the “Mormons” are the common enemies of mankind and ought to be 
destroyed.’247  After Missouri Governor Lilburn Boggs signed orders permitting the 
‘extermination’ of Mormons in Missouri in 1838, a group of their adversaries opened 
fire on a number of the Latter-day Saints who were seeking refuge in a nearby mill.  
Many of the Mormons were killed, including children.  Violence, rage, and the 
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aforementioned faith in vigilantism prevailed on both sides of the conflict.  Yet, the 
aggression displayed toward early Mormonism does lend veracity to the ongoing 
revelations and orations of Joseph Smith concerning his community’s experiences.  In 
keeping with our earlier assessment of the personal heresy faced by second-century 
Christians, the following pages illuminate Mormon persecution by focusing on 
specific texts.248  John Corrill’s A Brief History of the Church of Christ of Latter Day 
Saints provides a balanced and historically reliable account of early Mormon 
suffering and conflict.  After Corrill, attention is then placed on the insider 
perspective.  This is achieved by highlighting Joseph Smith’s own history of the 
events. 
 
John Corrill’s Account 
 John Corrill was an influential member of the Latter-day Saints during the mid 
to late 1830s.  In Far West, Missouri, Corrill witnessed and spoke out against the first 
wave of unjust persecution against the Mormons.  One of his letters outlining the false 
and sensational allegations made against his group appeared in the June 1834 issue of 
the Mormon periodical The Evening and Morning Star.  In the letter, Corrill claimed 
that the anti-Mormon mobs were spreading rumours accusing the Mormons of 
murderous intentions: ‘They tell [the citizens] that the “Mormons” are coming upon 
them, mob like, to kill their women and children.’249  Furthermore, the vigilantes 
burned many of the Mormons’ houses.  Even so, Corrill concluded his letter with a 
hopeful tone, believing that the ‘laws of the land’ would prevail.250 
 This optimism and equanimity persisted.  For example, Corrill presented a 
‘memorial’ to Missouri state legislature after the 1838 expulsion of the Mormons 
from that state, questioning the legality of Governor Boggs’ orders and petitioning for 
permission to remain.  Yet, after it was revealed that many of the details in the 
petition were misleading, Corrill admitted that some of the LDS claims had been 
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falsified.251  It appears that Corrill was already wavering by the time he was selected 
to present the ‘memorial’.  Over the tumultuous year of 1838, during which Mormons 
engaged in violent confrontation with their Missouri neighbours, Corrill became 
disenchanted with the leaders of his community.  When he questioned Joseph Smith’s 
recent revelations, the founding prophet directly threatened Corrill.  As LeSueur 
reports, Corrill’s response was to declare that ‘he was a republican; consequently, he 
would do, say, act, and believe what he pleased.’252 
 Such a statement is instructive for our reconstruction of the context and 
minutiae of early Mormon persecution.  History tends to homogenise and indurate 
what often was a complex and relatively amorphous chapter in time.  John Corrill is 
interesting because his story reveals the existence of internal conflict related to the 
republican values of some believers set against the increasingly despotic policies of 
LDS authorities.  Beyond this, however, his Brief History is beneficial because it 
recounts historical events in a reasonable and reliable manner.253  Corrill surrendered 
his membership in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints shortly before 
publishing his 1839 history of the group.  Prior to leaving, he had served as church 
historian, and that fact may account for his accessible style and even-handed 
approach. 
 In Brief History, Corrill expresses his own confusion over the reason for 
agonistic sentiments arising from non-Mormons in northern Missouri.  Most of the 
Mormons had left the area around 1834 and 1835 but began returning in 1836.  This 
caused unrest among the non-believers who lived in these counties.  Corrill avers that 
the Mormons committed no crimes, and their enemies must either hate the new 
religion or fear that the Latter-day Saints will become a majority in the vicinity; the 
latter being a particularly dire threat in an ardently democratic environment.254  Even 
so, no skirmishes arose because the locals met with the incoming Mormons and 
resolved their difference.  The same, however, was not the case two years later. 
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 In 1838 and 1839, tensions erupted in Missouri.  Decisions of state militia, 
local mobs, and gathered Mormons often reflected the movements of a chess match; 
the effort of one group determining the next action of another group.  In some cases, 
reports were exaggerated or entirely false.  For example, Corrill recalls a physical 
altercation between Mormons and others at the voting polls during a local election.  
Both sides clashed, utilising ‘clubs and boards’ to injure one another.  Afterwards, 
rumours spread that two Mormons had been killed in the fray and a mob was gathered 
in Davies County intent on harming more Mormons.255  After arriving in Davies 
County, however, Joseph Smith and a group of approximately one hundred and fifty 
men found no mob and no murder.   
 In other instances, though, vigilantism was used against the Mormons.  Not 
long after the above occurrence, a mob of four thousand assembled and decided to 
drive the Mormons from Davies County.  This was followed by a similar decision in 
the nearby county of Carroll.256  The citizens of Carroll rode into the town of Far 
West in Caldwell County, the Mormon centre of the state, and took two Mormons 
prisoner.  Corrill recalls these men exclaiming that ‘they meant to drive the Mormons 
from Davies to Caldwell, and from Caldwell to hell.’257  What ensued is often called 
the Missouri Wars.  Mormons and their enemies pillaged and burned the properties of 
the other.  The Mormons exchanged gunfire with a gathering of state militiamen, 
killing the majority.258  Non-Mormon mobs stole Mormon weapons, forced families 
out of homes, and took prisoners at random.  At Haun’s Mill, at least twenty Latter-
day Saints were killed by the congregated militia. 
 Throughout Corrill’s account, and consistent with his actions and other 
writings, relatively equal blame is placed on the Mormons and their adversaries.  
However, a degree of injustice surfaces in his inclusion of the legal measures 
subsequent to the violence.  Thirty-six Mormons, including the leaders, were arrested 
and charged with crimes ranging from murder to larceny.259  Various officers of the 
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militia, in comparison, not only committed similar acts such as arson but continued to 
steal horses, plunder homes, and shoot livestock even after the Mormon leaders were 
arrested.260  These men were not arrested.  Thus, LeSueur’s comment recognising the 
legal bias against Mormonism included earlier in the present chapter appears to be 
corroborated by Corrill.  The Mormons, primarily in the late 1830s and early 1840s, 
were guilty of violent crimes; yet they endured a special type of personal heresy in 
which legal rights are stripped without cause and society turns a blind eye to the 
comparable actions of those who pose little threat to the political and civil status quo.  
It seems fitting, then, that the Mormons were offered a pardon similar to the one 
extended to individuals accused of being Christians in the second century: in this case, 
renounce your faith and be permitted to reside in Missouri.261 
 
Joseph Smith: A Mormon Perspective 
 The sort of injustice experienced by the Mormons during the duration of 
Joseph Smith’s leadership undoubtedly reinforced their persecuted outlook.  The early 
Mormons seemed to believe that they were genuinely innocent, victims of a dubious 
and fickle social system in which cries of religious tolerance ring out constantly but 
come to nought for those outside of the civil religious norm.  After their experiences 
in Missouri, the Latter-day Saints sent at least eight hundred and twenty-three 
petitions signed by six hundred and eighty-three petitioners to the federal government 
seeking redress for the losses of or to property.262  These impressive numbers indicate 
the level of Mormon certainty concerning their blamelessness.  For their leader and 
founder, unreserved and unjustified opposition seemed consistent with the details of 
his life. 
 Indeed, at the age of six, young Joseph Smith contracted Typhoid fever, 
complications from which caused infection to spread to the bones of his left leg.  An 
experimental surgery left the boy bloody, sweaty, and in total agony.  He spent the 
next three years either bed-bound or using crutches.263  This traumatic event must 
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have affected Smith in some way.  Pain, as Davies acknowledges, often takes centre 
stage in the construction of identity.264  This should not be overlooked when, as in the 
present study, various phenomena are studied by applying the complimentary 
assumptions and approaches of the sociology of knowledge and Mol’s 
identity/adaptability dialectic.  The former accounts for the social (or group) dynamic 
inherent in the identity-constructing process whilst Mol’s ideas capture the propensity 
of individuals to form myths and rituals around meaningful events and roles.  A 
painful childhood experience is precisely the sort of personal adversity we expect to 
see filtering through to a collective’s developing belief system, if for no other reason 
than that the trauma demands explanation and, likewise, almost begs for narrative 
support. 
 We have already mentioned Smith’s First Vision, the oppressive darkness that 
enshrouded him prior to the theophanic arrival of Jesus and the Father.  Only a few 
years later, one month before Smith’s eighteenth birthday in 1823, his older brother 
Alvin died due to complications from colic.  Richard Bushman suggests that this 
event lifted Joseph to a more prominent position in the spiritual life of the Smith 
family: ‘Where his father had failed in achieving religious unity, he succeeded.’265  
This success, however, was the outcome of inspiration derived from Alvin’s death.  It 
was no coincidence when, years later, the Mormon prophet instituted the ‘patriarchal 
blessing’ as a divine rite by establishing his father Joseph Senior as the official 
Patriarch just before experiencing a series of visions in which he saw his deceased 
brother alongside Adam, Abraham, and Jesus.  As Davies points out, seeing Alvin in 
heaven prompted Smith to ponder the eternal fate of those who are unable to hear the 
gospel during their earthly lives and, subsequently, to posit and implement a ritual of 
baptism for the dead.266  Thus, Bushman’s comment is an astute one as it captures the 
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important overlap between the experience of Alvin’s death, the assumption of greater 
religious and familial responsibility by Joseph (ergo, a sort of supersession of his 
father), and the resolving objective of early Mormon doctrines.  In addition to Smith’s 
leg surgery and the influential death of his older brother, Smith encountered difficult 
economic hardships throughout his life.  In fact, Hansen postulates that the failed 
investments and agricultural ventures of Joseph Senior left the man psychologically 
feeble; Alvin’s death was the breaking blow and contributed to the need for Joseph 
Junior’s headship in the family.267  Either way, there is ample evidence that the 
Smith’s were one of many itinerant families whose peripatetic lifestyle was a product 
of financial necessity, trying to erase the slate after every loss. 
 Joseph Smith’s troubles did not end as he reached adulthood.  His perspective 
is adequately captured in the seven-volume History of the Church.  Although Smith 
began the work around 1838 and 1839, its final form was not published until the early 
twentieth century.  It is a fascinating record of the early years of Mormonism, at times 
sensational but always illuminating because of the insight it provides into the vantage 
of the movement’s founder.  The work begins with Smith’s depiction of the First 
Vision and the persecution that purportedly ensued after he shared the experience with 
local Protestant ministers.  Perhaps recollecting his childhood surgery or the sting of 
death following Alvin’s passing, Smith claims that ‘opposition and persecution...arose 
against me, almost in my infancy.’268  After imparting details of the theophany with 
Christian leaders, Smith says,  
I soon found...that my telling of the story had excited a great deal of prejudice 
against me among professors of religion, and was the cause of great 
persecution, which continued to increase...and this was common among all the 
sects all united to persecute me.269 
Though woeful, Smith explains that the same was true for those who accepted the 
authenticity of the Book of Mormon: ‘Great opposition and much persecution 
followed the believers...’270 
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 Whilst specific descriptions of the persecution are noticeably absent in the 
above statements, later passages from the same text include Smith’s recollection of 
individual instances in which he was the victim of violence and injustice.271  One 
example is his telling of the events of 24 March 1832.  During the night, a mob pulled 
Smith from his bed and carried him outside.  He was stripped of his clothes, choked, 
scratched, and covered with hot tar.  His account provides many details including his 
noteworthy memory of the participation of Simonds Ryder, a Campbellite preacher.  
Another member of the mob jumped on top of Smith’s prostrate body, scratching him 
‘like a mad cat’ and proclaiming, ‘God damn ye, that’s the way the Holy Ghost falls 
on folks!’272  It perhaps is telling that Smith recalled both the presence of Ryder (none 
of the other mob members are named) and the explicitly religious nature of the 
exclamation uttered by the individual who scratched the Mormon prophet.  Again, the 
record’s value lies in its offer of a glimpse into Smith’s own construction of the past.  
To suggest a religious or doctrinal motive standing behind the mob’s act would be to 
engage in too much speculation.  Even so, elements such as Smith’s emphasis on 
Ryder’s complicity do hint at the Mormon founder’s own personal understanding of 
the group’s narrative; his position as a chosen prophet and restorer of truth (e.g., the 
gifts of the Holy Ghost) brought on the ire and aggression of religious competitors 
(heretics) like the Campbellites. 
 As time passed, Smith became increasingly angry over those acts he perceived 
to be unjustified persecution.  Defending himself against the accusations of Mormon 
apostates only weeks before his death, the founder of Mormonism did not hold back: 
‘I have suffered more than Paul did.  I should be like a fish out of water, if I were out 
of persecutions...The Lord has constituted me so curiously that I glory in 
persecution.’273  In the end, Smith was murdered by a mob diverse in its composition 
but almost poetic in its representation of Jacksonian America: city militia members 
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and private vigilantes from multiple towns, some were tried for the crime but all were 
acquitted.274 
 
Ferment and Fecundity 
 Addressing the magnitude of internal division in the Mormon Church just 
prior to the ruinous outbreak of conflict in Missouri, Corrill contended ‘that if the 
Church had been let alone by the citizens, they would have divided and subdivided so 
as to have completely destroyed themselves and their power, as a people, in a short 
time.’275  Yet, it was Sidney Rigdon whose prediction was correct.  Echoing 
Tertullian’s bold claim that ‘the blood of Christians is seed’, Rigdon recognised the 
social benefit of attacks by anti-Mormons: ‘...every attempt of the kind has only 
excited inquiry, awakened curiosity, and caused investigation, which have, in every 
instance, resulted in an increase of members to the Church...’276  The heresy faced by 
both early Christians and early Mormons bred solidarity within each group. 
 What is more, these experiences engendered innovative theological 
expressions.  Irenaeus and Joseph Smith, as well as the collectives they represent, 
serve as examples of religious adherents who perceive themselves to be innocent 
victims.  So long as aggression is felt and internalised, it may be interpreted as 
persecution and allowed to engender fresh theologising.  We agree with David 
Buerger when he says that ‘important doctrines developed when outside forces and 
movements focused Smith’s attention on a problem in a particular way.’277  Social 
heresy forces a certain configuration of beliefs.  As is explored in the next chapter, 
these constructions are often complex soteriological schemas that integrate the heresy; 
explaining it, legitimating it, and preparing for it.  Hansen’s description of Smith’s 
religious objective is a fitting outline of the comprehensive soteriologies that can 
emerge from agonistic experiences.  Smith wanted reform ‘that would obviate 
distinctions between the secular and the religious, between church and state, between 
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heaven and earth, and create a seamless web encompassing the entirety of existence, 
past, present, and future.’278 
 As Nathan Adler notes, in their collective reaction to such agonistic heresies, 
antinomian groups often posit ‘an apocalyptic sense of the “last days.”’  In such 
groups, Adler also observed individual members ‘renouncing family, traditional 
marriage, and jobs; establishing their own small communities and their own new 
rituals’ wherein ‘trances, visions, talking in tongues, possession, and other ecstatic 
behaviour’ became common.279  We could, of course, point to polygamy and the 
veneration of ‘works of the spirit’ in Mormonism as examples of the same phenomena 
Adler mentions.  Certainly, both second-century Christians and early Mormons 
exhibited a strong sense of apocalypticism.  One must be careful, however, to avoid 
exaggerating the novelty of the teachings of Joseph Smith and Irenaeus.  Both 
inherited much from their religious environments, including scriptures and notions of 
human perfectibility; but the common religious concepts and practices that pervaded 
each culture should not be understood as detracting from the creative fecundity of 
each figure’s thoughts.  Instead, notions such as apotheosis or Christian perfectionism 
are taken to represent those values and qualities found in an atmosphere fertile enough 
to germinate the sorts of belief systems articulated by these two men and their 
respective communities.  Believing that social heresy can draw out a profound 
attraction between opposed religious groups and deifying soteriologies, it is necessary 
to acknowledge the constellation of resources available to these movements as they 
participate in stability maintenance through the organisation and conveyance of their 
belief systems.  In the following pages, these systems are analysed with a particular 
focus on their ability to resolve heresy, the third event of the process explicated in 
Chapter Two and a social task the necessity of which is poignantly captured by the 
emotional lines of a Mormon woman who witnessed the nineteenth-century sufferings 
of the Latter-day Saints: 
Let us go, let us go where our rights are secure, 
Where the waters are clear and the atmosphere pure, 
Where the hand of oppression has never been felt, 
Where the blood of the Prophets has never been spilt. 
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Let us go, let us go where the kingdom of God 
Will be seen in its order extending abroad –  
Where the priesthood again will exhibit its worth 
In the regeneration of man and of earth. 
 
Let us go, let us go to the far western shore, 
Where the blood-thirsty ‘Christians’ will hunt us no more; 
Where the waves of the ocean will echo the sound, 
And the shout of salvation extend the world round.280 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESOLVING HERESY: SOTERIOLOGICAL SCHEMAS 
 
 From the beginning, one of the primary objectives of this study has been to 
investigate the apparent elective affinity between religious groups suffering 
opposition and complex soteriologies that incorporate deification.  In order to do so, 
we first borrowed the term heresy from the theological arena and redefined it as a 
threefold ideal type of religious opposition.  As the principal outcome of Chapter One, 
this sociologically-informed redefinition of heresy paved the way for Chapter Three’s 
analysis of the persecution and social rejection faced by early Christians and early 
Mormons which gave conceptual recognition to the heresiological idioms employed 
by the believers themselves.  In Chapter Two, we presented a social process whereby 
religious groups experience such heresy and are forced to resolve the group instability 
that resulted from the conflict.  Now, having already elucidated the specific forms of 
heresy encountered by our two representative parties, we outline the soteriological 
schemas prompted by the heresy.  Although quite complex in terms of the theoretical 
notions required for their analysis (including anthropological, historical, 
eschatological, and teleological) these soteriological systems, nevertheless, are often 
articulated in a distinctive manner that goes some way in resolving the opposition 
experienced by the group. 
 The two major divisions that follow loosely correspond to the components of 
Mol’s definition of religion, viz., sacralisation and identity.  In ‘Order and Salvation’, 
the organisation and sacralising overtones of the belief systems receive due attention 
before turning to the roles and meaningful identities embedded within the 
soteriological schemas of individual members and their respective groups.  In that 
which follows, then, one can rather easily identify the influence of Mol’s fourfold 
model of sacralisation as well as the assumptions of the sociology of knowledge 
concerning social life as engendering and sustaining meaningful realities.  More 
specifically, we corroborate Claude Lévi-Strauss’ anthropological observation that 
‘mythical thought always progresses from the awareness of oppositions toward their 
resolution.’1 
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 Once again, Mol’s ideas prove salient for our analysis; the dialectic between 
stability and adaptability lends two crucial categories to the study of doctrinal 
development.  In a religious group’s effort to resolve opposition, Mol’s theory 
predicts a necessary balance between stable foci for religious identity and adaptable 
elements of the religious system.  For Irenaeus and other Christians of the second 
century this is seen in the flexibility of an open canon alongside the persistent 
veneration of the Hebrew Scriptures, it is also evident in Irenaeus’ insistence on the 
preservation of truth through the regula fidei exemplified in his argument over 
doctrinal variation concerning the date of Easter (Quartodeciman Controversy).  The 
same equilibrium appeared in early Mormonism when, for example, The Book of 
Mormon received immediate and immutable canonisation but was soon 
complemented by the Book of Commandments which reflected the need for 
pragmatic instruction, capable of assisting Mormons in the unpredictable events of 
life.  The publication of this perennially-open volume came just a year and a half after 
Smith founded his church.  Along similar lines, the notion of continuing revelation 
functioned as an inbuilt check on extremes, insisting on interminable communication 
between God and the Latter-day Saints but prescribing guidelines for the receipt of 
such divine messages.  For instance, Joseph Smith propagated the notion that all 
males were equally priests and prophets until Hiram Page claimed to receive 
supernatural revelations, then Smith came forward with two of his own providential 
pronouncements in which God unequivocally names Joseph as the only one 
authorised to convey divine message.2  Future revelations were possible but also 
limited to Smith.3 
 Due to the large volume of extant documentation concerning the religious 
landscape of nineteenth-century America, the heretical process we outlined earlier 
appears more pronounced for early Mormonism than for early Christianity.  This is 
not to claim that Irenaeus and his peers present a different social case; we confidently 
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assert that both are examples of the phenomenon.  However, we can look to early 
Mormons for a more complete and compelling picture of the doctrinal consequences 
that emerge as a religious collective grapples with the dual needs of resolving heresy 
and sustaining the plausibility of the proffered solution.   
 The Mormons who were driven from the state of Missouri in 1839 did not lose 
faith in their leader or their religious community. LeSueur notes that they, instead, 
‘believed that their troubles had been caused by dissenters and other enemies of God, 
and they accepted their plight as a scourge from the Lord to purify the Church and 
perfect the Saints.’4  Yet, this outlook was an interpretation of agonistic experiences, 
an interpretation embraced as reality.  Outside forces, however, repeatedly acted upon 
the early Latter-day Saints, causing the latter to absorb the blows as effectively as 
possible.  The opposition that was intended by God to ‘perfect the saints’ in 1839 was 
viewed differently when it began in Missouri almost eight years earlier.  Taysom 
shows how the concept of ‘gathering’ among Joseph Smith’s followers was altered 
over time, adapting to the undaunted aggression exerted by Mormonism’s opponents.  
In 1833, it was said that the LDS church existed to gather the elect in the city of Zion 
(Independence, Missouri), and believers were encouraged to dedicate themselves 
completely to this objective, facing death if it was required.5  By 1834, Smith’s 
revelations concerning Zion and the gathering began to take a graver tone.  Adherents 
were warned that failure to obey God’s commands would mean failure to establish 
Zion, Mormonism’s enemies would be victorious.6  When creating a city of God in 
Missouri proved too difficult of a task, Smith revealed to his followers in 1844 that 
the true Zion ‘could be found wherever the pure in heart gathered.’7  Taysom 
recognises this change as one example of a recurring pattern among early Mormons in 
which social pressures are accommodated and the group’s narrative is reformulated.   
 This pattern accords with ‘Mormonism’s capacity for adaptation’, a 
characteristic of the sect that Kendall White believes is demonstrated by the 
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‘theological innovations’ advanced by the group from 1835 to 1844.8  White follows 
Alexander’s division of early Mormon theology into two periods: the essentially 
orthodox phase from 1830 to 1835 and the inventive phase from 1835 until Smith’s 
death in 1844.9  The latter stage witnessed a number of important developments in 
LDS belief, but Alexander ultimately argues that the foundation for future Mormon 
theology was laid through the exposition of Smith’s revelations from 1832 until his 
death.10  In Alexander’s view, three influences motivated the questions that these 
revelations were intended to answer.  The second of these is the most important for 
our study, for it encapsulates our chief argument:  
The second influence was the persecution of the Saints in Jackson County, 
Missouri.  This persecution also intensified the emphasis on perfectionism – 
which eventually led to the doctrine of eternal progression.  As the Saints 
suffered and persevered, the [LDS newspaper] Evening and Morning Star 
reemphasised the idea that the faithful could become Christlike, and a side of 
man’s nature quite apart from his fallen state was thus affirmed.11 
In this way, opposition forced the Mormons to sculpt their existing, but inchoate, 
notions of chosenness into an unambiguous claim of eternal progress. 
 The explicit affirmation of such human potential was, however, the final 
articulation of a doctrine that had developed gradually for Smith.  Alexander, and 
White after him, designate the years from 1835 to 1844 as the innovative phase 
because Smith began to emphasise unique beliefs such as ‘the finite nature of God, a 
more optimistic view of humanity, and a doctrine of salvation by merit.’12  Also, after 
relocating to Nauvoo, Illinois in 1839, Joseph Smith began to stress the corporeality 
of the Godhead, reject the trinity, and teach that there were multiple gods.13  In a 
revelation from 1843, Smith asserted that ‘when the Saviour shall appear...we shall 
see that he is a man like ourselves.’14  The next month, the Mormon leader presented 
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his followers with a new teaching concerning the nature of spirits: ‘There is no such 
thing as immaterial matter.  All spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure, and can 
only be discerned by purer eyes.’15  Thus, in two creative strokes, Smith expressed an 
idiosyncratic view of metaphysics in which everything is material, even God(s).  The 
Nauvoo period also witnessed a change in Joseph Smith’s understanding of the 
afterlife, an area of doctrine which serves as a convenient example of the development 
of soteriological thoughts over the course of Mormonism’s first fourteen years. 
 In 1830, Smith offered his church a revelation concerning the eschaton.  
Echoing the biblical books of Daniel and Revelation, he outlined the sequence of 
events that would signal the end of time.  In doing so, Smith expressed a rather benign 
account of the dead receiving ‘a crown of righteousness’ and being raised up to ‘be 
with’ God.16  Just two years later, the Mormon prophet introduced two ‘priesthoods’ 
to his church, levels of activity and commitment that were integral to the Mormon 
notion of restoration.17  Those who received the priesthood were reminded that they 
would also receive all that the Father has, including the ‘Father’s kingdom’.18  
Another revelation from the same year offered a sort of revision of the 1830 prophecy 
concerning the end times.  Here, the seventh angel sounds the seventh trumpet and 
‘the saints shall be filled with his glory, and receive their inheritance and be made 
equal with [God].’19  This follows Smith’s explication of three kingdoms of glory: the 
celestial, terrestrial, and telestial.20  Another testament of developing concepts of the 
afterlife in 1832 is seen in section ninety-one of the 1835 edition of Doctrine and 
Covenants in which those who have the Melchizedek priesthood, and thus are 
expected to experience ‘celestial glory’, are said to be ‘gods, even the sons of God: 
wherefore all things are theirs, whether life or death, or things present, or things to 
come, all are theirs, and they are Christ's, and Christ is God's; and they shall 
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overcome all things.’21 As Grant Underwood notes, these 1832 revelations concerning 
three levels of glory in the afterlife did not significantly impact Mormon beliefs for 
over a decade.22   
 However, Underwood undoubtedly has a specific 1843 teaching in mind.  One 
of the most influential, and incendiary, of Smith’s revelations was presented to his 
followers just one year before his death.  In promulgating a unique view of marriage 
in which man and wife remain ‘sealed’ for eternity and continue to produce ‘seeds 
forever and ever’, Joseph Smith asserted that those who participate in this ‘everlasting 
covenant’ are to be ‘gods, because they have all power, and the angels are subject 
unto them.’23  The revelation also promoted polygamy, a practice and a doctrinal 
principle that would prove contentious for many decades.  It is enough, however, to 
note the transformation in thoughts represented by this prophetic statement.  Those 
who, in 1830, simply expected to join God in heaven were, by 1843, capable of 
becoming ‘gods’ and received assurance that ‘all things are subject unto them.’  
Theoretically speaking, the later notion should be understood as one outcome of early 
Mormonism’s struggle to avoid anomie when faced with persistent opposition.  We 
agree with Alexander that it was external force that gradually brought deification to 
the fore in Smith’s mind.  The disorder caused by physical hardships and the 
emotional chagrin resulting from interminable attacks on the credibility of Smith’s 
prophetic power caused a crescendo, nothing less than The King Follett Discourse. 
 At the 1844 funeral for King Follett, a revered member of the LDS 
community,24 Smith elucidated the details of what had become an evolving and 
increasingly complex theological anthropology.  Recognising the appropriateness of 
discussing eternal life at a funeral, the Mormon leader promised hope through 
knowledge: 
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The great majority of mankind do not comprehend anything, either that which 
is past, or that which is to come, as it respects their relationship to God...If 
men do not comprehend the character of God, they do not comprehend 
themselves.  I want to go back to the beginning, and so lift your minds into a 
more lofty sphere and a more exalted understanding...25 
Temporarily disregarding the significant issues Smith raises, such as the place of time 
in LDS soteriology and what some might see as the nearly Feuerbachian philosophical 
notion that to know god is to know oneself, we take this moment simply to highlight 
the way in which Smith introduces concepts of deification in terms of higher forms of 
knowledge.  He continued, 
God himself was once as we are now, and is an exalted man...We have 
imagined and supposed that God was God from all eternity.  I will refute that 
idea, and take away the veil...he was once a man like us; yea, that God 
himself, the Father of us all, dwelt on an earth, the same as Jesus Christ 
himself did...and you have got to learn how to be Gods yourselves...the same 
as all Gods have done before you, namely, by going from one small degree to 
another, and from a small capacity to a great one; from grace to grace, from 
exaltation to exaltation, until you attain to the resurrection of the dead...26 
Brodie notes that this sermon was the first instance in which the Mormon prophet 
proclaimed the ‘themes that he had been inculcating in fragments and frequently in 
secret to his most favoured saints.27  Indeed, just two months after the Kong Follett 
address, Smith gave another sermon in which he claimed to have always believed in a 
plurality of gods, asserting that the desire to clarify such teachings had been lingering 
for years.28  Even so, Arnal’s conclusion, cited in Chapter One, that ‘heresy creates 
orthodoxy, by forcing the articulation of what had up to that point remained 
unnecessary to say’ seems quite apt when connected to the evolution of early Mormon 
theology. 
 The theological import of the funeral sermon in April 1844 cannot be gainsaid.  
As Van Hale concludes, it was the King Follett Discourse alone that cemented the 
doctrine of eternal progression as ‘eternal truth’, and it marked a transition for 
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Mormon belief.29  More importantly, there are fewer clearer examples of the social 
interplay between conflict and doctrine.  If it is true that the resolution of heresy 
accompanies the reception and recognition of heresy, there is little surprise in the way 
that this influential sermon attempts to ameliorate various enduring struggles faced by 
the early Mormons.  Throughout the homily, references are made to Smith’s 
innocence and passive nature, his credibility as a prophet, the efficacy of baptism for 
the dead, and the just consequences awaiting apostates.  One of the primary concerns, 
and an especially relevant topic for believers who lost property and relatives to the 
tragic violence of religious opposition, is the incessant external threat to the emotional 
and physical wellbeing of the Mormons.  In a sense, the salvific progress that Smith 
articulates as a chance ‘to advance in knowledge’ was the capstone to that 
soteriological schema first initiated twelve years earlier when Mormons were 
promised a resurrection in which they would be ‘made equal with God’.  As the 
fermenting thoughts of the early Mormons and their leader interacted with agonistic 
forces and the perception of interminable religious persecution, pressure increased for 
elaborated soteriological beliefs capable of healing numerous social fissures.  For 
Mormons as well as for second-century Christians, heresy was at least partially 
resolved by articulating relatively complex soteriological schemas.  Before 
illuminating crucial components of Irenaeus’ Economy of Salvation and Joseph 
Smith’s Plan of Salvation, however, it is helpful to have a brief look at some 
examples of what is meant by resolution with regards to a belief system’s direct effect 
on contextual tensions. 
 
Toward Resolution 
 There can be little doubt that one of Irenaeus’ central concerns was the 
refutation of Valentinian ‘Gnosticism’.  Directed at this heterodox movement, Against 
Heresies often strives to counter the ‘Gnostic’ teachings point by point.  In doing so, 
Irenaeus adopts a unifying tone.30  For example, in response to his opponents’ belief 
in a demiurge as well as their promulgation of a form of docetism, Irenaeus presents 
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the belief that there is ‘one God the Father, and one Christ Jesus...’31  Likewise, 
Irenaeus asserts that Jesus was a human ‘in every respect’.  He also argued for 
agreement between the Hebrew Scriptures and the writings of the apostles as well as 
between the Eastern Church (he was born in Asia Minor) and the Western Church (he 
was bishop in Gaul).  In addition to resolving these doctrinal debates on Christology, 
textual reception, and internal church tensions, the second-century bishop came to 
view human history as God’s ongoing creation of ‘one harmonious and consistent 
whole.’32  This last statement is the most incisive for our analysis for in it, one 
encounters the notion of a soteriological schema as an overarching system of meaning 
that melds historical narrative, myth, participation, and group sentiments such as 
hope, justice, vindication, etc.  In the following pages, references to the Economy of 
Salvation as a specific interpretive system derived from the words of Irenaeus point 
back to this passage from Against Heresies: 
[God’s] wisdom is shown in His having made created things parts of one 
harmonious and consistent whole; and those things which, through His super-
eminent kindness, receive growth and a long period of existence, do reflect the 
glory of the uncreated One...but by their continuing in being throughout a long 
course of ages, they shall receive a faculty of the Uncreated, through the 
gratuitous bestowal of eternal existence upon them by God...By this 
arrangement, therefore, and these harmonies, and a sequence of this nature, 
man, a created and organised being, is rendered after the image and likeness of 
the uncreated God...(emphasis added)33 
 Recognising the social fragmentation and religious opposition knocking on his 
own nineteenth-century door, Joseph Smith involved his community in the enterprise 
of alleviating anomie.  For some of Mormonism’s opponents, this was far from 
laudable.  Perhaps the most intellectually sophisticated attack on early Mormonism 
was Alexander Campbell’s investigation of the Book of Mormon, Delusions.  Whilst 
outlining the ‘internal evidence’ that suggests the Book of Mormon is a fraudulent 
and dubious text, Campbell observes that Joseph Smith’s new scripture settles ‘every 
error...discussed in New York for the last ten years.’  The Mormon leader ostensibly 
resolves,  
infant baptism, ordination, the trinity, regeneration, repentance, justification, 
the fall of man, the atonement, transubstantiation, fasting, penance, church 
                                               
31
 AH, III.16.6 
 
32
 AH, I.10.2; IV.38.3 
 
33
 AH, IV.38.3 
  
220 
 
government, religious experience, the call to the ministry, the general 
resurrection, eternal punishment, who may baptize, and even the question of 
freemasonry, republican government, and the rights of man.34  
Although expressed in an accusatory tone, Campbell’s argument draws warranted 
attention to early Mormonism as an identity-conferring system.  Even in its first year 
of existence, the new religious movement offered its members stability by 
demonstrating inbuilt prowess with regards to doctrinal clarification.  If Mol is correct 
to define identity as ‘the stable niche that man occupies in a potentially chaotic 
environment’, then Joseph Smith’s new church was poised for social success from the 
outset, settling divisive religious debates mollified potential social conflicts in a 
milieu where the collective consciousness often entailed a wary bond of 
republicanism and Protestant Christianity and, consequently, offered a stable harbour 
for those seeking to escape the confusion. 
 While themes of unity in the face of division can be found in Joseph Smith’s 
earliest revelations,35 perhaps the most striking aspect of the religious movement lay 
in its conspicuous effort to indemnify its members against the prevalent unrest 
characterising America’s religious environment.  Givens alerts us to one paradoxical 
element of this phenomenon when he writes, ‘Combining the restricted sacerdotalism 
of Roman Catholicism with the quasi universalism of Protestantism, Joseph forged a 
new version altogether.’36  In a similarly useful comment, Bowman highlights the way 
in which the temple rituals introduced in Nauvoo, Illinois during the 1840s ‘pressed 
back against the uncertainty, confused loyalty, and constant fear of disorder and death 
that had plagued the Mormons in general and Joseph Smith in particular since the 
founding of the church.’37  However, the drive to resolve heresy extended beyond 
individual, circumscribed issues of belief and practice.   
 Although he acknowledges that Joseph Smith unified specific contentious 
topics of the day, such as the Mormon prophet’s dissolution of a distinction between 
physical and spiritual, Philip Barlow illuminates the discernible gestalt found in 
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Smith’s ‘actions, revelations, and words’ that attempted to resolve the ‘broken order’ 
found in the American religious context by encouraging ‘the Saints to live with one 
leg planted in the ordinary present, the other leg reaching beyond ordinary, sequenced 
time (what the Greeks called chronos) and into kairos (the opportune moment) and 
thence into divine mythos...’38  Cognisant of the need for historical rootedness and 
familial ties in a young nation of immigrants enchanted by the siren calls of 
disestablishment, Smith ultimately posited an earthly ‘Zion’ which spiritualised the 
family unit, mandated baptism for the dead, and connected his followers to the ancient 
Israelites: 
...the Mormon Prophet produced an overarching vision that reclaimed, 
extended, and redefined the meaning of family, that eventually changed the 
thrust of his religion...Grasping this [American] context, we can better 
appreciate the resonance of Smith’s introduction of patriarchs, who in formal 
ordinances blessed faithful recipients, assigning each an ancient Israelite 
family lineage – assigned them, that is, a new identity...(original emphasis)39 
Accordingly, Barlow notes that early Mormonism altered the notion of atonement as 
the work of Christ, instead defining the work of God as ‘incorporating virtually all 
relations and spheres of activity in which humans had a part...’40  In this way, both 
Irenaeus and Joseph Smith conceived of a soteriological schema encompassing past, 
present, and future.  Irenaeus’ ‘consistent whole’ and Smith’s ‘Zion’ both extended 
salvation history into the future as one stretches a blanket over a sleeping body, and 
that resolving action at once ordered salvation and sacralised order.   
 
Order and Salvation 
 The developmental direction of soteriology toward notions of deification 
subsequent to the persecutions and conflicts outlined in the previous chapter is not 
surprising.  In the middle of the second century, Justin already equated conversion to 
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Christianity with being perfected.41  For those, like Irenaeus, who combined similar 
ideas with the immediate experience of overt opposition, it was perhaps nearly 
inevitable that they would espouse a sort of perfecting salvation process.  In a sense, 
Henderson’s argument for the validity of the comparative method when studying the 
historical development of heresy and orthodoxy is also germane for our 
sociologically-informed analysis of the same topic: 
One might apply the neo-Darwinian idea of convergent evolution to illustrate 
the existence of these common points.  Just as different biological lineages 
sometimes evolve similar adaptations to deal with common problems, such as 
the hexagonal patterns in the cells of honeycombs and in the interlocking 
plates of some turtles, so heresiographers in traditions as diverse as the early 
Christian and the Neo-Confucian developed similar antiheretical strategies to 
deal with common challenges that had only a few optimal solutions.42 
If heresy and ‘common challenges’ are understood to be religious opposition, then the 
‘antiheretical strategies’ employed by the second-century Christians and early 
Mormons represent efforts to construct an orderly system of beliefs in which conflict 
found resolution.  It seems plausible that each of these groups arrived on the doorstep 
of deification because, in fact, there are a limited number of ‘optimal solutions’.  This 
concurs with our insistence that deification is not the only (or the necessary) response 
of all religious groups to overt opposition.  Indeed, it would stretch the realm of 
analytical possibility to substantiate such a claim.  It is possible, however, that young 
religious minorities tend to have few resolving options when faced with persecution 
and social marginalisation.  It is not our concern, nor does space permit us, to 
speculate as to the blend of biological, psychological, social, geographical, and 
emotional factors that constrain a collective in the latter’s reaction to social struggle.  
However, one should be mindful of the fact that a highly revered (but still open) 
corpus of texts sets a precedent for interpreting ‘historical experience in cosmic 
terms’, thus determining to some degree the manner by which Irenaeus and his fellow 
Christians made sense of the persecutions they witnessed.43  Drawing on those 
increasingly authoritative materials as well as available cultural and philosophical 
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resources, the second-century Christians predated the Mormons in articulating a 
deifying soteriological system as the preferred expression of social orthodoxy in 
response to social heresy. 
 As a seminal component of the soteriological schemas developed by these 
groups, deification provided optimal explanatory efficacy whilst clearly positioning 
the group and its members within a meaningful system of action and reward.  It 
settled the perceived disequilibrium between order and chaos, one of Mol’s central 
arguments concerning the role of religion in society.44  Furthermore, the soteriologies 
offered by Irenaeus and Joseph Smith reconciled their inherited paradigms, their 
contexts, and their unique experiences with social heresy.  The magical worldview of 
the earliest Mormons and the supernaturalism of the Graeco-Roman world provided a 
suitable foundation for their developing soteriologies.  For example, early 
Mormonism did not need to dissolve the boundary between the physical and the 
metaphysical, the magical perspective it had inherited had done much of the work 
already - although Smith certainly glossed the issue with an idiosyncratic view of the 
permanence of matter, in which the material world was spiritualised and the spiritual 
was materialised.45  Yet, nineteenth-century primitivism was counteracted by an 
acknowledgement of the Enlightenment in the Mormon emphasis on knowledge and 
pragmatism, hallmarks of Smith’s conception of progress and a topic explored later in 
the chapter.   
 Throughout the remainder of the present study, the soteriological schemas of 
Irenaeus and Joseph Smith are referred to, respectively as the Economy of Salvation 
(Economy) and the Plan of Salvation (Plan).  Irenaeus repeatedly uses οἰκονοµία 
(‘economy’) when discussing both the single, cohesive plan of salvation history as 
well as the various dispensations in which God interacts with humanity.46  Likewise, 
the notion of a specific ‘Plan’ of salvation emerges throughout Joseph Smith’s 
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scriptural compositions – most notably in the Book of Mormon where it is variably 
cited as a ‘plan of redemption’, ‘plan of happiness’, ‘plan of mercy’, and the 
aforementioned ‘plan of salvation’.47  As each of these expressions suggests, salvation 
is taken to be ordered and objective, acting on the believer and the collective with 
divine purpose.  The ‘Economy’ and the ‘Plan’ thus offer phenomena apt for 
comparison in a study of this kind. 
 In Irenaeus, one encounters a sort of antecedent to that which was later 
designated Heilgeschichte, a ‘salvation history’ characterised by stages of 
development and revelation in God’s actions toward his creation.  The Economy, for 
the second-century bishop, is God’s ordered arrangement for the ongoing process of 
creation.  Though a thorough theological sketch of Irenaeus’ system would require 
more space than we are able to dedicate to the topic, it is important to acknowledge 
that numerous scholars of Irenaeus highlight the way in which his theology is more 
accurately an anthropology; refuting ‘Gnostic’ cosmology, with its postulation of the 
soul’s return to the Pleroma, Irenaeus outlined the Economy as material humanity’s 
path to God.  Recalling the key passage (AH, IV.38.3) chosen earlier as representative 
of Irenaeus’ soteriological schema, it is seen that human history is salvation history is 
creation history.48  This leads Julie Canlis to define the Economy in Irenaeus as ‘God 
continuing in his ongoing creation of humanity’ so that humanity may receive glory.49  
This glory, for Irenaeus, is the ‘likeness’ that was lost when the first man of Genesis 
ate the forbidden fruit.  As is elucidated below, image (imago dei) and likeness 
perform integral functions within the Economy as the believer requires grace through 
the Spirit in order to progress from being in the image to being in the likeness, a 
possibility resulting from Christ’s incarnation.  Due to this articulation of the 
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soteriological system, Ysabel de Andia understands Irenaeus’ Economy to be ‘both 
the overall plan of salvation history and the dispensation of the grace of God, by 
ministry of the Word...’50  The result bears notable resemblance to theologian John 
Drane’s summary of the non-proselytism variety of Christianity, one of two 
‘understandings of the relationship between Christian faith and culture’:  
[It] is a positive view of human nature, seeing people as ‘made in God’s 
image’ (Genesis 1:26-27), and therefore having inbuilt potential to be 
something more than they now are in an ongoing process of change 
(‘conversion’) as the message of Jesus is taken seriously and acculturated in 
relation to different social circumstances.51 
Drane’s words are appropriate for our discussion of the Economy because he 
highlights both the causal relationship between an emphasis on the imago dei and a 
positive view of humanity’s potential to progress, as well as the notion that such 
progress occurs as faith interacts with diverse social situations.  It is also intriguing 
that Drane uses the term ‘conversion’ to describe this process of change over time, a 
faint echo of Mol’s belief that conversion is the stripping of an old identity and the 
welding of a new identity in its place or ‘a break between the past and the present’ as 
the old ways appear less and less adequate for interpreting experience.52  Born of the 
dialectic between belief and circumstance, then, soteriological schemas such as 
Irenaeus’ Economy abet social order by establishing a structure within which 
instability and change find purpose. 
 In early Mormonism, the picture is much the same, and the consequent Plan of 
Salvation came to be the ‘essential scheme of the “gospel”’.53  As the outcome of 
prophetic pronouncements and the martyrdom mentality adumbrated previously, 
Joseph Smith’s Plan is a dynamic combination, and ritualised expression, of cosmic 
narrative and moral pragmatism.  Consisting of natural laws and historical epochs, the 
Plan describes both the divinely-sanctioned system of redemption through the work of 
Jesus Christ as well as the process of obedience in which believers must demonstrate 
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their commitment in order to eternally progress.  This latter element is of primary 
importance as the laws, or ordinances, necessary for progression are considered 
eternal and cosmic, stretching from before the creation of the world into the endless 
future and applicable to God himself.  Thus, two parallel definitions of the Plan 
appear in Bruce McConkie’s widely read work on Mormon beliefs: 1) ‘...all of the 
laws, ordinances, and performances by conformity to which mortal man is 
empowered to gain eternal life in the kingdom of God’, and 2) ‘...all of the laws, 
ordinances, principles, and doctrines by conformity to which the spirit offspring of 
God have power to progress to the high state of exaltation enjoyed by the Father.’54  
The subtle differences between the two definitions are intended to signal the way in 
which the Plan is both the ‘gospel’ of Jesus Christ in which humans are granted 
salvation from death as well as the grander scheme permitting pre-existent souls to 
experience a mortal life and continue to gain knowledge in the afterlife until those 
who are fully exalted attain godhood.55  As salvation history, the schema represents 
this process of eternal progress as movement ‘from the pre-existence, through 
obedience in this life into the post-mortal life’ (see fig. 1).56  In an almost Platonic 
stroke, the Plan entails a pre-existence in which ‘intelligences’ endure a spiritual birth, 
learn necessary truths prior to their mortal birth on earth, and are eventually rewarded 
with the commensurate level of glory in the afterlife (Celestial, Terrestrial, Telestial). 
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Figure 1.  The LDS Plan of Salvation.   
Source: Diagram from David J. Ridges, Doctrinal Details of the Plan of 
Salvation (Springville: Cedar Fort, Inc., 2005), 1. 
 
 As in the case of Irenaean anthropology, the philosophical and theological 
foundations of the Mormon salvation schema deserve greater attention than is 
possible in our sociologically-oriented analysis.57  However, it is patently important 
that the belief system intimated above reflects a slightly later synthesis of the 
fragmentary concepts offered by Joseph Smith during his leadership of the LDS 
church.  He presented a more systematic understanding of salvation in the final 
months of his life, but those radical declarations required further organisation.  Whilst 
one historian claims that ‘the logic of [Joseph Smith’s] mythology and 
theology...satisfied the inbred desire of Yorkers to achieve an orderly, intellectual 
formulation of their beliefs’, it is perhaps even more evident that the pragmatism built 
into the movement from the outset appealed to the itinerant, semi-literate Americans 
who first joined the ranks of early Mormonism.  The Book of Mormon linked the Plan 
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with a ‘probationary time’ during which humanity must repent of the sin of Adam and 
Eve, serving God after having incurred the just consequence of original sin.58  Had the 
first humans skirted this responsibility, the Plan would have been thwarted.  In the 
early 1840s, of course, Smith expanded this notion, adding both the concept of 
deification officially introduced in the King Follett Discourse as well as the detailed 
account of the pre-existence included in the Book of Abraham.  The latter, presented 
by Smith as his own translation of a papyrus fragment, supplemented the earlier 
1830/31 Book of Moses (Smith’s addendum to the Old Testament) by enlarging the 
account of pre-mortality during which a plan is formed among the Gods for the 
creation of the world, the Father chooses to send Jesus as part of this plan, and Satan 
is expelled from heaven.59   
 In the Book of Moses, Satan conspires to destroy the agency of humanity, and 
the Book of Abraham explicitly incorporates obedience and reward into the 
overarching Plan.  Recalling the specific frustrations encountered by the Mormons as 
they physically and ideologically battled a bourgeoning American religious 
orientation in the form of Evangelical Protestantism whilst internal dissension tugged 
at the seams of LDS solidarity, it seems quite revealing that Smith’s teachings 
gradually culminated in a soteriological schema that emphasised the present (morality 
and submission) in addition to the past (pre-mortal council of the Gods) and the future 
(deification).  In the name of disestablishment and democracy, eighteenth-century 
America removed many of society’s ties to history or tradition.  In a sense, Mormon 
social subversion in the early nineteenth century is apparent in the group’s insistence 
on historical rootedness, only conceding that there was a temporary break in the 
continuity of time within the Plan, a rift that Smith repaired by restoring the gospel.  
In comparison, and germane for the present analysis, Irenaeus charged his ‘Gnostic’ 
opponents with subverting social norms in their own way.  The Graeco-Roman milieu 
defined religious legitimacy as possession of a demonstrable history.  By positing the 
existence of pneumatics, an elite category of humans who alone possess true gnosis 
(spiritual knowledge), the Valentinians avoided the need for tradition or history 
altogether.  In response, Irenaeus asserted that the truly ‘spiritual’ individual is 
someone who has ‘received the Spirit of God which was with men from the beginning 
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in all the “economies” of God and predicted the future, showed for the present, and 
told about the past...’60  By highlighting the activity of God in the past and discussing 
past, present, and future in terms of God’s ‘economies’, Irenaeus simultaneously 
answered the Roman cry for credibility and put forth the belief that God’s 
involvement with the world is as orderly as it is all-encompassing.  Thus, the 
soteriological schemas of both Irenaeus and Joseph Smith charted time and activity 
(God’s and humanity’s) in terms of past, present, and future.  Utilising these three 
divisions in the following examination of both systems allows us to remain attuned to 
the ways in which these opposed groups integrated their social struggles with their 
soteriologies. 
 
Past 
 Sociologists and historians are, of course, aware of the role(s) played by 
history within the teachings and practices of religious communities.  As was 
mentioned in Chapter Two, Berger views religious rituals as the preservation of 
historical events that were perceived as divine intervention.  By offering present and 
future generations of adherents the chance to engage with these past events, ritual 
provides continuity.  This relates to discussions of collective memory such as 
Castelli’s study of martyrdom.  Sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger joins the 
conversation in her more recent theoretical study of religion, beginning her analysis 
with the premise that religions are identifiable as such by their ability to situate 
believers and communities in a shared history or lineage.61  She claims that, for the 
world’s major faith traditions, this trait has been lost over time and accounts for the 
decline of those religions as they progressively come up short in this social function.  
Hervieu-Léger’s observation is instructive in at least one regard – namely, that one of 
the seminal functions of religion appears to be its provision of a poignant and robust 
historical identity for members individually and the group as a collective.  To this 
incisive thought, one might add that the historical identity conferred on the believers 
is just one of the various soteriological components the existence of which is owed to 
the interaction of societal pressures and doctrinal evolution. 
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 In the late first and early second centuries, both Jews and Christians saw 
themselves as the true Israel, God’s chosen people.62  Later, Celsus aimed his 
polemical artillery at this very claim, denying the alleged Jewish roots of the 
emerging Christian community.  His criticism was particularly powerful because of 
the new movement’s desire for credibility.  Consequently, this tension founds its way 
into soteriological ideas such as those promulgated by Irenaeus.  In refuting the 
‘Gnostic’ assertion that the Hebrew God was the Demiurge, a separate and naively 
malevolent deity from the great Bythos to whom those with gnosis will return, 
Irenaeus also established a historical connection for his fellow believers.  The Jewish 
God was the one and only deity, the very same force that created the world and sent 
Christ (the long-awaited Jewish Messiah).63  Stressing a motif of unity, Irenaeus 
linked the untested Christian present with the more acceptable Jewish past.  The 
resulting identity was a complex amalgam of Jewish distinction and a brand new 
Christian self-definition.  Although, as we stated in the previous chapter, Christians 
were beginning to exist as a monolithic movement, the heresy they faced from society 
prevented any total abrogation of their Jewish heritage. 
 The construction of Christian identity, however, benefited from more than an 
appeal to Jewish roots.  In both Demonstration and Against Heresies, Irenaeus 
adumbrates a narrative theology in which the creation of Adam serves as the first link 
in a soteriological chain.  Recall the key passage from the fourth book of Against 
Heresies with which we began this study of salvation and order.  There, Irenaeus 
refers to humanity as having been ‘rendered after the image and likeness of the 
uncreated God’.  In creating Adam, God essentially formed infantile, imperfect beings 
incapable of possessing perfection.  Irenaeus repeatedly asserts that Adam sinned 
because of his ontological state of having been created; only that which is uncreated 
(God) is truly perfect.64  The first human, then, is described as ‘innocent and 
childlike’, ‘very little’, ‘an infant’, and a ‘young child’.65  Expressing an idiosyncratic 
understanding of the Genesis account, Irenaeus suggests that original sin was not the 
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rebellious act of power-hungry humans but the nearly inevitable transgression of an 
immature creation for, as he states, ‘we have not been made gods from the beginning, 
but at first merely men, then at length gods.’66   
 Osborn summarises the way in which this view of humanity’s origins informs 
the entire soteriological schema: ‘...The words “let us make man in our image and 
likeness” extend beyond creation to the whole divine economy, which ends when 
mankind progresses from the kingdom of the son to the transforming vision of the 
father.’67  The Economy is a complex, but consistent, plan for Irenaeus.  Losing the 
likeness of God when their immaturity led them to sin, Adam and Eve stand as the 
first representatives of humanity, a lineage requiring redemption so that the Economy 
proceeds ‘according to the good pleasure of the Father’.68  In elucidating this history, 
Irenaeus makes room for the existence of persecution, locating the genesis of 
opposition in the antagonism exhibited between Cain and Abel, the second generation 
of humanity.69  Redemption, however, is offered through the recapitulative work of 
Christ which ‘does not bring human beings immediately to a state of perfection but 
recovers for them the capacity to grow into it.’70  Recapitulation, in the Irenaean 
sense, refers to the way in which Jesus Christ (the archetype of the imago dei) is a 
second Adam, fulfilling those aspects of the Economy that Adam could not.71  
Organising the narrative in this way, Irenaeus moved effortlessly from history to 
individual impetus as he enticed others with a prehistoric identity only available to 
those who accept Jesus as the restorer of progress. 
 Combating the exclusivity of the Valentinians, Irenaeus taught his own form 
of unique identity – albeit, an identity that he believed to be available to everyone in 
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equal measure.  Joseph Smith, however, went even further to establish an essential 
link to history that was effective for defying the unanchored ethos of the time whilst 
fortifying the in-group identity of his followers.  In one sense, Smith was not alone.  
Davis mentions that ‘no theme is so evident in the Jacksonian era as the strained 
attempt to provide America with a glorious heritage and a noble destiny.’72  Various 
groups purported to be a ‘restoration’ of one kind or another.  Alexander Campbell’s 
disciples, for instance, wanted to return to the practices and approaches that they 
believed were the defining characteristics of the earliest Christian communities.  As 
was discussed previously, many Americans began to envision a sacred future for their 
nation.  The need for heritage, however, was a difficult challenge in such a young 
country founded on principles of democracy and anti-authoritarian ideals.  Indeed, the 
relationship between authority and history became increasingly obvious; when every 
voice is equal and all lack the timbre of aged wisdom, reliability is difficult to discern.   
 Of course, for those same Jacksonians, no voice was more credible than 
God’s.  Yet, in positing innumerable gods and innumerable worlds, Joseph Smith 
eventually located and spotlighted the one immutable, indomitable source of truth that 
surpassed even the words of God, a spring of eternal knowledge that bowed to the 
rationalistic tendencies of post-Enlightenment America just as impeccably as it 
mollified the desultory lives of New England’s itinerant farmers: cosmological law.  
Preferring to discuss these laws in terms of ‘principles’ of the gospel, Smith slowly 
sculpted his soteriological ideas in such a way that the notion of principles governing 
not only creation but God as well was really the culmination of many other teachings.  
In his King Follett sermon, the Mormon leader pointed to the act of climbing a ladder 
as a fitting analogy for his brand of deification.  He claimed that God was once a man 
and had already climbed this ‘ladder’ of exaltation, progressing from one level to the 
next.  By explicitly stating the manner in which ‘all gods’ have progressed, and 
combining that notion with the metaphysical assertion that ‘intelligences’ (the pure 
matter cloaked with spirits in the pre-existence)73 have always existed alongside God, 
Joseph Smith instituted a meaningful belief system built on a cosmological formula.   
 Perhaps this was the natural climax to a movement that began with the 
publication of a voluminous work of sacred scripture purportedly translated from 
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historic tablets, telling the story of lost tribes from ancient Israel, and somewhat 
ostentatiously declaring itself a supplement to the Bible.  Without question, time only 
served to expand the historical identity first disclosed in the pages of the Book of 
Mormon.  As Bushman notes, Smith’s 1832 revelations concerning LDS priesthood 
‘linked modern priests to Moses, the patriarchs, and Adam as much as to God.’74  The 
Mormon priesthood ‘made the Saints “sons of Moses and of Aaron and the seed of 
Abraham,” part of an ancient family of priests...[Thus] the Saints had an instant 
history.’75  Chapter Three included the early Mormon’s provocative use of ‘gentile’ 
for those outside of the LDS community.  As was noted at that point in our study, 
using this term for outsiders was less about attempting to rewrite history and more 
about self-definition.  Ordained as priests in the same manner as Aaron, possessing 
the Book of Mormon, and uniquely chosen to restore the gospel, early Mormons 
looked to the potent past of Israel for identity in the unsteady context of nineteenth-
century America.76  
 As early Mormon soteriology evolved, narrative joined with ritual to sustain 
identity and explain heresy.  Again, Mol’s model of sacralisation as the combined 
product of objectification, commitment, ritual, and myth seems uniquely applicable to 
the early Mormon case.  The objectified narrative, or myth, not only provided a stable 
self-understanding but also neutralised potentially destabilising forces confronted by 
the group by giving an account of the origins of those forces.  For example, in 
addition to the aforementioned passage from the Book of Moses in which Satan is set 
up as humanity’s ultimate nemesis,77 other scriptural texts described the creation of 
the world as well as elaborated on the existing dualism between Satan and righteous 
believers.78  In some cases, there is an almost transparent link between persecution 
and Smith’s eagerness to anchor his system to a cosmological timeline par excellence.  
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For instance, locked in a Missouri jail in 1839 and aware of the violent expulsion of 
his followers from that state, Smith composed a letter betraying both his incensed 
mood concerning the aggressive opposition he faced as well as his confidence in the 
faith-building power of time.  Encouraging his fellow believers, he wrote,  
God shall give unto you knowledge by his Holy Spirit, yea, by the 
unspeakable gift of the Holy Ghost, that has not been revealed since the world 
was until now; Which our forefathers have awaited with anxious expectation 
to be revealed in the last times...A time to come in the which nothing shall be 
withheld, whether there be one God or many gods, they shall be manifest.  All 
thrones and dominions, principalities and powers, shall be revealed and set 
forth upon all who have endured valiantly for the gospel of Jesus 
Christ...According to that which was ordained in the midst of the Council of 
the Eternal God of all other gods before this world was...(emphasis added)79 
Shortly after these words were written, Mormonism entered the Nauvoo period, a time 
of heightened theological creativity.  Instituting temple rituals such as marriage 
sealing, the endowment ceremony, and baptism for the dead, Joseph Smith rounded 
out the sacralisation process by involving Mormon identity in somatic activity.  Once 
again, history played a significant role in each ritual.  The endowment ceremony, for 
instance, served as an opportunity to learn eternal ‘signs and tokens’ originally 
introduced to Adam and necessary for entrance into the celestial realm of the afterlife.   
 Baptism for the dead became increasingly important as well and highlights the 
way in which early Mormonism appealed to past, present, and future for the 
resolution of heresy.  Those who died in the past could be baptised by proxy in the 
present so that they might receive exaltation in the future.  The centrality of this ritual 
belief leads Davies to construct the concept of ‘soteriological lineage’ in order to 
analyse Mormon understandings of salvation.80  Davies, of course, is focused on 
Mormonism at the turn of the twenty-first century, yet his illumination of Mormon 
salvation as a sort of ‘family tree’ in which believers are encouraged to perform 
baptisms for their ancestors as a way of earning exaltation for both themselves and 
those who have already died is valuable for our investigation of early Mormon beliefs.  
Faced with hostility, death, and dissension, Joseph Smith articulated a schema in 
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which historically-rooted distinctiveness was bolstered by obedience and performance 
as well as solidarity-boosting notions of kinship.  Deifying progression was thought to 
be possible only by combining the actions of Adam and Eve in the past with 
commitment in the present.81  We now turn to the latter, exploring the ways by which 
Irenaeus and Joseph Smith made sense of the heresy they faced in the present.  
Connections to the past supplied early Christians and early Mormons with a much-
needed foundation, but the personal heresy faced by each of these nascent movements 
necessitated a more complete worldview in which perseverance and justice were 
commended and the physical world received due attention. 
 
Present 
 It has already been observed that, for Joseph Smith and his followers, the 
material world was spiritualised and the spiritual was materialised.82  In Givens’ 
terms, Mormons tend to ‘sacralise the everyday’.83  Viewing this tension between the 
material and the spiritual as one paradox among many in Mormon theology and 
philosophy, Givens emphasises the challenges faced by Mormons in the twentieth 
century as a result of the group’s struggle to possess and balance opposing categories.  
Ephraim Ericksen, a Mormon philosopher, ultimately concurs: ‘The tension between 
these two principles (the prophetic and the priestly), the dynamic and the 
conservative, the inspiration toward the new and the stabilising and the authoritative 
power of the old, constitutes the problem of twentieth century Mormonism.’84  Yet, 
the early Mormons of the nineteenth century successfully embraced the tension 
between a spiritual realm in which ‘all spirit is matter’ and a mortal life in which ‘all 
those who will not endure chastening...cannot be sanctified.’85  Six years after 
presenting the latter revelation, Joseph Smith reiterated the notion that God allows 
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suffering as a trial of faith.  Detained in a small jail cell, Smith recorded the voice of 
God as the prophet heard it:  
And if thou shouldst be cast into the pit, or into the hands of murderers, and 
the sentence of death passed upon thee; if thou be cast into the deep; if the 
billowing surge conspire against thee; if fierce winds become thine enemy; if 
the heavens gather blackness, and all the elements combine to hedge up the 
way; and above all, if the very jaws of hell shall gape open the mouth wide 
after thee, know thou, my son, that all these things shall give thee experience, 
and shall be for thy good.86 
In addition to compelling imagery, the revelation included a reinforcing 
acknowledgement of the beneficial role of opposition for those who endure in faith.  
Just as he had done before in his ‘Lectures of Faith’, Smith’s Plan formed a direct 
connection between suffering and obedience on the one hand and progress on the 
other. 
 For Irenaeus, too, the logic of the Economy extends to the social heresy faced 
by the faithful.  Explicating his chiliastic eschatology, the Christian bishop 
underscores the function of earthly hardships in delineating righteous and wicked: 
‘...Tribulation is necessary for those who are saved, that having been after a manner 
broken up, and rendered fine, and sprinkled over by the patience of the Word of God, 
and set on fire, they may be fitted for the royal banquet.’87  As indicated in the 
preceding chapter, the persecution of Christians came to be interpreted by believers as 
opportunities to progress, the chance to shoulder the mantle of martyrdom.  Familiar 
with the brutality of such spectacles as well as with ‘Gnostic’ denigration of the 
material, or physical body, Irenaeus not only highlights the importance of obedient 
suffering but of suffering in the flesh.  He taught that the ‘glory of man’ was ‘to 
continue and remain in the service of God’ but supplemented this imperative with a 
focus on Christ’s incarnation and recapitulation as the true theanthropos whose own 
obedient suffering restored humanity’s present advancement toward the ‘royal 
banquet’.88  Accordingly, the ‘glory of God is the living man’ for, as Osborn 
succinctly states, ‘participation is needed because human response is part of [the] 
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economy...’89  Yet, Irenaeus should not be misunderstood as claiming that humanity is 
the only active agent in the salvation process.  In fact, his discussion of humanity’s 
service to God clearly stresses the way in which such service is done in reciprocation 
for God’s continuous bestowal of grace and incorruptibility through his two ‘hands’, 
the Word and the Spirit.90  As a chance to obey and serve, therefore, the earthly life of 
the believer is an indispensible component of the soteriological schema for both 
Irenaeus and Joseph Smith.  As a mortal created in the image of God, one must 
display patient commitment in the face of opposition in order to advance in 
knowledge and spiritual standing. 
 
Mortality, Materiality (salus carnis) 
 Though the significance of the human body and its corresponding mortal life 
is conveyed slightly differently by Irenaeus and Joseph Smith, pride of place is given 
to the imago dei in each of their systems, a notable illustration of each figures aptitude 
in adapting existing theological categories and textual interpretations to suit the 
immediate demands of agonistic experiences.  Irenaeus, for instance, intimates the 
anthropological component of his Economy in response to an overtly hostile ‘Gnostic’ 
belief.  Voicing a distinct vituperation of the material world, Irenaeus’ Valentinian 
opponents not only denied the Incarnation but threatened to invalidate martyrdom.  
For these ‘Gnostics’, matter was thought to be the evil creation of a despotic but 
powerless Demiurge; salvation was escape from one’s physical body.  By implication, 
then, Valentinian dualism between spirit and matter seemingly robbed the 
persecutions suffered by second-century Christians of their power by removing 
spiritual significance from the physical bodies that were harmed.  Against this 
thought, and perfectly demonstrating the overlap between doctrinal and personal 
forms of heresy, Irenaeus insists that the recapitulative work of Jesus Christ was 
effective precisely because the Son experienced all stages of life in the complete form 
and nature of a human.91   
 Perhaps it seems counterintuitive to include Irenaeus’ view of the salvation of 
the flesh (salus carnis) in a discussion of the role of the present within the Economy 
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for after all, his insistence that humanity’s physical nature will receive redemption 
comes as the bishop elucidates his eschatological thoughts and offers the future hope 
of renewed bodies.  However, the expectation of renewed bodies is poignant because 
the future promise points back to a life lived in righteous obedience.  Later, our focus 
turns to the topics of the conquest of death as well as the individual’s identity as an 
active self, operating within the overarching, meaning-conferring schema.  Currently 
focusing on the importance of the present, however, it is vital to note that Irenaeus 
explicitly connects the salvation of the flesh to experiences of opposition as seminal 
events and beliefs contained by the Economy: 
...some who are reckoned among the orthodox go beyond the pre-arranged 
plan for the exaltation of the just, and are ignorant of the methods by which 
they are disciplined beforehand for incorruption, they thus entertain heretical 
opinions.  For the heretics, despising the handiwork of God, and not admitting 
the salvation of the flesh...disallow a resurrection affecting the whole 
man...how can they be wondered at, if again they know nothing as to the plan 
of the resurrection? (emphasis added)92 
Supplementing these comments in the very next chapter, Irenaeus rebukes the 
‘Gnostics’ for being ignorant of ‘God’s dispensations, and of the mystery of the 
resurrection of the just, and of the earthly kingdom which is the commencement of 
incorruption, by means of which...[the] worthy are accustomed gradually to partake 
of the divine nature. (emphasis added)’93  Going even further, he argues that there is 
logic to the schema by which the bodies that were ‘afflicted...being proved in every 
way by suffering’ should be the same bodies in which those martyred are revived 
prior to the final judgment.94  It is, of course, noteworthy that Irenaeus repeatedly 
attaches suffering and worthiness to the bodily resurrection of believers, doing so 
actually shifts the focus from the future to the present as the domain of action and 
efficacy.  In the present, one must demonstrate faith and subservience.  In the present, 
one is persecuted and ‘disciplined for incorruption’.  To operate under this scheme is, 
for Irenaeus, to participate in God’s arrangement for salvation.95  Future hope is 
accorded its motivating place, but the identity derived from historical continuity is 
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fortified by manifest, material meaning in the here and now, a mechanism of 
resolution particularly well-suited for those facing death at the hands of social 
competitors. 
 As an example of such a persecuted group, it is not surprising that the early 
Mormons eventually integrated physical, mortal life into their schema as well.  As his 
community journeyed from state to state, facing hostility and violent rejection of one 
degree or another in each location, Joseph Smith’s teachings on the imago dei 
evolved.  In the mid-1830s, the Mormon leader stated that the Father was a 
‘personage of spirit, glory, and power’ and added that Jesus was ‘made or fashioned 
like unto man.’96  A few lines later, Smith said that those who obey God’s commands 
will become ‘joint heirs with Jesus Christ’, thus ‘transformed into the same image or 
likeness’.97  Yet, as Hale notes, the doctrine changed by 1843, supplanted by the 
emerging notion of eternal progression.98  That year, Smith recorded a revelation 
explicitly affirming the corporeality of the Father and the Son.99  The Father was no 
longer a ‘personage of spirit’, and transformation into the divine image was no longer 
relegated to the future. 
 Smith closed the distance, temporally and ontologically, between past and 
future.  The God who created the world was an exalted man, and the humans who 
populated that world shared the physicality of God.  Addressing Mormon spirituality 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Davies offers an insightful expression of 
this dual proximity to the divine which is just as valid for understanding early 
Mormon doctrine as it blossomed in the 1840s: 
To speak of God’s body is not just some metaphorical reference for Latter-day 
Saints but is an expression of the profoundest symbolic expression of Mormon 
spirituality, for in it the Saint acknowledges a likeness with God, a likeness 
that is rooted in their ultimate kinship and speaks of the possibility of what lies 
open to one’s own destiny.100 
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In this way, Smith’s Plan of Salvation extended beyond historical narrative and future 
reward.  The present life was where the two touched ends, a crucial episode in which 
the human figure seized the chance to learn from experience and almost literally walk 
in the footsteps of God along the path of exaltation.   
 
Participation and Expectation 
 The actions and choices made during one’s life, however, were expected to aid 
the process of salvation for both Irenaeus and Joseph Smith.  A willingness to die was 
not the only form of patient obedience effective within the schema.  In fact, the free 
agency of humanity was central for each of the soteriological schemas.  Justin set a 
precedent by asserting, in response to persecution at the hands of unjust leaders, 
‘Indeed, every creature is capable, by nature, of vice and of virtue.  Nor would any 
action of theirs be worthy of praise unless they had the power to incline to either.’101  
For Justin, such power was slowly and partially acquired in this life.  Likewise, 
Irenaeus relates free will and the ability to choose good to humanity’s gradual 
possession of the ‘likeness’ of God.102  He explains that individuals possess 
knowledge of good and evil, the former consisting of obedience to God and the latter 
consisting of disobedience to God.  Through experience and discipline, the mind 
learns to preserve what is good, with the desirable consequence of becoming ‘a 
perfect work of God.’103  In Irenaeus’ view, then, ‘image and likeness’ = free will = 
participation (faith and obedience).   
 This active involvement of the individual in the Economy strikes a direct blow 
to the ‘Gnostic’ system Irenaeus contests, wherein only those void of true gnosis are 
required to employ good works in order to have any hope of future rewards.104  This 
form of ‘Gnosticism’ was ultimately deterministic, Valentinus categorised all of 
humanity into three decisive types: 1) Unbelievers immersed in fleshly nature, 2) 
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Christians who live by faith and works, and 3) True Gnostics who possess the 
knowledge needed to bypass the lower aeons and return to the Pleroma.105  The 
‘elect’, those constituting the third category, were not required to engage in righteous 
acts.  Even more pointedly, Irenaeus’ model of salvation entails a conspicuous 
measure of morality and, a fortiori, looks ahead to a time of judgment for the 
injustices that transpire in the present.  In the same way that Irenaeus vindicates the 
martyrs by making physical bodies a prominent part of the Economy, he offers a sort 
of explanatory condemnation of all forms of social heresy by highlighting the 
importance of human choice and righteousness in the process of becoming perfected.  
To obey the commands of God is to choose good over evil, and to choose good is to 
embody the identity offered by Christianity.   
 Bowman identifies an analogous theme in the Book of Mormon itself: ‘The 
history Joseph Smith learned from these [Book of Mormon] stories linked the success 
of civilisations to their righteousness.’106  In its epic tale of humanity’s oscillation 
between good and evil, one obvious message of the text is that ‘success 
comes...through commitment to God and humility before the commandments of 
Jesus.’107  Accordingly, in one of Joseph Smith’s earliest revelations, the voice of 
Jesus Christ states, ‘And it must needs be that the devil should tempt the children of 
men, or they could not be agents unto themselves, for if they never should have bitter, 
they could not know the sweet.’108  Then, in a somewhat desultory section of 
revelations, one reads,  
No man receiveth a fulness unless he keepeth [God’s] commandments. He that 
keepeth his commandments receiveth truth and light, until he is glorified in 
truth, and knoweth all things...Behold, here is the agency of man, and here is 
the condemnation of man; because that which was from the beginning is 
plainly manifest unto them, and they receive not the light.109 
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Again, agency allows obedience to governing and beneficial precepts.  In the early 
Mormon case, however, those commands ultimately became cosmological rather than 
divine.  In his attempt to resolve heresy, Joseph Smith dissolved the ontological 
boundary separating divine authority from base humanity and, in its place, formulated 
a system of eternal advancement which perfectly reflects Berger’s notion of 
cosmisation discussed in Chapter Two.  As was mentioned earlier, the voice of God 
did not resound loud enough for the early Latter-day Saints; their exigent 
circumstances created a need for an objective, and even more incontrovertible, 
authority.  As the early 1840s arrived, Smith began constructing a soteriological 
schema in which objective supremacy was assigned to the cosmos.  Agency was not 
human; it was almost a natural law and the means by which individuals could exhibit 
commitment to the community and its method of progress.   
 Accordingly, Smith instituted a number of key rituals and ordinances during 
his last two years as prophet.  In 1842, the Mormon founder invited nine men to the 
upper room of his Illinois store and ushered them through a new ritual in which he 
expanded earlier rites of anointings and washings by incorporating Masonic gestures 
and a narrative set in the Garden of Eden in order to more firmly link Mormon 
priesthood with the hope of divine communion.110  In the ceremony, participants were 
given undergarments with important symbols cut into the fabric.111  This ritual garb 
was then to be worn under everyday clothing from that point forward.  The function 
of these garments should not be overlooked in relation to our discussion of obedience, 
commitment, and the mortal life.  The ceremony integrated historical narrative, 112 
physical embodiment through Masonic motions and the donning of the garments, and 
the emerging understanding of a celestial level of afterlife in which individuals 
receive ‘all that the Father has’.  Also, the rite served as a chance to advance in 
knowledge; the ‘keys of the priesthood’ were received during the ceremony, signs and 
gestures needed for passage into celestial glory.  Those who received the ‘keys of the 
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priesthood’ during the temple endowment ceremony entered into the vital core of 
Mormonism, from periphery to nucleus.  Thus, the unique identity conferred by the 
narrative received a social intensification when Smith married it to a ritual in which 
secret knowledge was conveyed.  Participants, therefore, left the event with advanced 
knowledge and a physical garment as a reminder, both resulting from the adherent’s 
obedience to and participation in the ordinances of the church.  Holy but tangible, 
historical but ever-present; the temple garments conserved and strengthened identity 
through this integration of individual faith and institutional dynamism.   
 The next year, in 1843, Joseph Smith offered two revelations which would 
permanently alter Mormon spirituality.  He instituted the ‘covenant of marriage’, a 
belief and an accompanying ritual meant to ‘seal’ husband and wife together for 
eternity.113  This notion of eternal marriage was introduced alongside Smith’s first 
official endorsement of polygamy.114  With these new ordinances came a greater and 
unequivocal, imperative, viz., that believers had no hope of exaltation without 
participation in the rites of the church.  In fact, Smith’s revelations explicitly connect 
observance of the marriage rite with the chance to ‘be gods’.115  By combining the 
precedent for polygamy set by Abraham and the chance to progress toward divinity in 
the same revelation, Smith seamlessly blended the past, present, and future in his 
pronouncements concerning marriage.  Although he may imbue the historical context 
with an overly optimistic mood, Bowman’s illumination of the original, social 
importance of these marital ordinances for the early Mormons comes close to 
expressing our own notion: ‘The promise of sealing was that these familial 
relationships could become stronger than the whirlwinds of economy and society that 
tore them apart and would even, in the end, outlast death.’116  Not only did the beliefs 
attached to the new rituals help support the system of progression developed by 
Smith, but additional rites meant additional requirements for each adherent, and each 
participatory act was an exercise in strengthening group bonds and consolidating 
power against the heresy that continually threatened to erode solidarity.  The Plan, 
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just as was true for Irenaeus’ Economy, provided purpose by adjoining creation to 
redemption through participation.  As Bowman articulately states, this was a 
movement ‘through mortality and to divinity, gained through the experience of mortal 
life and through entering into the sort of holy relationships that the ordinances 
created.’117 
 
Future 
 That path toward divinity, however, appears to have no end for Irenaeus or for 
Joseph Smith.  The present spills into the future as both parties emphasise the salvific 
efficacy of the process over and above any sense of a final realisation.  As we explore 
soteriological schemas as products of the dialectic between experiences of heresy and 
emerging doctrines, it is important to recognise the permeability of that marker 
separating ‘now’ from ‘later’.  In our key passage from Irenaeus, outlining the 
Economy of Salvation, one reads that human growth occurs over ‘a long period of 
existence’ and ‘a long course of ages’.118  To possess the quality of the Uncreated, he 
says, one must continue as a being for a long period.  In the same way, Joseph Smith 
told his followers,  
But it will be a great while after you have passed through the veil before you 
will have learned [the principles of exaltation].  It is not all to be 
comprehended in this world; it will be a great work to learn our salvation and 
exaltation even beyond the grave.119 
We have already seen that Irenaeus and Joseph Smith understood the physical world 
and human flesh as crucial ingredients in their soteriological schemas, seeing the 
mortal life as an opportunity to progress through obedience and faithful resilience.  
Encountering hostility and social marginalisation may have readily cemented this 
rather positive outlook on the reparatory potential of perseverance and suffering, but 
those same agonistic experiences may have obscured the future as a wholly adequate 
recompense for the socially injurious punches thrown by a disapproving environment.  
However, the future was still assigned an important function within the schema as a 
period of vindication, manifested as both the reinstatement of justice and the ultimate 
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conquest of death for the righteous.  Given the distinctive characteristics of the early 
Mormon’s nineteenth-century American context, it is particularly unsurprising that 
they exuded high esteem for the future.  The new republic’s preoccupation with, and 
elevated hopes for, its place in the world still ringing in their heads, the early 
followers of Joseph Smith inaugurated a religious movement patently indebted to the 
millenarian fever spreading across the country.  Subverting the norm, however, Smith 
‘asserted that the Mormons alone were the chosen people, not the American public, 
and that their development of a new social order, amid the apparent disorder of early 
nineteenth-century America, would hasten the Millennium.’120  Hallwas and Launius 
add that this ‘mythic perspective, which was held as self-evident truth by the early 
Mormons, bonded them to each other and explained their lives; it was the foundation 
of their identity.’121  Although it may be more accurate to say that this regard for the 
future and Mormonism’s role in hurrying its arrival laid a sort of cornerstone for an 
emerging LDS identity, there can be little doubt that the anticipation of a paradisiacal 
future inherited from Millenarianism lingered as a steady flame during the years of 
early Mormon doctrinal development. 
 
Justice and Vindication 
 Fundamental to that developing notion of the future was its assurance of 
ultimate justice and redress.  Perhaps it is fitting that persecuted groups seek 
reparation and equality in their conceptualisations of the future.  By placing such 
ideals just beyond arm’s reach in the hereafter, the opposed and oppressed achieve 
alleviation of present hardship by interpreting experiences in relation to an optimal 
end.  In other words, and without venturing into the labyrinth of psychological 
apparatuses at work, those groups that encounter the sorts of heresy that we have 
discussed might be expected to hold an ideal future as a kind of persuasive prize 
toward which both self and group must continually advance.  Certainly, both the 
second-century Christians and the early Mormons expressed hope in a just future.  
Tout court, trusting in Christ’s second-coming as the initiation of a period of 
judgment in which the righteous are rewarded and the wicked are condemned, is far 
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from unique to Irenaeus or to Joseph Smith.  Both figures also inherited notions and 
texts that left unmistakable impressions on their developing beliefs.  For instance, 
each presumably had access to and perhaps read scriptural passages such as Psalm 
103:6 in which God is praised for bringing about ‘righteousness and justice for all the 
oppressed.’  In the case of the second century, Grant cogently argues that Christian 
writers of the time, such as Theophilus, reflected Stoic concepts of God as the ‘father 
of the just’ and ‘punisher of the impious’, exemplifying the influence of other 
philosophical schools on early Christian expectations of future judgment.122  It is 
significant, however, that Irenaeus asserts, ‘...A share is allotted to all by the Father, 
according as each person is or shall be worthy.’123  Even this claim echoes Justin, the 
latter stating that ‘each man receives eternal punishment or salvation according to the 
merits of his actions.’124   
 Still, Irenaeus articulates a more unique notion of final justice when, in the 
final chapter of his five-volume work, he suggests three gradations of reward for the 
righteous based on their earthly, meritorious actions: 
Then those who are judged worthy of life in the heavens will arrive there, that 
is, in the heavens, others will enjoy the delights of paradise, and still others 
will possess the splendour of the city...Such will be the difference in dwelling 
for those who have produced a hundred for one, sixty for one, and thirty for 
one.  The first will be raised into heaven, the second will live in paradise, the 
third will dwell in the city...Such, say the presbyters, the disciples of the 
apostles, are the order and the rhythm of those who are saved, as well as the 
degrees through which they progress...125 
Here, Irenaeus expresses a belief that bears undeniable resemblance to the tripartite 
division of the afterlife promulgated by Joseph Smith.  Davies writes that the 
significance of the three ‘degrees of glory’ in Mormonism ‘results from the dual wish 
to reward all according to their deeds, but also to differentiate between Mormon and 
Gentile’. 126  Without a doubt, Irenaeus is also attempting to establish righteousness as 
a group boundary marker, a litmus test for membership in the genuine Christian 
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collective in contradistinction to unrighteous ‘Gnostic’ movements.  Beyond that, 
though, the second-century bishop underscores the importance of earthly behaviour 
within the Economy by linking incentive with the ‘order and rhythm’ of salvation.127  
Even though there is the potential for tension between the significance of the present 
and the glory of the future, it is balanced and harmonised in Irenaeus’ schema – it is 
true that present actions have future consequences, but heavenly compensation in the 
future also reflects the degree of progress over the course of one’s life.  There is a 
sense that to grow in one’s ability to receive God now is to prepare oneself more fully 
for an eternity of just returns later. 
 A rather confusing revelation from 1833 presents an early Mormon 
understanding of justice and future reward.128  Believers are encouraged to remain 
passive and honourable when faced with danger.  With each successive attack, the 
Mormons are reassured that passivity will be rewarded even more abundantly in the 
future, and the decision to spare one’s enemy is designated a ‘righteous’ choice.  This 
particular revelation is enlightening because in it we encounter Smith’s nearly 
incessant concern with violent persecution against his community as well as a 
preference for passivity encouraged with the enticement of future redress.  Even as the 
revelation appears to justify force used as self-defence (‘if he has sought thy life, and 
thy life is endangered by him; thine enemy is in thine hands, and thou art justified’), 
the general message seems to hinge on a sense of God’s ultimate, and eternal, justice.  
Much later, when one might expect the Joseph Smith of the 1840s to turn his 
complete attention to resistance of the increasingly violent heresy faced by his 
followers, he wrote a letter providing directions for baptisms of the dead and 
reminding the Latter-day Saints that all righteous believers in history were persecuted; 
even so, ‘for all of this there is a reward in heaven.’129  Much as Irenaeus had done 
centuries earlier, Smith held the present and the future in balance with regards to each 
period’s import in the Plan of Salvation.  His reluctance to commit fully to a high 
view of the mortal life in place of future hope is quite striking given the prophet’s 
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increasing focus on deification and ritual knowledge in the months preceding his 
death.  Such hesitation not only reveals Smith’s humanity by illuminating his position 
alongside (rather than above) other early Mormons who sought order by any means 
available in the midst of heresy, but it also points to the power of future goals within 
soteriological schemas for sustaining the stabilising mood of hope.   
 
The Conquest of Death 
 Hope, for those whose identity partially results from a martyrdom mentality, 
means more than trust in some future episode of judgment, it means that those 
physical bodies that have been slain unjustly will not have suffered in vain.  Keeping 
in mind the present concern with soteriological schemas as overarching frames of 
reference, Mol incisively illuminates the challenge posed by death: 
A system of meaning in which norms, values, permanency, and institutional 
arrangements are combined arises as a response to the need for unity and 
permanence.  Death has to be fitted in the system, as it threatens to break 
down the unity of social relationships and the permanence of norms, quite 
apart, of course, from the threat to personal physical wholeness.  And so death, 
as all the other ‘breaks’ in the social pattern (such as birth, marriage, the 
change from adolescence to adulthood), is everywhere carefully absorbed in a 
system of interpretation.130 
We have already mentioned a number of the primary methods used by second-century 
Christians and early Mormons to rectify the deleterious social effect of death.  In the 
preceding chapter, it was noted that Joseph Smith entered an extended period of 
personal crisis after the death of his brother Alvin.  Just as many Christians have been 
plagued by consternation over the question of salvation for those who lived prior to 
Jesus’ ministry, so Joseph sought reassurance that his brother was given a fair 
opportunity to embrace the truth needed for exaltation.  As the Mormon leader 
introduced new rituals and beliefs, arguing for the permanency of spirit-matter and the 
worth of the mortal body, he constructed a system that bestowed ‘power and authority 
over death’.131  Facing the dual motivators of ‘Gnostic’ beliefs and martyrdoms in 
Gaul, Irenaeus articulated a related schema in which the flesh of humanity would be 
restored because it was in the flesh that the righteous persevered and in the flesh that 
Christ suffered and died. 
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 That being said, Joseph Smith employed a number of other strategies for 
confronting the deadly heresy that seemed to await the Latter-day Saints at every turn.  
In the same revelation listed in the previous section, promising a future reward for 
those who are persecuted, Smith explicated stipulations for baptisms for the dead.132  
In addition to extending the potential for exaltation to those who died before Smith 
finished restoring God’s principles, the new rite connected past, present, and future by 
placing directive power in the hands of worthy adherents who could now utilise the 
mortal life to impact the future of past relatives.  The early Mormon Plan of Salvation, 
however, took this sort of potent form late in Smith’s tenure as group leader.  Twelve 
years before laying out the particulars of baptism by proxy, Smith recorded the Book 
of Moses, an Old Testament supplement centred on the biblical character of the same 
name.  Here, Moses hears God say, ‘For behold, this is my work and my glory – to 
bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man.’133  Yet, God then proceeds to 
describe primeval events, effectively leaving the topic of eternal life as an insinuation 
that such an end-goal informed the entire process of creation.  For the early Mormons, 
the implication that God ordered history whilst maintaining an awareness of 
humanity’s ultimate need for immortality was undoubtedly comforting, but its open-
endedness in the Book of Moses is starkly evident when contrasted with Smith’s 
teachings in the 1840s. 
 The Book of Moses does, in a different way, illuminate Joseph Smith’s early 
alertness to the threat of death.  Enoch emerges as a major character in the book, one 
of only two Old Testament figures who avoided death altogether by being removed 
from earth by God in return for their faithfulness.134  Indeed, the incorporation of 
Enoch into the Mormon text becomes more revealing when one recognises that both 
Enoch and Elijah receive frequent mention throughout Smith’s revelations.  The 
earliest of these, for example, cite Enoch as one separated from earth and preserved 
by God for a future day.135  Although we can only speculate as to Smith’s motivations 
for doing so, it seems highly significant that the Mormon prophet began to refer to 
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himself as both Elijah and Enoch in the revelations presented to his followers.136  
Smith seems to have had some affinity with various Biblical characters, for instance 
with the Joseph of the Old Testament, but invoking the names of Elijah and Enoch 
must have conveyed a twofold message: Smith was a trusted and faithful servant, and 
the Mormon Church restored the ancient link connecting such faithfulness to the 
defeat of death.   
 It is important to note that those are the same two points highlighted by 
Irenaeus in his own references to Elijah and Enoch.  Of the former, Irenaeus says that 
he ‘was caught up in the substance of the natural form; thus exhibiting...the 
assumption of those who are spiritual.’137  Enoch is also mentioned as an individual 
who was ‘translated in the same body in which he pleased [God], thus pointing out by 
anticipation the translation of the just.’138  Irenaeus gave death an important function 
in the Economy as God’s logical answer to Adam’s sin, a necessary repercussion 
capable of reminding humanity of their inability to cope with immortality prior to 
progressing in God’s arranged plan;139 however, he did not hesitate to posit the 
existence of divine power capable of rewarding the righteous and justifying the 
disenfranchised.  Perhaps much more could be said of the way in which Irenaeus uses 
immortality (or the conquest of death) as a thread tying together his concerns with the 
regeneration of flesh, the slow maturation of humanity, and God’s bestowal of gifts as 
a loving recompense for obedience.  Indeed, the bishop’s unique doctrine of Christ’s 
recapitulation as a second Adam who, demonstrating exemplary subservience, 
knowingly marches toward death in order to overcome it and restore humanity’s 
likeness to God, seems particularly poignant in the light of our notion of social heresy 
as religious opposition even against the physical wellbeing of those opposed.140  As 
Mol predicts in the aforementioned quotation, death demands interpretation, and 
Irenaeus unequivocally elucidates its pivotal place within the soteriological schema.   
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 Space does not permit a fuller investigation of such motifs; nevertheless, it is 
important to acknowledge that death predictably permeates Irenaeus’ writings, from 
the infantile acts of the first humans in the Garden of Eden to the hope of 
incorruptibility in the eschaton.  For the early Latter-day Saints, too, victory over 
death is a conspicuously pervasive notion.  As Davies observes, ‘Whatever 
psychological motivations influenced Joseph Smith, the obvious social fact is that 
early Mormons generated a symbolic, ritual and social world that fully engaged with 
death in a way that led to a sense of its conquest.’141  When Smith gave his final 
speech in front of approximately ten thousand of his followers in June 1844, he fused 
perseverance, courage, and group identity with an expectation of eternal life and final 
justice by blatantly relating opposition to deification: ‘Do not seek to save your lives, 
for he that is afraid to die for the truth, will lose eternal life.  Hold out to the end, and 
we shall be resurrected and become like Gods...’(emphasis added).142  This revealing 
statement supports our overall contention that heresy, when recognised by a religious 
collective, often requires resolution by that opposed group, resulting in the latter’s 
formulation of a soteriological schema in which narrative is supplemented by 
behavioural admonishments and the future promise of godlike virtues.  Smith’s 
speech also hints at the significance of both group and individual identity within the 
belief system – each believer being required to exhibit absolute commitment to the 
collective task of protecting and preserving truth, roles engendered during (and for) 
the procedure of resolving heresy. This resolution process is remarkably observable in 
the case of Joseph Smith, and Barlow seems to grasp this fact perfectly when he 
describes the outcome of the Mormon founder’s schema-constructing efforts: 
As he built this kingdom, ‘connecting’ terms increasingly laced the Prophet’s 
speech, some biblically sponsored, some borrowed from Masonry and 
elsewhere: ‘kin’ and ‘kindred’; ‘sociality,’ ‘friendship,’ and ‘association’; 
‘covenants’ forming eternal alliances beyond traditional Christian notions; 
‘linking’ and ‘welding’ together the generations; ‘binding’ and ‘sealing’ 
spouses and families; ‘forging’ a great ‘chain’ of connections; ‘truth’ as 
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indivisible (past, present, future, whatever its source, circumscribed into ‘one 
great whole’); the course of God and man as ‘one eternal round’.143 
Both the community and its members, then, received their proper and interconnected 
place in the Plan of Salvation.  Consequently, our analysis now turns to those 
identities and motivating social roles within the soteriological schemas. 
 
Group and Self in the Soteriological Schema 
 Summarising historian Gary Wills’ use of the term ‘ultra-supernaturalism’, 
Gordon Shepherd and Gary Shepherd say that it refers to religious cultures that 
promote ‘a miraculous rather than a naturalistic worldview by emphasising the 
permeability of the boundary separating the spirit world from the natural world. 
(original emphasis)’144  Seeing ultra-supernaturalism at work in Mormon origins, 
Shepherd and Shepherd agree with our own comments above, noting that such 
‘beliefs serve to explain virtually every aspect of daily life...’145  Going further, these 
social scientists argue that ultra-supernatural belief acts as a ‘lens’ for interpreting 
social conflicts as events in a cosmic battle between anthropomorphised spirits of 
good and evil.146  As is elucidated throughout the present chapter, both second-
century Christians and early Mormons appear to have developed such interpretive 
frameworks as a means of resolving religious opposition.  If Shepherd and Shepherd 
are correct that these interpretations often entail the dramatisation of conflict wherein 
humans are given a role, then it is important to identify and discuss the identities 
involved in both the early Christian Economy and the early Mormon Plan.   
 The role of the individual believer within the soteriological schema is, in some 
ways, more readily detected than the function of the group itself.  Speaking in terms 
of progress and advancement, language we subsume under the category of deification, 
Irenaeus and Joseph Smith propounded systems patently predisposed to personal 
application.  Indeed, the identity of each community member is helpfully assayed by 
employing the concept of deification as the primary soteriological process by which 
every adherent receives meaning and an increasingly durable identity, the 
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soteriological self.  However, the order and arrangement of salvation extends to, and 
requires, the collective community.  Not only is a like-minded social unit necessary 
for legitimation of the ideas capable of resolving the shared agonistic experiences, but 
the solidarity engendered by heresy finds easy harmony in a common mission, the 
latter often emerging out of the group’s freshly-expressed narrative.   
 
Mission and Knowledge 
 Recalling the dialectic between adaptation and identity (stability) outlined by 
Mol, and believing that these two historical examples maintained a balance in that 
dialectic, it may be beneficial to regard our preceding analysis of the two 
soteriological schemas as an exploration of adaptation (or resolution) and the 
following paragraphs as a brief note on stabilising identity.  In much the same way 
that the motif of death permeates soteriological schemas in the latter’s endeavour to 
resolve heresy, mission and knowledge seem to stand behind much of the purpose 
derived by opposed religious groups in their espousal of those schemas.  In other 
words, the two concepts of mission and knowledge are keys for comprehending group 
identity in the complex soteriologies of Irenaeus and Joseph Smith.  For the latter, in 
particular, the two terms go beyond solely heuristic purposes, cropping up in common 
idioms of the group.  Of course, in the case of Irenaeus, the terms themselves appear 
less frequently but are more noticeably linked to one another; one critical mission of 
the church is to preserve knowledge in the form of true teaching.147 
 In summarising the first four books of Against Heresies, Irenaeus says of his 
writings against the ‘Gnostics’, 
...We have thus made known the truth and proclaimed the message of the 
church, which the prophets had already announced (as we have shown), which 
Christ perfected, which the apostles transmitted, from whom the church 
received it and, alone keeping it safe throughout the world, delivers to its 
children.148 
This statement reveals a great deal about Irenaeus’ perspective on the church’s 
identity and role within the Economy as the guardian of truth, but it also serves as a 
fitting example of the way such a group mission stems from historical narrative as 
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well as betraying something of a social exclusivity among second-century Christians.  
Although we have chosen to give little attention to the notion of boundary markers in 
relation to social heresy, it is worth underlining the restrictedness included in 
Irenaeus’ statement.  His explication of the regula fidei and its preservation 
communicates an important idea to his opponents as well as to his fellow believers.  
The teachings he represents are the truth because they have been transmitted in the 
church through the ages.  Thus, the elitism of the ‘Gnostics’ is combated with 
comparable but distinctive claims, and the societal heresy of the pagans (accusing 
Christianity of being a superstition) is also answered with an unequivocal appeal to 
history as authority.  It is implied, then, that Christians are to be the upholders of right 
knowledge, an especially compelling notion when understood in the original, second-
century context.  Interpreting the mission of the church in this way was to fight fire 
with fire, denying the ‘Gnostics’ their very identity. 
 Mission, for the early Mormons, amounted to an obligatory objective.  From 
the outset, Mormons were urged to evangelise and ‘gather’ the elect in order to hasten 
Christ’s return.  Initially, this mission entailed relocating converts to the American 
Zion, a place chosen by God as the New Jerusalem.  After only two years, however, 
Joseph Smith produced a revelation that spoke of the LDS mission in different 
terms.149  Members were no longer to think of Zion as a single gathering place of 
God’s chosen people but were to establish ‘stakes’ of Zion, literally spreading their 
message over vast geographical expanses.  Based on Isaiah 54:2, ‘Enlarge the place of 
your tent, stretch your tent curtains wide, do not hold back; lengthen your cords, 
strengthen your stakes,’ this new revelation and the others that followed gave the 
early Mormons a sense of purpose coupled with a more flexible definition of group 
success.150  As heresy intensified in the form of outsider hostility leading to scattered 
segments of believers, the movement maintained a joint commitment to the mission 
by transforming their expectations of a literal gathering into the figurative conception 
of a tent with numerous stakes – itself a striking portent of the all-encompassing 
soteriological schema that would arise to supply meaning for every facet of life. 
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 If Mol is correct in his postulation that charismatic leaders facilitate 
conversion by supplanting old identities with new ones,151 then the success of early 
Mormon mission activity may point to Joseph Smith’s ability to offer his followers a 
deeper sense of meaning.  The notoriously ethereal topic of charisma is improved by 
Davies’ treatment of ‘super-plausibility’, a concept briefly noted in Chapter One.  As 
a transcendent, supra-mundane form of knowledge that supersedes that which was 
previously thought plausible, super-plausibility is that supreme sacred knowing 
offered by charismatic religious leaders.152  With such a notion in mind, the 
relationship of conversion to knowledge becomes clear.  The early Mormon mission, 
as much as it was an effort to convert others, was the bestowal of sacred knowledge 
and, in that way, a diffusion of Smith’s charisma among those involved in spreading 
LDS teachings.   
 Thus, a large portion of early Mormon identity centred on the issue of 
knowledge.  Taylor notes the predictability of this fact by arguing that Smith’s forays 
into folk magic during his early years stemmed from a longing for divine knowledge 
that, after the founding of Mormonism, extended into the Plan of Salvation where 
humanity is to ‘advance in knowledge and power by dealing with matter on the 
earth.’153  In fact, Mormonism’s founder refers to knowledge and learning with 
regards to progress and ultimate reward so many times that it would be difficult to list 
them all.  In 1833, for example, he taught that those who obey God will be ‘glorified 
in truth and knoweth all things.’154  In 1843, he simply said, ‘It is impossible for a 
man to be saved in ignorance.’155  Again, in his King Follett sermon, Smith repeatedly 
tied knowledge to salvation and, in more than one instance, to deification.  One must 
recall, though, that the obtainment of knowledge was not restricted to personal 
endeavour but was accessed through the church.  With the institution of temple 
ceremonies and his ongoing status as an active prophet, Smith circumscribed the 
sources of salvific knowledge and underscored the church’s place as the restored 
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conduit of such sacred wisdom.  As the nucleus of the community, both spiritually 
and socially, the temple came to be a sort of axis mundi, controlling access to the 
rituals and corresponding knowledge needed for exaltation.   
 Of course, the possession of truth requires more than mere ritual and 
prophecy; it almost intuitively demands moral rectitude.  For example, one thinks of 
the notion of magisterium in Catholicism, a concept that blends the authority to 
instruct with papal infallibility.  In this regard, it is noteworthy that the early 
Mormons always perceived themselves as innocent; their own aggressive actions 
typically downplayed, and their opponents’ actions often exaggerated.  Their 
martyrdom mentality implied a certain moral quality that abetted the Mormon identity 
as purveyors of saving truth.  This moral component was woven like a thread through 
time, tying nineteenth-century Mormons to models of righteousness such as Abraham 
and Moses.  Innocence, in accordance with other virtues, supported the mission of the 
collective and suggested to those on the inside that nothing stood in the way of their 
advancement.  After all, to grow in knowledge was to approach godhood:  
We believe that God will continue to give revelations...until [the Saints] come 
in possession of all the truth there is in existence, and are made perfect in 
knowledge...When they are made perfect in one, and become like their 
Saviour, then [the Saints] will be in possession of all knowledge, wisdom, and 
intelligence: then all things will be theirs, whether principalities or powers, 
thrones or dominions, and, in short, then they will be filled with all the 
fullness of God.156 
Deification: Place and Progress 
 In order to comprehend the Economy as an ordered soteriology, it is important 
to return to our key passage from Irenaeus with which this discussion began.  The 
above sketch of Irenaeus’ soteriological schema surveys its organisation and intimates 
a form of group purpose prompted by the system, but Irenaeus also claims that God’s 
Economy enables ‘man, a created and organised being’ to be ‘rendered after the 
image and likeness of the uncreated God’.  Thus, a closer look at individual identity is 
imperative; those whose lives receive meaning through the stability of the Economy 
inevitably take on the unique contours of the scenario that engendered the system as 
well as the self-definition imparted by the soteriology.  Our study began by citing 
Irenaeus’ poignant preface to his final book in Against Heresies.  There, the reader is 
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encouraged to participate in the refutation of heresy ‘with the help of the celestial 
faith and following the only sure and true Teacher...who because of his immeasurable 
love became what we are in order to make us what he is. (emphasis added).157  
Combining this statement with Irenaeus’ other comments on the nature of humanity 
(the possession of free will and the need for maturation), it is immediately apparent 
that this second-century Christian leader espouses a form of deification, a system of 
progress that is the outcome of human ontology and Christ’s recapitulative work 
within the divinely-sanctioned Economy.158  What is more, individual faith seems to 
complement individual progress as a means for combating heresy.   
 Acknowledging the difference between our own sociologically-informed 
definition of heresy and the original usage of Irenaeus, whilst intentionally setting 
aside the theological/philosophical debates concerning different forms of deification, 
we see a connection between the social disturbances of religious opposition and the 
postulation of individual progress aided by commitment.  This is as true for the early-
Mormon case as it is for second-century Christians.  Watkins is correct to describe 
Joseph Smith’s King Follett Discourse as the apogee of the prophet’s thoughts on 
‘God, man, and godhood’.159  The sermon explicitly affirmed the potential for humans 
to become gods, the culmination of Smith’s teachings on spirit as matter, pre-
existence, and a multitude of gods.  Our final concern, however, is with the personal 
meaning that such an idea extends to believers.   
 
Deification, Asceticism, and the Soteriological Self 
 To posit the divinization of the self is to choose one response to overt 
opposition and persecution.  This may stand in contrast to some forms of asceticism in 
which the physical self is denied, but both are methods by which one transcends the 
agonistic circumstance.  The ascetic acts upon his or herself, hoping to manipulate the 
environment by denying natural tendencies and drives, thus rendering external stimuli 
impotent.  In contrast, the unique religious identity conferred on those within the 
soteriological schema, with its emphasis on world affirmation and the integral role of 
the material for the achievement of deifying potential, tends to be acted upon by the 
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environment.  One acknowledges the heretical and responds by assigning value to the 
experiences for the physical and spiritual advancement of the individual.  This is not a 
passive orientation; the soteriological self still acts on and engages the world.  The 
difference here is that the material realm is seen as an opportunity to participate in a 
salvific maturation process.  In order to resolve the conflicts of life, one need not 
reject the mortal bodies or biological drives but must view these as sacred rather than 
corrupt.  This is not to say that all, or any, physical impulses must be indulged; in fact, 
it is to propose quite the opposite.  Sexual desires, for example, may need to be 
controlled in order to continue the eternal progress of the self, but those desires, far 
from evil, are also understood to be cosmologically or divinely legitimated.   
 Human reason, free will, and intelligence (whether understood as attributes 
made possible by providential mechanisms such as divine grace, Christ’s ministry, the 
sacraments, and the Holy Spirit  or as immutable components of a cosmological 
arrangement) receive emphasis as the means for resisting such temptations and 
choosing righteous behaviour.  It is this path that is emphasised over and above the 
end itself.  Asceticism also entails a sort of journey, the continual process of self-
denial.  Again, this process is perceived as essential for the resolution of conflict and 
increasing nearness to the divine.  A key distinction, however, is in the emphasis of 
means versus ends.  While asceticism often highlights the ends, groups with complex 
soteriological schemas entailing individual deification often emphasise the maturation 
process itself.  This highlights one of the most common misconceptions concerning 
groups possessing divinization doctrines.  They rarely focus on the attainment of 
godhood propagated by these doctrines, preferring to utilise the doctrine for other 
purposes, such as providing group meaning, mission, and morals.  The individual 
must act righteously in order to progress.  The parameters of what constitutes 
‘righteous’ are determined by institutional leaders in the form of canonised texts, 
official pronouncements, and inherited traditions; though such parameters are 
efficacious for behavioural governance because the group as a collective provides 
legitimation. Thus, the soteriological schema, as a cosmological and objectively 
authoritative definition of reality, subsumes or supersedes the pre-existing 
interpretations (whether profane or sacred, secular or religious) and becomes the 
plausible basis for social relation.  As one’s identity often results from interaction 
with others, existence within a complex soteriological schema results in a 
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soteriological self, an overtly sacred identity made possible by the substructure of 
shared belief in natural and spiritual progress. 
 This focus on the present moralistic journey of the believer is by no means an 
innovation of the second (and certainly not the nineteenth) century.  In fact, Straw’s 
words on early Christian martyrdom quoted in Chapter Three appear all the more 
relevant here: ‘Consonant with the classical honour code and its ideal of the good 
death, a martyr’s confrontation with death distilled the essence of his or her actions 
and worth.’160  The Greek hero was at least partially venerated because of a certain 
life lived.  Martyrdom, likewise, did not point forward to eschatological hope but back 
to the way of life represented by the martyr.161   
 This raises an important point for comprehending the soteriological self.  
Hope, justice, and resolution are located in the present; they are lived.  Although a 
future state of glory may be postulated and embraced as a component of the 
individual’s salvation experience, it serves less as a motivation and more as the 
appropriate consequence or recompense for a life lived purposefully and prudently, 
not simply endured.  In other terms, it was not enough for Irenaeus to profess that 
Lyon’s persecuted Christians were going to be rewarded in heaven or for Joseph 
Smith to promise the same to his followers as their possessions were surrendered to 
the arson’s flame.  Persecution illuminated life and demanded meaning from present 
behaviour – namely, obedience.  A death was labelled martyrdom only by virtue of 
the righteous loyalty exhibited by the martyr prior to this culminating event.162  His or 
her willingness to follow the precepts of the community and its God cloaked the 
persecution in sacred significance.  As Perkins notes, there was a ready-made place 
for suffering in a ‘web of signification’.163  Soteriological schemas are similar ‘webs’, 
lending supernatural meaning and existential amelioration to the lives and choices of 
the group and its members, irreversibly dissolving any partition between the 
supernatural and the believer’s Lebenswelt so that spiritual activity is not perceived to 
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be penetrating ‘paramount reality’ but is reality.  The soteriological self as an active 
role within the schema not only anticipates a possible symbolic death at the hands of 
opponents but also prefigures the obedience symbolised.  By appropriating and 
applying the freedom of will, an immutable aspect of humanity, the self affects its 
own change.  Following the commandments and ordinances, choosing the right, 
staying the course, these are hallmarks of a self working out its own salvation as well 
as the system by which it may do so. 
 
God, Humanity, Resolution, and Adaptation 
 In Irenaeus’ Economy, theology mixes with these elements of soteriology and 
anthropology; the three components are inseparable, creating a synergy necessary for 
the effective refutation of the Gnostics.  In discussing such topics, he moves 
effortlessly from a Biblically-based creation account to Christological discourse and 
still further to an anthropological argument.  Humanity was created in the image and 
likeness of God.  In Adam, both of these qualities can be identified, though Adam was 
not perfect in any divine sense as a result of his having been created.  Perfection, as 
Irenaeus sees it, is only for the Uncreated.  Instead, Adam contained the perfection 
reserved for the created; namely, he possessed the ability to progress toward ultimate 
incorruptibility.  The Garden was prepared as a safe haven for the growth that was 
inherent in the human experience.164   
 This soteriological plan, nearly paralleled in the evolving writings and 
trumpeted discourses of Joseph Smith centuries later, was more than an intellectual 
construct.  Irenaeus and Smith both faced challenges and heresies beyond the 
philosophical arguments of their religious opponents.  They encountered social 
marginalisation and physical persecution that threatened to break social bonds and, 
accordingly, necessitated a more pronounced vision for the community.  Bowman 
eloquently addresses early Mormonism’s response: ‘The Mormons made of 
themselves a people...and [Smith’s] people became the society of which Joseph had 
dreamed: a firm rock in an unreliable world, a faithful community that itself became, 
in a way, the salvation its followers sought.’165   
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 Bowman’s observation is perhaps more incisive than he realises, implying that 
one natural reaction to overt religious opposition is to relocate salvation from 
hypothetical hope to embodied actuality.  Indeed, deification and the identity it 
engenders are captured quite well in the notion of embodied salvation, the 
soteriological self.  We also concur that such a notion may arise as a means of 
resolving heresy and restabilising community life.  As the previous pages have shown, 
anthropologist Mark Leone is correct to conclude that deification is common to many 
sects that originated ‘in circumstances that were flexible, changeable, and often 
fragile.’166  Leone also looks ahead to the concluding thoughts expounded in the 
following pages by noting that such belief systems (particularly that of the early 
LDS), themselves adapted to hostile experiences, tended to ensure future flexibility 
for the religious group: 
A belief system built along side [sic] these...facts was influenced by them and 
as a result enabled a population to adapt better...It is under such conditions that 
religions developed that were geared to change and 
changeableness...Whatever, the historical case, Mormonism became a very 
flexible faith, one which has revised its institutions and even some of its 
beliefs since its founding, as it has encountered circumstances requiring 
pragmatic action.167 
The pragmatism of which Leone speaks is important to note as our study turns to its 
closing thoughts.  The affinity exhibited between religious groups facing heresy and 
soteriological schemas entailing deification hinges on a form of pragmatism.  There 
may be little gained by speculating about the level of conscious awareness present in 
the formation of socially-stabilising worldviews, but there should be little hesitation in 
acknowledging the practicality of the heretical process in general, a system 
encompassing all aspects of social living (habitus, emotions, epistemology, etc.) and 
potentially capable of enhancing both dynamism and solidarity when they are needed 
most.  Therefore, whether opposed groups are cognisant of the reasons behind their 
own affinities or not, the dialectic between belief and experience is, in a sense, 
markedly pragmatic. 
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CONCLUSION 
SALVATION AND SUCCESS 
 
 A close comparative study of second-century Christians and early Mormons, 
the preceding pages explored the presence of an elective affinity between new 
religious movements that encounter social hostility/opposition and soteriologies 
involving deification.  The purpose of the study, after adapting and applying the term 
‘heresy’ to the tripartite conflict faced by such groups, has been to analyse and 
elucidate both the distinctive characteristics of the heresy as well as the types of social 
processes at work in each group’s efforts to resolve the conflict.  Along the way, the 
sociological insights of the sociology of knowledge and the identity theory of Hans 
Mol have never been far from mind.  Each strand of sociological theory contributes to 
our own understanding of the dialectic between experience and belief; the sociology 
of knowledge encapsulating the collective establishment of worldviews, and Mol 
pointing us to the motivations and propensities of individual believers in their 
struggles to maintain a firm grip on meaning in the face of confounding experiences.  
As was shown in the previous chapter, our two illustrative groups and their respective 
members successfully expressed and expounded identity-conferring soteriological 
schemas that integrated the heretical experiences discussed in Chapter Three.  Ably 
exemplifying Mol’s sacralisation process, these soteriological schemas entail 
historical narrative, ritual, commitment, and future reward.  Consequently, heresy is 
disarmed and transformed into a positive influence, the impetus to assemble a system 
capable of providing for the unique needs of the community. 
 Instead of soteriological schemas, our study could have referred to such 
interpretive frameworks resulting from the interface of doctrinal development and 
agonistic experience in terms of ‘cultures’ of salvation or ‘webs of signification’, but 
we have chosen to remain conversant with the nomenclature of theology.1  On the one 
hand, this is a sort of acquiescence to consistency (after all, we have chosen to use 
‘heresy’ as an ideal type of religious opposition).  On the other hand, there is an 
implied argument that social-science and theology have much to offer one another, an 
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argument that belief is not painlessly divorced from experience.  To adopt an 
anthropological term such as ‘culture’, would have been to risk losing the crucial 
emphasis placed on an individual’s progression by the soteriologies investigated as 
well as the centrality of the human body for those systems that result from 
experiences of physical persecution and death.  Simply put, ‘culture’, even in Geertz’s 
understanding of a ‘pattern’ of symbolic meanings, is inclined to survey the object 
from too great a distance, sacrificing an awareness of conceptual contours in favour of 
a broad picture.2  In our case, this might have led one to analyse a multitude of 
cultural elements held together by a soteriological core for both second-century 
Christians and early Mormons.  Although arguably valid in its own right, such a 
daunting task would encounter numerous pitfalls – namely, ignoring the subtle 
similarities in the ways each party resolved specific forms of heresy whilst presenting 
a heavy-handed comparison engendered by the claim that each historical movement 
was an example of a culture dominated by notions of salvation.  We have, however, 
attempted to approach our investigation by remaining intentionally committed to the 
former, illuminating subtle similarities in the resolving soteriological systems of these 
two historical groups.  Just as Irenaeus and Joseph Smith emphasised salvation, so we 
have retained theological language in order to emphasise important social aspects of 
heresy and doctrinal development. 
 Accordingly, our preference for ‘heresy’ results from the helpful duality that 
the heresy versus orthodoxy debate within the theological arena offers for expressing 
the social tension between the destabilising effects of religious conflict and the 
corresponding attempts at resolution.  Though it does not receive pride of place, the 
term ‘orthodoxy’ capably represents the resolution episode of the heretical process 
explicated in the preceding chapters.  In this way, Walter Bauer’s thesis and the 
ongoing theological conversation concerning the development of heresy and 
orthodoxy both receive an unexpected adoption and appropriation; instead of debating 
the sequence of doctrinal formation, however, the present study demonstrated the 
comparable social formula whereby religious opposition (heresy) interacts with a 
group’s efforts to resolve conflict (orthodoxy).   
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God-making Heresy 
 Ultimately, setting up heresy as an ideal type of religious opposition allowed 
both a fresh analysis of some well-worn topics such as early Christian martyrdom and 
offered new insight into the social aspects of doctrinal development.  As an ideal type, 
in Weber’s original sense, heresy of the sort we have investigated is never perfectly 
found in the world of observable and obtainable data.  At times, for instance, there 
may be no discernible delineation between social and personal forms of heresy whilst 
in other historical episodes it may be argued that religious opposition is always 
societal or always doctrinal.  Indeed, these assertions largely depend on the approach 
and background of the observer, as he or she brings presuppositions and relatively 
unavoidable biases to bear on the topic.  Even so, second-century Christians and early 
Mormons constructively demonstrate the heretical process; as collectives, they 
encountered, recognised, and resolved threefold opposition.  What is more, their 
resolving soteriologies, entailing forms of deification, tied explanations of opposition 
to both group and individual identity.  As each group adopted a martyrdom mentality, 
opposition came to serve a function in the maturation and growth of the believer.  In 
the words of New Testament scholar David Horrell, ‘It is through a process riven with 
conflict and opposition...that the process of “becoming Christian” occurs.’3  For the 
second-century Christians, just as for the early Mormons, this potentially alarming 
reality was soothed by a soteriological schema in which each present hardship was 
interpreted as an opportunity to take another step on the path toward sanctity, a 
journey sanctioned by the past and fuelled by confidence in the future.   
 
Adaptability and Success 
 Perhaps unwittingly, each group also ensured a different sort of hopeful future 
through their effective, collective resolution of heresy.  By formulating their beliefs in 
conjunction with agonistic experiences, the resultant systems possessed a signal 
measure of adaptability.  On 8 July 1844, the New York Herald printed an article 
predicting the end of Mormonism following the death of its leader.4  Eleven days 
earlier, Joseph Smith was fatally shot whilst imprisoned in a small jail in Illinois.  The 
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New York journalist who penned the words above could not imagine the future that 
lay ahead for the Mormons.  The movement not only grew in size after making its 
pilgrimage to the far western territory of Utah, but continued to foster and propagate 
the beneficial identity engendered by their experiences during Smith’s leadership.  By 
1882, prominent Mormon leader and political strategist George Q. Cannon could say,  
The doctrine of ‘the survival of the fittest’, applies to us, and insures us a long, 
a prosperous, an uninterrupted and a glorious career.  We can live in spite of 
adverse legislation, in spite of commissioners, in spite of governors, in spite of 
acts of persecution; we can live and still flourish, and still grow and still 
increase; and we shall do it.5 
Even when one considers Cannon’s context, the Mormons facing federal legislation 
that would demand that church property be surrendered to the U.S. government 
because of the unlawful LDS practice of polygamy, and disregards his acerbic 
rhetoric, his observation remains an incisive commentary on the suitability of early 
Mormon identity for future prosperity.   
 This, of course, is one of the corollaries and latent arguments of our study; 
arising out of challenging circumstances, soteriological schemas of the sort we have 
explored are necessarily well-suited to handling future heresy.  A significant 
contribution of Mol’s theory, as it serves as conceptual scaffolding throughout the 
present work, is its suggestion concerning the future prospects of religious groups 
who successfully strike a balance in the identity/adaptability dialectic.  Mol believes 
that early ‘Christianity survived [the first four centuries] primarily because of the 
looseness of the [empire’s] social fabric and because it provided a fierce minority 
identity strengthened by both opposition and martyrdom.’6  Yet, Mol recognises that 
his dialectical theory exposes a broader pattern.  All religious movements must adapt 
to fluctuations in their environments whilst maintaining both individual and group 
identity.  Of religious groups in the twentieth century, Mol argues, 
The future therefore seems to lie with those religious commitments to order 
and identity that intricately and sensitively re-establish the social authority 
necessary for the safeguarding of pivotal social values (such as responsibility, 
charity, reliability, etc.) and yet involve sufficient individualism and personal 
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6
 Mol, Identity and the Sacred, 38. 
 
266 
 
motivation to keep the motor of human existence humming with a minimum 
of friction.7 
In the preceding pages, we have shown the soteriological schemas intimated by 
Irenaeus and Joseph Smith to be systems composed of such commitments, interpretive 
frameworks determinedly striving for a harmonious but adaptable equilibrium 
between self, group, and society.  As was mentioned in Chapter One, both Mol’s 
notions included above and our own postulations regarding the future success of those 
religious communities that articulate complex soteriologies in the face of heresy have 
much in common with Stark’s thesis that successful religious movements must 
maintain a ‘medium level of tension’ with their social surroundings.8  The contention 
is that there must be some controlled degree of flexibility as the new religious 
movement interacts with the greater world, often a world that appears hostile to that 
new community.  For some social scientists, such as Stark or Kanter, this propitious 
trait of flexibility relates to various inbuilt commitment apparatuses; group members 
must feel connected but not depleted. 
 
Elasticity: A Synthetic Concept 
 However, we have focused on the interplay between social heresy and belief, 
noting the beneficial role of soteriologies in providing for the social needs of the 
group.  Consequently, our view of the relationship between adaptability and future 
success comes much closer to Davies’ concept of a ‘pool of potential orientations’, an 
idea prompted by the biological idea of ‘gene-pool’.  Davies describes this 
phenomenon as ‘a ready supply of differently emphasised doctrines which can be 
selectively utilised as occasion demands’ but, in a later publication, he expounds the 
idea further: 
It is advantageous for a religious tradition to possess, within its canonical 
sources, as wide a variety of potential orientations to the world as is consonant 
with the maintenance of an authentic distinctiveness.  There is a period during 
the early growth of a religious movement when these orientations are brought 
together to form the essential features of the faith.9 
                                               
7
 Ibid., 266. 
 
8
 Stark, 144. 
 
9
 Davies, Meaning and Salvation, 135; The Mormon Culture of Salvation, 248. 
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Such assertions rightly emphasise the multiform adaptability of religious belief, thus 
harmonising with the focus of the preceding pages.  Davies’ concept, however, stops 
short of describing that early phase during which ‘orientations are brought together’ in 
the construction of a symbolic core.  If the pool of potential orientations refers to the 
dormant cells waiting to become branches of a tree as time passes and the supply of 
sunlight changes due to the expanses of competing vegetation, our own intention has 
been to turn the analytical gaze toward the health of the trunk itself.  Soteriological 
schemas, as Weltanschauungen, derive from an admixture of inherited values, 
symbols, and novel experiences.  In some sense, then, the soteriological framework 
that results from agonistic experience serves the future of the group by providing 
potential orientations.  Born out of exigent and menacing circumstances, and intended 
to resolve them, the schema is intrinsically elastic and primed for the uncertainties of 
the future; potential orientations are not only available but are almost guaranteed a 
degree of salvific significance. 
 Instead of Stark’s ‘medium level of tension’ or Davies’ slightly cumbersome 
‘pool of potential orientations’, it may be helpful to conceptualise the flexibility of a 
religious community with regards to safely maintaining identity even whilst adapting 
to the vicissitudes of social life in terms of religious elasticity.  By elasticity, we have 
in mind a collective aptitude much like that expressed by Erikson: ‘When one 
describes any system as boundary maintaining, one is saying that it controls the 
fluctuation of its constituent parts so that the whole retains a limited range of activity, 
a given pattern of constancy and stability, within the larger environment. (emphasis 
added)’10  This accords with Bruce’s claim that belief systems will not survive in the 
absence of institutional control mechanisms.11  Often, such control mechanisms are 
endemic to the systems rising from the ashes of heretical experience.  Religious 
elasticity, in fact, might be defined in such a manner, as the phenomenon in which 
religious groups elaborate soteriological schemas with intrinsic guarantors of 
adaptability and order.  The difference between Bruce’s view and our own may be 
immediately apparent, however.  In the case of both second-century Christians and 
early Mormons, the soteriological schemas they put forward entailed institutional 
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 Bruce, 167. 
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control (e.g., the rule of faith and the necessity of temple ordinances) in addition to 
inherently flexible factors. 
 Thus, we diverge from other social-scientific understandings, such as that of 
Coser who refers to ‘elastic’ organisations as inclusive in contradistinction to ‘rigid’ 
exclusive groups or O’Dea’s similar delineation between two opposed strands of 
Catholicism, the ‘rigidity of overinstitutionalisation’ versus the ‘positive adaptive 
developments’.12  This dichotomy between rigid and elastic is too simple.  In fact, 
Coser notes that groups often respond differently to internal dissension than they do to 
external conflict, but he fails to recognise that the ability to apply different measures 
to different forms of opposition suggests some degree of flexibility even on the part of 
so-called ‘rigid’ organisations.  Instead, one might propose a notion of elasticity much 
more in line with D. Michael Lindsay’s term ‘elastic orthodoxy’.  In his study of 
evangelical Christians in America, Lindsay coins ‘elastic orthodoxy’ in order to 
explicate the curious tension between dogmatic conformity and culturally-beneficial 
associations with aberrant organisations exhibited by this Christian cohort: 
Evangelicals embody what I call ‘elastic orthodoxy’.  For a movement to 
succeed, you have to have some measure of unity; that, for evangelicals, is a 
core set of shared beliefs that are religious.  Most evangelicals believe the 
same things about God, the Bible, heaven and hell, and who gets there.  That 
provides a sense of cohesion for the movement.  The other thing, though, that 
makes evangelicals unique is that they have an elasticity to this orthodoxy so 
that they can build bridges in very interesting and creative ways, so they have 
been able to build alliances with a whole range of different religious groups 
and with secular groups as well.13 
Here, elasticity benefits the survival of the religious community by abetting its 
engagement with outside influences; the parameters of acceptable theological belief 
are stretched or suspended so that unexpected social affiliations become possible 
without the need to discard ‘truth’.   
 Sociologist Mathew Guest echoes Lindsay and translates the latter’s 
observation into language that even more suitably supports the concept of elasticity as 
a fitting description of social flexibility among religious movements: ‘Moreover, 
processes of ‘cognitive bargaining’, as believers negotiate their relationship with their 
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 Coser, 99, 104; O’Dea, ‘Catholic Sectarianism,’ 53.  On page 104, Coser also uses the term 
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 D. Michael Lindsay, Faith in the Halls of Power: How Evangelicals Joined the American Elite (New 
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cultural environment, may best be theorised as patterns of elasticity, rather than a 
simple spectrum ranging from resistance to capitulation. (emphasis added)’14  In a 
sense, the heretical process as it was outlined in Chapter Two is an instance of 
religious adherents struggling to ‘negotiate their relationship with their cultural 
environment’, and the general aptitude for integrating social conflict exemplified by 
the articulation of complex soteriologies as well as the future adaptability made 
possible by the comprehensive nature of those meaning systems seems to expose 
collective behavioural patterns that are not sufficiently captured by terms such as 
‘capitulation’, ‘accommodation’, ‘rigidity’, or ‘resistance’.  Of course, this is also 
Taysom’s argument, mentioned in Chapter Two, concerning Mormonism’s recurring 
talent for pairing partial accommodation with an immediate reconstitution of social 
boundaries.15  An apt example within early Mormonism is the elasticity exhibited in 
the group’s understanding of mission, an identity-conferring purpose highlighted in 
the previous chapter due to the light it sheds on the evolution of meaning in the course 
of experiencing social heresy.  As Bushman notes, the early LDS notion of an 
American Zion was ‘an elastic concept that encompassed any place where the Saints 
lived under divine law.’16  If one recalls the need for social support, or plausibility, in 
the maintenance of worldviews, then Bushman’s words imply that some framework of 
belief supplied sufficient conceptual space for the stretching of Zion; by some means, 
Zion remained a mobilising religious idea even after unforeseen circumstances 
necessitated its redefinition.  This retention of identity and plausibility in the midst of 
straining experiences without either shrinking toward rigidity or stretching to a 
breaking-point is what we mean by religious elasticity. 
 It should be noted that elasticity is not a perfect description of the social 
process with which we are concerned.  In fact, it could be argued that ‘plasticity’ 
comes closer to capturing the lasting impact of opposition on religious groups.  
Plasticity, however, does not encapsulate other factors, such as the presence of a 
permanently injurious threshold or the way in which soteriology can offer a sort of 
equilibrium, not by readying the collective for the next heretical jolt but by explaining 
the existence of opposition in the first place.  Both terms (elasticity and plasticity) 
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borrow from principles of physics, and both entail the deformation of an object as the 
result of external forces.  With plasticity, the deformation is permanent, and, in a 
sense, the consequence of heresy on a nascent religious movement is permanent, at 
least for those cases in which the group survives the blow to their stability by 
articulating an altered understanding of salvation.  Yet our preference for elasticity 
over plasticity derives from the overwhelming ability of such groups to achieve 
resolution at all.  Their beliefs change in some way, thus they may be permanently 
affected; but the complex soteriological schema is itself a way to restore balance, both 
in the face of present heresy and in anticipation of future opposition.  Religious 
elasticity, as an analytical tool, acknowledges that agonistic forces can stretch a 
meaning system too far whilst also highlighting the nearly incessant presence of 
tension.  In a manner of speaking, plasticity envisions a group whose encounters with 
resistance left perceptible scars; healed and surviving, the community remains just as 
malleable as ever; this is no dubious analogue.  Yet, elasticity offers an alternative; 
elastic religious communities successfully confer identity and meaning on their 
members by maintaining tension, allowing exogenous influences to elongate the 
structure of the group when necessary and contract when necessary.  Plasticity calls to 
mind images of meteors crashing into planets; craters lastingly marking those 
historical encounters.  Elasticity conjures the image of a taut rubber band virtually 
able to contract or to expand at any moment as external (and internal) forces make 
their impact, a phenomenon we have seen in conflict situations. 
 
A Note on Persecution and Deification 
 Among the early Christians, the exigencies of such conflict and persecution 
that formed an affinity with deifying elements of salvation eventually ceased their 
assault.  Ideas resembling those proposed by Irenaeus remained during the third 
century, undoubtedly tied to the widespread persecutions authorised by Decian and, 
later, Diocletian.17  However, with the edict of Milan in 313, sanctioned persecutions 
stopped, and the next few decades witnessed the instalment of Christianity as an 
authoritarian power in the empire.  As Bowersock notes, the notion of Christian 
martyrdom as a distinct identity required Roman polytheism in order to flourish in the 
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years prior to Constantine.18  Once the empire turned amenable to Christianity, there 
was a corresponding turn in the west from the high theological anthropology 
championed by Irenaeus and others wherein the present was esteemed as a divinely-
reinstated chance for progress to alternative, low anthropologies emphasising the 
corrupt nature of humanity.  In a sense, antagonism seems to have curved inward and 
led to forms of asceticism.   
 For Mormonism, too, a similar transition is apparent in the way that the 
movement embraced what White calls Mormon ‘Neo-Orthodoxy’ during and after the 
world wars of the early twentieth century.  According to White, shortly after 
Mormonism disavowed polygamy and Utah was granted statehood, the LDS 
community began to view God as sovereign and humanity as depraved and in need of 
grace.19  This development, however, was in many ways a return to the Mormon 
theology of 1830 to 1835 as opposed to the more innovative doctrines of Smith’s later 
years.  As seems to be the case with early Christianity, notions of individual progress 
and deification coincided with acute persecution and social marginalisation during the 
years of 1835 to 1844.  When these agonistic currents subsided, and full assimilation 
became a reality, so the tendency to place salvation in the present and to focus on the 
potential for personal progress subsided.  In each of these historical examples, it 
would be remiss not to acknowledge the persistence of theological concepts centred 
on the spiritual development of individual believers.  We can state quite confidently 
that the Christian Church has firmly held to such notions even into the twenty-first 
century.  Whether it is described in terms of justification, sanctification, Christian 
perfectionism, or the more general expression of spiritual maturity, there has always 
existed some theological contention that God bestows providential and transformative 
gifts on his chosen people.  Here, we simply note the apparent change in 
anthropological focus that accompanied the waning of exogenous opposition against 
our two illustrative parties. 
 
Further Study 
 In a study as broad and multifaceted in scope as the present work, there are 
almost innumerable possibilities for further research.  Our analysis was largely built 
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on the two pillars of heresy as an ideal type of religious opposition, and an exploration 
of the elective affinity between new religious movements facing opposition and their 
espousal of deifying soteriologies.  Using these two topics as our guide, it is possible 
to underline a number of research areas that would benefit from additional scrutiny.  
With regards to heresy as an analytical tool, our own attempt to provide a 
sociologically-informed definition was limited by the related need to sketch the 
contours of both the theological discussion of heresy and orthodoxy as well as 
existing sociological uses of those terms.  In order to demonstrate more convincingly 
the salience of ‘heresy’ for religious studies, thus removed from the theological arena, 
one needs to highlight the aspects of studies such as our own that directly resulted 
from the heresy paradigm and compare such findings to similar studies for which the 
preferred method was sociology of deviance, conflict theories, deprivation theories, 
etc.  In other words, because one of our chief aims was to propose heresy as a helpful 
tool for those outside of theology, future work is needed to clarify its value and/or 
illuminate the inherent shortcomings of alternative, but imprecise, terms such as 
opposition.  In effect, we turned the traditional notion of heresy as deviation from 
within - a perspective that naturally benefits from methods focused on the heretics 
themselves - on its head, preferring to study heresy as an external force and, therefore, 
directing the attention on the behaviours and responses of the group that faced the 
opposition.  In doing so, we opened the door to studies of solidarity-strengthening 
practices and issues of doctrinal development within religious groups facing intense 
social pressures.  For our analysis of early Christians and early Mormons, then, 
defining heresy in this way allowed us primarily to focus, not on the motives of the 
heretic, but on the resolution of the heresy. 
 Quite naturally, therefore, the present study invites future research on other 
historical examples of persecuted religious movements.  Although we have 
continuously affirmed that deification is far from an inevitable postulation in the face 
of opposition, it would be both interesting and enlightening to explore the measures 
employed by other groups in their struggles to safeguard identity against deleterious 
external forces.  Our own approach of juxtaposing two disparate groups did, in the 
end, lend a great deal of insight into the similarities of the social pressures faced by 
each; nevertheless, future studies might prefer to limit the focus to one community 
(perhaps, even utilising ethnographic methods) so that adequate space is available for 
a full explication of beliefs as well as multiple examples of doctrinal developments 
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during the period of acute opposition.  Such an approach would also create 
opportunities for collaborative work, bringing theologians and social scientists 
together.   
 In fact, as the preceding pages suggest, the now nearly-forgotten theoretical 
insights of Hans Mol remain quite apposite for such interdisciplinary endeavours, 
serving as a well-conceived middle ground between theories focused on social 
structure and theories emphasising individual agency as well as avoiding the blatant 
determinism which often deters theologians.  Our own exploration of religious 
opposition and its interface with soteriology certainly benefitted from Mol’s 
theoretical framework; perhaps his ideas deserve a reassessment for the twenty-first 
century as discussions of identity now pervade religious studies and multidisciplinary 
research is lauded as the way forward for humanities and social sciences.  Mol 
intentionally established a theory of identity meant to capture broad data and explain 
both individual and group actions, a theory as amenable to the religious believers 
themselves as it was workable for sociologists.  Although his work has shortcomings, 
it does spotlight religious identity from a unique angle, illuminating the relationship 
between the network of commitment, objectivity, ritual, and myth on the one hand, 
and the desire for social stability on the other.  In our view, and in our study, this 
theoretical scaffolding admirably highlights the manner by which religious 
movements seek to provide themselves with meaning, purpose, and stability, 
safeguarding and ensuring identity in the face of what they perceive as threats to all 
three. 
 The present study successfully engages the histories and teachings of two such 
movements during the early stages of doctrinal evolution, prior to the canonisation of 
belief.  However, the historical record limits the number of such cases available for 
scholarly inquiry.  That being so, future analysis could either direct attention to later, 
historical stages in the groups’ growth or could focus on contemporary movements.  
Possibilities abound for the latter; the scholar’s gaze could just as fruitfully fall on 
anything from persecuted Christians concentrated in specific geographical regions 
(China, perhaps) to tensions between Islamic sects to the stigmatisation of otherwise 
benign ‘alternative religions’ (e.g., Wiccans or Neo-Pagans) of the twenty-first 
century.  Exploring social heresy and its relationship to beliefs among contemporary 
religious communities would also allow the application of qualitative and 
ethnographic methods, potentially balancing the nearly unavoidable, though 
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regrettable, sense of detachment projected by abstract sociologically-based studies.  
With that in mind, and recognising the particular relevance of such an 
acknowledgement for our study of the way suffering became the source of identity 
and salvation for early Christians and early Mormons, we end with John Bowker’s 
poignant thought: 
There is nothing theoretical or abstract about it.  To talk of suffering is to talk 
not of an academic problem but of the sheer bloody agonies of existence, of 
which all men are aware and most have direct experience.  All religions take 
account of this; some, indeed, make it the basis of all they have to say.  
Whatever theoretical constructions may be built, the foundations are laid in the 
apparent realities of what it is like to be alive.20 
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